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

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JEWISH STUDIES

IN MEMORY OF

ISRAEL ABRAHAMS

BY

THE FACULTY AND VISITING TEACHERS

OF

THE JEWISH INSTITUTE OF RELIGION

PUBLISHED UNDER THE AUSPICES OF

THE ALEXANDER KOHUT
MEMORIAL FOUNDATION

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THE ALEXANDER KOHUT MEMORIAL FOUNDATIONS

In memory of Dr. Alexander Kohut, alike distinguished as Rabbi, Preacher and Orientalist (April 22, 1842–May 25, 1894) and widely known through his encyclopedic Talmudic Dictionary, the *Aruch Completum* (Vienna 1878–New York 1892; new edition Wilna 1910–1912, incomplete; photographic reprint of original edition, Vienna 1926); his family, through the initiative of his eldest son, George Alexander Kohut, has established a series of Literary Foundations, bearing his name. The primary object of these foundations is to foster Jewish learning and to make it possible for scholars engaged in original research to publish the results of their investigations.

The first of these Foundations was established in 1915, at Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut, and is designated *The Alexander Kohut Memorial Publication Fund.* Under its auspices the Yale University Press has since 1915 issued some notable works, comprising Texts and Researches, edited by members of the Faculty in the Semitic Department, and other volumes are to follow at regular intervals.

There is also an *Alexander Kohut Research Fellowship in Semitics,* annually awarded at Yale, made possible by a special gift in 1919, for the purpose of stimulating

post-graduate study. The Kohut Library, known as the *Alexander Kohut Memorial Collection*, is likewise deposited at Yale.

In 1922 and 1923 similar *Kohut Foundations* were established, successively in Vienna, Berlin, Budapest and New York, three of them in affiliation with Jewish institutions of learning, administered by a group of representative scholars, who serve as an Advisory Executive Committee in the selection of the literary material to be published.

There have appeared under the auspices of the *Kohut Foundation* a number of important works by distinguished scholars and among the forthcoming publications are included several significant contributions to Jewish literature, especially dealing with grammar, lexicography, folklore, and the history of religion.

EDITOR'S PREFACE

It is both fit and proper that this volume of learned papers be inscribed to the memory of that distinguished Bookman, Israel Abrahams (1859–1925), to whose creative scholarship, industry and rare catholicity of mind we owe not only an imposing array of published works, but a host of young disciples, who cherish and revere his name.

Canon Box, in *The Legacy of Israel* (Oxford, 1927), one of the most noteworthy books of our generation, originally planned by Israel Abrahams (see *Preface*), maintains that he was "admittedly the greatest Jewish scholar that England has produced. He united in himself the widest humane culture with scientific method and caution, and he was able to bring these faculties to bear on an immense and detailed knowledge of Hebrew and Rabbinic literature and history..." (pp. 374–375). Those of us who have read the glowing tributes to his memory by some of the world's leading Jewish and Christian scholars, immediately following his death, will recall that he was unanimously described as the most versatile and learned Anglo-Jewish bookman of his time.

He was equally eminent in all humanistic endeavor and in Jewish leadership. A pioneer in various enterprises, he was one of the pillars of the Liberal Synagogue Movement in England and a co-founder of the *Jewish Institute of*

Religion, to which he lent the prestige of his engaging and powerful personality. He not only gave it his unqualified endorsement, but came, with no little discomfort to himself, for two successive years (1924 and 1925) to America, in order to help plan its Course of Study and to teach the young candidates for the ministry with as much zeal and fervor as he taught at Jews' College in London and at Cambridge University. He served the *Institute* loyally and devotedly as counselor, instructor and unequivocal friend, and it honored him as well as itself when it conferred upon him the degree of *Doctor of Hebrew Literature*, at its First Commencement in 1925. Two of his most distinctive and spiritually satisfying publications, *Permanent Values in Judaism* and *The Glory of God*, were the outcome of his Lecture Courses at the *Institute*.

The custom of publishing memorial volumes in honor of recently-deceased, distinguished scholars is a gracious and tender gesture. In this instance, it is also the expression of the love and gratitude which all of us bear—from the President to the youngest student—to that noble and sweet-natured gentleman and sage, who has so effectively helped our infant Institution of Learning over its most critical years and has vitalised it by his teaching. In remembrance of that consecrated service, entailing no small sacrifice, and in recognition of his really notable contributions to humanistic letters, the present members of the Faculty, and others, officially affiliated with the *Jewish Institute of Religion*, inscribe this volume to his memory.

It is to be regretted that a biographical sketch of Israel Abrahams, especially prepared for this collection of essays by Mr. Herbert Loewe of Oxford, has had to be detached

and published separately. To compensate us for its withdrawal, we have some fine *Appreciations* by several eminent leaders of thought, whose appraisal of his life and work is a testimony of the esteem in which he is held by his own contemporaries.

Although Mr. DUDLEY WRIGHT's *Bibliography* may be regarded as scarcely adequate, from the point of view of technical accuracy, it is included in the hope that it may serve as useful material to the future compiler of a definitive list of the Writings of ISRAEL ABRAHAMS.

The artistically life-like Portrait which adorns the volume is reproduced from a painting in the possession of the Liberal Jewish Synagogue, London. It has been prefixed to one of his posthumous works and may also be seen in *The Legacy of Israel*, edited by EDWYN R. BEVAN and CHARLES SINGER, in the preparation of which ISRAEL ABRAHAMS had so important a part (facing page 374).

We are indebted to the widow of Professor HUGO GRESSMANN for the privilege of publishing his last *undelivered Address*, one of a series given in the Spring of 1927 at the *Jewish Institute of Religion*, under whose auspices he appeared before other American academic bodies. His premature death at the age of 50 is a great loss to Biblical research and Jewish literature alike. *The Jewish Institute Quarterly* for May, 1927, contains his own Keynote-Address upon the inauguration of the *Hilda Stich Stroock Lectures*, spoken March 3, 1927—a noteworthy utterance indeed—and the Tributes paid at the Memorial Service, held in the Union Theological Seminary, on April 11, 1927. Professor GRESSMANN's *Stroock Lectures* are to appear as one of the Publications of the *Institute*.

The Editor disclaims all responsibility for typographical errors and other textual inaccuracies. Proofs of each article were read at least once by the authors, as well as by Professor Samuel Krauss and Professor McCaul-Smyth, both in Vienna, for whose painstaking care we are deeply indebted. To Dr. Emil Damask, our accredited representative in Vienna, and to the well-known firm of Holzhausen's Successors, printers of this work, we are likewise under obligation for manifold courtesies.

Our grateful thanks are due more especially to the Rev. Harry S. Lewis, a member of the Publication Committee, for invaluable assistance in translating some of the contributions from German and Hebrew and in preparing the entire material, with the kind clerical aid of Miss Mary Nover, for the press.

New York, July 25, 1927.

George Alexander Kohut

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
The Alexander Kohut Memorial Foundations	III
Editor's Preface	V
Stephen S. Wise, Foreword	XI
Dudley Wright, Select Bibliography of the Works of Israel Abrahams	XIX
Maurice H. Harris, Israel Abrahams and the Reform Jewish Movement in England	XLVIII
F. J. Foakes Jackson, Israel Abrahams at Cambridge	LIV
Nathan Krass, Israel Abrahams, Master of Homily	LX
Claude G. Montefiore, Israel Abrahams and Liberal Judaism	LXII
Dora Askowith, Prolegomena—"Legal Fictions or Evasions of the Law"	1
Salo Baron, Azariah de Rossi's Attitude to Life (Weltanschauung)	12
A. W. Binder, *V'shomru*—a Century of Musical Interpretations	53
Joshua Bloch, Ο Σύρος and the Peshitta	66
Z. Diesendruck, Maimonides' Lehre von der Prophetie	74
I. Elbogen, Einige neuere Theorien über den Ursprung der Pharisäer und Sadduzäer	135
Richard Gottheil, Tit-Bits from the Genizah	149
Hugo Gressmann, Jewish Life in Ancient Rome	170
Julius Guttmann, Elia del Medigos Verhältnis zu Averroës in seinem *Bechinat ha-Dat*	192
R. Travers Herford, The Separation of Christianity from Judaism	209
George Alexander Kohut, Royal Hebraists	221
Kirsopp Lake, The Council of Jerusalem described in Acts xv	244
Reuben Levy, A Collection of Yemenite Piyyuṭim	266
Harry S. Lewis, The "Golden Mean" in Judaism	283
David G. Lyon, Text Variations in some Duplicate Inscriptions of Adad-Nirari, King of Assyria, ca. 1325 B.C.	296
Max L. Margolis, Specimen of a New Edition of the Greek Joshua	307
S. B. Maximon, In the Footsteps of the Rabbis	324
Claude G. Montefiore, Religion and Learning	342
George Foot Moore, Simeon the Righteous	348
Louis I. Newman, Joseph ben Isaac Kimchi as a Religious Controversialist	365
J. Obermann, The Death of Sisera	373
Felix Perles, Notes on some Midrashic Texts	381

Page

Cecil Roth, Leone da Modena and the Christian Hebraists of his Age 384

Chaim Tschernowitz, The Inheritance of illegitimate Children according to Jewish Law 402

Hermann Vogelstein, Einige Probleme der jüdischen Geschichte der Zeit des zweiten Tempels 416

Harry Austryn Wolfson, Solomon Pappenheim on Time and Space and his Relation to Locke and Kant 426

David Yellin, Forgotten Meanings of Hebrew Roots in the Bible . . . 441

Additional Notes 459

FOREWORD

STEPHEN S. WISE (NEW YORK)
President of the Jewish Institute of Religion

The relation of western Jewry to Jüdische Wissenschaft, which has virtually synchronised with the rise of Biblical science, remains to be appraised. For two generations, Jüdische Wissenschaft was almost exclusively made in Germany—that is to say, developed and flourished in the German-speaking lands of Europe. In the main, though not altogether, Jüdische Wissenschaft became a handmaiden of the Jewish Reform Movement, though, after the rise of the Breslau Seminary, it became the common possession and pursuit of Reform and Conservative Jewries in Germany, as illustrated by the names of Geiger and Graetz. Jewish learning fared rather differently in England. Jüdische Wissenschaft had not transplanted itself, any more than Biblische Wissenschaft had found real furtherance in England among Jews or Christians, in the first half of the 19th century.

Israel Abrahams, as much as any man who has lived, was incarnate of the spirit of Jüdische Wissenschaft in England. While he succeeded Schechter at Cambridge, as the latter had succeeded Schiller-Szinessy, he was in a very real sense Schechter's predecessor and did as much in a wissenschaftlich sense to make Schechter possible as Montefiore had done in a practical way. In an English-speaking land, however, this Jüdische Wissenschaft became

a new thing and the work of ABRAHAMS is as different from the work of Germans in the same field as English life is from German life. It was no little thing to have had a large part in transplanting from German to English-speaking lands this science, firstly, through his own learning and his own continuous contributions thereto, and, secondly, through his part in the founding and editing with MONTEFIORE of the *Jewish Quarterly Review* which is much more than a passing episode in the development of Jüdische Wissenschaft. Twenty volumes of the *Quarterly*, made possible by the joint labor of ABRAHAMS and MONTEFIORE, gave a home to Jewish learning in England.

But, perhaps, the most signal service of ABRAHAMS was rendered in yet another and the third of the ways aforementioned, namely in becoming Reader in Rabbinic at Cambridge University. There he became the intermediary between Christian and Jewish learning as well as between Christian and Jewish scholars. His personality, even more than his scholarship, made possible the finest appreciation of Jewish learning on the part of the learned in Cambridge. On the other hand, he brought into Jewish learning a new touch, a new and indefinable something, embodied most of all in the *Glory of God*, which it became the distinction of the Jewish Institute of Religion to publish immediately before his passing. His home, too, was the Jewish centre of Cambridge. Within it, the Don became the man, friendly and affectionate, never parading his learning before his juniors, but always inciting younger men to adventure with him upon learning's quest.

One wonders who but ABRAHAMS could have written the *Glory of God*? Perhaps none other than he could have done

just this piece of work. Over and above the fine quality of its learning and the haunting charm of its literary allusiveness, the uniqueness of *The Glory of God* in Anglo-Jewish literature lies in the fusion of learning which is passionless with mysticism which is passionate. Israel Abrahams herein proves even more abundantly than in any other of his works that learning need not be religionless, that the fervent scholar need not be an arid rationalist. I wonder whether one hundred pages have been written in the last century by a Jew in which there are at one and the same time such purity and beauty of style, such clarity and delicacy of religious perception, such richness and variety of learning.

As the then Acting President of the Jewish Institute of Religion, it remains for me to dwell upon an aspect of Abrahams' life as yet little known. Beginning in the years 1920 and 1921, when first the idea of establishing the Institute was mooted, Abrahams was consulted. While he lived, no important step was taken, and, in truth, few even minor appointments were made, until after consultation with him. He was characteristically unsparing of himself in giving judgment and counsel. The fundamental ideal of the Institute—a school of Jewish learning for the training of such as wished to prepare themselves for the ministry within Israel, which school should be free from what had come to be the little less than denominationalism or sectarianism of most of the Jewish seminaries founded in Europe and America in the nineteenth century—made a deep appeal to his own spirit.

Like Emil G. Hirsch, the honorary President of the Institute, he was equally impatient of intolerant reform and of bigoted orthodoxy. He was intolerant of such

orthodoxy and reform alike as are partisan and dogmatic rather than catholic and religious. The basic ideal of the Institute—to grant entire freedom to teachers and students alike—touched his imagination, and won his loyal and unwavering support.

It is telling an open secret to put on record that two men were successively asked by the writer to assume the presidency of the Institute. Neither of them could accept, —and, alas, that each of them was justified in his fear of physical inability to cope with the exacting burdens of leadership of an institution in the making! These two men were Israel Abrahams and Emil G. Hirsch. Hirsch, who, though a liberal of the liberals, was deeply and unshakeably Jewish in all his convictions, and possessed of the scholar's understanding of and the student's reverence for Jewish learning! Again and again, my associates and I urged Dr. Abrahams to become President of the Institute. He could not do that—I see it now. He could not leave behind him the great work he was doing at Cambridge, his work as teacher of classes and as leader of groups whom he more than any other man he kept firmly within the circle of Jewish life and loyalty. Moreover, at Cambridge, the man had become an institution. He was the Jewish Don of Cambridge though there were not a few other, more or less cryptic, Jewish teachers at the University.

It was only because I felt that he had given so much to Cambridge that I coveted for the Institute the unique combination of learning and personality which were his own, and, most of all, his veritable genius for moving young people to cherish the art of learning and to master the methods and the tools of the scholar. I dwell upon

this for an additional reason. A biographical notice, which appeared in the last Year Book of the American Jewish Publication Society, makes no mention of the circumstance that Dr. Abrahams' three visits to America were arranged as follows, the first as the Adolph Lewisohn Lecturer of the Free Synagogue and the Eastern Council of Reform Rabbis, and the second and third as visiting member of the Faculty of the Jewish Institute of Religion — his death coming upon the eve of what was to have been his third term as Lecturer and teacher, prior to the graduation of the first class of the Institute, the members of which he had taught in two previous years. No student of the Institute looked forward more eagerly, and even joyously, than did he to the first Commencement of the Institute. We did not permit him to return to England until after conferring upon him the first honorary degree granted by the Institute.

If he did not become a permanent member of the Institute staff, he "did the next best thing." In the first year of the Institute, he spent an entire semester with us, giving two richly satisfying courses to the student body, avid of the help that such men as he and Elbogen of Berlin and Perles of Königsberg and later Yellin and Guttmann brought from abroad. One of the two courses given during his first term at the Institute was subsequently published by the Institute Press, with the help of the Alexander Kohut Foundation, under the title, "Permanent Values in Judaism." In the third year of the Institute, the second semester of 1924–1925, he came to the Institute for the second time, a somewhat broken man, but with his passion to teach young people unlessened. Again he gave a number of

notable courses, including "Jewish Worthies of the Nineteenth Century—Heine, Lassalle, Disraeli and Herzl," and—the "Glory of God."

It seems to be a temptation among men to refer to some teachers and scholars as popularisers,—and not without something of contemptuousness. Little does the self-secluded and ofttimes arrogant student, whose spirit is never kindled by the passion of generosity, know the joy which ABRAHAMS claimed, the joy of sharing all he had with many, the joy not only of bringing things remote and recondite within the reach of many, but stimulating within large numbers that interest in Jewish learning, in the history and the utterances of the Jewish spirit, which has moved not a few Jewish men and women in our time to seek after the key to the door of Jewish learning.

Alas, that it must be confessed that not all men are scholars, even among those whose calling is in essence of the scholarly type! Still sadder to confess that not all scholars are men, that too often scholarship is imagined by its possessors to be the sum of all virtues, and a substitute for all other qualities of the human spirit. ABRAHAMS was a scholar and a man. He was a man as well as a scholar. His humanness enriched his learning. He was so much a friend of man that it is not too much to declare touching him, that he was the most generous and unselfish of men toward the younger scholars of our time. Of how many men who walk in the fields of learning may it be said that there is no touch of meanness nor taint of envy in them? When he erred, it was ever on the side of over-appreciation, that is to say, of lenity of judgment. He stinted only when he was compelled to resort to dispraise

Who shall attempt in these brief paragraphs to measure the immensity of ABRAHAMS' service in the last forty years? Throughout two decades he was, as we have noted, an editor of the *Jewish Quarterly Review* in its happier, fruitfuller days. He was one of the founders of the Jewish Historical Society of England. Again, by the side of MONTEFIORE, he was a leader, wise and tolerant, of the Jewish Liberal Movement in England, which never meant for him detachment from the totality of Jewish life, but a finer and more understanding attachment to everything truly Jewish. Annotator was he of our Hebrew Liturgy, that priceless treasure of the Jewish soul at prayer. Prophet was he a generation ago of the coming of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. Teacher was he at Jews' College, at the University of Cambridge, at the Jewish Institute of Religion,—a great teacher because of his learning, because of his friendliness, because of his Jewishness, because of his undaunted faith in men, as they entered into the realm of learning, or prepared to step into the sanctuary of worship, which faith was the complement of the unfeigned and joyous piety of his spirit.

Not long before his passing someone said of him with fine penetration that ABRAHAMS' function throughout life was that of reconciler. He was a reconciler, a mediator, a peace-bringer. Thus he sought to bring the orthodox and liberal points of view into the accordance of mutual respect, in the despite of the violence of such as are orthodox or liberal rather than Jewish. Effectively he mediated between the viewpoints of the Jewish and the Christian churches, never feebly compromising, but ever graciously conciliatory.

Such was the spirit of the man, that no scholar within or without Jewish life better envisaged the essential unity, despite variety, of the Hellenic and Hebraic legacies. Reconciler was he because of his learning, which was vast and varied, because of his understanding which was real and penetrating, because of his sympathies which were as ardent as they were wise, because of his inexhaustible capacity for appreciation, because of the rich and catholic generosity of his spirit. Kiddush ha-Shem, the truest glorification of God, to use his own term in another connection, was the life of ABRAHAMS. And his last work, which has just appeared, bears the name, "Ethical Wills" or Zavvaoth. ISRAEL ABRAHAMS' life was such another *Zavvaah*, for he lived and learned and taught and died in obedience to that high and heavenly mandate—obedience to which crowns man's days with a gleam of the glory of God.

It remains to be added that outwardly this Memorial Volume was made possible by a grant from the *Alexander Kohut Foundation*, established in connection with the Institute Press, and inwardly by the spirit of one, whose devotion to Jewish learning, whose affection for ISRAEL ABRAHAMS, whose ever-generous helpfulness to the Institute, moved him, Dr. GEORGE ALEXANDER KOHUT, to undertake and carry through the laborious task, which events in the appearance of this Memorial Volume.

SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY OF THE WORKS OF ISRAEL ABRAHAMS

DUDLEY WRIGHT (LONDON)

I. Contributions to *Jewish Chronicle*.[1]
II. Contributions to *Jewish Guardian*.
III. Contributions to *Encyclopaedias* of *Religion* and *Ethics*; *Biblica* and *Britannica*.
IV. Contributions to *Transactions Jewish Historical Society*, *Jewish Quarterly Review*, &c.
V. Other Works.

I

JEWISH CHRONICLE

1885	March 13	(Reference to his appointment as one of the special preachers at Oxford Synagogue).
	March 27	Shakespeare and the Jews (letter).
	July 17	Hebrew as an Examination Subject (letter).
	August 21	Old French Glosses in Rashi (letter).
	August 28	Inspiration (letter).
1886	January 29	Hebrew Poetry.
	July 23 and 30	Jews and Socialism.
	July 30	A Grammatical Study (review).
	August 6	Jews and Socialism.

[1] [Israel Abrahams contributed almost weekly to the *Books and Bookmen* column, created by himself, from August 26, 1892 to April 13, 1917. Not all the items are here listed. The titles of the most important articles are marked with an asterisk.—*Editor*.]

1886	August 27	Jew's Ear (letter).
	December 17,	24 and 31. The Rod of Moses, &c.
1887	February 25	The Rod of Moses and its legendary story (Papers read before the Jews' College Literary Society 1886–7).
1888	February 24	Notes on Purim Parodies.
	March 6	Purim Prayers (letter).
	March 30	The Shape of Matsoth.
1889	May 10	Tobit's Dog (letter).
	September 27	A River Legend (Taschlich).
	December 27	Sir Walter Scott.
1890	April 11	The Open Door (Passover address delivered at the West Hampstead Synagogue).
1891	January 16	Services for Women (letter).
	February 6	Graetz's History of the Jews (letter).
	May 22	Love thy neighbour as thyself (sermon).
	June 5	Note on the Shape of Synagogues.
	September 11	Death of Prof. Graetz.
	October 9	The One Note.
	October 23	Simchath Torah and Purim.
	November 13	Jews and the Theatre.
1892	October 14	The Children of the Ghetto (review).
1893	June 23	The Love of God (sermon).
1894	January 5	Death of Dr. Jellinek.
	February 2	Resettlement Day (sermon).
	February 23	The King of Schnorrers (review).
	April 27	Leopold von Sacher-Masoch.
	June 8	Dr. Alexander Kohut.
1897	March 12	S. Baer, editor of the Hebrew Bible and Prayer-Book.
	March 19	Shushan Purim.

1897	April 16	Chad Gadya.
	April 23	Jewish Wayfaring Life in the Middle Ages.
	May 21	A Question of Recreation (letter).
	June 4	The Poetry of Pentecost.
	June 11	The Mission of Israel (letter).
		Major Mordecai's Noah (review).
	July 23	The Zionist Craze and the National Idea (letter).
	August 6	The Zionist Craze and the National Idea (letter).
	August 20	Judaism and Nationalism (letter).
	October 1	The Infant Bible Reader (review).
	October 8	The Procession of the Palms.
	December 10	The Heine Centenary.
	December 24	The Everlasting Light: A Chanucah Sermon.
1898	June 24	Mr. Zangwill's Paradox and another's (letter).
	July 8	A Truce to Paradoxes (letter).
	September 30	The Succah of the Bible.
1899	February 24	Queen Esther on the English Stage.
		Notes on the Megillah.
	March 10	Racine's Esther in Hebrew (letter).
	March 24	The Child and the Hagadah.
	April 21	Hebrew in a Strange Service (letter).
	May 12	The Decalogue in the Liturgy.
	June 9	Jewish Historical Society Visit to Lincoln.
	June 30	The Original Hebrew of Ecclesiasticus (letter).
	July 21	Wisdom of Ben Sira (review).
	September 1	Jewish Literature in 5659.

1899	October 6	Some Jewish Marriage Ceremonies.
	November 3	The Jewish Education Question (letter).
	November 10	Reb Shemuel as a Lawyer.
	December 22	Children of the Ghetto—review of theatrical presentation.
1900	January 5	Prof. Toy's edition of Proverbs.*
	January 12	Joachim Gaunse (*sic*). Paper read before the Jewish Historical Society (Appears in a fuller form in the Transactions of the J.H.S.).
	January 26	A supplementary vocabulary of Angelology: Besant and Palmer's "Palestine"; Professor Siegmund Fränkel on the language of the Hebrew Ben-Sira.*
	February 9	"Songs of Exile."*
		The Supposed Acrostic in Ben-Sira (letter).
	February 16	Literary Study of the Bible; The Jewish Plea Rolls.*
	March 2	Religion of Israel to the Exile.*
	March 9	Flügel's Thoughts on many Subjects.*
	March 16	The Oldest Purim Play: Hans Sachs' "Esther."
	April 27	The Sirach Doublets: "Rome" in the Scroll of Antiochus: Saadiah as a critic.*
	May 4	Santob de Carrion and his Proverbios Morales.*
	June 1	Letter on Supply of Jewish Teachers.
		Morris Rosenfeld, "Ghetto Poet" (note).

1900	June 1	Summary of paper on Pessimism and Optimism, read before the Jewish Study Society on May 27.
		Some Geniza palimpsests: Appendix to Taylor's "Sayings of the Jewish Fathers."*
	June 15	Ethics of Judaism; Assyrian Illustrations of Isaiah.*
	June 29	Prof. Schechter at University College; Gabriel de Granada before the Mexican Inquisition, 1642–5.*
	July 6	Summary of annual report of Jewish Historical Society.
	July 20	The short "Hand Commentary."*
	July 27	Prof. Cheyne on Judaism.*
	August 17	Letter on Zionism.
	August 31	Letter on Jewish Ideals: a reply to Mr. Zangwill.
	September 14	Correspondence with Zangwill on Zionism.
		Interview with David Yellin in the Jerusalem Library.
	September 21	Jewish Literature in 5660.*
	September 28	The Biblical MSS. of Brit. Mus.*
		Letter on Some Zionists and Father Ignatius.
	October 5	Myrtle.
	October 12	Biblical MSS. of Brit. Mus.*
	October 19	The Theology of Hastings' Dictionary of the Bible: the Urim and Thummim.*
		Summary of speech proposing vote of thanks at Maccabean dinner to David Yellin.

1900	November 2	"The Valiant Girl."*
	November 9	A Hebrew-Persian Dictionary of the 14th century.*
	December 7	Review of the play "Herod."
1901	February 1	Oxford Hebrew Lexicon.*
	February 15	Jastrow's Dictionary of the Talmud.*
	March 8	Letter on Jewish Emancipation.
	March 29	Letter on King's School Examination and J.R.E.B.
	April 5	The Helpfulness of the Seder: A Passover Thought.
	April 26	Letter (with S.R.Hirsch) on Teachers' Training Classes at Jews' College.
	May 31	The Jewish Encyclopaedia: A first impression.
	June 14	Letter on the teaching of Hebrew.
	June 28	Summary of speech at Toynbee Hall on teaching of Hebrew.
	July 12	Letter on Hebrew Instruction at the Westminster Jews' Free School.
	August 2	Letter on Zionism.
	August 23	The Oberammergau Play.*
	September 6	Ethanites and Jerahmeelites.*
	September 13	Jewish Literature in 5661.
	September 27	Willows of the Brook.
1902	January 17	Sermon on "The Mantle of Judaism" (Congregation of British Jews, Manchester, on January 11).
	March 7	Letter announcing dates of Jews' College examinations for teachers.
	March 14	Letter announcing arrangements for application for the grants to King's scholars.

1902	April 4	Recent criticism of Jews and Judaism.*
	April 25	First notice of Encyclopaedia Biblica.*
	July 4	James: "Varieties of Religious Experience."*
		Summary of preliminary address delivered on June 30 at Conference of Literary Societies.
	July 11	Review of the Jewish Encyclopaedia, Vol. II.
	August 8	Review of the Encyclopaedia Britannica, Vol. IV.
	August 15	Harper's edition of the "Song of Solomon."*
	September 12	Schechter's ed. of Midrash Haggadol.*
	September 19	Stade's Zeitschrift, &c.*
	September 26	H. Weinstock on Judaism and Christianity.*
	October 3	Jewish Literature in 5662.
	November 14	Primitive Semitic Religion to-day.*
	November 21	The Asherah, &c.*
	December 12	Hebrew in the "Alliance" Schools.*
	December 19	Preliminary note on Jewish Encyclopaedia, Vol. III.
	December 26	Review of Jewish Encyclopaedia, Vol. III.*
1903	January 2	Further notes on Jewish Encyclopaedia, Vol. III.*
	January 9	Open Letter to Chief Rabbi on the J.R.U. Prayer Book.
	January 16	Final notes on Jewish Encyclopaedia, Vol. III.*
	January 23	Dr. Cassel's Manual of Jewish History and Literature.*

1903	January 23	Letter in the Christian World and the J.R.U.
	February 13	Cairo Fragments of the Hebrew Ecclesiasticus, &c.*
	April 3	Georg Brandes on Poland.*
	April 17	Rosenau on Hebrew Influence on the English language.*
	May 8	The Palestine Library: Important Proposals of Mr. A. M. Luncz.
	May 15	The 70th Birthday of Dr. A. Berliner, Vol. IV of Jewish Encyclopaedia.
	May 29	The Emerson Centenary.
	June 12	The Berliner Festschrift.*
		Summary of speech at presentation to Dr. Friedlander.
	July 3	Address delivered to J.R.U. on June 27.
		Summary of speech at Conference of Union of Literary Societies.
	July 17	Anti-semitism, &c.*
	July 31	Pronounciation of Hebrew.*
	August 14	Ritualism and Rabbinism.*
		Summary of speech at Union of Literary Societies Summer Meeting and of course of four lectures on the Synagogue.
	August 21	Summary of lectures delivered at Ramsgate.
	September 18	Jewish Literature in 5663.
	September 25	"Judaism as Creed and Life."
	October 2	"Judaism as Creed and Life" (second notice).
	October 16	Jewish Encyclopaedia, Vol. V.*

1903	October 23	Further Notes.*
	November 6	The "Note Line" in Hebrew.*
	November 27	Summary of speech at Maccabean dinner.
		Summary of speech at inaugural meeting of Society of Jewish Statistics.
	December 4	Theodore Reinach's "Jewish Coins."
1904	January 8	Adon Olom: Sermon delivered at the J.R.U.
	February 26	Mystics, Ascetics and Saints of India.*
	March 4	Centenary of British and Foreign Bible Society.
	March 11	Jewish Encyclopaedia, Vol. VI.*
	March 18	Titles of the Psalms.*
	April 1	Mrs. Ph. Cowen's Haggada.*
		Art in the Seder Table (illustrated).
		Summary of paper on the Bodleian Bowl, delivered before the Jewish Historical Society.
	April 8	Cheyne's "Book of Psalms."*
	April 22	"First Steps in Hebrew Grammar."*
	April 29	"Higher Criticism," &c.*
	May 13	Pro-Semitism, &c.*
	May 27	Year Book of Central Conference of American Rabbis.*
	July 1	Paper on Literature and Life read to Union of Jewish Literary Societies annual conference.
	July 15	Progress of the Jewish Encyclopaedia, Vol. VII.
	July 29	Dr. Kohler on Judaism.*
	August 26	"Song of Songs."*

1904	August 26	Summary of paper on "Jewish Wayfaring Life in the Middle Ages" read at summer meeting of Union of Literary Societies at Ramsgate, August 19.
	September 23	Higher Criticism.*
	October 7	Mr. F. D. Mocatta's Library.
	November 4	Jewish Encyclopaedia, Vol. VIII.
	November 25	Summary of presidential address delivered at meeting of Jewish Historical Society, November 23.
		Summary of paper on "Criticism and the moral and scientific objections to the Bible" read at the Hampstead and St. John's Wood Literary Society, November 17.
	December 2	Summary of paper on "Early Jewish Romance" delivered to the Jews' College Literary Society, November 27.
1905	January 27	Library of Naftali-Herz Imber.*
	February 24	Ninth vol. Jewish Encyclopaedia.
	March 17	Prof. Margolis on a Jewish Creed.*
		Lost Purim Joys.
	April 21	A Unique Hagada Picture.
	May 19	Dr. S. A. Hirsch's Book of Essays.
	June 9	Catalogue of Brit. Mus. MSS.*
	June 16	Jewish Encyclopaedia, Vol. X.*
	June 30	The Quartercentenary of Christ's Coll. Cambridge.
	July 14	Titles of the Psalms: Babel and Bible.*
	July 21	Synoptic Gospels.*
	July 28	The Rashi Anniversary.

1905	September 8	Date of Ecclesiastes.*
	September 29	Jewish Literature in 5665.
		The "Patronesses" of Rosh Hashanah.
	October 6	Jewish Encyclopaedia, Vol. XI.*
	November 3	Sir Charles Wilson.
	December 8	Jews and Judaism in the 19th century.
		Jewish Temperance.*
	December 22	The Scroll of Antiochus.
	December 29	Seals and Signet Rings.
1906	January 5	Method of Hebrew Teaching.*
	January 19	Martha Wolfenstein's New Stories.
	February 2	Jewish Encyclopaedia, Vol. XI.*
	February 9	Freedom of speech in the pulpit.*
	February 16	Sabbath Observance.*
	March 16	Obituary of Canon Tristram.
	March 30	Professor Steinschneider's Literary Activities.
	May 4	Jehuda Ha-Levi's Khazari.*
	May 25	Zionism.*
	June 22	The Literary Outlook.
	July 6	Letter on Summer School at Cambridge.
	August 3	Letter on Jewish Religious Education Board.
	August 17	Summary of Lecture on Jewish Life in the 18th century, delivered at Cambridge Summer School.
	August 24	Letter on Summer School at Cambridge.
	August 30	Temple of Onias.*
	September 21	Jewish Literature in 5666.
	November 2	The Didache.*
	December 14	Higher Criticism.*
	December 21	Message of Judaism.*
1907	January 18	Halachoth.*

1907	February 8	Verse translation of the "Hymn of Glory" by I. A.*
	April 5	Obituary appreciation of Dr. Adolf Neubauer.
	April 26	Higher Criticism.*
	July 5	Esther, Dr. Cheyne, &c.*
	July 12	Study of the Bible.*
		Summary of speech at Jewish Historical Society.
	August 2	Esther.*
	August 23	The Songs of Degrees.*
	September 6	Jewish Literature in 5667.
	September 27	Ezekiel.*
	October 4	*Minhag* in general and *Minhag America* in particular.*
	November 29	The Religion and Worship of the Synagogue.*
1908	January 24	Summary of speech made at Maccabean dinner to Dr. Büchler.
	February 28	A University for Jerusalem.
	April 10	The Problem of the Lectionary.*
	June 5	Dr. A. Löwy.*
	June 12	Studies in Judaism, 2nd ser.*
	June 19	Mathematics at Cambridge.
	June 26	Judaism, Unitarianism and Theism.*
	July 3	Thoughts on the Literary Conference.
	July 10	The Milton Centenary: address delivered before the Jewish Religious Union.
	August 21	Obituary of Dr. Charles Taylor.
	August 28	Moral Education Congress: Judaism and Morality.
	November 6	Hastings' Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics.*

1908	November 13	The Bodleian Bowl.*
	December 4	Summary of speech on Jubilee of political emancipation at Jewish Historical Society dinner.
	December 11	Palestine old and new.*
	December 18	Samson Agonistes.
1909	February 19	Prof. Margolis' *Micah*.*
	March 12	Prayer Book Revision.*
	April 16	Swinburne.*
	May 14	N. S. Joseph on Immortality.*
	July 16	Aspects of Rabbinic Theology.*
	August 6	The Profit of Religion.*
	August 13	Oliver Wendell Holmes.*
	September 17	Jewish Literature in 5669.*
	November 12	Theocritus and Canticles.*
	November 19	Summary of address "What mean ye by this service?" Defence against Dr. Adler—delivered to J.R.U.
	December 31	Ency. of Religion and Ethics, Vol. II.*
1910	January 14	Macalister's appointment to Prof. at Dublin and present state of Palestinian research.*
	January 28	Review of Daiches' Balaam.*
	February 4	Driver's portrait.*
	February 11	Wolf's Spinoza.*
	April 1	Cowley's Samaritan Liturgy.*
	April 8	Lib. Jewish Bulletin; Ency. Brit. and de Vignes Florig.*
	April 15	Pal. Expl. Fund and Oxyr. Papyri.*
	April 22	Laudator Temporis acti.*
	April 29	Eisler's first appearance noted: Jewish Review, No. 1.*
	May 6	Bentwich's Philo; Skinner's Isaiah.*

1910	May 13	Spring in Hebrew poetry.*
	May 20	Liberal Judaism and Divorce.*
		Obituaries of Emil Kautzsch and Schürer.
	June 3	An Impression of Emil Hirsch.
	June 10	The Bible and Impressionism.*
	June 17	China and Judaism; E. J. Worman Memorial Volume.*
	June 24	Friedlander's Grace of God.*
	July 1	Friedlander's Grace of God, Genizah, Geiger, Chwolson.*
		Important controversy with Gerald Friedlander: G. F.'s letters: July 1 and 22: I. A.'s replies in Books and Bookmen: July 8 and 29.
	July 8	Obituary of Schiaparelli [revealing I. A.'s interest in science].
	July 15	Riblah.*
	July 22	Jane Addams: "The Spirit of Youth."*
	July 29	J.Q.R. new series.*
		Jewish Literary Societies; their function, should they be religious?
	August 5	Krauss' Antoninus and Rabbi.*
	August 12	Tenth Legion at Jerusalem.*
		Sermon at Jewish Religious Union on "The Power of the Idea."
	August 19	Faith and Reason.*
	August 26	Cowley and Heb. Script.*
	September 2	Jews and laughter.*
	September 9	Abraham Geiger Mem. Vol.; Daiches' Jews in Babylon.*
	September 23	German Lib. Jew. manifesto.*

1910	September 30	Jewish Literature in 5670 [his criticism of C. G. M.'s Syn. Gospels led to correspondence in following weeks].
	October 14	S. Mendelssohn's S. Africa; Jewish Bibliog.*
	October 21	Dayan Hyamson's Sermons.*
	October 28	On Palestine number of *Die Welt*.*
	November 18	Picciotto's Via Mystica: the Oxford Gesenius Grammar.*
	November 25	Malter's Shem Tob Palquera.*
		Evidence given before Divorce Commission.
	December 9	Schechter's Sectaries.*
		Appreciation of M. Friedlander.
	December 23	Aldis Wright's Job.*
	December 30	Peake's Jeremiah.*
1911	January 6	History of the Bible Society.*
		Sayce's theory of the Phoenician alphabet.
	January 13	Nordau's Interpretation of History.*
	January 27	Leon Gordon; Burney's Ophel.*
	February 10	Ency. of Religion and Ethics, Vol. III.*
	March 3	Tercentary of the A.V.
	March 10	Zangwill's Italian Fantasies.*
	April 21	Rabbi Krauskopf and Tolstoy.*
	April 28	Petrie's Israel and Egypt.*
	May 26	Obituary of Mr. Antoine of JewsCollege.
	June 23	Lukyn Williams' controversy on missionaries.
	June 30	Lukyn Williams' controversy.
	July 7	Zeena Ureena.*
	July 28	Dr. Adler and Anglo-Jewish History; Camb. Bible for Schools.*

1911	August 18	British-Israel.*
	August 25	J.Q.R. 2nd vol. new series; Hirschfeld's Yefeth on Nahum.*
	October 20	Note on the comments of Rev. G. Margoliouth on Schechter's Zadokite documents.
	December 1	Kohler's Treatise on Jewish Theology.*
1912	January 26	Crimes and Punishments in Ency. Relig.*
	June 28	R. Travers Herford's Pharisaism.*
	July 12	Semi-jubilee of Rev. M. Abrahams at Leeds.
	September 13	Tribute to Joseph Massel.*
		Jewish Literature in 5672.
		Tashlikh (in New Year Supplement).
	September 20	Mishna Translations.*
	November 1	Ecclesiasticus, Oesterley.*
1913	March 7	Liberal Judaism in America: Address by I.A.
	November 21	Lecture at Cambridge on the "Nine Worthies" to the Cambridge Antiquarian Society.
	November 28	Death of August Wuensche.*
		Rites of Leon Modena.
1914	January 2	Tribute to Prof. Bacher.
	January 30	Bacher.*
	April 3	Passover article on the Four Sons.
	April 17	Letter about Holmes' "Joshua."
	May 22	Jewish Historical Society: paper on purchase of Hebrew books by English Parliament in 1647.
	August 28	Outbreak of war.*
	September 25	War poetry.*

1914	November 29	Tribute to Jacob Barth.
1915	January 8	Letter on authorship of Yigdal.
	January 29	"Liberal Judaism" in Ency. R.E.*
	February 5	Letter about Yigdal thanking Rev. A. Mischon for suggestion to include "Loved of my soul" in the Annotated Prayer Book.
		Letter about Treitschke and Graetz.
	February 19	Memoir of Dr. Cheyne.
	March 26	A Passover Pizmon.
	April 30	Peretz's death.*
	May 7	Prof. A. Berliner's death.
	August 27	Society of Hebrew Studies.*
	October 22	Memorial address at Cambridge Hebrew Congregation to those who had fallen.
	November 5	Schechter's Seminary Addresses.*
	November 26	Obituary of Schechter.
	December 17	First publication of I. A.'s Atonement Hymn, since printed in "Studies in Pharisaism."*
1916	January 7	Frank Haes.*
	January 28	Proposal to found new Society of Hebrew Studies; explains aims and objects.
	February 11	Memoir of Joseph Jacobs.
	March 3	University Extension (Toynbee Hall) course in Jewish History. Opening Lecture: The Spanish period of Jewish History.
	May 26	Shakespeare Celebration.*
	July 21	Zangwill's War for the World.*
	July 28	Tribute to Ernest Polack.

1916	October 27	Bishop Bury's Russian Life.*
	November 17	Sabbath and Modern Life.
1917	April 27	Jewish Historical Society: "Hebrew Loyalty under the Georges."
	May 4	American Jewish Bible.
	May 25	Rabbi Mattuck's right to the Rabbinic title.
	July 27	Jewish Historical Society: Hebrew translation of Shakespeare.
	November 23	Jewish Historical Society: Jewish Historians of the Greek period.
	October 5	Sidney Mendelssohn: a tribute.
1918	April 5	Tribute to Arthur Davis at first Arthur Davis Memorial Lecture.
	April 19	[Editorial reference to article by I. A. in "Hibbert Journal."]
	June 21	League of British Jews: Future of Palestine; lecture at Wigmore Hall.
	October 25	Address at Hampstead Literary Society: Prophet and Priest.
1919	February 14	[Spirited defence of Mysticism in Judaism, called forth by the Chief Rabbi's and G. Friedlander's attack on Miss Montagu. Important as defining I. A.'s own attitude towards (a) Mysticism and (b) Liberal Judaism.]
	February 28	Lectures at Toynbee Hall (1) Mediaeval Translations of the Hebrew Bible and (2) The Jewess in the Apocrypha.
	March 7	Tribute to Mrs. Moses Zangwill.

1919	August 8	Conveys thanks of Vice-Chancellor and Senate at Cambridge for the part played by the Jewish Chronicle in collecting the funds for the Wright Scholarship.

This was his last contribution to the "Jewish Chronicle."

II

JEWISH GUARDIAN

1919	October 3	Judaism and Spiritism.
	November 21	George Eliot and Judaism.
	December 19	Dr. Judah (Julius) Theodor.
1920	January 2	Lost Poems of Yannai.
	February 6	Cambridge Ancient History.
	February 20	Rebekah Luria's Éternal Memorial.
	April 2	Mrs. Humphry Ward.
	September 10	Mandates and Personalities.
	September 17	The Pursuers of Peace: 1831.
1921	July 29	Ruth and Nausicaa.
	September 16	Apples and Honey.
	September 30	A Happy New Year.
	October 14	Gilding the Citron.
	October 21	Maurion and Watts.
		Rejoicing in the Law (letter).
	December 2	A Memory of the Rev. S. Singer (letter).
	December 23	A Latin Hymn for Chanuka.
	December 30	The Year's Literature.
1922	January 20	Think and Thank (letter).
	February 10	Daily Bible Readings.

1922	February 17	A Palestinian Portent.
	April 12	Passover Colour.
	May 12	Child versus Parent.
	July 21	Prophecy and Religion.
	July 28	Number 28 American Jewish Historical Society.
	September 15	The University of Jerusalem (letter).
	September 22	The University of Jerusalem (letter).
	October 20	Prof. Hermann L. Strack.
	November 10	Dr. G. Buchanan Gray.
	December 8	History of History.
	December 22	Eliezer ben Jehuda.
	December 29	Principal James Denney's Letters.
1923	February 16	First Letter from America.
	March 2	Second Letter from America.
	March 9	Third Letter from America.
	March 23	Fourth Letter from America.
	April 13	Fifth Letter from America.
	April 20	More Letters from America.
	April 27	Our American Letter.
	May 11	Letter from America.
	May 18	Letter from America.
	June 1	Leisure (reprinted from "The American Hebrew;" also republished in vol. II of *Judaean Addresses,* New York 1927).
	June 15	Heaven and Hell.
	September 7	Apples and Honey.
	September 14	'Ay 'tis thus.
	October 5	Silence and Worship.
	October 12	What America Thinks (letter).
	October 19	The Sabbath Angels.
	November 2	The late Dr. S. Hirsch.

1923 November 9 to February 22, 1924. Pens and Persons.
1924 February 22 The Talmud on Education.
February 29 Pens and Persons.
March 7 Pens and Persons.
Lady Magnus as Writer.
March 14 Esther: A Purim Duologue.
April 11 Jewish Institute of Religion (letter).
May 9 Academy and College (letter).
May 23 Vanishing Ghettos.
May 30 Curiosity.
August 8 Pens and Persons.
August 15 Pens and Persons.
September 12 Pens and Persons.
September 26 A New Year Colloquy.
Pens and Persons.
October 10 Tabernacles.
October 10 to November 21. Pens and Persons.
November 28 Jewish Students Federation (letter).
December 12 Pens and Persons.
December 19 Pens and Persons.
December 26 David Neumark.
1925 January 9 Pens and Persons.
January 30 Pens and Persons.
Hermetica (review).
February 6 Pens and Persons.
February 20 Pens and Persons.
March 6 Nina Salaman (address).
March 13 Pens and Persons.
March 27 Pens and Persons.
The Loeb Classics (letter).
April 3 to June 5. Pens and Persons.
June 12 Rebekah Kohut, "My Portion" (review).

1925	June 19 to July 31.	Pens and Persons.
	July 31	Zionising our Institutions (letters).
	August 7	Pens and Persons.
	August 14	Pens and Persons.
	August 28	Pens and Persons.
		The late Dean Ryle.
	September 4	Pens and Persons.
	September 18	Pens and Persons.
		Ibn Gabirol's New Year Hymns.
	September 25	Ibn Gabirol's Yom Kippur Hymns.
	October 2	Hosanna.
		Liberal Judaism.

III

ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF RELIGION AND ETHICS

Abravanel. Acosta. Adultery (Jewish). Architecture (Jewish). Art (Jewish). Blasphemy (Jewish). Body (Hebrew). Family (Jewish). Heresy (Jewish). Ibn Gabirol. Inheritance (Jewish). Liberal Judaism. Marriage (Jewish). Names (Jewish). Name of God (Jewish). Rashi. Sabbath (Jewish). Sanhedrin. Sects (Jewish). Symbolism (Jewish). Talmud. Targums.

ENCYCLOPAEDIA BIBLICA

Bracelets. Breeches (jointly with Stanley. A. Cook). Coronation. Crown (jointly with Stanley. A. Cook). Dress (jointly with Stanley. A. Cook). Girdle. Jannes and Jambres. Tunic. Shoes (jointly with Stanley. A. Cook and T. K. Cheyne). Turban (jointly with Stanley. A. Cook). Mantle (jointly with Stanley. A. Cook). Mitre (part). Modin. Necklace (jointly with T. K. Cheyne). Ornaments.

ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA (XITH EDITION)

Asher ben Jehiel. Bahya Ibn Paquda. Circumcision. Crescas. Delmedigo. Dukes, Leopold. Duran. Einhorn, David. Elijah Wilna. Elisha ben Abuyah. Exilarch. Eybeschutz. Frank, Jacob. Fränkel, Zecharias. Frankl, Ludwig. A. Friedman, Meir. Gaon. Geiger, Abraham (in part). Gersonides. Graetz. Habdala. Halakha. Halevi. Haphtara. Harizi. Hasdai Ibn Shaprut. Herzl. Hirsch, Samson R. Ibn Tibbon. Immanuel ben Solomon. Jacob ben Asher. Jellinek. Jews (Dispersion to Modern Times). Joel. Johanan ben Zaccai. Josippon. Kalisch, Marcus. Krochmal. Lazarus, Emma. Leon, Moses. Leon of Modena. Luria. Luzzatto, Moses Hayyim. Luzzatto, Samuel David. Mapu. Marano. Meir. Meir of Rothenburg. Menasseh ben Israel. Mendelsohn, Moses. Mocatta. Molko. Nachmanides. Najara. Nasi. Perles, Joseph. Proselyte. Quaraites. Qaro. Raba ben Joseph ben Hama. Rabbah ben Nahmani. Rapaport, Samuel. Rashbam. Rashi. Ritual murder. Sabbatai Sebi. Sabbation. Sachs, Michael. Samuel of Nehardea. Shekel. Simon ben Yohai. Singer, Simeon. Smolenskin, Perez. Steinschneider, M. Synagogue, United. Tam, Jacob ben Meir. Tanna. Wise, Isaac Meyer. Zunz, Leopold.

JEWISH ENCYCLOPAEDIA

Vol. 1. Acrostics.
,, 2. Gaunse, Joachim.
,, 7. Jacobs, Joseph.
,, 8. Maccabees.

HASTING'S DICTIONARY OF THE BIBLE

Vol. 3. New Moon.
,, 4. Time. Trumpet.

IV

TRANSACTIONS OF THE JEWISH HISTORICAL SOCIETY OF ENGLAND

Vol. II. Paul of Burgos in London.

„ IV. Joachim Gaunse: A mining incident in the reign of Queen Elisabeth.

The Jewish Monarch and Queen Elizabeth.

„ V. A Note on the Bodleian Bowl.

Presidential Address: The Science of Jewish History.

Letter sent to Mr. Max J. Kohler, Hon. Sec. of the American Committee in charge of the Celebrations in honour of the 250th Anniversary of the Settlement of the Jews in the New World (sent as President of the Society).

„ VI. The text of Mr. Robert Grant's Bill.

Prefatory note to "The Deacon and the Jewess."

Speech on Jubilee of Political Emancipation.

„ VII. First draft of prospectus of the Society.

„ VIII. Purchase of Hebrew Books by the English Parliament in 1647 (in conjunction with C. E. Sayle, M.A.)

Isaac Abendana's Cambridge Mishnah and Oxford Calendars.

Bibliography of Dr. Joseph Jacobs' Contribution to Anglo-Jewish History, Literature and Statistics.

„ IX. Speech at Peace Banquet.

Hebrew Loyalty under first Four Georges.

„ X. Notes on Isaac Abendana.

HIBBERT JOURNAL

April, 1918. Palestine and Jewish Nationality.
July, 1919. The Revival of Casuistry.
October, 1918. Review of C. G. M.'s "Liberal Judaism and Hellenism."

JOURNAL OF THEOLOGICAL STUDIES

No. 87. Review of M.R. James' "Lost Apocrypha of the O.T."
No. 90. Review of Strack's Introduction to the Talmud.

REVIEW OF THEOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY

No. 5. Review of Smend's Weisheit des Jesus Sirach.
Review of Strack's Einleitung in den Talmud.

JEWISH QUARTERLY REVIEW

(Co-editor with C. G. Montefiore)

Vol. I. The Fox's Heart.
Tobit's Dog.
Review of Cassel's Commentary on Esther and Cave's Inspiration.
„ II. Marriages are made in Heaven.
Sambary and Benjamin of Tudela.
Review of Driver's Books of Samuel.
„ III. Jewish Ethical Wills.
„ IV. Review of Guttmann's Verhältnis des Thomas von Aquinas zum Judentum.
H. Graetz, the Jewish Historian.
Works of Prof. Graetz (note).
„ V. Tobit and Genesis (note).
Samuel Portaleone's proposed restrictions on Games of Chance (note).
„ VI. Miss Smith: an argument.
Miss Smith: Notes in reply.

Vol. VI. Joseph Zabara and his "Book of Delight."

,, VII. Introductory note to "Some translations of Hebrew Poems."

,, VIII. Review of the Revised Version of the Apocrypha.

,, IX. Third Book of Maccabees.
Σαββαθιον (note).
Note on "The Mission of Judaism."
Review of Frankenberg's Datierung der Psalmen Salomos; Israel Levi's Dix-huit Bénédictions et les Psaumes de Salomon and Schürer's review by Frankenberg.

,, X. Some Egyptian Fragments of the Passover Hagada.
Genizah Specimens.

,, XI. The Jewish Year.
An Aramaic text of the Scroll of Antiochus.
Prof. Schürer on Life under Jewish Law.

,, XII. Review of Schechter and Taylor, "Wisdom of Ben Sira."
Paul of Burgos in London.

,, XIII. Note on a version of En Kelohenu.
Misc. on the two books of the Maccabees.

,, XIV. Recent criticism of the letter of Aristeas.

,, XVI. Review of King's Influence of the Triennial Cycle on the Psalter; of Tennant on the Doctrines of the Fall and Original Sin; of Abbott's "From Letter to Spirit."

,, XVII. An eighth century Genizah document.
The High Priest's procession and the Liturgy.
Bibliography of Hebraica and Judaism.

,, XVIII. Bibliography (four instalments).

,, XIX. Bibliography (two instalments).

,, XX. Some Rabbinic Ideas on Prayer.

V

OTHER WORKS

1876–7. Israel Abrahams translated Neubauer's article on the Hebrew Translation of "L'image du Monde" which appeared in *Romania* No. 18, April, 1876, pp. 129–39. This appeared in *Miscellany of Hebrew Literature* edited by Rev. A. Löwy, Vol. II, pp. 157–74, London 1877.

1884. Contributed to "Inspiration, a Clerical Symposium."

1887. The Rod of Moses (in Jews' College Publications).

1891. "A Jovial Ascetic" (in the Book of the Fair).

1896. Jewish Life in the Middle Ages.

The Bodleian MS. *The Fear of Sin* (Festschrift zum achtzigsten Geburtstage Moritz Steinschneiders).

1899. Chapters on Jewish Literature.

1900. An Arabic fragment of the Scroll of Antiochus (in Hebrew characters), Kaufmann Memorial Volume.

1902. Selected Hebraica and Judaica (in American Jewish Year Book).

1903. Hebrew Lessons (jointly with Alice Lucas).

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Impatience in Prayer.

1905. Festival Studies.

Bibliography of Hebraica and Judaica (reprinted from *Jewish Quarterly Review*).

1906. Festival Studies.

Short History of Jewish Literature.

A Formula and a Responsum (Jews' College Jubilee Volume).

1907. Judaism (Religions Ancient and Modern).

1908. Literary Remains of S. Singer, three volumes.

1909. Edition of Macaulay on Jewish Disabilities, 2nd ed., 1910.
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The Union and the Festivals.
1911. How did the Jews baptize (Journal of Theological Studies, July).
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1912. The Deacon and the Jewess (Transactions of the Jewish Historical Society).
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1913. The Book of Delight and other Essays.
The Decalogue in Art (The Kohler-Studies in Jewish Literature).
1914. Annotated Hebrew Prayer Book.
John Quincy Adams and Joseph Hume (Publications of the American Jewish Historical Society).
1915. Jews (in Hutchinson's History of the Nations).
1917. Studies in Pharisaism, Vol. I.
Jewish Life under Emancipation.
1918. Essays on the Future of Palestine.
1920. By Paths in Hebraic Book Land.
Arthur Davis Lecture on "Poetry and Religion."
1922. A Companion to the Authorized Daily Prayer Book.
1923. Permanent Values in Judaism.
Genesis Haphtaroth (Simonsen-Festschrift).
1924. Studies in Pharisaism, Vol. II.
1925. The Glory of God.
1926. Some Triennial Haphtaroth (Paul Haupt-Festschrift).

POSTHUMOUS

1927. Legacy of Judaea by Oxford University Press.
Volume of Starrs, with Dr. H. P. Stokes (*not yet issued*).
Schweich Lectures for 1922, "Campaigns in Palestine."
Jewish Ethical Wills, 2 volumes.
The Lost Confession of Samuel.
The Words of Gad the Seer (pp. 8–12 of Poznański Memorial Volume).

ISRAEL ABRAHAMS AND THE REFORM JEWISH MOVEMENT IN ENGLAND

MAURICE H. HARRIS (NEW YORK)

Not till a man has passed away are we ready to estimate his worth. Now that Israel Abrahams has gone, it becomes our sad but reverent duty to survey his career, to realize our debt to him, and to garner the assets, personal, scholastic and spiritual that he has left behind—our lasting legacy.

We think of Israel Abrahams as scholar, first and last. While rabbinics marked his major contribution, and in this subject he held a chair in Cambridge University, and on that and on corelated themes he wrote most of his books and monographs—this was by no means his exclusive domain. His wide reading—and he had the gift of rapid absorption—rendered him a man versed in many subjects of human concern; while his keen analytic mind and discerning judgment made his opinion, whenever ventured, of enduring value.

This, however, is not the phase of his life I have been asked to portray; still his scholarship was ever the background of all he did and of all he was.

I

My word is to be of his influence on the Liberal Jewish Movement in England. First, his place in Reform Judaism in general. Like most of the progressive school, he came from an Orthodox home and imbibed Judaism in its traditional interpretation. This Jewish life in the older sense he conscientiously lived, not only in his youth, but also during his early maturity. This, then, his point of departure. Yes, he was linked to the old school by personal affiliation and, by ties of affection. So large a part does the sentimental play in one's religious life; and it should. It is in this emotional sphere that religion is differentiated from philosophy. Philosophy is cold, objective; religion—warm and subjective.

So we find ABRAHAMS during his first years as a teacher of those who were in turn to be the teachers of Orthodox Israel. During all this period, he conscientiously fulfilled all the behests of rabbinic law from the laying of phylacteries to dietary restrictions. These observances he continued some time after their validity no longer, appealed to his convictions. So often does sentiment survive belief.

II

The Reform movement had existed in England since the first half of the 19th century. In some measure it was an arbitrary divergence from Orthodoxy. It accepted the biblical law and rejected the rabbinic. That was the attitude of the Karaites with their cry "Back to the Scriptures." In neither instance was it possible to be consistently sustained.

But ISRAEL ABRAHAMS followed the later more philosophic school of Reform that had its inception in Germany, and of which GEIGER was the most notable expounder. These views ABRAHAMS best expressed when he came to the United States and addressed an Assembly of the Eastern Council of Reform Rabbis during my Presidency of that body.

He pointed out the error of drawing a sharp line between laws biblical and laws rabbinic. He claimed the right of *discrimination* in both. That is now the enlightened stand of the liberal Jew in all lands. In that spirit we would say, not everything in the Mosaic code is binding today—for example its laws relative to marriage and divorce; its dietary restrictions; some provisions of its penal code; its priestly institutions and its sacrificial system.

Nor should everything in rabbinic Judaism be rejected. We owe to it infinitely much. The poetic ceremonial in ushering in the Sabbath, with the kindling of the lights, the blessing of the children, the sanctification of the bread and wine. To it we owe the rich elaboration of festival observance, the entire institution of Hannukah is necessarily rabbinic. Likewise, the framework of the Prayer Book. Indeed, the Reform Jew realizes that each era contributed to the venerable institution of Judaism something of permanent value and of perennial application.

None realized more completely than ABRAHAMS that just as Judaism's development did not end with the Mosaic Code, so likewise it [illegible]

not end with the Shulchan Aruch of the 16th century. The Reformer points out the error of keeping Jewish observance down to the standard of the Middle Ages. That Judaism is endlessly growing is a cardinal concept of Reform. This is involved in its acceptance of the theory of evolution, which it applies not only to natural phenomena, but likewise to all human institutions, political, social, religious.

Very decidedly did Israel Abrahams endorse that article of Reform belief teaching the rejection of a personal Messiah, who would bring about a national restoration of Israel to the Holy Land. All prayers voicing that hope have been eliminated from the Reform Ritual. But Abrahams did not only not believe in the religious restoration of the Jewish Nation, he did not believe in the secular restoration, that is, in Zionism. He refused to recognize the Jews as a nation, today. He acknowledged only one flag. This is not necessarily the Reform position; but it is that of the Jewish Religious Union of England. Let us turn to that now for more detailed consideration.

III

Reform Judaism has been a plant of slow growth in Great Britain. English Jews have imbibed English conservatism. So when the subject of ritual change was timidly broached, it met with bitter opposition. These early pleaders at first asked only for a diminution in the length of the service and in the number of prayers, and for more convenient hours of divine service. Also, for sermons in English, a mixed choir and organ, and the abolition of the Second Day of the Holy Days.

The Spanish and Portuguese congregation of London, from which body the plea came, did everything to prevent the organization of a branch Synagogue. Hence the necessity arose of establishing a separate congregation. This was finally undertaken and in the year 1840 was formed the West London Synagogue of British Jews. It was denounced as schismatic and a warning against its endorsement was issued to all the Jewish congregations in England. The Chiefs of the two Orthodox wings promulgated an order reading out of the Jewish communion all members of the Reform Synagogue. Ex-communicated, they could not bury in the cemetery of their fathers, and had to acquire one of their own. Nor was the Rev. D. W. Marks their first

minister, so recognized by the Board of Deputies—the body that administered all Jewish affairs.

It must be borne in mind to completely realize the situation, that the head of the Jewish community of England was a Chief Rabbi whose office and function were recognized by Parliament. This gave to Orthodoxy the character of an "established Church": while the Reform body would probably be styled in English parlance a "non-conformist" organization.

This Reform Synagogue survived its condemnation. But it continued as a congregation rather than as a movement, such as we know it in the United States. There was later formed a congregation of the new school in Manchester and another in Bradford. Still no further ritual changes were introduced. They all retained their conservative character—the sexes separated, the head covered, and Sabbath restrictions maintained on traditional lines.

Half a century after the establishment of the West London Synagogue of British Jews, another group started a Sabbath afternoon service on a Reform basis. Again opposition was aroused, and the Chief Rabbi (Dr. Hermann Adler), "inhibited" the Rev. Morris Joseph from preaching before it.

That modest little service was the beginning of the Jewish Religious Union. From its very start in 1902 Israel Abrahams entered into its counsels. The movers of the project realized the value of the co-operation of so broad a scholar and so loyal a Jew. For now, at last was to be launched, not only a Synagogue but a movement.

It became the first thorough-going Reform congregation in England. For its promoters were not content with mere external change in ceremonial and in the conduct of its divine service. It was founded on the modern conception of Judaism particularized above. It involved, furthermore, the rationalistic interpretation of the Bible, the equal place of woman in religious privilege and obligation, together with a deeper recognition of the mission of the Jew and a sense of responsibility for the spiritual welfare of mankind at large.

For every step the founders turned to Abrahams for guidance. A modified Prayer Book was needed to express these views, and it was he, with his fine knowledge of rabbinic lore and Jewish tradition, that could speak with authority on every change proposed in the service. He was particularly recognized as the best expounder of the

Jewish Prayer Book, as all who have read his copious notes on the Singer Tephillah can testify.

Every adaptation of ceremonial to modern Jewish life, as accepted by the new Synagogue, first passed through the crucible of his fine discerning mind, in which delicacy of feeling as well as scholarly knowledge entered. His address before this body on the "Union and the Festivals" still treasured, is an instance in point. He was best able, too, to champion the cause of the new movement against its opponents—and they were not few.

Naturally, he himself came in likewise for censure. He had to suffer for his convictions. Doubtless it was his identification with this "heresy" that compelled his relinquishment of his chair in homiletics at Jews' College for the training of the ministry.

We speak of "The three R's" as fundamentals of learning. The Jewish Religious Union could point to its "Three M's"—Claude Montefiore, Lily Montagu and Israel Mattuck. They rallied around Israel Abrahams like "Three Musketeers" (if I may be forgiven this comparison) in a metaphoric sense, in their struggle for the triumph of the spirit of religion.

He aided the Union in another way by teaching in its pulpit. He was a lay preacher. Not a rabbi, he was a teacher of rabbis, not only in England, but also in the United States.

IV

Some of the scholarly activities of Abrahams had a distinct relation to the Reform movement, especially his "Studies in Pharisaism and the Gospels." He did for Pharisaism what Carlyle did for Cromwell—rehabilitated the misrepresented and misunderstood. Yet, so graciously did he rescue the Pharisees from the obloquy long resting on them, as to win over even their opponents. But it was his New Testament studies that we may regard as a phase of Liberal Judaism. For in the Orthodox School, the New Testament was placed on the Jewish "Index" so to speak. A great commotion arose in London as recently as 1924 because a Jewish minister of the Hampstead Synagogue dared to teach the New Testament to a post-graduate group. The local Jewish weekly thundered its anathemas against this "scandal." How short sighted that attitude! It failed to realize how much of Jewish history is hidden in the New Testament. This called

for the scholarship of a Jew, such as ABRAHAMS, to make clear many otherwise obscure references in the Gospels, such as "The Dove and the Voice," "Publicans and Sinners," "The Personal use of the Term Messiah."

Yes, an appreciative study of the life of the founder of Christianity, marks a notable stand of liberal Judaism. To this day Orthodoxy is not yet reconciled to that point of view.

In the Council of the Jewish Religious Union that he served so ably in its early uphill years, he was not only valued for his important contribution to this English Reform movement, for his Jewish erudition, but he was also loved as a friend.

Aye, a friend of so many, for he radiated kindliness as well as light. In our admiration for the scholar, we can never lose sight of the man. He taught Liberals to be liberal. His students reverenced him for his gentleness and geniality. Ever did he hesitate to censure, even when rebuke was justified, but hastened to encourage where he discerned but a gleam of promise. We get a more amiable picture of the mediaeval Christian from his "Jewish Life in the Middle Ages," while his "Permanent values in Judaism" and "Glory of God" cannot but awaken new esteem for Jewish tradition in the heart of the Christian.

So in the art of life, he was the teacher of us all. We gladly sat at his feet. Thus his sterling character helped to give confidence to the Liberal Movement in England, in its incipient stage. Its founders will lovingly treasure his memory and feel a lasting gratitude for his contribution to their cause.

ISRAEL ABRAHAMS AT CAMBRIDGE

F. J. FOAKES JACKSON (NEW YORK)

" I tell you," Edward, said my father with some severity, " we must judge men not so much by what they do as by what they make us feel that they have it in them to do. If a man has done enough either in painting, music or the affairs of life, to make me feel that I might trust him in an emergency he has done enough." This quotation from SAMUEL BUTLER's *Way of All Flesh* is characteristically Cambridge in sentiment; for nowhere is man judged more strictly by what he is, and no matter how great his achievements may have been, he is almost invariably measured by the impression he has made on his contemporaries. Although, therefore, the theme I am requested to write upon is the services ISRAEL ABRAHAMS rendered at Cambridge to Christian scholarship, I desire particularly to consider him as a man and an influence in the University.

ABRAHAMS was not educated in Cambridge, and only came there when his reputation as a scholar was already matured. Nevertheless, like some other of the adopted sons of Cambridge, he rapidly assimilated the spirit of the University, or I should say brought it with him. In fact when it appointed him to the Readership in Talmudic, the University secured a man who satisfied one of its ideals of a student who knows and loves his subject and has no desire of regarding it in the light of a profitable investment or a means of self advertisement.

It would be difficult to find a more unworldly scholar than ISRAEL ABRAHAMS, not that he lacked native shrewdness, nor appreciation of the good things of this world, but that he cared for learning more. As for pushing himself forward nothing seemed further from his thought. He was a most indefatigable writer and wrote easily and well, but never with an eye primarily to profit, though I believe he could easily have realised more than a competence with his pen,

but his object seemed to me almost always to promote his favourite studies and to co-operate with others whilst keeping rather in the background.

As an example of this I may mention the weekly seminar of theological students held under the presidency of Professor BURKITT. These were initiated just before and during the war in meetings to work at the Acts of the Apostles with the object of assisting Dr. LAKE and myself in our edition of the first two volumes of our *Beginnings of Christianity*. BURKITT took the chair from the first, and I acted as secretary. The work accomplished was sometimes interesting, always profitable, and at times tended to be somewhat dull and discursive as such gatherings at Cambridge, where thoroughness rather than brilliance is the objective, and men are singularly averse to committing themselves to new opinions, often are. But for the active and suggestive mind of our president, I doubt if they would have lasted, but they have continued successfully to this day. ABRAHAMS was a frequent visitor and generally contrived to give life and interest to the discussion. It was a pure work of supererogation on his part and also of self sacrifice; for he was as I have reason to know often oppressed by the stodginess of the academic methods employed. Except BURKITT and some occasional visitor, even those who had some knowledge of Jewish thought had little power of applying it to the questions raised, and this ABRAHAMS possessed in a marked degree. This was conspicuous when we came to passages where a traditional reference to Jewish customs had long been handed down by generations of Christian scholars. ABRAHAMS had the first hand knowledge to expose the hollowness of this second hand exegesis by an authoritative reference to Rabbinic literature, and he always did this with consummate tact and judgment.

To show that this is not a mere private opinion, I quote a letter written by Professor BURKITT, dated December 6, 1925:—

> "Abrahams was one of the most valued members of the seminar which meets (with me in the chair) most Wednesdays in full term. More than any Jew I ever met including Montefiore—he seemed to understand the *aims* of serious Christian scholarship and investigation. He seemed to understand that Modernists could be really 'Christian' without being Crypto-Unitarian. Also, that modern enlightened Christians could feel that the Christian Religion meant more than the admirable

if somewhat unpracticable counsels of the Sermon on the Mount, i.e. he had a sympathy with Christian theology as well as with Gospel ethics, though perfectly loyal to Judaism.

"He also was fond of pointing out that Luria and some other Jewish mystics were full of real fervour of Contemplation while all the time they practised the full Jewish ritual and food laws.

"That is the vital nerve of the opposition of Abrahams and Montefiore to most German scholars, especially Schürer: they complained that German scholars represented Judaism as a system which stifled spiritual aspiration in compulsory ritual observances—just because their ancestor Martin Luther of old had felt stifled in the monastic observances of Catholicism.

"Besides all this Abrahams was a journalist, interested in the general movement of thought and literature. Like Schechter he was a great novel reader—all sorts.

"To his fellow Jews, like Montefiore, he exhibited the rare spectacle of one who was 'relaxed,' reformed, modern, &c. and yet was a force of religion. He was *not* 'chaplain' to the Jewish undergraduates, but he was their official pastor and confidant.

"All his talk was good and we *do* miss him at our seminar.

"Would you tell your Jewish friends that Abrahams' library is going to Christ's College Cambridge and to the Mocatta Library in London, and that subscriptions for this purpose (which will ultimately go to Mrs. Abrahams) should go to the Rev. E. Levine, 9 Pembridge Villas, London W.11."

The seminar was often well attended not only by Cambridge men but by visitors who came from a considerable distance; among these I can recall that Dr. Oesterley, whose studies in Judaism are well known, and Mr. A. C. Jennings, author of a commentary on the Psalms with W. H. Lowe, were frequent attendants. The present Regius Professor of Divinity Dr. Nairne subsequently joined the seminar and he has given me an account of his impressions of the influence exerted there by Abrahams.

After mentioning *The Glory of God* of which he had written a notice in the Cambridge Review, and quoting from his lectures delivered in New York in 1923 the words so pregnant with meaning—"Liberal Judaism discovers in the Talmudic spirit an escape from Liberalism which bases itself on literalities," and declaring the two

volumes of *Studies in Pharisaism and the Gospels* to be "pure gold," the Professor goes on to say:

> "But he soared beyond books and was spirit among our carnalities.
>
> "At those wicked seminars he and Oman used to break through to the truth that mattered, reducing the evolutionary process to its place among the beggarly elements—yet never eccentric and delighting in a bit of accuracy as much as any of us."

This testimony from the two leading divinity professors in the University is amply sufficient to show how appreciative Christian Scholars with a broad outlook were of ABRAHAMS' work, and the members of his own college were well aware that the Reader of Talmudic was an ornament to it. Two especially understood and valued his work Professor BROOKE, editor with Mr. MCLEAN of the Cambridge Septuagint, and Mr. ELMSLIE, Hebrew professor at Westminster (Presbyterian) College Cambridge, the two last Fellows of Christ's. Unfortunately ABRAHAMS was never elected a fellow, and consequently though he dined often at the college table, he was not in intimate touch with the inner life of the society.

The friendship between ABRAHAMS and MONTEFIORE was of great service to Christian scholarship. Here were two Jews who were in real sympathy with those who desired to understand the religious professions of the church, and to use every means of obtaining a correct knowledge of how they originated in Jewish sources. These scholars were ready to play the part, not of Christianized or of anti-Christian Jews but of genuine Hebrews in sharing the investigations of those of another faith. The results have been most beneficial, and ABRAHAMS' part will not be forgotten, even though, as Professor W. E. BARNES of Cambridge, an excellent Semitic scholar, writes to me, "he was not as kindly (and just) a critic of the Christian view as Montefiore. But he was good in helping Christian theologians in Jewish questions." I hardly consider this to be an unfair judgment, though I should like to be able to do so. I do not, however, forget that ABRAHAMS had a vigorous mind and an equal power of forcible expression of his views. As I write of ABRAHAMS and MONTEFIORE I must allude to an interesting conversation in Union Theological Seminary, when I introduced him to Professors FRAME and E. F. SCOTT, who put him through a regular catechism as to his views, and quoted

a number of books, which made me try to appear that I had so much as heard of them. ABRAHAMS remarked later that he did not believe that anyone in Cambridge, except BURKITT, knew of the existence of these books with which the two New York Professors were so familiar. But they had the presumption to ask, as I should never have dared to do, but was most grateful to them for doing, what was his exact literary relationship to MONTEFIORE: "Was he the profound scholar and his friend the gifted amateur?" ABRAHAMS' eulogy on the learning and ability of his colleague in so many scholarly adventures was a masterly expression of generous appreciation.

Mr. EPHRAIM LEVINE, a pupil of mine who once collaborated with me in a book called the *Parting of the Ways*, has dwelt on the relations between ABRAHAMS and the Jewish undergraduates at Cambridge. There were comparatively few in my time and the University so far as I remember made no provision for respecting their scruples against doing their examinations on the Sabbath. ABRAHAMS never spared himself to secure their resting in seclusion on the Saturdays and doing their work under his supervision on the Sundays. Anyone who knows what a wearisome thing "invigilating" during an examination is can appreciate the kindness of heart which prompted ABRAHAMS to undertake the duty year after year. He and Mrs. ABRAHAMS were also famed for their hospitality to students, even in Cambridge where the young men are certainly not neglected in this respect. A besetting sin of all University officials, at least so far as my experience of England and America goes, is that of "donnishness." The causes of this are manifold, modesty in some, conceit in others, a false sense of dignity, stupidity and others too numerous to mention. But the symptom is invariable, and results in making those in contact with the patient thoroughly uncomfortable. ABRAHAMS was entirely free from this feeling. He was so natural and kindly that he set the young at once at their ease.

At the memorial service at the Jewish Institute at New York this quality of ABRAHAMS was emphasised or implied by all who knew him intimately; and I was specially delighted by one speaker, who is a Cambridge man and had known ABRAHAMS in early life. It was, if I recollect aright, less of a panegyric on his scholarship, his virtues, or his piety, these were assumed, than an appreciation of the man, his geniality, his humour, his spontaneous sympathy and

kindness. The memory of such a man is a pleasant thing to recall; for one has met a good many distinguished men, and not a few benefactors to their species, whose loss may be irreparable, but whose absence is more regretted conventionally than actually. ABRAHAMS was not in this category; and one does not so much solemnly regret his loss as prize him as a delightful memory.

For it is not their eminence which endears one's lost friends towards us, but trifling incidents, sometimes humourous, which bring into relief their characteristics. I recall the night ISRAEL ABRAHAMS dined in our college hall as my guest, and I told the cook to serve the sort of dinners our one Jewish fellow ate, and how pathetically he asked for leave to follow the excellent menu provided for the high table of Jesus. I think smilingly of his arrival in New York in 1923, and how my wife carried him off, indignant and remonstrant, and forced him to buy rubbers on a day on which he could hardly stand, and his English prejudice against what he called "galoshes." These little eccentricities endear our friends to us more than their greater qualities. And, as one smiles at these trifles, one remembers his genuine qualities. His complete absence of petty jealousy, the value he set upon the work of infinitely lesser scholars than himself; his hatred of all that was petty, superficial, pedantic and consequently dull. And then one feels that a friend has left us who is really missed, and one, who like Daniel may be described as a man greatly beloved.

ISRAEL ABRAHAMS, MASTER OF HOMILY

NATHAN KRASS (NEW YORK)

The versatility of Israel Abrahams should not obscure his fine talents in the field of homiletics. Abrahams was a preacher neither by profession nor by practice. Yet he understood the art of writing sermons exceedingly well. The small number that he delivered are gems of highest homiletic quality. The reader discerns at once the hand of a master who deftly draws a picture that enthralls.

There is a misconception prevalent concerning sermons. Emphasis is unduly laid upon content, while form is considered of minor importance. Tell the people the truth. Feed them with moral food. Overstock them with spiritual assets. Present much and each will get something. This view ignores an essential element, the artistic.

Preaching is an art, not a science. A sermon is not a collection of doctrines, dogmas, facts. It is literature woven on the loom of art out of the strands of fact, sentiment, emotion, fancy and imagination. It transmutes crude material into charming reality. It creates moods. It wins the heart. It gladdens the soul. It achieves by virtue of the spell it produces on the reader or listener. It links past, present, and future by casting the vision of unbroken continuity over the temporal divisions. It lifts man out of the sordidness of daily drudgery by letting the glamour of idealism fall across his path. By a deft touch here and there, it evokes a thrill as the doors of memory or hope are suddenly thrown wide open. It makes historic figures real. They talk to us as if they were our comrades and our neighbours. Though coming from a remote past, they do not seem like conjured ghosts, but rather like forgotten friends whose fresh return we welcome with a joyous throb.

Israel Abrahams understood all this and was able to create this desired effect. His sermons always breathe a spiritual message. His truths are clothed in beauty. His words are chiselled with charm. His style is lucid, chaste, and smooth. His sentences are steeped in

Jewish lore. He does not make his sermons heavy with the wealth of varied knowledge, but uses his vast learning with artistic restraint. His Biblical quotations, his Talmudic allusions, his Midrashic references form organic parts of the sermon, blending with his own original material into a perfect unit. His illustrations are not aliens; they are native, perfectly at home in the homiletic environmont he creates. His matter is always concrete, even when he deals with abstract themes. His sermon on "Friendship," for example, touches human relations not with the wand of philosophy, nor does it light them up with the lamp of logic. The reader, transported into a world of living reality, feels himself transformed through love and service into a nobler being, a better friend. When he speaks about the love of God, one does not feel overawed by the vast concept of divinity, rather does a glimpse of the mystic union of man and God flash before the eye. Avoiding carefully the danger of turning God into a mortal friend, our skilled homilist makes us feel that while God is not man, He is yet near in a real sense unto all who call upon Him in sincerity and in truth.

The nine sermons by ISRAEL ABRAHAMS in the book entitled "Aspects of Judaism" are exemplars of splendid sermonic style, combining a knowledge of Jewish sources, mastery of English, insight into human needs, and a grace of expression, revealing a soul that is gentle, generous, and saintly.

ISRAEL ABRAHAMS AND LIBERAL JUDAISM

CLAUDE G. MONTEFIORE (LONDON)

It is not easy to estimate aright ISRAEL ABRAHAMS' services to Liberal Judaism in general, and to Liberal Judaism in England, in particular. As regards the first, the fact that by far the greatest English-born Jewish scholar of his age was an enthusiastic Liberal Jew was in itself of very considerable importance. No one could possibly allege either that Liberal Judaism in England was the work of dilettantists or of faddists, or that it was the product of a desire for convenience, when the reply was so obvious and so crushing: what about ISRAEL ABRAHAMS? It is true that such suggestions were very foolish even without ISRAEL ABRAHAMS. When such giants as GEIGER and HOLDHEIM in Germany, or KOHLER and EMIL HIRSCH in America, could be quoted as leaders in Liberalism, it was needless to point to any other. But, to many ignorant English Jews, GEIGER, HOLDHEIM, HIRSCH, KOHLER are mere names, whereas to nobody was ISRAEL ABRAHAMS a mere name. All knew that he was a very great scholar; the bitterest foe of Liberal Judaism could no more deny that than he could deny that the battle of Waterloo was fought in 1815.

But this was not all. ISRAEL ABRAHAMS was not only an ardent Liberal, but he was, at the same time, a warm defender of the religious value of Rabbinic and orthodox Judaism. He had rendered yeoman service to its cause. He had done more to make Rabbinic and orthodox Judaism better understood and appreciated by non-Jews than any other man in England, perhaps than any other man in the world. That such a service should have been rendered to these types and phases of Judaism by an ardent Liberal was something very unusual. We do not usually find the best exponent and defender of one section of a given religion among the most ardent adherents of another section, and that section in many respects greatly opposed to the first section and most bitterly attacked by it. The magnanimity of ABRAHAMS was as distinguished as his scholarship.

And this again is not all. ABRAHAMS' magnanimity and impartiality, his moderation and breadth of mind, may not have taught all the opponents of Liberal Judaism, or even all its adherents, to practise, or to achieve, these virtues, but, at all events, they have given an ideal. Moreover, they have helped us Liberals to realize our own close connection with the parent stem: they have made us understand that there was something in the spirit of Rabbinic or of orthodox Judaism which we can still cherish and appropriate. ISRAEL ABRAHAMS made us perceive the many agreements as well as the many differences, and he made us perceive *in* the differences legitimate developments, and not haphazard changes. While he was, I repeat, an enthusiastic champion of the New, (and he advanced and matured in his Liberalism with his growing years), he was also a mediator between old and new: he constructed a bridge over which many could pass; he built it, and showed to us its legitimacy and appropriateness.

All this he did in ways which it would be difficult to describe in detail. To my great regret he wrote no regular book upon Liberal Judaism. That general work he accomplished in regard to it, which I have just attempted to describe, he did partly by word of mouth, partly by occasional remarks and utterances—indications, implications and the like—scattered through his many writings, and partly by the very fact that those fine expositions and defences of Rabbinic and orthodox Judaism (so unlike, and so much more effective and more true than, the ordinary expositions and defences) were well known to be composed by one who was neither a Rabbinic nor an orthodox Jew. Pointing at ISRAEL ABRAHAMS, one could legitimately ask: "See what Liberal Judaism can do. The scholar who stands head and shoulders above other English Jews, the scholar who has taught and helped so many orthodox Jews, and who has made orthodox Judaism so much better known and so much more appreciated—what was he himself?" And the answer was well known: This great humanist scholar, fine alike in character and temperament, was an ardent Liberal Jew. In Jewish matters—whether in history, theology, or any other department of Jewish learning—he was among the First. He was one of the Masters of those who know. And whither had this great knowledge led him? To Liberal Judaism, to which, as his knowledge increased, he became increasingly devoted.

Next to this general service, we come to his services for English Liberal Judaism in particular—for Liberal Judaism as organised in and by the Jewish Religious Union and the Liberal Jewish Synagogue.

I may, perhaps, at this point, just allude to the fact that ABRAHAMS made a big, definite sacrifice for the Cause. I believe I am correct in stating that when the J.R.U. was founded, he held the salaried post of Professor of Homiletics at Jews' College, the Jewish Seminary here, which is a strictly orthodox institution. All the authorities knew that he was a Liberal: yet the confidence and trust in him were so great that he was for many years a valued and beloved member of the staff. And he, on his part, was very attached to the College, to its Principal and to his colleagues. With his complete appreciation of the orthodox position, with his broadmindedness and impartiality, and with his excellent tact and judgment, he found no difficulty in teaching his pupils without violating either his own conscience, or saying anything to them of which the Principal, Dr. FRIEDLÄNDER, would have disapproved. But when the J.R.U. was founded, and ABRAHAMS became a leading member of its governing body, writing and speaking on its behalf and in advocacy of its principles, it was soon necessary for him to resign his connection with the College. It was a considerable wrench and a considerable material sacrifice, but he never hesitated. His duty to Liberal Judaism had to take precedence of his affection for the College.

ABRAHAMS did not, indeed, found the Union or start the movement. That honour belongs to another—to the Hon. LILY H. MONTAGU. But though he did not found the Union, the Union could not have gone very far, or perhaps even have continued very long, without him. The history of the Liberal Jewish Movement in London may be divided into two parts; the first part reaches from its foundation in 1902 to the arrival of Rabbi MATTUCK in 1912; the second part extends from 1912 till now. There is no doubt that the first part—the ten years from 1902 to 1912—was the more difficult period, and it was in this period that ISRAEL ABRAHAMS gave us the most valuable help. Everything had to be organized from the beginning. For our especial needs and requirements there were few precedents. We had, as it were, little to go upon. Before long, the other scholars who belonged to the original committee—I am thinking especially of Mr. SINGER and Mr. MORRIS JOSEPH—were compelled, or thought

it right, to retire. We were left with ISRAEL ABRAHAMS. But he was a host in himself. He saved us from many mistakes. What *he* sanctioned and approved in liturgy and rite, we knew was sound and satisfactory, and could very properly be defended. And cogently and successfully did he defend us. He wrote for us one or two pamphlets which were of the utmost value, and which we still use. When we were attacked in the Jewish press, he contributed some admirable replies. I fancy that many men hesitated to attack us, for they realized that we had in ISRAEL ABRAHAMS a defender who knew so much more, and was so much abler, than they! Who, indeed, that had any self-knowledge would not have known that he was impar congressu Achilli? It is needless to go into details. It suffices to say again that we could hardly have managed without him, or that if we had had to get on without him, we should have got on very badly. We had to take daring and important decisions. We had to settle several difficult questions. Finally, we had to decide whether we would become a regular congregation and have our own synagogue, &c., whether the J.R.U. should create the L.J.S.! When the synagogue was established, we had again to settle several delicate matters, such as our attitude on marriage questions, proselyte questions and others. In all these ISRAEL ABRAHAMS either helped us directly by his advice or indirectly by his approval. We always breathed more easily when we had that approval: rarely, if ever, did we act against his wishes. Up till the time of Rabbi MATTUCK's arrival, ISRAEL ABRAHAMS was our Rabbi! He delivered several excellent sermons from our pulpit. In short, our obligations to him are very large and deep.

With the arrival of Rabbi MATTUCK, we had some one who could (and did) devote all his time and energy and knowledge to our cause. Nevertheless, even in our second period, ISRAEL ABRAHAMS gave us considerable help. He was less frequently in London, but his knowledge and judgment were put freely at our disposal, and at our "Rites and Practices" Committee he often gave us sound and valuable advice. He knew, with rarely erring judgment, when to maintain "tradition," and when to break with "tradition" in order to gain a larger end and higher good. It is needless to express anew what the breaking of the tie which bound him to us and us to him has meant for those who worked with him and loved him.

Is it improper to end upon a personal note? Israel Abrahams and I were close friends for some 37 years; our friendship, therefore, began long before the J.R.U. was founded. We were already very intimate when Miss Montagu started it and roped us in. He aided me and encouraged me in my own work. He read most of my books and articles in M.S. or in proof, and was always willing to answer questions and resolve difficulties. Any help which I may have given by my pen to Liberal Judaism as its expounder and defender is largely due to the Friend and Scholar in the Background. Only now, perhaps, do I rightly and fully feel and realize all that for me he did and was, when I am deprived of all that ever ready and ever generously given help, and of all that no less generously given encouragement and support.

PROLEGOMENA
"LEGAL FICTIONS OR EVASIONS OF THE LAW"

(Seminar report of a study on Legal Fictions and Evasions of the Law, sketched under the personal direction of ISRAEL ABRAHAMS. Synopsis of an extensive monograph, prepared by the Author.)

DORA ASKOWITH (NEW YORK)

I. INTRODUCTION

1. *Importance of the subject.*

A. Since the ceremonial laws touched the average Jew's daily experience and entered practically and even frequently into his religious life, a consideration of these laws will help us to understand the attitude of the Jews towards the fulfilment of these laws.

a. Were they regarded as a burden or a calamity?

B. It will help us to understand the relation of the Hebrews, in ancient times, to the community and state and in our own day will help us to explain the attitude of the Jews towards important problems such as "Kashruth," educational requirements and civic laws in conflict with religious obligations, questions of marriage and divorce.

C. A careful consideration of the subject will help us to interpret the injunction in Deut. XIII, 1, "What thing soever I command you, observe to do it; thou shalt not add thereto, nor diminish from it." Did this mean that for all future time, without regard to varying circumstances, not the least alteration or modification should be made in the religious and civil laws established for the people of Israel?

D. It will throw light on the essential differences between orthodox and reform Jewry.

2. *Definition of terms.*

A. *Law.*

a. Difference between divine and human law.

b. Cicero's conception:—"A certain eternal principle which governs the entire universe, wisely commanding what is right and prohibiting what is wrong." (Sec. 4, Bk. II of De Legibus.)

c. Civil and natural law.
   (1) Interpretation of Isaiah; Jerome; St. Chrysostom; St. Ambrose; Justinian; Grotius; Bacon.

d. Moral Law.
   (1) Goodness as fulfillment of the law; sin its violation.
   (2) Rights must be defined before wrongs can be ascertained.
   (3) Changeability of moral codes.

e. Liberty and law.
   (1) Significance of "I walk at liberty for I observe thy law." (Ps. CXIX, 45.)

f. Unchangeability of content of law but changeability of form. All people who are governed by laws use partly those principles of justice which are adapted to their peculiar circumstances and partly those common to all mankind.
   (1) Mosaic Law an adaptation of other laws before it, and a basis for formulation of later laws.

g. Laws not good because written, but written because good.

h. Rôle of legalistic element in the development of religious systems.
   (1) Numa, the lawgiver, looked upon as founder of the Roman religion.
   (2) Judaism a legal religion. Attitude towards the law marks the difference between orthodox and liberal Jews.
      (a) Divisions of Law according to Hebrews.
         1 Precepts.
         2 Statutes.
      (b) According to the Torah, laws must appeal not only to the will, but to the heart and intellect.
   (3) Though much in the teachings of Jesus that Jews could accept, rejected by them because of his attitude towards the law.
   (4) Two great Ante-Nicene Fathers of the western church were lawyers:—Cyprian and Tertullian.
   (5) Influence of the law in Buddhism and Islam.

(6) Modern European law has become isolated from religion only gradually and incompletely.

i. Law must rest upon some authority.
   (1) Author must have power of enforcing it, or it cease to be law.
   (2) Where no superior law, no law present.
   (3) Reverence foundation of society.
   (4) Judicial institutions and religious observances lend mutual aid.
   (5) Reward and punishment, sanctions of all law.

j. Agencies by which law is brought into harmony with society:
   (1) Legal fictions.
   (2) Equity.
   (3) Legislation.

B. *Religion.*

a. Interpretations of Hegel; Max Müller; Spencer; Lang Jevons; Frazer; Crawley; Wundt.

b. Primitive forms of religious worship based on fear.

c. Relation of culture to religion.
   (1) Spiritual life of Jews at any given time an index of their social life.

d. Elements:—Royce's conception.
   (1) Practical; to do.
   (2) Emotional; to feel.
   (3) Theoretical; to believe.

e. Roman religion:—something to be done rather than something to be thought or believed or loved.

f. Religious acts:—ceremonies; sacrifices; prayers; good works.
   (1) Faith versus good works.

g. Content of religious systems the same, but the forms change.

h. Lessing's significant statement:—"All wise men have the same religion." What is that religion? "Wise men never tell." (Disraeli.)

i. Influence of religious syncretism.

j. Conception of Moses Mendelssohn:—"Judaism has no dogmas, but is a religion of action."

k. Utility of religion.
(1) Ideas of John Stuart Mills.
a Power of education.
b Power of public opinion.
(2) Character building.
(3) Develops sense of unity.

C. *Legal fictions, evasions, or abrogation of laws.*

a. Adaptation of laws to circumstances; mitigation of the rigor of the law in order to reconcile it with the exigencies of life under changing circumstances.

b. Need:—where enforcement of the law would cause people to rebel against authority. Rabbis tried to meet law by law, or by legal fiction through which the law in question was partly abrogated, but the authority of the law as a whole maintained intact.

c. Glossation was to be softened by fiction under influence of Hillel, and fiction was to be followed by equity in school of Hillel. [Meaning of this paragraph is not clear. *Editor.*]

d. Cases of accommodating the law to existing conditions are mentioned in the Bible and Rabbinical literature.
(1) Biblical injunctions.
(a) Deut. XIII, 1.
(2) Rabbinical authority.
(a) To make new provisions and establish institutions as a " hedge " for the protection of the Biblical laws.
(b) Under certain circumstances to suspend and to abrogate the Biblical law.
(c) Authority derived from passage in Deut. XVII, 8–11.
(3) Talmudic view.
(a) " Better that a single law be uprooted than that the whole Torah be forgotten." Tem. 14 b.
(b) Ber. 54 a; Ber. 63 a; Yeb. 89 b; Yeb. 90 a.

e. Principle of accommodation helps to reconcile the present with the past.
(1) The significance of compromise as a factor in the formulation of constitutions among all peoples.

II. The Observance of Laws

1. *The desire for law.*

A. The longing to systematize, to form a completely rounded theory of the universe lies deep in intellectual man.

B. Just as there is harmony in Nature, so should there be in life. This harmony is obtained through the medium of a system of laws. Life must be made orderly.

a. Man craves for reason, order, fixity, legislation.

b. Life without guiding principles and thoughts is a life not worth living; like a ship without a rudder.

c. Law is the regulator of life.

d. Routine as a valuable medium in the strengthening of character.

e. Goethe's definition of duty:—"To love that which we are obliged to do."

2. *The deeply religious crave for an element of asceticism.*

A. The more difficult the observance of a religious system is made, often the more deeply appreciated.

a. William James' analysis:—"Religion that goes too easy may be suspected."

b. If too easy, regarded as not being deep, elevating, soul-lifting.

c. Sacrifice as a test of devotion.

(1) Homage theory; expiation for sin.

3. *The search after God.*

A. An all pervading desire.

a. Finds expression in literature:—Psalm XIX; "The Search" by Thomas Curtis Clark; Robert Browning's "Pauline"; Pope's "Essay on Man"; Gamaliel Bradford's "God"; Emerson's "The Poet."

B. Knowledge of God is fruit of religion.

a. Idea of God as the satisfaction of perfection.

b. It is only because man has in himself some image of God that he can think of Him at all.

C. Unity of God is the keynote of dogmatic Judaism.

D. Socrates' question:—"Is what is loved by God holy or is it holy because God loves it?"

E. Philo's phrase, "Heavenly Man."
F. Love of God.
  a. In Deuteronomy:—he who acts from love of God stands on a higher level than those who act from fear of God.
G. Conceptions of God as they find expression in the major religious systems:—
  a. Judaism:—Holy God (Jerem. XXII, 13–17); identifies knowledge of God with moral qualities; understanding of God rather than a belief in Him.
  b. Christianity:—dogmas; not concerned with moral standards.
  c. Islam:—God spiritual one; no holy God.
H. In giving, the Jew feels he finds God.
  a. Mitsvah:—meritorious act.
    (1) A store of merit and therefore of merit's reward.
    (2) How far a motive for the observance of the law.
I. Fulfilment of God's certain will identical to the pious Jew with obeying the law.

4. *The role of authority.*
A. Philo's belief that the Bible is the authoritative revelation of God.
B. Authority as revelation.
  a. Revelation versus rationalization.
C. The need of some kind of authority.
D. The influence of tradition.
  a. Israel continues to consult God through the medium of the Scriptures and He answers His people by the mouth of the Scribes, the Sages, the Interpreters of the Law.
    (1) Oral law versus written law.
  b. Decalogue as expression of man's duty to his Maker, countrymen and state; whole moral duties of man.
    (1) Laws of Moses sprang from the same source as the right of nature.
  c. The Torah embraces oral tradition as well as the written code.
  d. Conception of Tradition as neither Scripture nor primitive Judaism, but general custom which forms the real rule of practice.

E. Has Judaism dogmas?
   a. Opinions of Abarbanel and Maimonides.
F. Is the tendency of liberal Judaism today to get itself back to the enforcement of the law; to lay more stress on authority?

5. *Fear as a vital factor in the observance of the law.*
   A. Rewards and punishments.
      a. Significance of "Mitsvah"; how far is selfishness embodied in the procuring of the act.
      b. Attack upon the people who evade the laws:—Mark VII, 10–13.
   B. The significance of prayer.
      a. The efficacy of prayer:—Mark XI, 24:—"Therefore I say unto you, what things soever ye desire, when ye pray, believe that ye receive them, and ye shall have them."
         (1) Coueism.
      b. As a medium of bringing divine aid.
      c. As a source of satisfaction and comfort in sorrow.
      d. Power over the name.
      e. As pardon for the past and desire for improvement in the future.
   C. Repentance.
      a. "Better one hour of repentance and good deeds in this world than the whole life of the world to come."
      b. Finds its special expression in prayer.
         (1) Goethe's "Who Never Ate with Tears his Bread"; Jean Ingelow's "Sorrows Humanize our Race."
      c. As self-sacrifice:—Isaiah LIII.

6. *Outward violation of the law as against inward tendency.*
   A. Maranos:—Crypto Jews of the Iberian Peninsula.
      a. Classes of the Maranos.
   B. Attitude of Maimonides.

III. Was the Law burdensome?

1. Testimony of literature extending over twenty-five centuries and including all sorts and conditions of men.
   A. Bliss and happiness of living and dying under it.
   B. Delight in the observance of the Sabbath.

2. 613 Commandments.
   A. Many obsolete.
   B. Some concerned only certain classes.
   C. Others provided for rare contingencies.
   D. Barely 100 laws which concerned the life of the bulk of the people.
   E. In times of great persecution the leaders of the people reduced the whole Law to three prohibitions:—
      a. Idolatry.
      b. Incest.
      c. Bloodshed.
3. Effect of the law upon morality and religion.

IV. Cases of Abrogations of the Laws

1. *Ancient times.*
   A. General.
      a. In consequence of the destruction of the Second Temple by the Romans, numerous laws were suspended, especially sacrificial laws and most of the laws concerning Levitical uncleanliness and purification.
   B. The Sabbath.
      a. Thirty-nine types of forbidden occupations.
         (1) Rest relative to occupation pursued.
      b. To the prophets a day of high moral purport.
         (1) Question as to whether you can have the Sabbath spirit without the symbol.
      c. Mekilta (end); Shab. 151 b:—"You may desecrate one Sabbath in order to be able to keep many Sabbaths."
      d. Locomotion on the Sabbath.
         (1) Journey extended to 4,000 cubits; putting of a meal at the end of the 2,000 cubits' limit. "Erube tehumim"; "erube hazerot"; "erube meboot." Mishnah, Er. I–IV.
   C. Passover in duplicate.
      a. Cf. Exod. XII, 18; XIII; Num. IX, 1–14.
      b. 14th day of second month instead of 14th day of first month.
   D. Day of Atonement.

a. Mishna Yoma VIII, 6; Yoma 83 a:—observance not necessary in case of illness.

b. Adjustment of Jewish calendar. R. H. 20 a.

E. Prosbul.

a. A fictitious assignment of a debt to the court in order to remove the bar of the Biblical statute of limitations; Sheb. X, 3–4.

(1) Abrogates the law in Deut. XV, 1–3.

b. Moneys of fines charged by a public court not released by the Sabbatical year.

F. "Agunah."

a. Yeb. 88 a; Git. 3 a.

b. Single witness sufficient to establish the death of absent husband.

G. Discontinuance of Jubilee.

a. Lev. XXV, 8–12; Ar. 32 b.

H. Regulations of rabbis concerning oaths and vows.

a. Kinds of oaths:—utterance; vain; witness; trust.

b. Vows often taken under momentary impulse or in times of danger.

(1) Vows which could not possibly be fulfilled.

c. Relaxation necessary unless people were to become transgressors.

(1) Vows sometimes clashed with domestic duties or interfered with proper relations to their neighbors.

d. Vows annulled by Beth Din or Chacham, but only in certain cases.

(1) No power over oaths or vows which court charged man to make.

(2) Private vows and oaths only annulled under certain conditions and restrictions.

I. Agrarian laws.

a. Dues on agricultural produce for maintenance of priests.

b. First fruits and firstlings of cattle.

c. Annual tithe.

J. Dietary laws.

a. Lev. XI, 47.

b. Pentateuchal distinctions.

(1) Permitted and forbidden food.

(2) Proper slaughtering of cattle and birds.

(3) Prescription against eating milk and meat.

c. Reasonableness of dietary laws.

K. Laws of clean and unclean.

a. Belong almost wholly to later code.

2. *Abrogative power of later courts.*

A. "Hilkot Mamrim" II, 2–7:—"Every law may be set aside temporarily by a minor authority, when it is necessary for the maintenance of religion."

B. Opinions of Maimonides; Abraham ben David; Asheri; Samuel ("The civil law of the land in which we live is our law":—Git. 10b).

3. *Modern times.*

A. Abrogation of laws not compatible with new circumstances.

B. Some laws and customs fell of themselves into disuse.

C. Abolishment or modification of laws by rabbinical conferences.

a. Authority recognized only by reform Jews.

D. Problems of our own day.

a. Opening of stores on Sundays and Holy Days.

(1) Involves relation to community and state.

b. Kosher regulations:—question of price of meats and method of slaughtering animals.

(1) State laws involved.

c. Educational:—singing of hymns and offering of prayers at exercises; examinations on Holy Days.

d. Questions of marriage and divorce.

E. Attitude towards the State.

a. Earliest legislative systems were closely associated with religious institutions of the state.

(1) Observance of the one was the sanction of the other.

(2) Instruction in the national religion became the basis of public education.

b Utility of the law.

(1) Private interests may be at variance with public advantage.

(2) Is the advantage of the individual to be regarded in preference to that of the majority?

c. How far can the state interfere in religious problems?

V. Pragmatism as a Test in evaluating Legal Fictions or Evasions of the Law

1. William James' conception:—"Anything in the way of belief is true if it is practically effective."
2. If whatever is expedient is right, whatever is right is expedient.
3. How far can the utility or expedience of the law determine its authority?
4. Is truth that which works?

VI. Conclusion

1. A detailed analysis of the subject emphasizes the fact that "Legal Fictions" are both useful and justifiable.
2. The effect of the evasive laws can only be pernicious in religion when people realize them as such.
   A. Religion is only a yoke when one makes it so.
3. Compromise is the controlling element in life and one of the essential factors in the development of civilization.

AZARIAH DE ROSSI'S ATTITUDE TO LIFE (WELTANSCHAUUNG)

SALO BARON (NEW YORK)

Azariah de Rossi is not important for us moderns, whose world is so different from his, as a man but as a type. As a personality he seems—from the little we know about him[1]—not to have been of a commanding power. He was not a man of strong passions in love or hatred; we do not see him constantly struggling and making his way in the ups and downs of life. He was not brilliant in wit, in spirit, in courage or in keenness of thought, like many of the outstanding characters of Renaissance-Italy. Nor was he one of those creative geniuses—also quite numerous in Italy of that time—who, compelled by an inner force, found new ways in art or in thought, in trade or in statesmanship. His best qualities were thorough erudition and a sincere, although rather timid, love for the truth. And so unconsciously, rather blindly and timidly, he stumbled into a kind of immortality, when he began, at the age of sixty, to write his important historical work. But that the "M'or Eynaim" became so important, rendering its author one of the greatest, or perhaps the very greatest of Jewish historians, who flourished in the seventeen centuries between Josephus and Jost, was certainly not entirely due to his own merits. It is enough to compare him with such historians as Guicciardini and Macchiavelli, in order to see clearly, how much he falls short of the achievable standards of his time and country.

But if not unique and original, he is the more typical and representative of Italian Jewry in the sixteenth century at its best. As compared with their coreligionists elsewhere, the Jews of Italy,

[1] Cf. my short article in the *Hebrew Encyclopaedia* אשכול (Berlin 1926), p. 28 seq. The following references to Azariah's opinions are quoted from the two best and most popular editions of Ben Jacob and, in brackets, of D. Cassel. מצרף לכסף = מ"ל, צדק עולמים = צ"ע.

because of their peculiar political and economic conditions and of their closer social and intellectual relations with the Gentile world, had developed a somewhat distinctive cultural life of their own—an interesting synthesis of medieval Jewish and classic-Italian Renaissance spirit—so that a short survey of the fundamental views expressed by a representative man like Azariah upon life in all its aspects, will throw light, I think, on a curious chapter in the neglected history of the "Jewish Weltanschauung."

I

In the most basic questions of religion, philosophy and science, Azariah was certainly able to reconcile rather easily the views of his contemporaries with the established creeds of medieval Judaism. The universal revival of the classic spirit had not yet caused any profound changes in Natural Science and most of the speculations, derived from Greek philosophy, had long since been brought into a kind of agreement with traditional religious beliefs by the thinkers of Islamitic, Jewish and Christian Scholasticism. And although Azariah supports his opinions by citations from Christian Fathers and Teachers to a degree as yet unheard of in Hebrew literature, as well as by references to the ancient Greeks, the contemporary Italians and the usual Jewish sources, he is by no means compelled to give up any of the acknowledged principles of the older Jewish authorities.

For him the universe is like one Big Man (the inverted notion of the Macrocosm and Microcosm)[2] created by one immaterial[3] God out of absolutely nothing.[4] The tohu wabohu of the Bible, previous to Creation, explained by so many authoritative thinkers in

[2] I, 18 (C. 19): לאדם שהוא עולם קטן ... העולם אשר הוא אדם גדול. This notion was stressed again among the Jews not long before Azariah by Leone Ebreo in the second of his "Dialoghi di Amore" known and highly appreciated by Azariah who called them סילון וסופיאה. Cf. I, 9 (C. 10) and also H. PFLAUM, *Die Idee der Liebe. Leone Ebreo* (Tübingen 1926), p. 104.

[3] I, 84 (C. 100): שע"כ נאמין בו ית' אחדות גמורה בהרחקת כל צדי נשמות ככל בני ישראל תכיתי דרך.

[4] Cf. especially his sharp polemics against Philo's admission of a primordial matter (I, 96 seq.; C. 112 seq.): אך שוב נשוב אל ידידיה ואל דבריו בחומר, אין ספק כפי הנראה מהם כי בן הכוח הוא בגללם על הלחי, וזו אינה צריכה לפנים שכבר נודע כי כל תופשי התורה איבעית איבא קרא ואי בעית איבא קבלה יעידון יגידון איך הבריאה היתה כולה חדוש משולה בלי קדמות כל חומר. This harshness is understandable in view of the fact, that Philo was very popular in the Italian Jewry, as we learn from Azariah himself (I, 112; C. 129); his own opinion about the Sage of Alexandria, after a long discussion (ch. 3—6), being rather equivocal. Cf. also I, 106 n. (C. 123 n.).

different ways, is, according to Azariah, just this absolute nought.[5] And in reality, even the expression "previous to Creation" is not the right one, because Time itself is one of the works of Creation[6] like Space and its derivatives, so that there was no *before* at all.

Also after the Creation God has not left the world to itself, but it always was and always will be guided by His higher will.[7] This guidance may be indirect, as God has created Nature and its laws to perform in an established order all the different tasks, which He has purposed. Therefore, such happenings in the world as rain, winds, pestilence, famine, premature death have no moral significance in themselves, being merely the accidental consequences of natural causes.[8] Even so, they are, as is Nature in general, only the instruments of God's general will.[9] On the other hand, if He wishes, He may sometimes use these events for a special purpose and then, although apparently unchanged, they cease to be accidental and become moral

[5] II, 118 (C. 389 seq.): האמנה לכל המינים אחרי שזוג ההכנים . . . פתרו טלות תהו ובהו הבל ואין כאמור . . לך: אמור להם למטרשים אותם חומר וצורה בנשמם דברי אלהים חיים לדמיוני היונים בהיולי וצורותיו המתהלפות כי בתחילה טכבוד תורתם לא יבינו בזה אל פעולות אלהינו. Azariah here rejects the Aristotelian conception of a primordial matter and form as he had before rejected (see previous note) the Platonic theory of the primordial Hyle alone, as then introduced again into Jewish philosophy by Leone Ebreo (in his third Dialogue). Cf. also PFLAUM, *loc. cit.*, p. 123 seq. As to Azariah's own different interpretation of Plato, based upon Marsilio Ficino, the then authoritative Platonist cf. I, 105 seq. (C. 123).

[6] II, 195 (C. 462): ואדרבא קודם לכן (לששת ימי בראשית) אילו יונח מן האפשר . . . אך אין ספק שהנאות הוא להאמין בו דמז נפתר כי לכל יודעי בינה הזמן אשר בלעדיו אין קדימה ואחור הוא מכלל הנבראות ככל צבאות השמים והארץ. Cf. also I, 84 (C. 100).

[7] This eternal dualism between God and world is one of the most fundamental views in Azariah's philosophy. It is true that we find passages like this (I, 5): עד אמרו דבר ראוי להשתכלות והוא שלהיות האלהיות נראה בכל נמצא הנה העולם כולו שמותיו ית' . . . Yet Azariah is very far from any really pantheistic conception, although pantheism had received already in his time a very articulate formulation in the works of Giordano Bruno (whose chief activity was indeed after the death of Azariah), and, earlier to a lesser extent in the Dialogues of Leone. Cf. B. ZIMMELS, *Leo Hebraeus* (Leipzig 1886), p. 59 seq. On the other hand we miss in Azariah's conception of the guidance of the world by God any mediator, such as the Philonic Logos or even the aristotelian-medieval "Active Intelligence." Cf. also II, 99 (C. 371). For him the relation between Creator and Created was quite immediate. The old fundamental question, how could this imperfect world have been created directly by an absolutely perfect Creator, seems not to have seriously troubled him.

[8] Cf. especially I, 12–14 (C. 13–15).

[9] I, 12 (C. 13): המשתמש גם כן בסבות הטבעיות בעדרנת הכלי. See also II, 100 (C. 379). Cf. Coluccio Salutati (De nobil. leg. et med., c. 31): Est natura, sunt et homines Dei cuncta facientis indubitaliter instrumenta.

phenomena. Furthermore, there are extraordinary cases when God, either to punish evildoers or to give a warning to the perceiving world, changes the ordinary course of Nature, and does things which cannot be explained by natural causes. So is, for instance, the earthquake not merely a "disease in the element of earth" or any other result of purely natural causes, as the Greek philosophers try to make us believe, but the effect of God's special will, as had been frequently emphasized by the Teachers in the Talmud. Or at least, says Azariah—and here appears clearly his synthetical attitude toward Jewish and Greek thought[10]—let us admit that earthquakes come sometimes from God and sometimes only from Nature. In this latter case, of course, they too are merely accidents without meaning.[11] The obvious objection, that thus many earthquakes and other natural evils would be inflicted upon the world undeservedly, is met by Azariah with a quotation from Philo,[12] that God when creating the world disregarded the little evil connected with the elements for the sake of the much greater good they bring. But how can Azariah reconcile this Philonic theory with his own entirely different notion of the immediate Creation and the continual direct control by God of everything that happens in the world? Is there not rather a limitation of God's Omnipotence in His inability to create more perfect elements and even afterwards to alter them according to His will? This inconsistency, as many others, Azariah must leave unexplained.[13]

At any rate these elements, four in all,[14] once created by God are invested with certain qualities which in a natural way make up the

[10] The eclectic method of Azariah is apparent further in sentences like these: (I, 85; C. 100): ... העולם השכלי (אשר לרעתי יקרואוהו חכמי האמת עולם האצילות והספירות). (I, 86; C. 101): הלא על קריאת השטות אם בן הוא או אצילות ואור וספירה ואידיאה כדבר אפלטון ... בהספים החכמים על הענינים לא נחוש אם בכנוייהם איש מרעהו יסרדו. The mention of the light in this connection was due perhaps to the teachings of Leone Ebreo and Patritius (1529–1597).

[11] I, 13: או לסחות נסור מישתי הקצוות אל האמצע ונאמר ... סבותיהם לא אל האלהים תסיד ולא אל הטבע תמיד, אבל פעמים יבואו ממנו ית' ופעמים כיתר הפעולות הטבעיות מדרך הקרי.

[12] Cf. C. 14 n.

[13] Nevertheless, this whole discussion greatly impressed R. David Gans. Cf. his צמח דוד on the year של"א (1571): דברים נפלאים מדבר הרעשים.

[14] Azariah remains here on the established ground of the Aristotelian-medieval physics. Even when he mentions some existing doubts as to this point he quotes merely Maimonides and other medieval authorities (I, 163; C. 179), not taking any notice of the theory of his contemporary, Cardanus (1501–1571), then so much discussed. The latter reduced the number of the elements to three, declaring fire to be not a substance but an accident. On the other hand when we find Azariah distinguishing

construction of the sublunar world, and determine by their different combinations the infinite variety in the physical world. By reason of their weight the things composed out of the heavier elements are placed in strata, lower than those, built up from the lighter ones. Therefore, the terrestrial globe composed chiefly of earth and water, the heaviest of the four elements, is on the bottom, and, as the same conditions are prevailing all around, it is also in the centre of the universe.[15] It is surrounded by the lighter elements, air and fire, and their compounds. Above those in the lunar and the higher spheres there is a fifth element (the ether).[16] Here below, we find man, the most earthly creature, made chiefly from earth, the heaviest element, as is implied by his very name, Adam, in accordance with the old Biblical etymology.[17] Man is, therefore, the very core and centre of life, for whose sake everything has been created to serve his needs. Was Azariah aware, how deep a meaning lay in this simultaneousness of bottom and centre? We do not know, for even the things hitherto mentioned have rather to be guessed from general considerations than to be read in clear statements of the author who only deals with them incidentally in connection with discussions on other subjects.

Being thus situated in the centre of the universe, the earth as well as mankind on it, is subject to the different influences of the animated[18] celestial bodies, which are situated in the spheres which encompass the globe. Although Azariah by no means expresses clearly his views

between the four elements only according to their weight without any reference to the other common medieval distinction of temperature, this was due perhaps to his silent opposition to the theories of this philosopher or to those of another contemporary, Telesius (1508—1588) who declared that heat is the chief universal principle in nature. Also the new elements introduced by the alchemists have no place in his physical conception. It seems that this occult science did not exercise upon him the sort of attraction that it did upon many of his contemporaries, notably among the Gentiles. But cf. his views upon the practical Cabbala later on.

[15] I, 145 (C. 161): כי תפקח עיניך על הכדור המקשה שבו יציירו האקלטים עם היטים והנחלים וכל יותר החלקים המתיחסים אל יסוד העפר והטים אשר לכובד חטרם ברצון הבורא ירדו טטה טטה.

[16] He says about the heavens (I, 149; C. 165): בהתאמת אצלם דעת החוקר (Aristotle) הטונח המסורסם מהרכבת ארבעה היסודות שאינם רק נשם חטשי. I, 164 (C. 179) he speaks merely about: בכל נמצא תחת הירח.

[17] I, 183 (C. 194): הכלל המתוקן והמקובל אל כל חכמי לב שהדבר יכונה על שם החלק הגובר במחברת, כמו שכנוי האדם הוא מן האדמה המרובה על יתר היסודות במתכונת...

[18] He quotes Philo (I, 84; C. 99): גם המפק... בצבא השמים אם הם בעלי נפש משכלת אם אין, הנה... הוכיח כי כן... Cf. also II, 60 (C. 332).

about the nature and the function of the heavenly spheres, we shall not err, if we assume, that he accepts with more or less clearness the dominating theories of the medieval scholastics. Accordingly, the earth is encompassed by the spheres in the following order: Moon, Mercury, Venus, Sun, Mars, Jupiter, Saturn, the fixed stars and the primum mobile,[19] the latter by its motion influencing all the others and especially also the motion of the single planets. These last, although fixed within their own spheres have a so-called גלגל הקפה (epicycle)[20] apart, thus rotating round their axes and at the same time participating in the general movement of their spheres.[21] To support this view Azariah quotes against Aristotle and some Talmudic authorities not only the official Ptolemaic astronomy, but especially also the elucidation given to it by Thomas Aquinas. Although the Bible calls the moon "the lesser light," which seems to imply that it is second only to the sun and far superior to all the stars, Azariah explains, in full accord with medieval astronomy, that the brightness of the moon is a mere result of its lesser distance from the earth, and that it only shines by light, reflected from the sun.[22]

The highest authorities taught that the spheres exercise an enormous influence upon the earth and its inhabitants and Azariah sees no reason to doubt it. The tides of the seas, for instance, are commanded by the movement of the primum mobile as well as (quoting from Maimonides) by the general influence of the moon upon the element

[19] Azariah mentions besides the seven planets also the: גלגל המזלות or הכוכבים העיוטדים and the הגלגל היוטי המקיף בכל.

[20] Cf. P. DUHEM, *Le Système du Monde* I (Paris 1914), p. 125 seq. Azariah thus appears to have had some appreciation of the epicycloidic theory of the Ptolemaic astronomy notwithstanding the then widespread ignorance of this complicated theory (cf. S. OPPENHEIM, *Das astronomische Weltbild im Wandel der Zeiten*, 2. ed., Leipzig 1912, p. 64) and regardless of the opposition of some Arabic astronomers and of Gersonides (I 163, C. 179). (The Arabic opposition was known to Azariah from Isaac Israeli's יסוד עולם, I. himself concurring in the ruling theory, cf. י"ע ed. Berlin 1848, pp. 15 and 25 seq.) Cf. also *Moreh*, p. II, ch. 29; M. DELAMBRE, *Histoire de l'Astronomie du Moyen-Age* (Paris 1819), p. 171 seq. and DUHEM, *loc. cit.*, p. 130 seq.

[21] Cf. I, 150 seq. and 140 (C. 166 and 156).

[22] Cf. the interesting note ט"ל, p. 113 seq. (C. 117 seq.). Also his underestimate of the size of the sun as being only $166\frac{3}{8}$ times larger than the earth (I, 263; C. 273), is only a repetition of an erroneous hypothesis of Ptolemy, due to the latter's error, that the distance between the sun and the earth is equivalent to 1,210 radii of earth, while in fact we measure to-day 23,300 radii on the average. Cf. DUHEM, *loc. cit.*, II, p. 34.

of water,[23] and, in like manner, Azariah does not hesitate to ascribe to the celestial bodies a lucky or sinister influence on the fate of mankind and of single nations. He does not tell us, whether or not he accepted all the doctrines of that "classical age" (Olgiati) of judicial astrology about the influence of the stars on the destinies of individuals and the ability of man to foretell the future by a close observation of the different movements in the universe.[24] But he does not doubt in the least that such extraordinary changes as eclipses, although they too can be explained by natural reasons, imply a kind of warning for the peoples of the earth, the Jews, as we shall see, being the only exception to the rule.[25]

As a matter of fact, however, we never can really tell what is natural and what preter- and supernatural. Our knowledge of nature is so small and so uncertain, that we can hardly deduce from it any consequences in matters of belief. Despite all his rationalistic views, despite his ironical refusal to accept poetical narratives about natural phenomena as scientifically true,[26] and despite—what is more important—the preference given by him to the experience of the senses as compared with merely logical proofs and considerations,[27] he is yet extremely sceptical of the absolute value of any human science.[28]

[23] Cf. I, 158 (C. 173 seq.).

[24] The fact that he kept aloof from alchemy does not prove anything as regards his attitude to astrology. E.g. Leone Ebreo rejected every kind of magic and yet he developed a whole astrological theory in his second Dialogh. Cf. also ZIMMELS, *loc. cit.*, p. 56. On the other hand Azariah most likely knew the distinction made, shortly before him, by Pomponatius who admitted signs given for extra-ordinary events like the birth of Jesus, but denied the ordinary individual astrology. Cf. M. CARRIÈRE, *Die philosophische Weltanschauung der Reformationszeit* (2. ed., Leipzig 1887), p. 84.

[25] II, 174 (C. 445): ולא בלבד המקרים היוצאים מסדור השבע כאותם שזכרנו יחשבו בהראותם למוסתים על עתידות ניראות אבל גם ההוים בנוהג שבעולם יתוארו על ככה, כמו לקות המאורות אשר סבתן היא התמצע הירח בין השמש לארץ או הארץ בין השמש לירח וכו'. See also the passages quoted in note 60. Cf. however, II, 76 n. (C. 348 n.).

[26] ל"ט, p. 33 (C. 35): איך באמת ובחמים נשחק להמון המשוררים כגוי אובד עצות ליתים קדמונים על הזיותיהם שאילן תות האדם מדם חללי זוג העוכבים הכבליים... וביוצא באלה מן המעמים של תהו אשר דמו על סעולות השבע.

[27] Cf. I, 154 (C. 170): הרי לפנינו הפכמת האלהיים בשתי האומות נגד מה שהתבאר אל החוקרים הנזכרים לא בלבד כן הסופת כי גם מן החוש ובלי האסטרולאביאו... Still a man like Salutati held the opposite view of the Middle-Ages. Cf. A. MARTIN, *Mittelalterliche Welt- und Lebensanschauung im Spiegel der Schriften Col. Sal.* (München und Berlin 1913), p. 96.

[28] I, 165 n. (C. 178 seq.): והרי זה כלו עדות כי אין בחקות השמים מדע אנושי אשר תאבר כי הוא ואין זולתו אמתי בשלוח. Cf. also I, 19, 149 (C. 20, 165). This epistemological scepticism of Azariah has as little to do with the widespread philosophical scepticism of his age (the first two parts of Montaigne's "Essays" appeared 1580, only five years after the ע"ט)

Against those doubtful achievements of the human mind stand the religious creeds, originating in divine revelation, as firm rocks of absolute certainty. Therefore, is the preternatural not less real, but perhaps even more so than the natural. Hence, Azariah does not deny at all the existence of demons.[29] On the contrary, he so firmly believes in the interference of spirits in human affairs, caused sometimes by all kind of sorcery—no exceptional occurence in a period when thousands of "witches" were burnt at the stake—that he makes out of it an argument against a certain theory of the Pythagoreans, as promoting witchcraft.[30] Still more firmly does Azariah believe in miracles. We have already seen that he was convinced that God sometimes changes the ordinary course of Nature for moral reasons. So little does he doubt that miracles are performed for the sake of Israel that he apologizes when it occurred to him to give a natural reason for an unexpected recovery of his wife and to compare it with an undoubted miracle of Elishah.[31] The immortality of the individual soul being a perfect certainty,[32] the religious creed in the resurrection

as his empirical view with the future development of Francis Bacon's (born 1561) empirical philosophy. It was, on the contrary, a belittlement of human reason, as then emphasized by the leading men both of the Reformation and Counterreformation, in order to prove the superiority of the divine revelation. It may be, however, that Azariah was influenced in this kind of scepticism as well as in his empiricism by that "founder of the modern empirical psychology" (Lange and Höffding), Johannes Ludovicus Vives (1492—ca. 1540), whose commentary on Augustinus he quotes twice.

[29] As well known this was even a matter of serious halakhic codification in the times of Azariah and afterwards, cf. Yoreh Deah 179, esp. (19). On the other hand, also among the Christians of that time even such an independent and usually unprejudiced thinker as Jean Bodin was firmly convinced of the existence of demons and he devoted to this subject a special treatise, his "Démonomanie" (1581). Not to speak about Giordano Bruno (cf. his "De magia") and others.

[30] מ"ל, p. 101 n. (C. 107 n.): אשר לבד מהיותו הלק רע ושטאלי נמצא בו נ"כ הכנה לכשפים אצל הנפשות אשר בשקידתן על רשומם תתפעלנה מהטה. Cf. also I, 80 (C. 95): מטטרא דמטאטא.

[31] Cf. I, 19 and II, 157 seq. (C. 20, 428 seq.). Cf. the interesting argumentation of Ficino who had a great influence upon Azariah (cf. מ"ל, p. 15 n.; C. 17 n.) in his "De christiana religione" ch. 10: Noli ... mirari, quod Marsilius Ficinus, philosophiae studiosus miracula introducat ... Sunt autem propria rerum naturalium rationes, quae secundum naturam sunt; divinarum vero, quae super naturam huiusmodi sunt, tum metaphysicae probationes, tum vel maxime miracula etc. Cf. also Fr. Olgiati, *L'anima dell'umanesimo e dell'rinascimento* (Milan 1924), p. 591.

[32] I, 83 (C. 98): המוב כי הנפש בלי ספק נשארת אחר המות (Philo's) דברו. Thus he does not even think worthy of discussion the controversy between the Averroists and Alexandrists about immortality, which had stirred all the leading spirits in Italy a few decades previously and which was indeed the "chief problem of the philosophy of the Renaissance"

of the dead is for him only so far a matter of doubt, that he cannot definitely decide whether all without distinction or only those who were righteous in their lives will arise from the dust.[33] The world hereafter is for him not only as certain a reality as anything in the natural world, but in fact the ultimate goal and purpose of man and, therefore, of all Creation.[34]

II

However, this natural world was at least one reality out of many. And what he saw in it was merely a reflection of the common opinions of his contemporaries. Although his מ״ע was published thirty years after Copernicus' " De revolutionibus " and in the lifetime of Giordano Bruno, his geocentric and anthropocentric view[35] represents so much the general belief of the age, that such a distinguished astronomer as Tyho de Brahe[36] could still many years later, endeavour to sustain it with scientific proofs. And as for the four elements no man, besides the alchemistic dreamers, in that period before Joachim Jung and Robert Boyle, thought of a larger number. Consequently, Azariah had so far only to accept the achievements of the Greek and Arabic astronomers and physicists, as acknowledged by the whole Western world. Even the more difficult task of reconciling these ruling theories with many different opinions expressed by the Talmud or even by

(E. GOTHEIN, *Schriften zur Kulturgeschichte der Renaissance, Reformation und Konterreformation*, II, Berlin 1924, p. 106). Neither does he allude to the theory of Pomponatius in his then very famous " Tractatus de immortalitate animae " (1516), (which, as Fiorentino says, was rather a treatise " De mortalitate ") that immortality is a religious but not a scientific truth. Azariah was thus in agreement with the official view of the Church which in 1513 had restated the dogma of individual immortality and always rejected any duality of Truth.

[33] I, 111 seq. n. (C. missing) ודעת קבלתנו בתחיה שתשוב (הנפש) אל הגוף אשר היה שם אהלה עם היות מחלוקת אם תהיה אף לרשעים או לצדיקים בלבד שהוא הנראה קרוב אליה ביותר. Cf. also I, 18 seq. (C. 92 seq.).

[34] Cf. II, 106 seq. (C. 358) and I, 99 (C. 115 seq.).

[35] It is worth mentioning, that Azariah himself quotes (I, 145; C. 160) the very remarkable sentence of R. Hamnuna (Zohar III, 10ᵃ) דהא כל ישובא מתנלגלא בעגולא דכדור which notwithstanding the opposite endeavours of DUHEM (*loc. cit.*, V, p. 143 seq.) cannot be understood in their original Aramaic except as implying the earth's rotation round its axis. Azariah, however, makes use of it only as evidence of the earth's rotundity. This is the more characteristic, as Azariah certainly knew from the " Praeparatio Evangelica " of Eusebius (1. XV, c. 58), a book quoted by him many times, that already some of the Greek philosophers taught, that the earth rotates round its own axis. Cf. also DUHEM, *loc. cit.*, I, pp. 25 and 404 seq.

[36] His chief work " *Astronomiae instauratae progymnasmata* " appeared 1589.

the Bible itself, had been performed long before Azariah by his greater philosophical predecessors.

In one respect, however, he was facing a problem, new yet unsolved. The wonderful travels and discoveries throughout the century before the composition of the מ"ע had widened the geographical horizon of mankind in an unprecedented manner and abolished some of the most established creeds of centuries. Not to accept these new results was impossible for a man like Azariah. But how accept them if they were so much in contradiction to what was taught by the Talmud and the Midrashim?

Even herein Azariah needed not to be an extreme innovator. He had merely to apply the same method which was used by his predecessors in regard to many other remarkable utterances of the Rabbis, as far as they too were in open contradiction with the achievements of Greek and Arabic science. Azariah emphasizes again and again, while quoting many of the highest authorities in medieval Judaism (notably the last Geonim and Maimonides), that not everything uttered by the Teachers in the Talmud represents an old tradition reaching back to Moses on Sinai—which would be an unmistakeable truth,[37]—but that many sayings simply express the personal and possibly erroneous opinion of a single Rabbi (or of a single period). It is useless, according to Azariah, to explain away those divergencies, as the honour of the Talmud is better safeguarded by admitting the possibility of a few erroneous personal statements, than by violating the truth.[38] Certainly, that was in Azariah's time, although less in Italy than elsewhere, a rather daring point of view which required

[37] Azariah is here reflecting the habit of his age, which regarded every ancient source as authentic beyond doubt. And if the great Humanists themselves did not criticize the antique Greek sources (cf. G. VOIGT, *Die Wiederbelebung des klassischen Altertums*, 3. ed., Berlin 1893, p. 365 seq.); how much more then was such an attitude necessary towards the Holy Scriptures, every letter of which was of divine origin. Even Jean Bodin says (Methodus c. 8): "Ac tanti est apud me Mosis unius auctoritas, ut omnibus omnium philosophorum scriptis ac sententiis longe anteponam." Cf. also J. GUTTMANN in *MGWJ* 49 (1905), pp. 315 seq. and 459 seq. Lorenzo Valla with his relatively radical criticism of Livy as well as of the Vulgate is merely an exception which proves the rule. And even he was ready to recant quickly everything he had said.

[38] Cf. especially ch. XI which is thus summarised by Azariah: כבוד חכמינו לעולם ינהלו עם הכצא לעת כיום אנשי התבונה והנסיון נוטים מקצת דבריהם אשר כתבו על עצמי קצת נמצאות ומקריהן, כי הנה לא דברו בם כמו בדיני התורה על פי מסורת טפיני וקבלה נבואית אשר לה בודאי בלתי הרהור ומחקר תכרע כל ברך, אבל כפי חכמת האדם והשערתו, והיא היתה המסורסת לפעמים ביתים או בגלילות ההמה, לבד טהיות גם בן אשר כי דבריהם בכל או בקצת ייטיבו מאלה.

no little courage. And it is enough to compare with it the similar, almost simultaneous attempt of R. Moses Isserles in his תורת העולה where all the devices of pilpulistic interpretation are used in order to reconcile traditional views with new ones, especially in regard to geographical facts, and thus to avoid any admission of a possible error in the Talmud. Azariah peremptorily declines to follow him in this course.[39]

To be sure, the method of Azariah was more in accord with historical truth, but Isserles, in reinterpreting the old documents so that they might seem to correspond with newly discovered facts, followed the traditional method of Judaism, more than did Azariah. The latter, while leaving the firm ground of tradition, and yet not daring to go to the other extreme of denying the incontestable reliability of every word in the Bible, came into new difficulties. Thus when trying to reconcile the obvious fact of the new discoveries with the old *nil novi* as well as with his conviction of the superiority of the ancient times, he wants to prove that all the new worlds were known in remote antiquity and merely forgotten later. He, therefore, maintains that the voyage of King Solomon's fleet to Ophir was a circumnavigation of the world, like that of Del Cano, the surviving captain of Magellan's expedition (1519–1522),[40] and that it was performed in the same period of three years.[41]

[39] In Azariah's polemics against this work of the great Polish Halakhist we detect an unusually sharp note. Referring to its title he writes (I, 166; C. 180): ואטרתי עליו אם תעלה עולה לה' אל אטת תעלנה, כי הנה טוב מאד להחריש מהצדיק צדיקים בטעמות לא יתכנו.

[40] Azariah's description of this voyage (I, 145 seq.; C. 161 seq.), based upon a secondary source (Ulloa's biography of Charles V.), contains numerous inaccuracies. He does not tell us that the ship "Victoria" of Del Cano was only one of the five which left San Lucar under the command of Magellan (whose name does not figure at all in his account), and he gives the number of the crew on it כד' מאות איש, while the boat with its 85 tons could not have carried such a number. In fact, 237 men alltogether left Spain with Magellan and only 18 came back with Del Cano. The journey covered the period from September 20, 1519 to September 8, 1522, not just שלש שנים כשני שכיר. The words: "Primus circumdedisti me" were not chosen by Del Cano himself, but were engraved on a crest, given him by Charles V. Also his return route was around Africa, and not through the Mediterranean Sea, as supposed by Azariah. Cf. the minute description of the voyage by Antonio Pigafetta, one of the surviving members of the expedition (Engl. transl. in *The Earliest Voyages Around the World*, ed. by Ph. F. Alexander, Cambridge, 1916, pp. 1, 5, 84, 206). We shall see later how Azariah supposed a ship could travel from the Red Sea to the Mediterranean.

[41] I, 148 (C. 164): הרי מכל מה שזכרנו בענין זה כי אנית שלמה הנזכרת גם היא היתה נוסעת על האוקן חאטור מן הפאה ואל הפאה של מטע האניה ויטוריאה, ובכן העולם הנזכר אינו חדש כי אם אצלנו, ואטר רב החובל

In this connection Azariah shows a considerable knowledge of geography, a science then already highly developed in his country. It is true that in many fundamental questions he still clings to the antique conceptions. His chief source e. g. for geographical distances is still the old Ptolemy, with only a few corrections or rather additions made by some of his famous contemporaries. So the inhabitable Eastern hemisphere, in his opinion, extends over 180 degrees longitude, from the Canary Islands to the Eastern coast of China (Canton).[42] Notwithstanding all the new explorations—which, as well known, were facilitated to a large extent just by this illusion—the world was still convinced that the distance between those two points was equal in either direction. Accordingly also the distance between any given two points in the Eastern hemisphere, reckoned by degrees of geographical longitude, must have covered more degrees than in our modern geography. No wonder, therefore, that Azariah referring exclusively to the data of the Ptolemaic geography, places Jerusalem at 66° long. (from the Canary Islands), Jaffa at 65° 40′, Cairo at 62° and Seville on the other end of the Mediterranean at 7° 15′.[43] This is entirely based upon the measurement of Ptolemy, according to which the total distance from Gibraltar (7° 30′) to Iskanderun on the Syrian coast (69° 30′) amounted to 62 degrees, while we count it nowadays as 41° 41′. This necessarily led to many further mistakes in detail.[44] Azariah adhered to this erroneous supposition as did all his contemporaries,[45] disregarding entirely not only the previous measurements of Eratosthenes and Strabo and the later ones of a few Arabic geographers,[46] all of whom came much nearer the truth, but also one of the highest achievements of European medieval geography, the "Alphosine Tables" (although composed, as is well known, under

אתה ראשון מבבתני לא צדק כי אם אחרי שוב הארצות ההנה להתגלות כיום הזה, אשנם בבחינת האמת כבר נמצא מי שקדם אליו ביטי שלמה. It is worth mentioning that 30 years later a well known Christian geographer in Germany, E. SCHMIDT, declared, that the New World was known to Homer, Plato, Aristotle, Virgil, Seneca and especially to King Solomon as the land of Ophir. Cf. S. GÜNTHER, *Der Humanismus in seinem Einfluß auf die Entwicklung der Erdkunde* in *Geographische Zeitschrift*, 6 (1900), p. 69.

[42] Cf. I, 152 (C. 167).

[43] Cf. I, 146 seq. and 155 (C. 162 seq. and 171).

[44] Cf. O. PESCHEL, *Geschichte der Erdkunde* (München 1865), p. 50 seq.

[45] So the famous maps of Jacopo Gastaldi (1543) and Girolamo Ruscelli (1561).

[46] E. g. Alkhwarizmi (9th century) with his $51\frac{1}{2}$ degrees maximum distance. Cf. S. GÜNTHER, *Geschichte der Erdkunde* (Leipzig und Wien 1914), p. 49.

the direction of a Jew, Isaac Ibn Said in the thirteenth century) which had reduced the maximum length of the Mediterranean to 52 degrees.[47] His measures in geographical latitude, however, are, as those of the Ptolemaic geography in general, nearly correct. Thus he locates Jerusalem at 31° 40′ latitude, Jaffa at 32° 6′, Cairo at 30° and Seville at 37° 50′. Only in regard to the site of antique Carthage (32° 26′) he is curiously mistaken. Also he follows Maurus and the other contemporary commentators of Ptolemy's Geography in their overestimate of the earth's circumference, as contrasted with the underestimate of the great Alexandrian himself.[48]

It need not be said, that Azariah believed firmly in the rotundity of the earth. That might still have been doubted by a man like Columbus, but could by no means be contested after Magellan. He knows also that the globe is inhabited on both hemispheres, and consequently has no doubt as to the existence of the so-called "antipodes," while in the Middle-Ages even those who were inclined to

[47] Cf. C. A. Beazley, *The Dawn of Modern Geography*, III (Oxford 1906), p. 501, n. 3. The Alphonsine Tables were very often reprinted in the sixteenth century. Cf. Delambre, *loc. cit.*, p. 249. And indeed Azariah himself quotes them twice in his works. Furthermore, it is remarkable, that Azariah took no notice of Israeli's "Jesod Olam" (*loc. cit.*, f. 19) which gives the longitude of Jerusalem as 66° 30′ and that of Toledo as 28° (instead of 11° in the Ptolemaic Geography), so that the difference in longitude between the two points would be 38° 30′, a figure nearer the truth than any of the others.

[48] Azariah's measure (I, 263; C. 273) of 5,650 German or 22,600 Italian miles (probably equal to nautical miles today) would result in more than 41,900 km for the Equator, while it is in fact, slightly less than 40,000 km. At the same time Ptolemy's 180,000 stadia (cf. his Geography I, 11, 2) if multiplied by 210, the number of metres in a stadium, makes only 37,800 km. Cf. Günther, *Geschichte der Erdkunde*, p. 23 seq.; Duhem, *loc. cit.*, II, 6—8; Wright, *The geographical Lore of the Time of the Crusades* (New York 1925), p. 17. [Notwithstanding the almost universal agreement that Ptolemy has underestimated the size of the circumference we may venture perhaps to remark, that if we take as a basis for the stadium of Eratosthenes (total 252,000) and of Poseidonios (total 240,000) not 157. 5 or 158, but 168 metres, as assumed lately by Thalamas, then Eratosthenes' measure will be too great and Poseidonios' (= 40,320 km) nearly correct. The same would then be the case with Ptolemy's computation, because his 180,000 stadia are merely a reduction of Poseidonios' 240,000 as result of an increase of $\frac{1}{3}$ on each stadium.] Consequently Azariah's acceptance of Rava's שיתא אלפי פרסי הוה עלמא (b. Ps. 94 r.) against the decision of the Gemara, while he assumes that those 6,000 parasangs are equal to 6,000 German or 24,000 Italian miles means nothing else, but a further increase in the wrong direction. The opinion of Rava, however, has found advocates also in more recent times. Cf. Günther, *Studien zur mathematischen und physikalischen Geographie* (Halle a. d. S. 1877), p. 102.

see in the earth a globe mostly believed that the inhabitable land is plunged in an enormous ocean, although they differed greatly as to the relative proportion of land and water. Furthermore, Azariah is quite sure, that the "oikumene" extends to the South far beyond the tropic of Cancer and to the North beyond the northern polar circle, which regions were regarded previously as unfit for human settlement on account of their temperature.[49] As a result of these considerations he sees clearly that the ancient belief of the Agada that Jerusalem was at the very centre of the earth ("the navel of the earth" Ez. 38, 12) was not to be understood literally.[50] He is further not unaware of the obvious difficulty that even with regard to the old oikumene—which, at any rate, included the bulk of the human race—this assumption could not be literally maintained. For in the supposed general extension of 0°–180° long. and 24°–66° lat. of the inhabitable land, Jerusalem, said to be situated, at 66° long. and about 32° lat., was by no means in the centre. In order to find some kind of scientific justification Azariah introduces the ancient divisions of "climates." According to the differences in insolation due to the inclination of the earth's axis, the medieval geography disregarding the modifying influences of the air and ocean currents, defined between the Equator and the North Pole 24 "climates" of different width, each representing, as we approach the Pole, an increase of half an hour in the longest day.[51] Azariah accepting this Ptolemaic division states that among the seven "climates" covering the boundaries of the oikumene (here between 16° and 48° lat.) Jerusalem is placed in the fourth or middle one.[52] But how many other countries were situated in the same "climate."!

[49] Cf. I, 145 and 152 seq. (C. 161 and 197 seq.).

[50] Cf. I, 152 seq. (C. 167 seq.).

[51] Thus the first climate covered $8\frac{1}{2}$ lat., the 24th only 3'. Cf. J. HANN, *Handbook of Climatology*, I (Engl. transl. New York 1903), p. 91 seq. and PAULY-WISSOWA-KROLL, *Realenzyklopädie*, XI (1922), p. 838 seq. Cf. also Jesod Olam *loc. cit.*, f. 18. The remark of CASSEL (p. 168) is quite mistaken.

[52] I, 161 (C. 176): ועוד לחבב א"י על בעליה ולתת כבוד לשפה ושעם אל מעלתה אמרו היותה באמצע, עם כי לא במחונה או בחבל תמדוד מנה אל סביבותיה יספיק לנו שהיא באקלים חרביעי ואמצעי לכל השבעה, אשר על כן אוירו מחכים בשוה המזג. Azariah probably follows here Esthori Ha-Parchi's כפתור ופרח, quoted by him several times in other connections. Cf. ed. Berlin (1852) f. 18 r.; ed. Jerusalem (1897), pp. 102—105. But Esthori's conceptions are based upon the older theory which divided the Northern Hemisphere only into seven climates, the first beginning at the Equator. On the other hand, Azariah, who accepts the differences of half an hour in the length of the day, must necessarily approve the medieval division into twenty four climates. In fact, however, neither Ptolemy's (Agathodemon's) fourth

On the other hand, in stating that the inhabitable region extends northwards to about 10° south of the North Pole, A. merely follows an hypothesis accepted in his time, because even if he knew—which is uncertain—of the recent discoveries of the English travellers Chancellor (1553) and Borrough (1556), who had reached Nova Zembla, there still remained a considerable distance to be covered before the above mentioned polar region was reached. In discussing these problems he is also able to rectify many rather confused notions of the medieval Jewish scholars, especially in the Franco-German countries, as regards geographical conditions in the distant Palestine and Babylon.[53] But this does not prevent him from making a few mistakes of his own. Thus he assumes that Parvaim, mentioned in the Bible, is none other than Peru (an opinion shared also by a few non-Jewish scholars of that time), and that Ezion Geber near Elath on the Red Sea was at the same time near the shore of the Mediterranean or at least connected with it by rivers.[54] Like almost all of his contemporaries, he believed in the existence of the mythical country of Prester John of Ethiopia, identical with our Abyssinia,[55] as well as in that of the lost ten tribes of Israel.[56]

climate beginning at 36° lat. nor even that of Sacrobosco (well known to Azariah) at 43° 40′ lat. includes Jerusalem, which is situated, as mentioned above, at about 32°. Cf. WRIGHT, *loc. cit.*, p. 454 seq.

[53] Cf. e.g. the curious explanations of Rashi and R. Tam to מטרא בטערבא סהדא רבה מרת (b. Sabb. 65 r.).

[54] I, 146 (C. 162): וארץ אופיר ופרוים אשר מפנה אנית תרשיש אחת לשלש שנים ... היתה מביאה אליו זהב וכסף ... אין ספק שהיא מדינת הפי"רו הנמצאת בעולם חדש. Cf. CASSEL's note ibid. and also II, 149 (C. 420). I, 149 (C. 163): כי חרשי העץ אשר בעציון היו קרובים אל הים הנזכר או יושבים על נחרות הולכים אליו והיתה להם הכנת עצים (כי אולי על כן נקראה עציון) ואומנות יתרה לעשות אניות טובות לצורך טהלכי תרשיש.

[55] Cf. I, 181 and II, 203 (C. 192 and 474). As to the identification of the anonymous author therein mentioned with Sebastian Münster and the reasons why Azariah does not mention his name, cf. Cassel's Register, p. 170 and J. PERLES, *Beiträge zur Geschichte der hebräischen und aramäischen Studien* (München 1884), p. 40 seq. The widespread belief in Prester John was even supported by apparent facts, as the sailors of Vasco da Gama's famous expedition had brought home not long before, what seemed to be, reliable narratives from the natives of Mozambique about numerous cities founded by Prester John along the coast and his vast realm inland. Cf. R. H. MAJOR, *The Discoveries of Prince Henry the Navigator* (London 1877), p. 547 seq. It was then already identified with Abyssinia which corresponds to the frontier given by Azariah. Cf. the chapters on Africa and Abyssinia in the then very popular "Theatrum mundi" by Abraham Ortellius, published not long before, but already quoted by Azariah. Cf. further in general S. GÜNTHER, *Geschichte der Erdkunde*, pp. 57, n. 5 and 72, n. 2 and WRIGHT, *loc. cit.*, p. 283 seq. As to the Italian Jews, besides the narratives well known to them of David Reubeni, cf. ZUNZ, *GS* I, 175 no. 60.

[56] Cf. his interesting discussion I, 181 seq. (C. 193 seq.).

III

Of Nature outside of man, of its greatness and essential beauty, he had little understanding. No wonder! If even the medieval Gentiles, an overwhelming majority of whom lived outside of the not numerous and not crowded towns, had, until the thirteenth century[57]—as a result of their exclusively religious orientation—scarcely eyes for natural beauty, we cannot expect such an appreciation from a Jew who probably lived all his life in a relatively crowded Jewish street in Mantua or even in the comparatively spacious Ferrara, that first "modern city" in Europe, a few decades before the institution of the official ghetto. If Azariah happens to speak at all about natural phenomena, he obviously does so out of books, rather than from his own personal experience.[58] When he uses poetical comparisons you feel instantly, that these are not things seen in life, but very common, almost standardized literary similes. And when a thing occurs in his life which upsets it entirely, like the earthquake in Ferrara, he devotes a special investigation to speculations about the origin of earthquakes in general, as contained in different authors, Jewish and non-Jewish, but does not even try to give his own picture of this disastrous experience. It is not Nature by itself, that matters. It is only Nature in relation to man. The earthquake is only a "voice of God" to warn or to punish man. Unusual cosmical phenomena are mainly signs given by God to man.

But in this extremely anthropocentric world there is a place apart for one people, Israel. Although, as we have seen, ready to give up the ancient belief, cherished also by many Christian authorities, whom he eagerly quotes,[59] that Palestine is the centre of the earth, Azariah does not see any reason to abandon the corresponding theory

[57] Cf. J. BURCKHARDT, *The Civilization of the Renaissance in Italy* (Engl. transl. of the 3d ed. London 1890), pp. 298 and 47.

[58] As an illustration of the extent to which his knowledge of nature was for him a *Bildungserlebnis* rather than an *Urerlebnis* (Gundolf), we may give the following (I, 204; C. 215): (צ"ל: מתקייטת) בהדיא אמרו כל בריה שאין לה עצם אינה חיה (נ"ח א) ובחולין ס"ג ב' חדש. Cf. also in the same connection his deduction about the anatomical position of the nose relative to the brain, and the origin of metals. Cf., however, what he writes I, 161 (C. 176) about the situation of the face of a new-born child: ותאמרנה התולדות העבריות.

[59] I, 154 seq. (160 seq.). Cf. further H. EICKEN, *Geschichte und System der mittelalterlichen Weltanschauung* (Stuttgart 1887), p. 622 and WRIGHT, *loc. cit.*, p. 259 seq.

that Israel is the centre of humanity. If man is the chief aim of creation, this aim is best accomplished in Israel and his supreme tasks. Therefore, is Israel under the direct guidance of God and far less dependent on Nature. Consequently, as long as the Jews are faithful to God, natural signs even of cosmical dimensions have no meaning for them. For they neither need warning by such signs, as they have other means to recognise God's will, nor are they always subjected to the ordinary course of Nature, because for them, and for them only, God performs miracles.[60]

This central position of the Jewish people in mankind is not only temporary, but has to be traced back to the very origins of the world and it will last as long as the world itself. Hebrew, is not just one language among many others, but it is the only language created by God himself. It was also the only one in existence until the period of the Tower of Babel, when the other languages came in use, having been invented by man. Thus all other languages are merely of human origin, the Hebrew alone of source divine. No wonder, therefore, that it is by far the most beautiful and perfect of all spoken tongues that have ever existed.[61] As old as the language itself are also both the alphabet (אשורית), in which, decides Azariah, the Torah was

[60] II, 175 (C. 446): והגה ישפח לבנו ותגל נפשנו עדת בני ישראל כי עם אשר בהיותנו טרבים להשוא ככל הגוים אותות השפים ויתר הסימנים אשר להם שיורו בשוה על כלנו, הלא בעשותנו רצון אבינו שבשמים אשר לסגולתו האצילנו לא ימשול ולא יורה עלינו לא נחש ולא קסם כדבר בלעם באומות העולם והנביא בעל לשון הלמודים בישראל (ירמ' י' ב') מאותות השמים אל תחתו. Cf. also I, 16, 19, II, 98 (C. 16, 20, 370).

[61] II, 182 (C. 453): אומר כי עם המצא בעדת הכצינו הראשונים ... טי שחשב כי שבעים הלשון כלם היו גם לפני דור הפלגה, הנה הדעת הגובר ואשר בפי כל ישרים יתרומם הוא כי רק ביטי סלע נתחדשו ברצון האלהים, ועד העת ההיא לא היה בעולם רק לשון הקדש. Among the arguments which Azariah gathers to prove this opinion perhaps the most interesting is that which he learned from his friend Leone Muscato: היות מן הראוי נתינת השלם לשלם ובשרט טאת השלם שהוא הבורא ... כן נצדק בדבורנו שהבורא יח', אשר לא חסר בעולמו רבר מן הנאות לא נמנע מהשפיע על אדם הראשון השלם בטינו ... את הלשון הזה אשר הוא היותר שלם לכטה סגולות שבו וכו'. Cf. further II, 192 (C. 464): ואני לחדוש יקר הנני טוסיף ... טעם נכון בהתיחס תאר קדוש אל לשונגו, והוא כי להיותו בריאה אלהית באדם הראשון טעת ימי בראשית ... ולא טוסכם טבני האדם כיתר הלשונות עם שנלוה להם בם עור האלוהי הנה הם כלם נכונים אל ההספד ככל טעשי אנוש ... והוא לבדו יעמוד עם יתר הנבראות ... ובכן יצדק בו טאר תאר קדוש הטורה קיים ונצחי. That Azariah lays so much stress upon this assertion is due perhaps to the fact, that the general opinion among the Gentiles was bent toward the opposite view. Even Giannozzo Manetti (1396—1459), notwithstanding all his high respect for the Hebrew language and his relatively expert knowledge (cf. U. Cassuto, *Gli Ebrei à Firenze nell'età di rinascimento*, Firenze 1918, p. 275 seq.) professed that all languages as well as scripts were invented by man, when he first felt the need to communicate with his fellow-men. Cf. G. Gentile in his *Giordano Bruno e il pensiero di rinascimento* (Firenze 1920), p. 176.

written originally,[62] and the vowel points which have been afterwards many times forgotten and rediscovered.[63] Arabic and Aramaic[64] are nothing but corrupt derivatives from the original pure Hebrew.[65] When, for example, Galen prides himself on the beauty of his own Greek—which Azariah, as he once confesses,[66] never knew satisfactorily—in comparison with which all the others are like the bleating of cattle or the twittering of birds, Azariah declares this to be mere self-praise and racial complacency.[67] That the same thing might be the case with himself, has never struck Azariah's mind.[68]

However, not for language alone is all mankind indebted to Israel. In fact, all wisdom and science, all culture and civilization, have their common source in the past of the Jewish people. And as King Solomon was the wisest of all men that ever walked on the surface of the earth, so all the main elements of knowledge came to the peoples of the earth from and through Jewish sources.[69] Azariah

[62] Cf. the long discussion in II, 193 seq. (C. 464 seq.). As to the antiquity as well as the eternal future of the Torah cf. his quotations from Philo and Josephus I, 86 (C. 102).

[63] II, 204 (C. 476): כל דברי החכמים ... יצדקו יחדיו שהנקודות נתנו מסיני וביטי עזרא ואחר חתימת הגמרא היינו שנראו בהתחדשם או אחרי השתכחם או התבלבלם ביד השטן כאילו היום ההוא נתנו וגם יצדק עמהם מה שנראה לנו היותן מסודרות עם אותיות הכתב מימי בראשית והכל תמיד ע"ד שכתוב וחזרו וסדום.

[64] Azariah is quite aware, that Aramaic was the common language of the Jews in Palestine throughout the period of the Second Temple. He even develops a theory that the Torah was then in general use only in an Aramaic translation, the Hebrew original being accessible exclusively to the educated classes. Cf. I, 126 seq. (C. 142 seq.).

[65] II, 202 (C. 473): בלשון העברי הקדמה והערבי והארמי אחריו אשר נשתבשו היטנו.

[66] I, 3.

[67] II, 193 (C. 464).

[68] When Azariah tells us once (ט"ל, p. 102; C. 107 n.): ונהי דהטון העם בבית שני היו מדברים בלשון ארמי ... הלא אנחנו כיום עם היות שפתנו אתנו ללועזות בלעז משכילי עם אשר רבו לטעלה יביעו ידברו ויכתבו בלשון הקדש, we must assume, that this use of a spoken Hebrew language was most likely confined—like the contemporary Latin conversation—to exceptional occasions in the higher educated circles. Another similarity to the Humanistic customs may be found in a kind of a modern linguistic purism of Azariah, even in the reshaping of proper names as in the case of Philo (I, 76; C. 90): אשר לדדוף את דרך קצת יחידי סגולה הנמצאים בדורנו החילותי מראש לכנותו קרוב להודאת שמו הנזכר: ידידיה. This tendency corresponds to the mannerism, then very popular, of appropriating the most astounding classical names, even for ordinary use. Cf. BURCKHARDT, *loc. cit.*, p. 250—256.

[69] I, 73 (C. 87): ועוד מה להם לדרך מצרים לבקש תודה מפי גוי כרתים, ומקרב אחינו היה לנו המלך שלמה אשר דבר על הארז ועד האזוב ... או יונח כדבר הרב המורה ... שעקר ידיעתם יצא ראשונה מבני עמנו. Azariah even supposes, that all true knowledge of every age is included in the Bible. He says (I, 255; C. 264): ואם בתענית פ"ק (ט' א') אמרו מי איכא מידי בכתובי דלא רמיזא באוריתא (in the Talmud with slight variations) ב"ש שתאמר מי איכא מידי דברי הבאי של הולין דליתיה בתורת משה והנלוה אליה מכתבי הקדש. Cf. also Jacob Provençali in his ש"ות בדבר למוד החכמות (1490, see

quotes here Maimonides as authority for this ancient, widespread belief among the Jews and partly also non-Jews, emphasized perhaps in the extremest form already in the Hellenistic period. It is true that the Gentile world had proved itself superior to the Jews in many regards and especially in the field of Natural Science, as Azariah had to admit when he abandoned some of the most accepted views of the Talmudic astronomy and geography. But Azariah, like many of his predecessors, meets this objection with the argument that when the Jews went into Exile the dominating peoples captured their Scriptures. Thus the Jews henceforward could not help learning from their neighbours in turn.[70]

Notwithstanding this catastrophe, Azariah does not doubt that the Jewish people, the oldest of all existing nations, will also survive them all and endure in Jerusalem and outside it[71] until the time of the Messiah, when they will gain uncontested supremacy. The belief in the speedy coming of the Redeemer, who would usher in the new age both for Israel and the Nations, was certainly an important element in the Weltanschauung of Azariah as well as of the entire people.[72] Not that Azariah stresses this point very often, or that he seems to have reflected very much about it or had distinct notions as to the details therein involved. On the contrary, the problem is, in Azariah's eyes one of those דליבא לפומא לא גלי פומא למאן גלי, on which, besides this, there is no use speculating. At any rate he sees a real danger in arguing this question, and notably in the tendency of some of his contemporaries to fix in advance—by using all the different means of interpreting the Holy Scriptures—the date of the arrival of the Messiah. In the time of the composition of the "M'or Eynaim" there was in many circles of Italian Jewry a very strong belief in the immediate imminence of the end of the days. It was generally expected to occur in the

later on) p. 67. Plato in particular was regarded by many Jews and Gentiles (Pico, Leone Ebreo, &c.) as a disciple of Moses. Azariah rejects sharply the opinion held by some Jews of that time, that Aristotle himself in his old age became converted to Judaism. Cf. I, 236 seq. (C. 246 seq.).

[70] I, 74 (C. 87): הלא אחרי בוא ספרי הסגולה ליד הנכרים אשר משלו בנו את הכל למדנו מהם בהכרח.

[71] Cf. מ"ל, p. 55 (C. 58).

[72] Cf. e.g. his arguments in favor of discussing problems which, as הלכתא למשיחא, have no immediate importance (II, 2; C. 276): וזאת סבה שלישיה אל הדרוש הזה ובלתי ריקנית כי מתוך הויכוח תתברר הלכתא למשיחא באמת אשר לדעת רבים ונכבדים קרוב לבוא עתה. Cf. also II, 127 and 146 (C. 399 and 417).

year 5335 (1575).[73] Azariah not only declines for himself to accept this date as more probable than any other, but he raises his voice to caution his brethren against such prognostications, which might end, as often before, in painful disappointment.[74] Moreover the "days of the Messiah" are—in Azariah's opinion—by no means the final aim of a real Jew. They only mean freedom from external oppression and the opportunity for the faithful to accomplish more exactly all their duties, notably the מצות התלויות בארץ, and to be nearer to an understanding of God. In addition to this, universal peace and a considerable extension of human life[75] may be regarded as important improvements. All of these advantages are confined within the natural limits of life on earth. Really final, because preternatural, is and remains only the world hereafter.[76]

IV

Belief in the superiority of the Jewish people and the Messianic hope have, in the opinion of Azariah, no practical consequences as

[73] Cf. the ingenious deliberations, quoted in ch. 43 and based chiefly on a book published a few years before: מגדל דוד by Mordecai Dato (1525—after 1591; cf. C. ROTH, *REJ* 80 [1925], p. 71 seq.).

[74] Azariah had special reasons for this attitude. For only so could he meet the attacks against his own innovations in Jewish Chronology. According to his computation the time passed since the creation of the world was about a hundred years more than the official Jewish מנין לבריאת העולם. Thus in the time of the composition of the ט"ע it was already certain, that the real year 5335 was not the year of the redemption. He tries, therefore, to prove, that his theory, far from weakening the popular hope in the coming of the Messiah, is, on the contrary, promoting it by preventing the disillusion. II, 103 (C. 374): ואולם לבד טכל האשור אשאל את החכמים הנזכרים ובחסדם יודיעונו אם בוא יבוא הזמן ההוא של"ה... ואנחנו ח"ו לא נושענו מה יענו מלאכי גוי ומה ישיבו אל לבם הטוח עניי הדעת נכאי לבב וקשי רוח ואנה נעזוב את כבודנו, כי על כל אלה נכון הדבר בעיני ואחשבהו לי טעשה צדקה לפני אלהינו להקדים וכו'.

[75] Cf. I, 209 (C. 220).

[76] After quoting (II, 106 seq.; C. 378) from Nachmanides' ספר הגאולה: כי הנה אין תכלית נטולנו ימות המשיח ולאכול מפרי הארץ והתרחץ בחמי טבריא וכיוצא בהם מן התענוגים, וגם לא הקרבנות ועבודת בית המקדש הם תכלית חפצו טמנו, אבל נטולנו וטבטנו הוא חיי העולם והחענג הנפש התענוג הנקרא גן עדן והנצל טעונש אפס נפלאתי כי לפי דעתו יכול היה להוסיף: הגיהנם. ואנחנו עם זה נקוים את דבר הגאולה וכו'. Azariah adds: בסבות תאותנו אל הגאולה אחת רשומה מאד והוא שטרנו אז את המצות בשקום עיקר חיובן שהוא הארץ. As to this last point cf. also I, 162 (C. 177). The quotation from Nachmanides differs in many points from the original (ed. Lipschitz, London 1909, p. 206 seq.). The most characteristic changes and omissions are those made by Azariah, in order to avoid hurting the Christians. Thus he changes להשיג היום בגלות עם העמים הטחשיאים אותנו ועם מה שאנחנו מן הטומאה in והשקוץ אותנו מלאים חמת חצרות והמקרים המעיקים היום. He omits entirely: לא מאשר נהיה פוסחים על שכניה... אנשי הרתות הזרות כי רוח זרעו or: אמונות נכריות אולי הן אמת כאשר יחשבו חסרי הדעת באומתנו... וסופתה יקצורו. Cf. further SCHECHTER, *Studies*, p. 105 seq., where the passage is not rendered exactly enough.

regards the relations between Israel and the Nations, as long as the Jews are actually living among them. On the contrary, Azariah devotes a special chapter (55) in his book to prove that the Jews in the dispersion are in duty bound to pray for the welfare of the country in which they are living. Now Israel is spread all over the world and it follows, therefore, that they must pray for the welfare of all nations. This result again cannot be achieved, if nation wars with nation. Thus the welfare of each country and peace among nations, both notions being expressed in Hebrew by the word "Shalom," not only correspond with the real interests of the Jews, but have also become almost religious ideals, sanctioned by a tradition which reaches back to the first dispersion in Bible times.[77]

To be sure, Azariah writes thus with the ardent hope of influencing the public opinion of the Gentiles, למען דעת כל עמי הארץ. Nor was this an impossible undertaking at that time. Azariah could rightly expect his book to be read also by Christian scholars,[78] for many of them in Italy were acquainted with Hebrew. There is little doubt that the abbot of the famous Monte Cassino was not the only Christian to whom Azariah had sent his book, as a welcome gift.[79] Furthermore, the later numerous translations of single chapters of Azariah's work into different European languages prove sufficiently, how much the Gentile world was interested in it long after the author's death. Nevertheless, we may take it for granted, that most of the views expressed by Azariah render his firm convictions. Only exceptionally this apologetical tendency may have induced him to lay stress upon a point not essentially connected with his innermost beliefs. So when he speaks about the old Jewish custom to pray for all nations alike, as already practised by the high-priest in Jerusalem, he does not mention, that he knew it only from sources—Philo, Josephus, Eusebius—which he did not regard as authoritative for Jewish law. (It is not a mere coincidence that these sources are also obviously apologetical.) But still he is able to interpret many of the traditional

[77] II, 175 (C. 446): למען דעת כל עמי הארץ כי אנחנו שארית הפלטה כל ימי היותנו גרים ותושבים בארץ לא לנו, חייבים על פי נביאי האמת וכפי מנהג האבות שהוא תורה, להתפלל בשלומה של המלכות המושלת בנו, וכי לעת כואת בפרט אשר עונינו הפיצונו בארבע רוחות השטים יש לנו לשחר אל אל על שלום בני תבל כלם לכל ישא גוי אל גוי הרב. Cf. also the last passage in ch. 55.

[78] Cf. also his characteristic expectation (II, 116; C. 387): גם קרוב אלי הדבר מאד ולדעתי ייטב אצל משכילי הנוצרים וגבוני עמנו ...

[79] Cf. *REJ* 30 (1895), p. 315 seq.

Jewish sources in the same way without forcing them too much.[80] And when he declares, that the Gentile ruler may expect from his Jewish subjects not only prayer on his behalf, but also complete obedience to the laws of the state,[81] he is entirely in the traditional line. At the same time, he may overlook many important historical facts, and notably he may avoid discussing the difficult topic of occasional conflicts between duties toward the state and those imposed by religion. In such cases it cannot be doubted, that Azariah—like almost all of his Jewish and a large part of his non-Jewish contemporaries, notwithstanding all the theories of the supremacy of the State over the Church from Marsiglio of Padua to Macchiavelli—would give preference to religious duties in all fundamental questions which could not be reconciled by the famous דינא דמלכותא דינא. None the less he is essentially right, when he emphasizes, that traditional Judaism had long ago compromised with existing facts.

In one point, however, he had to be more cautious: in the question of the political constitution of the state. The Jewish tradition based upon the Bible as well as upon the later developments was not much in favor of the monarchical system. It is known how much in the discussions of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries about the best form of government the adherents of a Republican constitution always referred to the Jewish Bible, while the advocates of Monarchy looked for support to the New Testament. In reality later Judaism, as is well known, had to compromise here also. Jewish history in the Middle-Ages has shown, with especial force, that the condition of the Jews was more stable, and, therefore, relatively better in monarchical states, than under most of the shifting popular governments. The more so, because republics were to be found mostly in city-states, where the ruling merchant class had important reasons to impede

[80] Cf. his treatment of certain Jewish prayers (II, 177; C. 448): ובעתה קודא טשכיל לשם קדמונינו תתן כבוד על מה שתקנו בתפלות מראשית השנה על כלה מלוך על כל העולם כלו וכו' ... גם מה שכתוב בקצת התפלות להעביר מטשלת הזדון ולעקור מלכותו ... עלינו באמת לשבח אותו כשיובנו הדברים על הנכון הזה והוא שנבקש תקומת ההולה בהסרת החולי כו'. Characteristic of Azariah's cautiousness in not hurting the feelings of his Gentile readers is also his conscious alteration of Biblical passages as quoted in the Talmud (I, 210; C. 221): בשר חטורים בשרם (Ez. 23, 20) in: בשר אבירים כ' and אשר סיח דבר שוא (Ps. 144, 11) in: אשר סיה של אותה ריבה ד"ש.

[81] So when he speaks about the faction of Juda the Zealot which rejected the earthly kingdom, he adds in a special note (I, 77; C. 91): נגד דעת תוה"ק ודעת כל חכמי הפרושים שהחזיקו בטלכות והזהירו לסור למשטעתה ולשבוי הקיה כנודע.

Jewish economic competition. Hence the political theory of the Jews became more favourable to monarchical government.

However, in Azariah's Italy, matters were not quite settled: old republican traditions clashed with new monarchical forces. In Mantua and Ferrara where, so far as we know, Azariah spent almost all his life, a strong, rather absolute monarchy had been long established. No wonder, therefore, that Azariah seems to advocate a monarchical system, although a moderate one, for the Gentile world. He first discusses—quoting Josephus—the fundamental question: what are the ends of the state? and he reaches the conclusion, that there are two chief purposes to be distinguished. One is internal jurisdiction, which implies the maintenance of public order, whilst the second is defence against external enemies. For the first aim the most appropriate constitution seems to be the republican, for division of power may be a preventive against abuses. On the other hand, the second aim is best achieved under the guidance of one man. Consequently the best way out of the difficulty is that already suggested by Plato—a king who observes the fundamental laws of the country.[82]

We thus see Azariah reaching a similar conclusion to what was to become one of the chief theories of Jean Bodin, the profoundest

[82] I, 90 (C. 106): אבל נשער כי תכליות המלוכה שנים, האחד לשפוט את העם כי יריבון אנשים, והשני להושיעם מכף אויביהם אם ינכרו צריכו, והנה על דבר המשפט מלוכת הרבים היא הנאותה מאד כי לא יסכימו בעול, אכן על אודות המלחמה תאות מלוכת חיחיד כי בתחבולות יעשנה בלתי הסר מחשבות מאין סוד. His own view may be best defined in the words which he had quoted previously from Plato: מלוכת היחיד אשר יתנהג על פי התורות היא המעולה על כלן כאשר בלעדי התורות אין כטוה לרוע. Notwithstanding his: ח"ל these words are not to be regarded as a literal quotation from Plato. In fact, Plato after finishing a long discussion about the five (not seven) forms of government reached the conclusion (Resp. IX, 6 580 c), that the best one is to be seen in a King, whom he calls βασιλικώτατον καὶ βασιλεύοντα αὐτοῦ. This differs greatly from the formulation of Azariah. But Azariah's words actually reproduce the Platonic theory of government, if not in the ideal state of the "Republic" at least in the second best state of the "Laws." Cf. IV, 710 E. In fact, however, Plato's detailed deliberations about the content of such a monarchic constitution (βασιλικῆ πολιτεία) in his third (693 D seq.) and sixth book (756 E) suggest rather a mixed constitution whose components are oligarchy (rather than monarchy) and democracy, as had been pointed out already by Aristotle in his "Politics" (1266a). On the other hand this criticism of Aristotle could no longer overshadow in the period of Renaissance the Platonic classification of governments into two chief divisions only (μητέρες πολιτειῶν III, 693 D): Monarchy and Democracy. Thus we find in the very beginning of Macchiavelli's "Principe" the following statement: Tutti gli stati, tutti i dominij, che hanno avuto, et hanno imperio sopra gli uomini, sono stati e sono o repubbliche o principati. With or without knowledge of the great Florentine, Azariah followed the same line, reaching, however, quite different conclusions.

political thinker of the age. But was Azariah aware of the intricate difficulties involved in the notion of fundamental laws? While Bodin could easily refer to Natural (and Divine) Law, then generally accepted as binding on all men including kings,[83] would Azariah, too, acknowledge, that the Gentile State, was founded on Divine Law and hence was of divine origin? Obviously not. On the contrary, he says immediately afterwards, that the Jews alone are guided by God in all external wars and indeed needed a king for no purpose whatever, because their jurisdiction too was based upon laws divine.[84] It is true that Azariah seems here to contradict himself. Shortly before he cited with approval views expressed by Philo and the Talmud, where the hostility of the Bible to monarchy in Israel was explained away by the hypothesis, that their demand for a king angered God only because it showed lack of faith in the way it had been voiced and because it was untimely, for God had willed that the kingdom should be established later in the time of David. Yet Azariah would hardly have admitted any Natural Law common to all mankind except the seven Noachite commands, which are certainly no protection against abuses of political power by monarchs.

At any rate in practice — that is doubtless the opinion of Azariah — the Jews should not interfere with the form of government in the different countries in which they are living. The less so, as their sojourn there is only temporary, their own real home being the Palestine of the future. So long, however, as they are staying in a country, they must remain faithful and obedient to its rulers, whoever they may be.[85] This notion, so remote from modern ideas of citizenship, that Jews were mere temporary sojourners in the countries of their dispersion, was very widely spread even in Renaissance Italy, and here we see again how much Azariah is representative of the dominant opinions of his time. The idea was strengthened not only by the reality — as elsewhere — of the strong Jewish autonomy which made of

[83] Cf. e.g. his *Six livres de la République* which appeared, only one year after the מ"ע. I. II c. III (3e éd., Paris 1578, p. 205) beginning with: Le Monarque Royal est celui qui se rend aussi obéissant aux loix de nature, comme il désire les sujets estre enuers luy ...

[84] מ"ע ibid.: אמנה ישראל הנושעים מאויבים בה' אלהינו אין להם שום סבה לבקש מטלכת היחוד ... אך לכל הפנים אין לשומו לטען ישפוט על דברי הריבות כי המשפטים כבר הושמו לפנינו מאדון כל הארץ.

[85] II, 178 (C. 448): וכן המנהג אשר לתוספת חוזק נמצא בקצת הקהלות לברך את שריהם וכל אבזריהו, הוא באמת מנהג ותיקין למצא בעיני אלהים ואדם חן ושכל.

the Jews a state within a state, as was afterwards charged against them, but especially by the fundamental fact—the importance of which cannot easily be overestimated—that the political life of the Jews in most Italian cities of that period was based upon temporary *condottas*, the validity of which expired every ten years or so and had to be expressly renewed. Under such conditions the Jews could hardly be expected to regard themselves as more than a class of temporarily tolerated foreigners, and so indeed they actually were according to legal theory if not altogether in point of fact. And this, of course, also intensified the old Messianic hopes in the Italian Jewry.

Yet even this same legal theory constituted the Jews legal contrahents with the different states, who thus acknowledged them to possess a certain degree of equality and independence far removed from the contemporary juridical theory of the *servi cameratus* in Germany. And facts were even more expressive. In Italy, at least until the Counterreformation changed entirely the position of the Jews, their general social standing was comparatively high, and their relations with their Christian neighbours, especially in the educated circles, where interest in Jewish cultural values had increased considerably, had many elements of equality and mutual respect to a degree unparalleled in other European countries.[86]

So we understand, why Azariah could go further in his appreciation of Gentile culture, than the most advanced of his predecessors living in somewhat similar conditions under the rule of Islam, or in the earlier Christian Spain. He quotes in his works in an unprecedented manner from Classical and Hellenistic literature—as was not surprising in Italy of the Age of the Renaissance—and he also introduces, as mentioned above, many writings of the Fathers and Teachers of the Church. Thus he speaks with the highest esteem of Augustine whom he calls ראיש חכמי הנוצרים,[87] of Eusebius, Jerome, Aquinas and even of contemporary Christian theological scholars such as Eugubinus, Samotheus and many others. He goes even so far, as to admit that the Jewish Teachers had sometimes to learn from the Gentiles, as when R. Gamliel accepted a certain astronomical theory from Hipparchos and R. Ada ben Ahava took over another one from the famous Ptolemy,

[86] As to Azariah's own personal relations with Christian scholars cf. I, 21 (C. 22) in Ferrara; I, 130 (C. 146): near Mantua; *REJ, loc. cit.*: at Monte Cassino.

[87] Cf. I 86, 121 (C. 100, 137), &c.

both of these theories relating to the calendar and, therefore, having some influence on the religious observance of the Jewish festivals.[88] And again Azariah accepts the chronology of Ficino, who supposes that Moses was a contemporary of Atalantes the head of the Egyptian astronomers and of his brother Prometheus the head of the scholars in Natural Science, both of whom he regards as belonging to the חרטומים, forgetting his own theory that Moses was the fountain-head, from which the Gentiles derived the chief elements of knowledge. Only in the fourth generation afterwards, in the writings of Hermes Trismegistus he discovers the undoubted influence of Mosaic thought.[89] Even when the views of Christian scholars could by no means be reconciled with Jewish beliefs, as when Augustine interpreted some sentences of Hermes, or Gelenius expounded some passages in Philo, so as to give support to the Christian dogma of the Son of God, Azariah praises them for doing their best in the defence of their own religion.[90]

In this one point Azariah felt, that he was in some regards an innovator. Other Jewish writers, especially amongst the Italians, had studied Gentile languages and literatures and had used them extensively in their own researches. Even in the native town of Azariah and among his own friends such men were not exceptional. But Azariah used this material more abundantly than did anyone else and he used it when discussing subjects of vital importance to Judaism. In so doing he risked opposition, for there was always a vivid current of hostility to Gentile studies, even in Italian Jewry. Such a letter, as that written in 1490 by Jacob ben David Provençali from Naples to Messer Leon,[91] certainly expressed more than an individual view. Here we see a money-lover, of obscurantist tendencies, who barely approves of medicine as a profession, who praises alchemy as the art of easy money-making, and who rejects peremptorily any study of philosophy, especially of Aristotle's.[92] No wonder, therefore, that

[88] Cf. II, 75 seq. (C. 347 seq.). Cf., however, צ"ע, p. 130 (C. 134).

[89] Cf. I, 85 (C. 100 seq.).

[90] I, 86 (C. 101): ובאמת אצל הישרים בלבותם נאוה להם על זה תהלה, כי כל המרבה להסך בזכות דתו הרי זה משובח. Cf. also I, 101 and 133 seq. (C. 117 seq., 149).

[91] Published under the title שו"ת בדבר למוד החכמות in the collection דברי חכמים by Eliezer Ashkenazi (Metz 1849), p. 63 seq.

[92] Although he himself confesses (p. 73) that he suffered much from the numerous advocates of philosophy, this is only one of a series of complaints about his own lack of financial success, and not to be taken literally. Also his origin from Marseilles does not in itself explain his utterly hostile attitude towards philosophy. Cf. further (Vogelstein) RIEGER, *Geschichte der Juden in Rom*, II (B. 1895), p. 66.

Azariah incurred the enmity of some Jewish scholars, who charged him with abandoning the fundamentals of religion.[93]

As if to exculpate himself before the bar of Jewish opinion in Italy and above all in other countries, where Jews were more rigidly excluded from Gentile society and the distance between Jewish and non-Jewish culture was felt more strongly, Azariah devotes a special chapter (2) to prove, that there is no sin in using sources of Gentile origin, in order to clear up some obscure point and to establish some historical or scientific truth. He hardly omits a single occasion to repeat this justification. At the same time he denies any intention whatsoever to introduce those כתים ודודנים, where there is the slightest danger of conflict with Jewish Law or Tradition.[94] Gentile sources of information about the Bible can only be considered, when supported by the Holy Scriptures themselves.[95] Furthermore, the evidence of the entire Gentile world is not strong enough to induce us to doubt the truthfulness and reliability of a Jewish tradition which reaches back to Moses on Sinai or to the inspired prophets.[96] For—says Azariah—if you doubt tradition, you must also doubt the Scriptures which have been handed down to us by the same kind of tradition.[97] This argument, in support of which Azariah quotes equally the Talmud and Augustine, was destined to play an important part in the "chief work of the Counterreformation"[98] the *Disputationes* (1576–1588)

[93] Cf. I, 189, 261, II, 30 (C. 202, 271 and 303).

[94] I, 75 (C. 89): ובכלל בהא סלקינן ובהא נתתינן כי כל מקום שאין בו כסירה לא לתורה שכתב ולא לתורה שעל פה לא דבר רק הוא בעיני ללטוד הסתום לנו מן המפורש להכמי האומות.

[95] II, 53 (C. 325): האמנה מהצטרך למסוך בכלן על דברי נכרים בלי ראית כתבי קדש, יהיו באין ולא נשית עליהם לבנו. Although he must have known how difficult it would be in practice, to bring this in agreement with another principle accepted by him from Maimonides (I, 75; C. 89): שאם הדברים אשר לצורך השעה אבקש יהי מטבעם להמצא בכתבי הקדש, בלי ספק קראתי בספנים באיזות למאהבי מבני עמי, וכעת לא הבאתי ילדי נכרים אל שעריגו.

[96] II, 4 (C. 278): הנה עם שנתרצה כראוי לנו לחלוק מכבוד אלהינו ליראיו ולומר שאם יהיו כל חכמי א"ה בכף מאזנים ואחד מהם בכף שניה מכריע הוא את כלם. The reason for that we find in another interesting discussion of A. (I, 257 seq.; C. 267 seq.) about the difference between the נביא and the חכם, in which he reaches the conclusion: ואין לך צעיר בנביאים אשר לא יעלה גם עלה על כל החכמים שנמצאו מני שים אדם עלי ארץ, כי רוח יתירא ביה ... Cf. also a statement of Col. Salutati about questions in Natural Science (quoted by Martin, *loc. cit.*, p. 104): Augustino teste, cui tum intellectus acumine, tum profunditate scientiae, tum manifesta sancti spiritus in eo loquentio auctoritate, plus quam physicis credo.

[97] I, 185 (C. 196): שככה יעזו אנוש לנסנם על תורת משה עצמה חלילה שהם גם כן מספרה לנו...

[98] Gothein, *loc. cit.*, p. 98. Cf. e.g. *De verbo Dei* 1. IV, c. 4 ed. Rome I (1832), p. 152 seq.

of Cardinal Bellarmine, a younger contemporary of Azariah, who wrote to confute the Protestant denial of Catholic tradition. The Jewish Sages, according to Azariah, were only capable of error, when they spoke out of their own human reason and knowledge. Even in such cases, Gentile sources are only so far reliable, when they are written without a special tendency, just as the evidence of a Gentile cannot be accepted by a Rabbinic court, unless it be an incidental statement, made in ignorance of its legal bearing.[99]

So far Azariah's theory. In practice, however, it certainly was very difficult to distinguish between what was real tradition and what was human judgement in the Rabbinical literature, where these two elements are steadily intermingled. Furthermore, however much he may have tried to avoid discussions which possibly involved practical issues, he never could tell what consequences would ultimately be drawn from his supposedly theoretical statements. While he was convinced, that he did not touch at all a practical problem, when he disproved the acknowledged system of Jewish chronology, his theory, if accepted throughout the Jewish world, might actually have involved unforeseen conclusions. Besides this, it is always dangerous to destroy the illusion of a people; it often happens that a disillusion weakens the national force, which was nourished by the untrue conception. This was what many of the Italian Jews felt. They would not have resisted Azariah's extensive use of non-Jewish sources, but they were revolted at some of his unorthodox conclusions and they afterwards forbade the reading of his work by Jews without the special permission of a Rabbinic court. The large masses of the Jews in the North and East went a step further. They resented not only the conclusions, but also the way in which these were reached. In fact Azariah's justification of the study of foreign languages and

[99] I, 74 (C. 88): והנה המעיין דברינו בפרקים הבאים ימצא כי כל הגוים אשר קראנו פה בשם לאיזה גלויי מילתא תרויהו איתנהו בהו, היינו שהם משיחים לתוטם ולא שייכי בנוסא דעובדא כל מאומה ... הכא נמי כל כותבי הזכרונות שיהיו נקראים בדברינו אלה אשר כלם הקפידו על כבודם שלא יהיה לבוז בדברם כזב, ובקשו לעשות לחם בקולמוסם המתוקן ובקובל שם תפארת עם טלכים ויועצי ארץ, הוו להו בנוסחין אשר נאמנו. We feel in this description, how much Azariah had before his eyes actual conditions in Italy with the widespread search for glory as well as for some rich Maecenas from among the dukes and courtiers. He overlooked, however, how much these very motives might have actually had the opposite result and shaken the reliability of men like Annius de Viterbo, Pietro Aretino and Giovio.

of the reading of non-Jewish books,[100] was in itself a sufficient reason to prevent his books from being read by a majority of the Jews living in Poland, Germany and Turkey in quite different social conditions. The few favorable voices such as those of R. David Gans and R. Jom-Tob Lippman Heller, could not overcome the express disapproval of R. Joseph Karo, MHRL and R. Jacob Emden as well as the quiet, more effective ignoring of his work by the general reading public in the following generations until the nineteenth century. Even in Italy itself, the altered social conditions of the Jews, resulting from the Counterreformation, changed their attitude towards the Gentile world so that they were no longer in sympathy with Azariah's methods of thought. In his own environment, however, the views of Azariah seemed far from revolutionary and he remains the typical Jew of Renaissance-Italy.

V

In some respects Azariah belonged rather to the conservative part of Italian Jewry. All his important works are written in Hebrew. For the rest, he confined himself, so far as we know, to a few occasional verses written in honour of the Duchess Marguerite of Savoy in four languages (Hebrew, Aramaic, Latin and Italian).[101] On the other hand, there were among his contemporaries a considerable number of good Jews who published their most important works in Italian (e.g. his personal friend Leone da Sommi). For him social intercourse with the Gentiles and acknowledgment of the cultural values of non-Jewish literature had merely a theoretical importance. In life, especially in relation to Jewish Law, not the slightest change

[100] He is, of course, bound to explain away many hostile utterances of the Talmud against the חכמה יונית and the ספרים הצונים. About the latter he declares (I, 69; C. 82 seq.): שכונתם באסור קריאת הספרים החצונים איננה רק כשהיא קבע לא של עראי וקרי שהקורא כמשתקע בהם וחושב אותם ספרים מטולאים לשתות בצמא את דבריהם הרי זה ודאי חומס נפשו ... אבן על הקריאה לרגעים וכל שכן לבקש הנוכל להתעורר מהם על ברור איזה דבר מתיחס בצד מה לדרושי תורתנו אין ספק שלא יקפידו מאומה ... But it is certainly more than doubtful, whether Azariah himself was able to acquire his profound erudition in the non-Jewish literature by such a קריאה לרגעים, notwithstanding his גם בקצת מעתות הפנאי עברתי ... (I, 205; C. 216).

[101] The fact of his signing an Italian letter to the abbot of Monte Cassino with the Italian name Buon'aiuto for עזריה does not mean much at that time, except perhaps that it is another illustration of his puristic inclinations. The same name occurs before Azariah in Rome (cf. RIEGER, *loc. cit.*, p. 175) and (for עזריאל) in Florence (cf. CASSUTO, *loc. cit.*, p. 235).

was to take place. The Jewish Law and the performance of all the legal duties by every single Jew are so much the central point in Judaism, according to Azariah, that we must be grateful to the old Sages whose teachings have preserved Judaism and saved us from becoming like the other peoples of the world חלילה.[102] Those legal prescriptions, whether they be based upon the written or oral law, or whether they be precautionary regulations, made by the Talmudic Teachers, are all eternal and cannot be changed, whatever may be the result of scientific investigation.[103] Even customary laws, based upon mere popular beliefs and usages, are valid and unchangeable. Respect for the Torah must be strictly maintained among the masses of the population and, therefore, nobody is permitted to preach in public against the slightest custom in Israel. And even in pure theory, whenever a conclusion may seem dangerous to some established popular belief, you may discuss it in writing, but never in speech before the whole people.[104]

This rather unusual distinction between the written and the spoken word will appear less strange in view of the fact that even in Italy of the Renaissance, the Jewish masses could be regarded as too illiterate to follow a serious literary discussion. Moreover, Azariah in his often expressed contempt for the uneducated, is again only a representative of that later stage of Italian Humanism which started as a lay, popular and democratic movement but ended by upraising a new class of literates, whose haughtiness surpassed even that of the contemporary nobles. Azariah, personally rather modest, could not help being influenced by the prevailing prejudices of his class.[105]

[102] Cf. I, 259 (C. 269).

[103] Ibid.: וכפי מה שכתב הרב הגדול רמב"ם ז"ל ... שכל הדבר בקטן כגדול הנמסר לנו באמרם שכך נתקבל ממשה רבינו, וכן כל מה שלמדוהו באחת ממדות התורה, או שהם עשוהו סיג אליה, לא נהרהר ח"ו אחריו מאומה לדרוש ולתור ולבוא אתם עליו בטשטש כאילו עדותם לא נאמנו מאד, או שגבהו מדרכיהם דרכינו ומדעתם נדע גם אנחנו, חלילה לנו מעשות זאת, והאיש זד יהיר אשר יעז על ככה, לא יראה כי יבוא טוב, והיה כערער בערבה עשן מארובה ומוץ לפני רוח. Cf. the whole ch. 28. In fact all laws are equally important and all sins, equally grave. Cf. his quotation from Cicero II, 34 (C. 307).

[104] מ"ל p. 88 (C. 94): כי האמנה בן ראוי תמיד לקיים את אשר נתפשט בהמון כל עוד שלא יהיה בו נזק תורני חלילה, בשגם לא בכל זאת תנעל הדלת בפני כל הבא לחקור בסוד הכתים את האמת ... Cf. also ibid., p. 66 (C. 71), where he mentions a number of customs in actual force although their original reason had vanished. II, 92 (C. 364): מלבד כי יש לי עדי אמונה להביא תנאים אמוראים וגאונים שהכתינו לא יקפידו בגלוי הדבר אשר בסודו אלא בשיתנלה בדרשות על פה כי אז נחוש על ההמון השוטע, אבל לא בהכתבו אל המשכילים על ספר ... Cf. also his first תשובה in צ"ע, p. 119 (C. 123).

[105] Cf. BURCKHARDT, *loc. cit.*

Azariah goes so far in his acceptance of Jewish legislation in being, that he declares, in strict conformity with traditional Judaism, that every single interpretation of the earthly Sanhedrin is without doubt in agreement with the will of the Court in heaven.[106] Hence his anger against the Karaites who reject so many fundamental laws in Judaism.[107]

So extremely legal is Azariah's conception of Judaism, that he finds it a matter of course, that the most serious men in past ages have shown very little interest in purely theoretical questions, and least of all in historical ones.[108] Indeed he finds it necessary to excuse himself for devoting so much of his own time and energy to the solution of scientific problems which could contribute nothing to the knowledge of the Halakhah. It is not without piquancy to hear the most distinguished Jewish historian for many centuries apologising for the time he has wasted in studying history—a subject of no practical benefit. His excuses are also characteristic. He first points out that the human mind is moved by natural curiosity to find out the truth about everything. Secondly—and this Azariah considers to be more important—historical investigations sometimes enable us to clear up a few obscure points in the interpretation of the Bible and some apparent discrepancies in the statements of the Talmudic Sages.[109]

[106] ט"ל, p. 66 (C. 71): ובבחינת האמת הכלל המועיל וקיים הוא כי כל אשר יעשה ב"ד של מטה בכל המתיחם לטקראי קדש הוא לבדו נרצה בב"ד של מעלה ... Cf. also צ"ע, p. 130 (C. 134).

[107] After quoting (ט"ל, p. 26 n.; C. 27 n.) Christian authorities (Origen and Rhodiginus), to show that even the Gentiles believe, that Moses received from God also an oral Law which he taught to the Jews, and which, later forgotten, had been restored by Ezra, he adds: ועתה יראה כל מבין עם תלמיד, עד מה הקראים אנשי בוגדות ראוים לתוכחת מגולה, כי גם אשר לא מבני ישראל המה יקיטוה בידינו ... Cf. also I, 102 n. (C. 119 n.): חורשי און ,אנשי רשע ,צ"ע ibid.: and צ"ע, p. 121 (C. 125): יאבד זכרם.

[108] I, 243 (C. 253): הלא ידענו כי בנוהג שבעולם נברא רבה כותיה (כרס"נ) דאטר טלתא ובפרש בלתי מתיחסת רק ליריעת העתים אין כל נופה צריכה בדיקה ואחריו כל אדם ימשוך, ולכל הפנים בשנם אפשר כי נתעלטה הלכה זו מן הנכבדים שזכרנו הנה התנצלותם נגלה כי השרודים בנופי תורה אין מדקדקין בטעיות כאלה ... Cf. also ט"ל, p. 42 (C. 74).

[109] II, 2 (C. 275 seq.): האטנה טביש אני טראשית כי תאטר בלבבך קורא נעים הלא זאת החקירה (ע"ד המנין ליציריה) היא כהלכתא לטשיחא ונרועה עיד היטנה, כי טה לנו ולה ומאי דהוה הוה זה אלפי שנים או כהנה שבעתים, אף אתה תשיב אטריך לך כי תתבונן ראשונה איך האמת בעצמו הנדרש נ"כ טאלפי חכטים בחקירות יותר רחוקות טואת, הלא הוא כחותם אלהי אמת סגולת הנפש היסה ושוב שהכל יכספוהו, ושניה לה העולה ביותר כי במשך הדרוש הזה תיראה שיזדטן לנו להבין טעטי קצת דברים אשר בכתבי הקדש ... וזאה סבה שלישיה אל הדרוש הזה ובלתי ריקנית כי טתוך הויכוח תתברר הלכתא לטשיחא באמת ... While discussing the different Talmudic sources about the assaults on the Jews in Alexandria, he remarks (I, 167 seq.; C. 182): ומאשר הואלנו עתה לחקור על קשט הדברים האלה לא בעד גופא דעובדא דמאי דהוה הוה רק למאי דאיכפת לן שלא ימצאו דברי חכמינו בספורים של מאורעות מפורסמות פותרים זה את זה. Cf. also I, 175 (C. 189). This repeated emphasis upon מאי דהוה הוה goes back to b. Ketub. 3 r. Cf. I, 256 (C. 266). The other passage from b. Chag. 16 r. is not only wrongly quoted by Azariah, but has in fact quite the opposite meaning.

To be sure, not everything said in this way sounds quite sincere, and indeed much may have been written in order to conciliate popular opinion. But for us it is enough that Azariah felt obliged to make such allowances for current beliefs. He even goes a step further and develops a theory that the knowledge of history is far less important for the Jews than for the rest of the world. He quotes the famous passage from Livy—the passage so often used and abused in the time of the Renaissance—in which the Roman historian recommends the study of the past, which teaches us by examples how to seek the useful and to avoid the harmful. With all the exaggerated admiration which he, in common with his contemporaries, has for Livy,[110] Azariah yet declares the study of history to possess this didactic value for the Gentile world but not for the Jews. The latter have in their divine laws a sure guide for individuals as well as for the whole people. Every further investigation into the facts of the past ages for enlightment in actual practical needs is, therefore, entirely superfluous and a mere loss of time.[111]

Such being his conviction, it was natural that his fundamental conception of history should still be based upon the traditional *theocratic* theory, once held by Jews and Christians alike,[112] while the Renaissance historiographers had already long[113] emancipated themselves from this basic conception. Whatever may be said in favor of the one view or the other, we may safely say that whilst Italian historiography of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries in its most representative figures was laying foundations for secular, purely scientific, and, therefore, "modern" historical research, the leading Jewish historian of the period remained in his fundamental views typically "medieval."

Azariah's legal conception of Judaism, however, did not induce him to undervalue the Agadic element in it which, as he tells us,

[110] I, 254 (C. 264): ... אשר לפניו ואחריו עד היום לא קם באומות העולם כמוהו.

[111] Ibid.: ואמנם לא שקר טליו בבחינת העמים אשר לא ראו אור התורה התמימה עם יתר כתבי הקדש ובחשכת הלמודים האנושיים יתהלכו, כי הם הם בזעת אפם ושורה שכלם יצטרכו לזרות ולהבר את כל אשר תוציא האדמה מטקדי בני האדם עד מקרי הבהמה ולהתבונן מה יעשו לטוב להם מספר ימי צבאם תחת השמש, אבל אנחנו עם אלהי אברהם וזרע יעבדנו ... כבר יצאנו חפשים וקומטיות מן העבודה הואת עד בלתי השאיר לנו כשרון שנעמול בה לרוח, כי הלא בתורתו ומציותיו שם כל מחשך לפנינו לאור ויפתח לנו שיעדי צדק אל הדרך אשר יעלה בה איש ואיש או הטוים המוגים להתרחק מכל הצר הצורר ולקרבה אל ההצלחה בכל אות נפשנו.

[112] Cf. I, 126, 157, 176 (G. 142, 173, 190) and the passage quoted n. 113.

[113] Since the days of Lionardo Bruni Aretinus (1369–1444). Cf. E. Fueter, *Geschichte der neueren Historiographie* (Leipzig 1911), p. 12 and 17.

brings a man nearer to the knowledge and love of God.[114] As a zealous student of Jewish ethical philosophy, he realised also that the Mizvoth include, above all, the "duties of the heart." Not that his philosophical concepts, with regard to the subject, were entirely clear. On the contrary, he was here again an eclectic who took over from the prevailing ideas of his age whatever was best suited to the most popular creeds of the day. Moreover, his opinions on fundamental ethical questions are sometimes very naive. Thus when he wants to disprove the chronology of the Persian kings as given by the Talmud he stresses the argument that the same king who had done so much for the construction of the Second Temple could not have been delivered by God into the hands of his enemies.[115] Again, he takes it for granted that those among the high-priests who were just and had not acquired their office by bribery, like their successors in the years of the decline, must have enjoyed a long life.[116] Also his solution for the problem of determinism and free will is rather weak if compared with those of many of his medieval predecessors.[117]

It is also not strange that he fails to draw the necessary line between the Talmud and philosophy on the one hand and the Cabbala on the other. Although he was himself very little of a mystic, he still accepts this secret lore of Judaism as containing the real truth. (He quotes it almost exclusively by the then current expression חכמת האמת.)[118] He does not even hesitate to give preference to the

[114] I, 198 (C. 211): זיתאמת דבר הספרי הנוכר רצונך להבין את יוצר הכל עסוק באגדה, כי בודאי הטשתדל בטשליו ובכליצת דבריו לטשוך את לב ההטון להכרתו ית' הלא לבו טמש הוא הנמשך טקדם.

[115] II, 45 (C. 318): וזה עני אשר על אף אויבינו ורודסינו צוה שיבנה הבית ביטי זרובבל בהנחות ונדבות כפי הידוע ... באופן שעל ידו ובעזרו נבנתה העיר על תלה וארטון הקדש על טשפטו, איכבה נוכל לחשוב, כי אלהי טשפט ה' כר טעליו פתאם ויהי ערהו להסגירו ביד צר בשצף קצף אלה הטצות וזה שכרן.

[116] After discussing Sifre (II, 39 seq.; C. 312 seq.): בשביל שהיו טוכרים את הכהונה ברטים הרי בי על ששת הדורות הראשונים שלא עשו כאלה יש לנו לחשוב כי התחילו שנותיהן טתקצרות ימותם רבו לא שעשו להם כנפים ...

[117] Cf. I, 14.

[118] Although the term Cabbala has been current for the occult science in Judaism during more than three centuries (occurring already in 1233 as a technical term in this sense in a Jewish-Arabic book quoted by Harkavy in his annotations to גרין-שם"ר, די"י V, 47), and although it was common in this sense also in the Italian literature of his day, Azariah never so uses it. He either applies the word to the old Talmudic antithesis of דברי תורה and דברי קבלה (cf. BACHER, *Die älteste Terminologie* ... Leipzig 1899, p. 165 seq.), or he uses it, like other medieval writers, with regard to the oral tradition. Cf., however, I, 104 (C. 121): טקבלי האמת.

Cabbalists over Maimonides, whom he himself so highly esteemed.[119] This was natural enough, for he was convinced, as were almost all of his contemporaries, that the chief Cabbalistic books were really composed by the Tannaim to whom they have been ascribed,[120] albeit he confesses that there are later interpolations in the Zohar. But this does not hinder him from absolutely rejecting the well known suspicions entertained against Moses de Leon, as then already voiced by Abraham Zacuto.[121] So high is his esteem for Cabbala, that he does not entirely reject even practical Cabbala, and while quoting the sharp expressions of Maimonides against the writers of amulets, he merely demands caution against misuse of these magical spells by incompetent persons, but he does not object to them altogether.[122]

In his relation to mysticism Azariah was a child of his age. He had no taste for Cabbalistic speculation and certainly not for Cabbalistic practice. But this was the period of the climax in the development of the secret science, it was the time when Luria and his admirers in Palestine exercised their highest influence upon the whole Jewish world and especially upon the Italian Jewry. Even the Gentile world in that country had shown for a long time a deep concern in the mysteries of this Jewish occult wisdom; it is enough to mention, in this connection, the glorious youth, Giovanni Pico della Mirandola, whom Azariah quotes a few times with the highest esteem.[123] In fact,

[119] II, 110 (C. 380 seq.): אחר כן אומר שיסלח לנו הרב המורה הגוזר אם לא נקשיב בזה אל דבריו, כי... הנה עינינו רואות חכמי האמת מחזיקים בדעת...

[120] II, 201 (C. 472): כל הבהיר והזוהר והתקונין ומערכת האלהות (אשר יצאו החוצה מסעולות ר' נחוניה בן הקנה ורש"בי ומיעתו לפני חבור המשנה) המסיקים מזן אל זן אמרות טהורות... It is true, however, that in Halakhic questions he gives preference to the Talmud over the Zohar (cf. ט"ל, p. 40; C. 42), thus following the example of the chief Halakhic authorities even those who, like R. Joseph Karo (Azariah quotes him in one such instance), were themselves extreme partisans of the secret lore.

[121] I, 223 seq. (C. 232 seq.) footnote: וכן בזוהר עצמו... נמצאו אמוראים לא מעט... וכבר דברתי סוה עם כבוה הכמי לב אשר גם המה ראו כן המהו, והקרוב לכלם כי איזה תלמיד אשר תשוקתו גדלה מהשגתו מצא הגהות בגליונים והבלעין בספר... והנה בס' יוהסין להר"ראז זכות... תמצא כי בהגיע המחבר לזכור בין האחרונים הר"ר משה דיליאון... כתב בשם דיין עכו דברי שקר על קצת דברי אמ"ז לומר כי זה רבי משה בכח שם הכותב בדא אל תוכם טלבו להג הרבה... כי על כן שבח אני את המדפיס הנזכר (ed. Constantinople 1566) אשר הוסיף בשולי הספור ההוא הגהה אלו דבריה, הנך רואה מכלות הדוברים על צדיק עתק לא ידעו ולא יבינו ההוספים ללענה דברים שהם כבשונו של עולם והספר ההתום לזר יחשבוהו וישימו לאל מלתו וראיותם ושעוותם הבל ואין בם ביעיל, עד כאן לשונו המכסר בעד הואיל והמכים להדפים הספיר ההוא, אשר אמנה יותר היה רתוי לו החלל בדלוג, ראי מלת הגהתו בכלע משתוקת הספור כלו בתרין...

[122] Cf. ibid. the end of the note.

[123] I, 16 (C. 17): חכם גדול לנוצרים... ספרים יקרי הערך... Cf. also I, 89, 123, 237 (C. 104, 139, 247).

Cabbala was in the air and there was no reason for Azariah to stand aloof. When he writes about Cabbala he voices the ruling views of his time rather than his own original inclinations.

VI

This high esteem of the Cabbala chiefly depended, no doubt, upon its supposed antiquity, at a time when all works of ancient origin, regardless of their intrinsic literary value, inspired such an exaggerated reverence. Moreover, one of the fundamental points in the philosophy of life in the period was the thought that the best things belong to the past. In modern times, our watchword is progress and we instinctively look on human history, notwithstanding its ebbs and flows, as a development from lower to higher forms. This idea of evolution and progress was entirely strange to the mind of a Renaissance man. On the contrary, since the Middle-Ages the ruling idea in this regard had been rather of a continual degeneration. And this fundamental conception was so much strengthened by the Renaissance worship of everything antique, that it could even be generally believed, that the body of a woman in ancient times must have been far superior in beauty to that of any modern lady.[124]

No matter whether the general innate psychological tendency to be *laudatores temporis acti*[125] is to be made responsible for this belief, or whether it is rather due to the religious supposition that the further away from Creation the further the world becomes from the Creator and, therefore, the more incomplete. At any rate Jew and Christian were equally certain that past ages were incontestably superior to their own. Christendom certainly was highly influenced by the dogma of the original sin which involved the steady decline of mankind, only partly checked by the preternatural redemption.

[124] Cf. BURCKHARDT, *loc. cit.*, p. 183 seq. No wonder, therefore, that the Renaissance also took over from the Middle-Ages their chief social principle—aristocracy by birth—to such an extent, that many prominent Italians prided themselves on their descent from some celebrated family of antiquity, e.g. Ahenobarbus in Rome or Plato himself. This reminds us how Azariah does not fail to mention (II, 212; C. 483): על משפחתי מן האדומים אשר קבלנו מקדמונינו היותה אחת מן הארבע היקרות שהגלה מיטוס לרומי ...

[125] Azariah too uses the phrase almost stereotyped in all times and languages (מ"ל, p. 3; C. 56): יהירות הדורות הולך וגדול.

Their picture of the world, consequently, was essentially pessimistic; it was a vale of tears stumbling down the ages towards a deplorable end on the day of the Last Judgement. Judaism, to be sure, laid far less stress on the idea of Adam's sin and looked forward in a spirit of decided optimism to the Messianic age, but it was so built up upon Bible and Talmud that it could not help admitting as preeminent the epochs to which these great documents belong. Revelation, God's words to Moses and to the prophets, whether written down in the Holy Scriptures or handed down through oral tradition are the unmovable foundations, and how can later generations be compared with that age of giants? As for the Jews' radiant hopes for the Messianic future, may not the advent of the Messiah be expected just as readily, when things are at their worst? We have seen also that Azariah—in conformity with some high medieval authorities—minimizes the importance of the Messianic age, as compared with the really final end, the עולם הבא. If Eduard v. Hartmann's famous statement be correct, that Antiquity looked for happiness in this world, the Middle-Ages in the world hereafter, and we modern men in the world hereafter as realized in this world (through the process of evolution), we see here medieval Judaism following the general trend of the period and neglecting the more modern ideal of Messianism in this world for the sake of the medieval one, the life to come. Furthermore, if the Western world in general had real historical reasons in addition to these theoretical ones to acknowledge the superiority of classical culture, how much more reason had the Jew to glorify the age of his national freedom and power? The less he actually knew about the real conditions of life in those remote ages, the more light he saw and the less shadow.

No wonder that Azariah viewed the past as a son of his age. Thus he accepts the explanation given by Nachmanides for the abridgment of human life after the Deluge as caused chiefly by the weakening of the air.[126] So strongly does he believe in the superiority of ancient times that he uses it as an argument to prove his theory on chronology, because otherwise we should be led to the obviously impossible conclusion that the Reform of the calendar by Hillel II enabled the Jews to live more directly under the guidance of God

[126] I, 209 (C. 220). Cf., however, I, 216 (C. 226).

than heretofore.[127] Azariah holds, as we have seen, that the customary laws in Israel, derived from the wisdom of their ancestors, have to survive even when their original raison d'être is lost. And he goes further. He feels himself in duty bound to find an explanation, not only for everything handed down by tradition which, as divine in origin, needs no further defence, but also for all the occasional mistakes made by the Sages when they spoke for themselves alone. To admit the possibility of such mistakes was in itself daring, and Azariah, devotes more than one argument—as we have seen—in order to excuse himself for doing so. But even to him it seemed obvious that the later commentators of the Bible could not have "seen more," than the Talmudic authorities.[128]

On the other hand, the scientific investigations of Azariah must have shown him that the later authorities often came nearer the truth, than their predecessors.[129] Indeed the basis for all his life's work was a firm conviction, that thorough investigation into the original sources or facts would enable him to correct some erroneous views of the Talmud about chronology, about some geographical data and other topics. Moreover he saw quite clearly from his own practical experience, that for the investigation of almost all sources it is preferable to use the latest available edition. In that period of the awakening scientific spirit, many new editions of classical works – almost critical editions in our sense—were constantly appearing. Especially in the case of Greek authors, almost all editors started to give first of all the original texts, instead of the Latin translations exclusively in use until that time in the Western countries. Such an edition, for instance, Azariah had to use himself for his translation of the Letter of Aristeas.[130]

[127] After pointing out, that the actual calendar, if it were of divine origin, would be superior to the ancient קדוש עפ"י הראיה that depended on a decision of an earthly court, he adds (מ"ל, p. 87; C. 93): עד שתאמר כי הימים הראשונים לא היו טובים מאלה ואדרבא טוב לנו מאז עתה כי ה' מחוקקנו. As to the date cf. II, 56 (C. 328).

[128] Azariah writes a special chapter (14) on the question: מחלוקות אשר נמצאו לרבים מטפרשינו האחרונים ז"ל על דברי החכמים בבאור קצת מכתבי הקדש ויקשה כי הלא אין לחשוב שראו יותר מהטה ואיככה ידושה ... שאנחנו העטלמים ראינו יותר מהטה: I, 190 (C. 201). Cf. also his reference to the demonstration in Kosari, ibid. and I, 261, II, 94 (C. 271 and 366).

[129] Cf. his quotation from Ptolemy about geographical questions (I, 149; C. 164): כי כל דרוש כזה טוב להודות עליו לאחרונים אשר לכמה סבות יעמדו מיום אל יום על האמת ביותר.

[130] Cf. I, 3. Azariah states even the following as a rule (II, 14; C. 287): וכבר ידעת גם כן מהעתקת ספר אריסטיאו של מעלה כי את אחיונים אני הוא כחביבים ביותר.

How to reconcile this apparent contradiction? Azariah uses for this purpose an old simile; that of the pygmies, who are seated on the shoulders of giants and, therefore, enjoy the wider outlook.[131] But was not this already a somewhat dangerous concession? The next step would be to conclude that the later generations, notwithstanding their inferior capacity, were enabled to reach a higher intellectual level than the ancients, whose accumulated knowledge was at their disposal, and finally one might be led to question that inferior capacity itself. What would remain then of the dogma of the progressive deterioration of humanity throughout the ages? In the last statement, which we have quoted from Azariah, he appears almost to have abandoned this dogma. Again he was not conscious of his inconsistencies.

However, all these inconsistencies are due not so much to Azariah's lack of capacity as to his essential method. They are intrinsically connected with his whole syncretistic attitude toward the different manifestations of the human mind. In this respect Azariah genuinely belonged to the Italian Renaissance, although only in its earlier stage, when people like Pico proclaimed the unity of the human spirit expressing itself through ancient and medieval philosophy, through Cabbala and science, through Christianity, Judaism and Islam. But even here Azariah would not have dared to follow such a syncretist as Ficino, who declared, that it is of less consequence to God, how he is worshipped, than that he be indeed worshipped. Moreover, the essential content of Azariah's thought can in fact hardly be described as an expression of the spirit of the Renaissance.

"It was in general (says Giovanni Gentile,[132] perhaps the highest authority on Renaissance thought now living) the aesthetic conception of human reality, which Humanism upheld against the medieval one."

[131] After quoting many Talmudic sentences about the superiority of the Ancients, he adds (I, 185 seq.; C. 196): האמנה אחרי הגיע אל האחרונים מה שהשיגו הראשונים לבד מהשנתם עצמה נראה דהוה ליה כמשל הגנם הרוכב על הענק שוכר בעל שבולי הלקט בהקדמתו על שם אחד מחכמי קדם, באופן שיאות להאמר כי היתרון אשר אמנה נמצא לקדמון על האחרון בדברים הנתלים בנבואה מצד היותו יותר קרוב לבעליה הנו לאחרון על הקדמון בדברים אשר חשרם יצא מגוז העין והנסיון, יען היותו תמיד הולך ומוסיף חבל להבל ומשיחה למשיחה ... עד כי בעוד הראשונים עצמם אשר נלאו סביבות היאורים להוציא להם מים אמור יאמר הכורה אחר כורה אני קרתי ושתיתי. Azariah is not aware, that by this formulation he is giving up most of what he had said previously on the same page and elsewhere.

[132] In his *Il carattere dell'umanesimo e del rinascimento*, *loc. cit.*, p. 252. Cf. already BURCKHARDT, *loc. cit.*, p. 1 seq.

In Azariah there is not the slightest sign of such a conception. Indeed, as the Jews in general had only little part in Renaissance Art, the finest and profoundest manifestation of that age, or in the calling into existence of the new State as a work of art, so also Azariah's conception of life is anything but aesthetic. In all essentials he still belongs to the Middle-Ages. As his cosmology is Ptolemaic medieval, as his physical world is explained entirely by the Aristotelian medieval physics, so also his conception of history, the chief field of his activity, is theocratically medieval to an extreme. In the field of geography he was bound to acknowledge the new facts, but he was able to do so without giving up the fundamental conceptions of the old Ptolemaic lore. Above all, philosophy together with science is for him, as it was for the good old Middle-Ages, " ancilla theologiae."

In one point, however, there is in Azariah's teaching an important element of progress. He was not essentially a man of the Renaissance (there were few such amongst the Jews except Leone Ebreo) but neither were his ideas ultimately dependent upon the Islamitic Middle-Ages. What he undertook was an attempt, not the first but certainly the ablest, to reconcile Judaism with the *Christian* Middle-Ages as well as with the early Renaissance in its newer, although not as yet revolutionary reinterpretation of classical antiquity. Azariah tried to do with Christendom what the great Spanish Jews had done with the Islamitic world. As the Jews were destined to live more and more in Christian surroundings and as the Christian nations were about to assume leadership in the further progress of mankind, his attempted synthesis, however backward, contained a large promise for the future. Furthermore, it was of highest importance, that he acknowledged new discoveries in the natural world, that he tried to bring them into agreement with Judaism and not to explain them away. This was the only attitude, which promised well for the time to come in a world, where the volume of scientifically known facts had just begun to increase to an unprecedented degree.

But these promises had to remain unfulfilled. By a tragic coincidence Azariah himself lived to witness in the course of his adult life the rise and growth of the Catholic Counterreformation. Twenty years before his death he had to look at the sudden change of the Church's policy towards the Jews from that of a far-reaching kindness

and often even of protection to an open antagonism. Catholicism, endangered in its very existence, struggled with renewed force against everything non-Catholic within and without. How difficult was it under these conditions to persevere in the attempt to reconcile the Christian with the Jewish world! The more difficult, because the next and most hopeful step led in the direction, pursued by Azariah; that is, towards reconciliation with Catholic scholasticism. But the renewed vigour of Catholic scholastic thought which found expression in the neo-scholastic movement of a Bellarmine and a Suarez, was in fact a product as well as a tool of the Counterreformation, the general hostile attitude of which towards Judaism was a formidable obstacle to mutual understanding.

Furthermore, this neo-scholastic movement itself was doomed to fail. All the new influences of the time were against it. The modern state, early capitalism, the dissolution of the medieval society, the amazing progress in Natural Science, the development of rationalism—all these broke up the monumental structure raised by the medieval Church. The combination of the superrational elements of religion with the rationalism of science, attempted by both the Jewish and the Christian scholasticism, could not withstand the destructive forces which abolished all the scientific conceptions in these closed uniform systems. Thus the Church withdrew more and more into the domain of the Christian Dogma, as formulated by the Tridentine Council. Judaism too retired more and more into the realm of the Halakhah. It still tried for a time to cultivate the superrational element in the Cabbala, which reminds us of a somewhat analogous attempt made within the Catholic Church by Pascal and later by the Romanticists to release religion from all rationalistic bounds. But the Jewish leaders soon recognized, that if this mystical lore was somehow a bridge to the external world, Jews only used it to walk out (Sabbathai Zevi and Frank) and nobody came in instead.

So the Jews returned more and more exclusively to their old certain basis, the four ells of the Halakhah, ignoring, as far as possible, all the changes in the external world. Thus the majority of the Jews who lived in Catholic countries (Poland, Southern Germany and Italy) were in many regards nearer to the time of the Saboraim and the early Geonim, than to the immediate past of the later Middle-Ages. Only in little Protestant Holland could the small Jewish minority

4*

try to persevere for a time in the endeavour to reconcile religion and modern thought.

As a matter of fact, however, the line of development was broken. Only a much later age, originating (and not by mere chance) in equally Protestant Prussia, was destined to accomplish what the Italian Renaissance had failed to do. But when Leopold Zunz, in more than one respect spiritually related to Azariah, whose life and works he recounted to a later and attentive Jewish world, undertook the old synthetic task of the Italian, he had to start anew.

V'SHOMRU

A CENTURY OF MUSICAL INTERPRETATIONS

A. W. BINDER (NEW YORK)

The traditional nussach or musical mode of ושמרו which comes to us from the ages, raises the question whether or not it conveys with it the spirit of the text as cited in the Pentateuch, Exodus XXXI, 16–17. 18. For *V'shomru* comes to us in the form of a command.

> "Wherefore the children of Israel shall keep the Sabbath, to observe the Sabbath throughout their generations for a perpetual covenant. It is a sign between me and the children of Israel for ever; for in six days the Lord made heaven and earth, and on the seventh day He ceased from work and rested."

Logically, therefore, *V'shomru* should be interpreted in musical terms which signify command. Such a purpose being usually carried out with music of a martial character; with music through which we hear trumpet sounds bearing a command, expressing the significance of a holy pact, and of a covenant never to be broken. But our traditional mode is not at all of that tune. For, through many generations we have heard ושמרו sung to the following נוסח:—

ILLUSTRATION NO. 1

V'shomru
(Original Version)

arrang. by A.W. Binder.


mf X
sos es ha-sha-bos l'do-ro-som b'ris o - - lom Be -
ni u-ven b'-ne yis-ro-el os hi l'-o-lom ki
mf
p
she-shes yo-mim o-so a-do-noy es ha-sho-ma yim v'es ho-o -
p
retz, U-va-yom hash-vi-i sho-vas va-yi - no - fash.
dim.

One cannot say that the above melody is significant of a command or even of a pact, but unmistakably expresses a spirit of "sweet-peace and rest."

How impossible it was for our fathers to have sung *V'shomru* on the Sabbath eve in a commanding tone. For was not the Synagogue on the Sabbath the only haven of refuge, where the Jew could come and feel that he was among his own? That feeling of relaxation certainly could not have been attained by chanting his prayers in a stiff and commanding tone, but rather from the mode which we have just shown, and which gives us the sacred feeling of the Sabbath Day—the mode of "sweet-peace and rest."

During the past century, many composers of synagogue music, among whom were men of great musical ability, have interpreted the text of *V'shomru* in many ways. Significant, however, this fact remains, that in all but one of the many important settings to this prayer, the composer has always aimed to radiate the rays of the Sabbath "sweet-peace and rest" through his composition.

It is a known fact that until about 125 years ago, choral music in the Synagogue was undeveloped and very rare. The service was carried on by the cantor with the help of the congregation. Congregational singing always existed amongst our people, and developed even more so, when the organ and choir were banished in the diaspora. Some of the objections to the reinstatement of the choir into the Jewish religious services, were based on the fact that the choir would do away with the traditional participation of the congregation in the musical responses of the service to which they had long become accustomed, and which became part of their religious experience.

One very often wonders how the florid recitative of the cantor's chant came about. This we may attribute to two facts. One, that the florid passages of the cantor are oriental in character, coming probably from our oriental origin. The second may be due to the fact that the cantor, taking advantage of the fact that he was the only one occupying the "stage," made use of the situation by embellishments in the traditional melodies, such as we hear even to the present day.

Thus, we find that the many musical interpretations of *V'shomru* hark back to the two points mentioned above, congregational participation and embellished chantings.

In Solomon Sulzer's Synagogue Works (1804–1890), we find a strong desire to weave modern musical form through the traditional modes

of the various parts of the liturgy. SULZER was rarely free from the influences of his contemporaries, MOZART, BEETHOVEN and SCHUBERT, nor was he entirely free from the influence of church music which had developed to a great extent in his day.

ILLUSTRATION No. 2

It is in the form of a stiff church chant. But there might have been two primary reasons, which led SULZER to give us such a work. In his day, the congregants were still accustomed to lend musical participation in certain prayers and responses. Consequently, he composed some of his choral works in music simple enough to be followed by the worshippers. They certainly took advantage, and do so to the present day in his Synagogue which still stands where the old Vienna Ghetto used to be. And then again, SULZER might have had the desire to create a literal interpretation of the text according to its biblical spirit. However, SULZER gave us nothing but the skeleton of a form which was only to be taken up and developed by his successors.

LOUIS LEWANDOWSKI (1823–1894), in his two volumes of Synagogue Music, תודה וזמרה, has made a most valuable contribution to synagogue music during the last century. Not only has LEWANDOWSKI employed

the traditional modes in a masterful manner, but has also laid the foundation of a most admirable form and style, which was followed and developed by a great many composers of synagogue music in later years—a style which was simple, direct, sincere and for the most part Jewish.

LEWANDOWSKI, in his *V'shomru* (page 100, Vol. I), seems to have grown out of the age where competition existed between choir and congregation, as was the case in the days of SULZER. His *V'shomru* represents a compromise. For it is scored for "Chor und Gemeinde" (choir and congregation).

The congregation and choir begin together in a mode which interprets both the "command" and "rest and peace" modes.

ILLUSTRATION No. 3


V'shomru
Andantino. parlando
Chor und Gemeinde (Unisono)
L. Lewandowski.
mf
V' - shom - ru v'-ne yis - ro - el es ha - sha -
bos la - a-sos es ha - sha - bos l' - do-ro-som b'-ris o - lom.

The next section is a four measure passage for the choir voices alone, à la SULZER.

ILLUSTRATION No. 4



Passage "1" comes in again with the aid of the worshippers, and finally, for the last phrase "He ceased work and rested," we have a repetition of the choral passages with a pianissimo ending.

A rather simple and unpretentious work, but one which prophesies the day of the ideal religious service, when congregation and choir will each have their full and active share in public worship.

S. Naumbourg (1817–1880), deviates from the styles of his predecessors. Having inherited a great many Sephardic melodies, he later employs them to great advantage in his four volumes of Synagogue Music. In his וישמרו, in F# Minor, he gives us a most refined recitative for the cantor, in the "rest and peace mode" which at once ushers in a lovely Sabbath spirit.

Illustration No. 5

This solo is followed by a chorus for male voices, based on one of the tunes of the קדיש, which is known today throughout the modern Synagogue World.

Illustration No. 6



NAUMBOURG ends his *V'shomru* in a quiet and dignified manner, which suggests in many ways the Sephardic chant, which we find over and over again in his works. This interpretation of *V'shomru* is typical of the *V'shomru* of the diaspora, for in it we get to feel the sacred joy with which the Jew welcomed the Sabbath. It was to these beautiful tunes that he hoped and looked forward, during the six days of labor. NAUMBOURG's ושמרו is not elaborate, but indeed very beautiful; almost cameo-shaped.

SAMUEL ALMAN, now living in London, has given us in his latest volume of synagogue music an interpretation of *V'shomru,* which is quite different from those of his predecessors, at the same time adhering to the traditional modes in the most orthodox manner.

ILLUSTRATION No. 7



In his opening phrase which takes the form of a bass solo—we hear, although in the minor mode, martial strains. He has taken the skip of the fifth, which we find in the first and original version of ושמרו, and has constructed it in such a way, as to give the effect of a command or even a warning. This figure of the monotonous triplet, and the jump of a fifth, is later on beautifully developed through the choir.

What seems to be most significant of ALMAN's ושמרו is the fact that through his genuine musicianly qualities, he introduces the coloratura style of the cantor, into the beginning of this work and later on develops it with much ingenuity through the choir. This passage certainly deserves citation, for it is one of exalted beauty.

ILLUSTRATION No. 8



The major mode which we find in the original version, at point X, receives due attention from ALMAN. For in a passage of trumpet sounds running through the inner voices of the choir, we hear כי ששת ימים, bringing before our imagination the forming of an eternal pact never to be broken.

ILLUSTRATION No. 9



When ALMAN returns to his original key, it is a blessed return. For his ending, שבת וינפש, is really restful and refreshing. This musical setting to *V'shomru* is indeed significant, as well as characteristically Jewish.

In the *V'shomru* in C Minor of DAVID NOWAKOWSKY, (died in 1908), the famous choir master to Cantor MINKOWSKY of Odessa, we find a work of supreme beauty attained by superb musicianship and majestic Jewish feeling. NOWAKOWSKY adheres strictly to the traditional mode, and couples that with a fine sense of musicianship and musical knowledge, so prevalent in his day among his contemporaries, TSCHAIKOWSKY, RUBINSTEIN, RIMSKY-KORSAKOW, and a great many others of the Russian School of that day.

Here we have something utterly new. The male chorus sings a chorale, while above it the female voices chant in unison, in almost recitative style—in the true traditional mode.

ILLUSTRATION NO. 10



The theme of his fugue on כי ששת ימים is based on the actual נוסח, embodying the middle section of the original version which changes to major.

ILLUSTRATION No. 11

The answer in the fifth by the tenor seems to be the most natural thing which is expected to happen, and helps in a large measure to establish the traditional Sabbath eve atmosphere. There are four announcements of the above theme, and some slight development, all wrought in a manner worthy of a master, giving proof of the extraordinary contrapuntal ability of NOWAKOWSKY, running through all of his work. The close of this beautiful work ends in the usual quiet manner which has become characteristic of the modern interpretation of *V'shomru*. It is, however, different from the others, inasmuch as it is polyphonic in style. Its mode is similar to that of the rest of the work.

In an effort to acquaint the music world with some of the beauties of Synagogue Music, its beautiful modes, its subtle harmonies and exotic expressions, I set out in one of my five *V'shomru's* to create

one, in the form of an art-song. This is conceived in the traditional mode, and opens with a quiet melodic line, as follows:—

ILLUSTRATION No. 12


Andantino con espressione.
A.W. Binder.
Voice.
Piano.
p
V'shom - 'ru b' - ne Yis - ro - el es ha-sha -
The child-ren of Is-ra-el shall keep the Sab-bath, Shall keep the Sab -
cresc.
bos la - a - sos es ha - sha - bos
bath, To ob - serve the Sab - bath, the Sab - bath
cresc.

This melody continues according to the meaning of the text down to אות היא לעולם. I return to ביני ובין בני ישראל and interpret that in a melody of the recitative nature, very fervent, reaching an exalted climax.

ILLUSTRATION No. 13

ff meno e maestoso
Be - ni u - - - ven be - ne u - ven be -
A sign, a sign it is be - tween
ff
ne Yis - ro - el os hi os
Me and the child-ren of Is - ra-el It is a sign, It is a
hi os hi le - o - lom.
sign It is a sign for - ev - er.
ff
sfz

This passage represents solemnity—the solemnity which one feels throughout this beautiful text. After the climax, we hear part of the original motif again, and finally there is a passage for the closing, representing the "rest and peace" mode. This *V'shomru* occupies a distinctive place for itself, principally on account of its new form.

Seeing the works which have been analyzed from a bird's-eye view, we find that SULZER and LEWANDOWSKI fall into a form entirely their own. While we must give both these masters credit for the great work which they accomplished in founding the classical school of Synagogue Music, and while they were able to weave the traditional mo ifs through the recitatives for the cantor, which we find in their volumes, still they were incapable of that abandon, that complete embodiment of the Jewish spirit in their choral works. But for a few exceptions, and in those cases for very brief periods, do we find the Jewish soul expressed. Their choral music is kept in forms, with a watchful eye on their neighbor—the German church-chorale.

Not so with NAUMBOURG, nor with ALMAN, or NOWAKOWSKY. The Jewish spirit speaks in their works, without restriction or imitation, without the fear of Wagnerian criticism, such as was aimed at MEYERBEER and MENDELSSOHN. Everything, everything is felt in NOWAKOWSKY, both in solo passages and in his choral treatments. His harmonies are genuinely Semitic, containing that wonderful subtlety, coupled with simplicity. In ALMAN, as well, we feel the Jewish soul, we hear the talmudic student at study, and all such other beautiful touches that Jewish life reveals.

But we are happy to find that Synagogue Music is on the march, forwards. We are happy to feel that we have had our SULZERS, and LEWANDOWSKIS, who were builders of firm foundations, and that after them came NAUMBOURG, WEINTRAUB, ALMAN, GEROVITCH, ZIVI, LOWENSTAMM, DUNAIEWSKI, SCHORR, NOWAKOWSKY, who were the builders of a structure which we hope, will tower to exalted musical heights.

Ο ΣΥΡΟΣ AND THE PESHITTA

JOSHUA BLOCH (NEW YORK)

As early as 170 C.E. reference is found to an anonymous Syrian interpreter of the Bible who is vaguely spoken of as "the Syrian" (ὁ Σύρος). The reference occurs in the writings of Bishop Melito of Sardis.[1] Speculation as to the identity of this unnamed Syrian has been rife ever since the days of BERNARD DE MONTFAUCON (1655–1741). Some scholars did not hesitate to identify "the Syrian" with the Peshitta. If this could be definitely established it would strengthen the assumption that the Peshitta is of a much earlier date than is generally claimed for it.[2] In fact this view was advanced by JOHN WICHELHAUS[3] and in a somewhat modified form, it has been maintained by JOSEPH PERLES[4] who says: "Verisimillimum igitur videtur, Syri denominatione interpretationes eas, quae a Peschittho profectae viva voce circumferebantur, indicari. Etenim Syrus cum Peschittho multis locis congruit, ubi vero differt, ex ipsius Peschittho corruptione aut eorum, qui auribus percipiebant, errore quocunque differentia illa nasci potuit."[5] But in opposition to this view, there are scholars who

[1] On κατεχόμενος τῶν κεράτων, he says ὁ Σύρος καὶ ὁ Ἑβραῖος κρεμάμενός φησίν, ὡς σαφέστερον τυποῦν τὸν σταυρόν Scholia to Gen. XXII, 13. Mill, Proleg. 1239. Dr. FIELD (in Origenis Hexaplorum quae supersunt, Proleg. LXXVII, 1874) claims that the Syriac version here quoted by Melito, is not the Peshitta; but while he admits a frequent resemblance between it and the renderings imputed to "the Syrian," he certainly produces not a few instances of diversity between the two. Cf. PRAGER, *De Vet. Test. Versione Syriaca,* Gottingae 1875, p. 11.

[2] See my article "The Authorship of the Peshitta" in *A.J.S.L.*, vol. 35, pp. 215–222.

[3] In his *De Novi Testamenti versione syriaca antiqua quam Peschittho vocant* (1850), pp. 63–68.

[4] *Meletemata Peschitthoniana,* Breslau 1859, pp. 49–51. Cf. LOISY, *Histoire critique du texte et de versions de la Bible,* Amiens 1892, and BLEEK-WELLHAUSEN, *Einleitung in das Alte Testament.* 6. ed., Berlin 1893, pp. 557 ff.

[5] *Ibid.,* p. 50.

question the possibility of such an identification.[6] Among these latter FIELD is especially to be mentioned. That there are frequent agreements between ὁ Σύρος and the Peshitta is not denied by FIELD who cites a large number of passages where both seem to agree to a remarkable extent.[7] But these passages, according to FIELD, do not necessarily establish an identity, in as much as their agreement can be explained on the ground of a common underlying Hebrew text. Furthermore, FIELD advances positive evidence against their identification by citing another series of passages where ὁ Σύρος varies from the Peshitta. Among these is one passage which PERLES[8] employs as proof for the possibility of a Semitic translation in the case of ὁ Σύρος, a rendering of Gen. XXII, 13 on which Diodorus remarks on the ἐν φυτῷ σαβέκ of the LXX for בסבך that ὁ Σύρος does not give φυτῷ, only σαβέκ. If, as is assumed by PERLES, a Semitic translation could be inferred from the mere occurrence of the Semitic word σαβέκ, then the same conclusion would be permissible in the case of Theodotion, who simply transcribes so many Hebrew words.[9] But here the Peshitta has nothing in common with ὁ Σύρος for it has not retained the Hebrew word. The phrase נאחז בסבך is rendered by ܐܬܚܙ ܒܣܒܟ. From this and similar instances FIELD[10] correctly concludes that "syrum nostrum anonymum cum versione Peschito (quae dicitur) nihil commune habere." Equally correct is his rejection of PERLES, suggestion of explaining the variation of ὁ Σύρος from the Peshitta as a corruption of the latter in the course of its crystallization into writing or in its oral tradition. Indeed, how is one to imagine that from the ܐܬܚܙ there would emerge, through any kind of corruption, just the word σαβέκ which corresponds quite accurately to סבך in the Hebrew text?

Still more mistaken is another assumption, championed especially by DÖDERLEIN[11] and accepted by EICHHORN,[12] that ὁ Σύρος is Sophronius' translation into Greek of the Latin version of the Hebrew

[6] F. BUHL, *Canon and Text of the Old Testament*, p. 187 f. Cf. DUVAL, *La littérature Syriaque*, 1907, pp. 25 ff.

[7] *Origenis Hexaplorum*, I, p. LXXVIII f.

[8] *Meletemata Peschitthoniana*, p. 49 ff.

[9] See the list given by FIELD, *ibid.*, I, p. XL f.

[10] *Ibid.*, p. LXXIX.

[11] Quis sit ὁ Σύρος V.T. Graecus Interpres. Altfort 1872.

[12] *Einleitung in das Alte Testament*, 3. ed., pp. 412—415.

Bible made by Jerome. FIELD [13] has given us a detailed argument in refutation of his assumption. It has thus finally met its end and may fall into deserved oblivion.

FIELD himself agrees with MONTFAUCON that ὁ Σύρος is a Greek translation made by a Syrian. It is only in the more exact formulation of this hypothesis that MONTFAUCON and FIELD differ. MONTFAUCON [14] considered it as more probable that ὁ Σύρος was " versionem aliquam Graecam ex Syro factam." According to FIELD, however, the translation was not from the Syriac but from the Hebrew and circulated in Syria; still he does not exclude a joint use of the Peshitta, saying rather that ὁ Σύρος had made his new Greek translation " adhibita etiam versione Syriaca simplici." [15]

In order to prove that in ὁ Σύρος we have a Greek and not a Syriac version, MONTFAUCON advanced the following two proofs: (1) In Ezekiel VIII, 16 ὁ Σύρος, according to one of the scholia in the Sixtina, has rendered אולם by κιγκλίς for which usually one would expect κάγκελλον as is correctly pointed out by the scholiast.[16] κιγκλίς and κάγκελλον are synonymous terms, the difference between which can only be understood in the Greek. (2) In Genesis XXXIX, 2 ὁ Σύρος, according to Diodorus, has for מצליח not ἐπιτυγχάνων as in the LXX, but κατευοδούμενος. These two terms are likewise synonymous and can not be differentiated in the Syriac.[17] FIELD [18] takes up these proofs, but does not find the first one conclusive, for, since in the Syriac صنعصا is used in the sense of κάγκελλον [19] it is possible that صنعصحمرا was used in the sense of κίγκλις. On the other hand FIELD finds the second proof " majoris immo maximi momenti," and in order to strengthen it he adduces evidence from the Syro-Hexaplar where the accurate ἐπιτυγχάνων of Gen. XXXIX, 2 and κατευοδούμενος of Ps. XXXVI, 7 are rendered in exactly the same way by عنى حسب.

[13] *Origenis Hexaplorum*, I, pp. LXXIX—LXXXII.

[14] Hexaplorum Origenis quae supersunt, I (1713), *Praeliminaria*, p. 20 f.

[15] *Op. cit.*, p. LXXXII.

[16] " ὁ Σύρος τὴν κιγκλίδα καλεῖ, ἥτις λέγεται παρὰ τοῖς πολλοῖς κάγκελλον."

[17] MONTFAUCON adds here the similar synonymous renderings of Symmachus (εὐ οδούμενος) and of Aquila (κατευθυνόμενος). These, FIELD rightly leaves out of consideration since they are not mentioned by Diodorus.

[18] *Op. cit.*, p. LXXXII.

[19] Cf. R. P. SMITH, *Thesaurus Syriacus*, col. 3671 f.

It seems, however, that even the second proof is not wholly incontestable. To be sure κατευοδούμενος is credited to ὁ Σύρος by Diodorus, and also by Procopius, who differs only slightly in offering κατευοδῶν.[20] But, εὐοδούμενος or κατευοδούμενος is also handed down as a translation of Symmachus εὐοδούμενος in the hexaplaric notes of the Sixtina and in MSS. M. and Brooke-McLean "j"=HOP 57, κατευοδούμενος in MSS. HOP 127 and Brooke-McLean "v"= Rahlfs, 344.[21] One might therefore, though not without some doubt, assume a confusion between Σύρος and Σύμμαχος, brought about perchance by a false interpretation of the abbreviation "Συ" for Σύμμαχος (Field, *Orig. Hexap.* I, p. XCV). In this connection it is interesting to note that Field[22] points out the fact that Chrysostom erroneously ascribes to ὁ Σύρος a reading of Symmachus (or more correctly of Theodotion). That not only Diodorus but also Procopius names ὁ Σύρος as the author of κατευοδούμενος or—δῶν would surely not militate against the assumption of such confusion, since Procopius very often only copies his predecessors. In that case, the error, if it did not originate with Diodorus himself, must have arisen in the period between Diodorus and Procopius.

In conclusion, Field[23] cites Jeremiah XLVIII, 33 where ὁ Σύρος employs κελεύειν according to a usage of "exquisitissima Graecitas," for the singing in time which accompanies and stimulates to labor ("οὐκέτι οἱ ληνοβατοῦντες κελεύσουσι λέγοντες ἰά, ἰά"), and concludes thereupon that "etiam stylus syri nostri anonymi Graecam potius quam Syriacam originem arguit." But nothing is proved thereby. For the real Greek style would also be explicable if the Church Fathers, who quote ὁ Σύρος, had ad hoc rendered a Syriac text into Greek.

In view of these considerations it is a matter of gratification to find a passage which has been overlooked by Montfaucon, Perles, Prager and Field, but which, it seems, gives an absolutely convincing proof of Field's theory of ὁ Σύρος and which is particularly important for the solution of this still very puzzling problem. The passage is to be found in Theodoret's Questiones in Octateuchum in

[20] See Field, *op. cit.*, on Gen. XXXIX, 2.
[21] See Field and Brooke-McLean ad loc.
[22] *Ibid.*, p. LXXVII, note 17.
[23] *Ibid.*, p. LXXXII.

the 19th question on the Book of Judges [24] and thus a new reference to ὁ Σύρος is added to the list of references collected by FIELD.[25] This passage has already been discussed by E. HAUTSCH [26] and by Prof. GEORGE F. MOORE;[27] but neither endeavored to connect it with the question as to who was ὁ Σύρος, with which, of course, they were not concerned.

Theodoret discusses [28] the well known passage in Judges XII, 6, where Jephtah's people request the Ephraimites to say "shibbolet," but they say "sibbolet" instead. The translator of the text of LXX which is the source of Theodoret, unable to reproduce the particular form of the *Shibbolet* test obviously abandoned a literal translation, since the difference in pronunciation could not be reproduced in Greek [29] and in order to make the situation intelligible to his readers inserted "a password" instead of שבלת and סבלת: καὶ ἔλεγον αὐτοῖς Εἴπατε δὴ σύνθημα καὶ λέγοντες σύνθημα οὐ κατηύθυναν τοῦ λαλῆσαι οὕτως, κ.τ.λ. Theodoret, whose knowledge was not limited to the LXX text, remarks that the password consisted of a word whose very pronunciation afforded proof of the nativity of the speaker, and in order to make this clear, he continues: "When they tried to deceive Jephtha, saying they belonged to the other tribes, he commanded that they be asked one word which in their pronunciation of it would be decisive proof. For just as the Edessenes, the Syrians, the Mesopotamians ('Euphratesians'), the Palestinians,

[24] *Opera*, ed. SCHULZE, I (1769), p. 337. The importance of this passage for the study of the Aramaic dialects was already pointed out by PAUL DE LAGARDE. See his *Übersicht über die im Aramäischen, Arabischen und Hebräischen übliche Bildung der Nomina, in Abh. d. k. Ges. d. Wiss. zu Göttingen*, vol. 35, 1889, p. 91 note. But as to the ὁ Σύρος question he referred to FIELD. Cf. also A. RAHLFS, in *Nachr. d. k. Ges. d. Wiss. zu Göttingen*, Philol.-hist. Kl., 1915, p. 423 ff., who points out the bearing of the passage in question to the problem presently discussed.

[25] *Ibid.*, p. LXXVII.

[26] In his *Der Lukiantext des Oktateuch*, in *Nachr. d. k. Ges. Wiss. zu Göttingen, Philol.-hist. Kl.*, 1909, p. 538.—*Mitteilungen des Sept. Untern.*, I, p. 23.

[27] In his article "The Antiochian Recension of the Septuagint" in *A.J.S.L.*, 29, 1912—1913, p. 37—64 in which HAUTSCH's work is critically reviewed.

[28] *Loc. cit.*

[29] It seems that the Greeks had no way of reproducing the distinction of sounds represented by ש and ס, the former of which appeared to Roman and to Greek ears pecularly barbarous. See JEROME, de nomina hebr. (III, 15, ed. Vallarsi; On. Sacra[2] 10, 6. Cf. MOORE, *loc. cit.*, p. 43—44, and see his excellent commentary on Judges (ICC), p. 309.

the Phoenicians, all use the Syrian speech, yet each still retains its own peculiar differences from the other, so the Hebrews, which were twelve tribes, had, as it appears, their own idioms, just as in the other case." For as "the Syrian" says, some of the others call an "ear of grain" *sembla*, while the Ephraimites used to say: *sembeló*. Jephtha being aware of this, ordered them to pronounce it and put to death those who were convicted thereby."[30] Theodoret then cites, as a parallel to the existence of different dialects among the ancient Hebrew, the same phenomenon among contemporary Syrians. Concerning the enumeration of the various divisions of the Syrians, LAGARDE[31] remarks that Theodoret employs the provincial names of his period as they have authentically come down to us in the political handbook of that period, the *Notitia dignitatum Orient.*[32] One rather hesitates to accept LAGARDE's opinion that Theodoret speaks here of five dialects of Aramaic, for it is highly improbable that the dialects coincided with Roman provincial boundaries; and since there were two Palestines, there were not five but six provinces. At all events both Palestines are under the same Dux and the same is true of Euphratensis and Syria.[33] It seems rather that the enumeration merely points to the existence of a whole group of Syriac speaking provinces and correspondingly to the existence of several dialectic differences in Syriac.

Theodoret then cites ὁ Σύρος in connection with Judges XII, 6. He evidently does not cite him verbatim; since the wording of the Biblical passage varies considerably. But if one can not reconstruct the exact text of ὁ Σύρος from Theodoret's quotation, one can safely say that in any case ὁ Σύρος substituted a Syriac dialectic variation for the Hebrew dialectic variation שבלת : סבלת; since σεμβλὰ and

[30] "τίνα λόγον ὃς ἐπέφερε διὰ τῆς γλώττης τὸν ἔλεγχον." ὥσπερ γὰρ Ὀσροηνοὶ καὶ Σύροι καὶ Εὐφρατήσιοι καὶ Παλαιστινοὶ καὶ Φοίνικες τῇ Σύρων χρῶνται φωνῇ, πολλὴν δὲ ὅμως ἡ διάλεξις ἔχει διαφοράν, οὕτως Ἑβραῖοι μὲν ἦσαν αἱ δυοκαίδεκα φυλαί, εἶχον δέ τινα ὡς εἰκὸς ἰδιώματα, ὥσπερ ἀμέλει καὶ αὗτη. ὡς γὰρ ὁ Σύρος φησῖ, τῶν ἄλλων τὸν ἄσταχυν σεμβλὰ καλούντων οἱ τοῦ Ἐφραὶμ ἔκ τινος συνηθείας σεμβελὼ ἔλεγον. τοῦτο γινώσκων Ἰεφθάε λέγειν ἐκέλευσε καὶ διελεγχομένους ἀνῄρει.

[31] *Op. cit.*

[32] Cf. e. g. O. SEECK's edition (1876), p. 49, where among the provinces of the Orient there are mentioned "Palaestina secunda, Palaestina salutaris, Foenice, Libani, Eufratensis, Syria salutaris, Osrhoena."

[33] See SEECK, *Ibid.*, pp. 69—74.

σεμβελώ are only two different pronunciations of the same Syriac word ܫܒܠܬ, which corresponds to the Hebrew שבלת. It is therefore to be assumed that ὁ Σύρος *is not identical with the Peshitta.* For the latter has faithfully copied the Hebrew dialectic variation creating ad loc. a collateral form ܫܒܠ, which occurs nowhere. Furthermore, ὁ Σύρος was a Syrian in origin. For only such a one could have conceived the ingenious notion of substituting for a Hebrew dialectic variation, inexpressible in Greek, a Syriac dialectic variation which could be expressed in Greek but which has nothing further in common with the Hebrew than its occurrence in the same word.

It is also evident that ὁ Σύρος did not write in Syriac but in Greek, as Montfaucon and Field rightly assumed. For the difference between σεμβλά and σεμβελώ could not at all be expressed in Syriac script; both words would, in Syriac, have to be written ܫܒܠ. In the Greek, on the other hand, the difference between the Semitic sibilants שׁ and ס could not be rendered, and so unless a wholly free translation as in LXX, were to be given, another difference would have to be substituted in the passage, one that could be expressed in Greek script. Since in Syriac there is a Emphatic State ܫܒܠܐ besides the Emphatic State ܫܒܠܬܐ,[34] σεμβλά and σεμβελώ can be transcriptions of this ܫܒܠܐ. More probably, however, they represented an equally sounding Absolute State to ܫܒܠܬ; for the Absolute state of substantives, which as is well known has been almost wholly absorbed by the Emphatic State in literary Syriac, and has survived much longer in the dialects, in Syro-Palestinian for instance, and for the period of ὁ Σύρος may without any hesitation be assumed as still very much in use. In this case, σεμβλά and σεμβελώ correspond, with regard to grammatical form, quite closely to the שבלת of the Hebrew text, which has no article. Even if they were to represent the Emphatic State of ܫܒܠ, they would still be in the singular and would so far correspond to the original Hebrew text, not the Peshitta, which to be sure, also uses the same word here, but according to general transmission in the plural (ܫܒܠܬ and ܫܒܠܐ). Thus in any case the probability is that in the present passage ὁ Σύρος translated not from the Peshitta, but from the original Hebrew text.

[34] See Th. Nöldeke's Compendious Syriac Gramm. Engl. transl., London, 1904. § 87.

From the evidence advanced here it is quite clear that ὁ Σύρος can not, in any way, be identified with the Peshitta. FIELD [35] was inclined to the opinion that ὁ Σύρος was a bilingual Syrian, of Greek origin, who translated into Greek from the Peshitta.[36] Rather a bilingual Greek of Semitic origin would be a more apt description of the translator. ὁ Σύρος surely was a Semite even though he is not to be identified with the Peshitta. However, the origin and date of both still remain questions of doubt and until we come into possession of new evidence their history must remain obscure.

[35] *Op. cit.*

[36] On the other hand see SCRIVENER-MILLER, Introd. to the Crit. of the New Testament, vol. 2, p. 7, note; and BLEEK-WELLHAUSEN, *Einleitung in das Alte Testament* (1893) p. 560. Cf. SWETE, *Introduction to the Old Testament in Greek,* p. 116.

MAIMONIDES' LEHRE VON DER PROPHETIE

Z. DIESENDRUCK

I.

Bekanntlich war das Problem der Prophetie ein Zentralpunkt im *Moreh*, wie es MAIMONIDES nicht allein in vorhergehenden Schriften und Briefen ankündigt,[1] sondern im Buche selbst wiederholt, und sogar so weit, daß er diese Frage als den eigentlichen Zweck des Werkes betrachtet und alle die philosophischen Auseinandersetzungen, die im *Moreh* vorkommen, bloß als Hilfs- und Beiwerk, auf jeden Fall als Uneigentliches in der Gesamtkomposition hinstellt.[2] Es müßte daher ein Unbegreifliches erscheinen, sollte gerade diese zentrale Lehre nichts weiter sein als eine Darstellung einer schon landläufig gewordenen Theorie und auch als solche noch in unklarer Form vorgetragen. Dies allein müßte genügen, daß wir uns veranlaßt sehen, durch genaue Untersuchung und Interpretation der wirklichen Absicht MAIMONIDES' in dieser Frage auf den Grund zu kommen. Wir sind aber zu einer solchen Interpretation noch aus anderen Gründen gezwungen: aus sich widersprechenden Auffassungen der Prophetielehre MAIMONIDES' bei späteren Autoren und auch aus scheinbaren Widersprüchen bei ihm selbst.

Schon die allgemeinste Würdigung zeigt eine bis zum Gegensatz gehende Verschiedenheit. Die späteren jüdischen Philosophen, wie

[1] In allen Stellen des Mischnah-Kommentars, wo MAIMONIDES über Prophetie spricht, erwähnt er das geplante ספר הנבואה. So in der Einleitung zu Seder Zeraim, als Plan: ספר בסגי עצמו ואולי השם יסיעני עליו עם מה שיאוי יצטרך לענין הזה (sc. הנבואה) ... והדבור בזה והראיה להתחבר לענין הזה. In der Einleitung zu Sanhedrin X (7 Artikel) spricht er schon von ספרי שאני מתעסק בו „הנבואה". Dann in den Acht Kapiteln (Abschnitt 1): והוא יותר ראוי בספר הנבואה אשר זכרנו, (Abschnitt 7): אני עתיד להשלים זה בס' הנבואה. Vgl. ferner EPPENSTEIN, *M. b. Maimon.*, S. 78.

[2] In der Einleitung zum *Moreh* spricht er, bezugnehmend auf den Mischnah-Kommentar, vom ספר הנבואה וספר ההשואה, an deren Stelle dann der *Moreh* trat. Besonders bezeichnend aber ist die Stelle *Moreh* II, 2, wo MAIMONIDES erklärt, daß alle philosophischen Untersuchungen im *Moreh* für ihn nur soweit in Betracht kommen, inwiefern sie ein טפתח בהכרח להבנת דבר מספרי הנבואה sind oder dienen לבאר בספקות נתלות בנבואה oder לבאר עקר בענין הנבואה.

etwa NACHMANIDES und ABRAVANEL,[3] bekämpfen heftig die maimunische Auffassung, als gegen die Grundsätze der Torah verstoßend, somit als äußerst antidogmatisch. Andererseits aber findet sich ein Autor,[4] der MAIMONIDES gerade das Gegenteil vorwirft, nämlich einen Rückfall zum Dogmatismus. Und beide können Gründe für ihre Auffassung anführen. — Nicht anders verhält es sich im Speziellen. Von den, offenen und nur angedeuteten, Polemiken der späteren Philosophen gegen MAIMONIDES finden wir manche — und zwar die untereinander so verschiedenen GERSONIDES[5] und ALBO[6] —, die sich gegen das mehr sensualistische Moment der Imagination, das bei MAIMONIDES eine wesentliche Bedeutung hat, richten: GERSONIDES nämlich lehnt die Imagination für die Prophetie ganz ab, ALBO läßt die Frage offen. Während andererseits SPINOZA[7] gerade gegen den Intellektualismus in der Maimonides-Lehre polemisiert und diesen ganz verwirft zugunsten der Imagination. Wenn nun auch die Lehre MAIMONIDES' wirklich

[3] NACHMANIDES (im Bibel-Kommentar Gen. 18, 1): ואלה דברים סותרי הכתוב אסור לשטעם אף כי להאמין בהם. ABRAVANEL protestiert wiederholt gegen die Auffassungen MAIMONIDES', besonders aber in der großen Auseinandersetzung im Kommentar zu *Moreh* II, 36, wo er darangeht, die sieben Grundsätze (הקדמות) des MAIMONIDES von einem prinzipiellen Gesichtspunkte aus zu untersuchen ולברר בהם הצודק מהבלתי צודק כפי אמונת התורה האלהית והאמתית אלינו קהל המאמינים, כדי לבער הדעת הנפסד מקרבנו. Die meisten dieser Grundsätze verwirft er dann als מבוארת השקרות. Hier werden die Einwürfe der Anhänger MAIMONIDES' genannt, die Proteste der Gegner bedurften wohl keiner besonderen Erwähnung.

[4] LEFKOWITZ, in Judaica, Festschrift für H. COHEN, S. 169.

[5] Milchamoth II, 6 (8. Zweifel): nach längerer Auseinandersetzung gelangt GERSONIDES zur folgenden Teilung: שהמקבל זה השפע בקסם ובחלום הוא הדמיון והמקבל אותו לנבואה הוא השכל ההיולני. Vgl. Is. WEIL, *Philos. relig. d. Levi ben Gerson*, S. 101.

[6] Ikkarim III, 8: אם נאמר שהנבואה ג"כ ענין דמיוני יגיע אל הכח המדמה, כמו שדמו קצת חכמינו הנמשכים אחר הסילוסוף, שענין הנבואה הוא דבר טבעי נמשך אל הכח המדמה בלבד, כמו ההלומות... והדבר הזה יבחישהו החוש והשכל. Auf Grund dieser Negation, die sich offenbar auf MAIMONIDES bezieht (denn es heißt da שהוא כדמות הנפלאות שלא יתנבא, was wörtlich an *Moreh* II, 32, erinnert), gelangt dann ALBO zu einer positiven Definition: נדר הנבואה... שהוא שפע שופע מהשם יתב' על חכח הדברי אשר באדם, אם באמצעות הכח המדמה אם בזולתו, מודיע לו על ידי מלאך או בזולתו וכו'. Er lehnt also nicht bloß die Notwendigkeit des מדמה ab, sondern auch die eines vermittelnden Faktors (מלאך) überhaupt.

[7] Tract. theol. pol. I, 4, 7; 25: Asserimus itaque ... neminem nisi imaginationis ope ... Dei revelata accepisse, atque ad prophetizandum non esse opus perfectiore mente sed vividiore imaginatione; s. ferner I, 32 und II (anfangs). Über seine Polemik gegen MAIMONIDES vgl. JOEL, *Spinozas Theol. Pol. Tractat*, S. 18 ff. Besonders Tract. I, 19: Quod revelatio per solas imagines contigit, patet ... Et quamvis MAIMONIDES et alii hanc historiam et itidem omnes ... in somniis contigisse volunt, non vero ... illi sane *garriunt*; nam nihil aliud curaverunt, quam *ungas Aristotelicas* et sua propria figmenta ex scriptura extorquere; quo mihi quidem nihil magis ridiculum videtur.

aus verschiedenen Elementen zusammengesetzt sein mag, so wäre es doch nicht so einfach gewesen, das eine zu bekämpfen und ganz oder teilweise eliminieren zu wollen, wenn man erkannt hätte, daß diese Elemente in der bekämpften Lehre eine Einheit bilden und also zuerst diese als solche widerlegt und aufgelöst werden muß, ehe man ihre Bruchstücke anderweitig zu verwerten sucht. Aber gerade die Erkenntnis dieser Einheit ist es, die wir vermissen.

Aber noch schwieriger wird das Verständnis dieser Theorie, wenn wir sie bei Maimonides selbst betrachten. Gleich zu Beginn seiner Hauptdarstellung der Prophetielehre[8] führt er drei Anschauungen über diesen Gegenstand an: erstens die Anschauung der Masse, wonach die Prophetie eine geradezu willkürlich von Gott erfolgte Inspiration irgendeines Menschen bedeutet — unabhängig von Alter oder sonstigen intellektuellen und moralischen Qualitäten. Zweitens die Anschauung der Philosophen, die die Prophetie als eine „Vollkommenheit in der menschlichen Natur" bezeichnet, „die aber ein Mensch erst durch die Erziehung erlangt". Ein Unwissender also oder ein sittlich Zurückgebliebener kann demnach nie zur Prophetie gelangen — „vielmehr liegt die Sache so, daß ein hervorragender, in seinen Vernunfterkenntnissen und Charaktereigenschaften vollkommener Mensch, wenn zugleich seine Einbildungskraft die denkbar vollkommenste ist und er die Vorbereitung erlangt, die Du hören wirst, notwendig ein Prophet sein muß, da diese Vollkommenheit in unserer Natur liegt". Schließlich drittens „die Ansicht unserer Torah und die Grundlage unseres Glaubens", die „ganz dieselbe" ist wie die zweite und sich nur in einem Punkte von ihr unterscheidet, daß nämlich auch der zur Prophetie Geeignete und dazu Vorbereitete durch Gottes Willen daran verhindert werden kann.

Abgesehen nun davon, ob diese dritte Ansicht sich wirklich mit denen der Torah verträgt — eine Frage, die uns hier weiter nicht beschäftigen kann —, so kann man sie zunächst gar nicht als dritte bezeichnen. Von den beiden ersten hatten eine jede eine charakteristische notwendige Bedingung: die erste die Inspiration (und vernachlässigte daher die Qualitäten des Subjektes), die zweite die Qualitäten des Subjektes (und vernachlässigte die Inspiration). Eine dritte Ansicht also müßte — wenn sie schon kein neues Moment

[8] *Moreh* II. 32.

einführt — zumindest diese beiden kombinieren, was hier jedoch nicht der Fall ist. Denn das eine Moment, daß Gott in diesem natürlichen Prozeß präventiv eingreifen kann, bedeutet ja nichts, und es würde doch auch niemandem einfallen, von einer anderen Ansicht über die menschliche Bewegung oder das Leben zu sprechen, wenn er nur ganz allgemein — und auf alles Natürliche anwendbar — glaubt, Gott könne da präventiv eingreifen. Die dritte Ansicht scheint also identisch mit der zweiten zu sein und die hinzugefügte „Ausnahme" ganz unwesentlich. Dies, von den Kommentatoren gleich empfunden,[9] kann doch unmöglich MAIMONIDES entgangen sein, er kann aber auch nicht darüber hinweggetäuscht haben wollen.

Dazu kommt noch folgendes: MAIMONIDES beruft sich wiederholt auf seine Äußerungen in den früheren Werken. Insbesondere erwähnt er — und setzt deren Kenntnis geradezu voraus[10] — die Unterscheidung zwischen Moses und allen anderen Propheten, wie er sie im Mischnah-Kommentar[11] und dann, kürzer, im Mischneh-Torah[12] durchführt. Als vierter der Unterschiede ist nun im Mischnah-Kommentar der, daß, im Gegensatze zu Moses, der immer prophezeien konnte, „alle Propheten der Prophetie nicht teilhaftig werden nach ihrem Willen, sondern nach dem Willen Gottes, denn der Prophet verbleibt ja zuweilen Tage oder Jahre, ohne daß über ihn die Prophetie kommt, und er betet zu Gott, er möge ihm die Prophetie erteilen, und er wartet, bis er ihn prophezeien läßt, nach Tagen oder Monaten oder überhaupt nicht ...[13]". Hier ist es klar, daß der Wille Gottes eine positive Funktion hat, nämlich die Prophetie zu verleihen —

[9] ABRAVANEL z. St.: ... הדעת השלישי שזכר הרב הנה במציאות הנבואה הוא דעת הפלוסוף בעצמו מבלי תוספת וחסרון. Ebenso EPHODI und SCHEM-TOB z. St. — Der Versuch SANDLERS, *Das Problem der Proph.*, S. 59 ff., diese Schwierigkeit zu lösen, muß als mißlungen bezeichnet werden.

[10] *Moreh* II, 35, eingeleitet mit כבר באתי לבני אדם כלם הד' הבדלים.

[11] Vorrede zu Sanhedrin X, 7 Grunds.

[12] *Jesode-Hatorah* 7.

[13] והענין הרביעי כי כל הנביאים לא תנוח עליהם רוח הנבואה ברצונם אלא ברצון ה"ש, שהרי יעמוד הנביא ימים או שנים ולא תבא לו הנבואה ויבקש מן הבורא ה"ש שיודיע לו הדבר ויעמוד עד שינבא אותו... או שלא יודיעו בשום פנים, וכבר היו מהם כתות שהיו מכינין עצמן ומזככין מחשבותם... ואינו מן ההכרחי שינבא בעת שיכין לזה. Bezeichnend ist, daß dieser vierte Unterschied im *Jesode-Hatorah* schon anders formuliert wird: כל הנביאים אין מתנבאים בכל עת שירצו, משה רב' אינו כן אלא כל זמן שיחפוץ רוח הקודש לובשתו ונבואה שורה עליו ואינו צריך לכוין דעתו ולהזדמן לה, שהרי הוא מכוון ומזומן ועומד. Man sieht, der Schwerpunkt ist hier verschoben; an Stelle des göttlichen Willens tritt später die Notwendigkeit der Vorbereitung bei den Propheten, während früher die Vorbereitung, da nicht ausreichend, von untergeordneter Bedeutung war.

im Gegensatz zu der im *Moreh* zuerst vorgetragenen Anschauung (denn auch im *Moreh* ist die Rede nur von den anderen Propheten mit Ausschluß des Moses), wonach die natürlich erfolgte Prophetie von Gott nur verhindert werden kann, als eine Art „wunderlicher" Eingriff. Hätte Maimonides seine erste Ansicht auf die letzte umgeändert, wie könnte er dann die erste noch hier anführen, um sie als Grundlage zu weiteren Folgerungen zu machen?

Ferner eine dritte Schwierigkeit. Maimonides bringt zu Beginn des Kap. 32 die drei Ansichten über Prophetie in eine Beziehung zu den drei von ihm[14] vorgebrachten Ansichten über die Weltschöpfung. Sicher kann nicht allein die Dreizahl der Vergleichspunkt sein. Abravanel[15] und ihm anschließend auch Munk[16] versuchen es, die beiden drei in eine sachliche Beziehung zu bringen. Demnach entspricht die hier vorgetragene erste Ansicht „der unwissenden Masse" der dortigen Ansicht unserer Torah, wonach die Weltschöpfung eine vollständige war, eine *creatio ex nihilo*; die zweite Ansicht über Prophetie, die der Philosophen, entspricht der dortigen aristotelischen, wonach die Welt ewig ist und alle Schöpfung nur im Aktuellwerden von Formen besteht. Die dritte Ansicht soll der Schöpfungstheorie Platons entsprechen, wonach die Materie ewig war, aber dann vom Schöpfer gestaltet wurde. Während nun die Beziehungen zwischen den ersten zwei Ansichten — in Prophetie sowohl als auch in Weltschöpfung — klar sind, so ist nicht einzusehen, welche Ähnlichkeit wohl eine Prophetietheorie, die, wie die zweite, das Ganze als notwendigen Naturprozeß ansieht, wobei beides, Voraussetzungen und Ergebnis, naturhaft ist, die nur noch das präventive Eingreifen Gottes hinzufügt — wie diese Theorie in eine Analogie mit der platonischen Schöpfungstheorie gebracht werden kann, wonach doch ein Akt der Formgebung zur formlosen Materie dazukam. Was mag wohl in unserem Fall die Materie sein, die geformt wird, und worin besteht der Formungsakt? Oder soll Maimonides diesen Vergleich herbeigezogen haben, obwohl er auf alle anderen Ansichten paßt, bis gerade auf die, die er selbst vertritt?

[14] *Moreh* II, 13.

[15] Kommentar zu *Moreh* II, 32.

[16] *Guide* II, S. 259, Anm. 2. Wenn Munk von der dritten Ansicht sagt „qui attribue la prophétie à une faculté préexistante *se développant* par la volonté divine", so ist dies eben nur zu diesem Vergleichszwecke angepaßt, entspricht aber nicht dem Maim. Text. Vgl. *Guide* II, S. 262, Anm. 1.

Alle diese Schwierigkeiten, wenn sie auch bisher nur die Peripherie des Problems berühren, sollten genügen, uns auf die Notwendigkeit aufmerksam zu machen, die von MAIMONIDES so vielfach und vielversprechend angekündigte Lehre von der Prophetie auf ihren wahren und eigenen Gehalt hin zu untersuchen; nachzusehen, ob er nun wirklich eine eigene Ansicht darüber hatte, ohne im wesentlichen den herrschenden Ansichten nachzureden, und wenn so, worin für ihn das Exzeptionelle und Ereignishafte, das Bedeutende in der Prophetie war. Ob wir es in diesen Gegensätzen mit Widersprüchen zu tun haben oder mit bewußten und gewollten Antinomien, woraus sich ein Drittes ergeben soll.

II.

Man wird diesem Gegenstand nicht gerecht, wenn man den ersten Kapiteln (II, 32—35), in denen MAIMONIDES von der Prophetie handelt, eine allzu entscheidende Bedeutung beimißt. Bleibt man bei diesen und nimmt man die darin gemachten Äußerungen als grundlegend an, so verfehlt man die richtige Absicht des Philosophen.[17] In Wirklichkeit sind die ersten vier Kapitel, wie schon die Kommentatoren erkannt haben,[18] nur als Einleitung zu betrachten, die zwar mit der Hauptlehre nicht in Widerspruch stehen dürfen, die aber aus dieser verstanden werden müssen und nicht umgekehrt. Daß MAIMONIDES den Vortrag seiner eigentlichen Theorie erst mit Kap. 36 beginnt, beweist schon, rein stilistisch, der feierliche Anfang mit דע [ar. אעלם], womit gewöhnlich etwas Neues eingeführt wird; aber noch mehr beweist es die Erklärung, daß hier „das wahre Wesen der Prophetie" erklärt werden soll: אמתת הנבואה ומהותה — ein Ausdruck,

[17] Selbst KRESKAS beging diesen Fehler, wenn er, Or Adonai Tr. II, 4, 4, gegen die דעת הפילוסופים, die er auch als die MAIMONIDES' annimmt (הרב קים דעתם), so polemisiert: כאשר נקח דעת הפילוסופים ישאר הפלא איך היה שלא נמצא בכל זה הזמן ... מי שהגיע לזאת המדרגה אחר נתינת התורה אלא מהאומה הנבחרת, והנה חכמת היונים והכשרים מפורסמת מאד — ולזה יחס מניעת ההשגה מהם לפלא. Zu diesem Einwand konnte er nur auf Grund der vorläufigen Erörterung, in der dritten Ansicht, gelangen, wo der Intellekt noch im Vordergrund war. Denn später *Moreh* II, 37, begegnet ja MAIMONIDES selbst diesem Einwurf. — Ebenso JOEL, *Die Religionsphilosophie des M. b. Maimon.*, S. 56: „In der Tat gesteht ja auch Maimonides, daß seine Ansicht in der Hauptsache die der Philosophen sei."

[18] So NARBONI, ed. Goldental, Fol. 42, zu *Moreh* II, 32: וגדר הנבואה יביאהו בפ' ל"ו. Ebenso SCHEM-TOB zu II Kap. 36: בזה הפרק הגיח הרב גדר הנבואה ראשונה. Auch ABRAVANEL zu Kap. 32: הנה ראה הרב להקדים לגדר הנבואה ד' פרקים מצאת הכרח הלמוד, dann zu Kap. 36: בפרק הזה ראה הרב לגדור הנבואה.

der von nun an wiederholt wird[19] und der bei MAIMONIDES von großer Bedeutung ist. Bedenkt man die strenge Unterscheidung, die MAIMONIDES zwischen הישרת המציאות oder הישרת השכל למציאות oder מציאות (Existenz) im allgemeinen und מהות הדבר ואמתו oder מהות (Wesen) wiederholt macht,[20] die grundlegende Wichtigkeit dieser Unterscheidung für ihn (und auch alle Philosophie), so wird man kaum glauben können, diese Worte hier und später seien ganz zufällig und ohne jede Absicht hingeschrieben. Während er also im Anfang[21] ganz allgemein von den verschiedenen Anschauungen über Prophetie spricht, mehr auf die Abgrenzung des Gebietes ausgehend, oder nur von den allgemeinen Bedingungen der Prophetie oder besser des prophetischen Menschen, so wird hier das Problem als solches angeschnitten: Wie ist Prophetie möglich und wie kommt sie zustande?

Die Problemstellung hier sieht zwar „psychologisch" aus, und es könnte so der Schein entstehen, MAIMONIDES handle hier nur von der empirischen Verwirklichung prophetischer Begabung, ohne auf ihr Prinzipielles einzugehen. So auch konnte JOEL[22] zum Satz gelangen, MAIMONIDES in seiner psychologischen Fragestellung sei erst durch GERSONIDES, der die Frage „metaphysisch" faßte, ergänzt worden. Dies aber ist irrig, wenn man bedenkt, daß bei MAIMONIDES Psychologie und Metaphysik nicht trennbar sind und eine Frage nach der psychologischen Möglichkeit eines Aktes keineswegs empirisch allein gefaßt werden kann, sondern mit allen metaphysischen Grundfragen eng verknüpft ist. Ist dies schon der Fall bei der normalen Erkenntnis, dann um so mehr bei einem Ausnahmsfall wie Prophetie.

Im Gegenteil; vergleichen wir die Problemstellung bei MAIMONIDES mit der bei anderen repräsentativen Philosophen — etwa bei SAADJA, vor ihm, und GERSONIDES, nach ihm —, so sehen wir noch klarer, wie sehr MAIMONIDES auf das Eigentliche der Frage sich eingestellt

[19] So *Moreh* II, 36 (Mitte): הנה כבר הגיד לנו יתי אמתת הנבואה ומהותה, dann II, 38 (Mitte); II, 39 (Anfang); II, 45 (Anfang).

[20] Am eingehendsten wird diese Unterscheidung im *Moreh* I, 46, durchgeführt, worin die הישרה למציאות הדבר auf Akzidentielles, auf Handlungen und Relationen bezogen wird, im Gegensatz zum wahren Wesen. Vorher war der Unterschied in I, 33, auch I, 36, erwähnt. Angewendet auf den Gottesbegriff wird dies dann in I, 57, worin מציאות als bloße Akzidenz bezeichnet wird. Vgl. auch I, 49.

[21] II, 32: דעות בני אדם בנבואה.

[22] *Levi ben Gerson*, S. 46.

hat. Bei SAADJA[23] war das Zentralproblem die Offenbarung, das Übernatürliche in dessen Eingriff ins Natürliche; er mußte daher die Zweckmäßigkeit untersuchen und die Evidenz und kam so zu Fragen der Gesetzgebung und des Wunders.[24] Bei GERSONIDES[25] war die Frage: Wie ist Vorhersagen der Zukunft möglich? Da bei ihm Prophetie mit Wahrsagerei und Traum als wahrsagerisch sehr enge verknüpft war, so war ihm diese Frage das Wichtigste. Beide haben trotz ihrer Verschiedenheit doch das eine gemeinsam, daß sie die Prophetie nur im Zusammenhang mit dem Verlauf des objektiven Weltgeschehens sahen; in ihrem Ursprung aus demselben oder in ihrer Auswirkung auf dasselbe. Hingegen MAIMONIDES schaltet beide Fragen von vornherein aus; er behandelt noch in den vorbereitenden Kapiteln die extremen Fälle sowohl von Offenbarung, wie am Sinai,[26] oder von reiner Divination,[27] macht sich von diesen für ihn akzidentiellen Fragen los, um dann auf das Phänomen der Prophetie in seiner Reinheit einzugehen, zunächst ohne Zusammenhang mit dem praktischen Verlauf der Dinge, um erst später, in Form einer Konklusion,[28] auch auf diese wieder zu sprechen zu kommen. Für

[23] *Emunoth Wedeoth* III, 3—6. Über den polemischen Charakter (besonders gegen die Brahima, die die Notwendigkeit der Offenbarung für die Sittlichkeit ablehnten) siehe S. HOROWITZ, *Die Prophetologie in der jüdischen Religionsphilosophie*, S. 36 ff; vgl. auch SANDLER, *loc. cit.*, S. 15 ff.

[24] Dies insbesondere in seiner Polemik gegen CHIWI-ALBALCHI über die Bevorzugung der Menschen vor den Engeln. Über den ganzen Zusammenhang dieser Frage siehe J. GUTTMANN, *Die Religionsphilosophie d. Saadja*, S. 139 ff.

[25] Gleich zu Beginn seiner diesbezüglichen Lehre (Milchamoth II, 1) spricht er von der Prophetie nur im Sinne einer: ידיעה לאדם בדברים העתידים, wodurch ja auch möglich wurde, immer von חלום או קסם או נבואה zu sprechen, da dies der gemeinsame Punkt war. Auf Grund dieser Auffassung dreht sich auch alles Weitere um ואת ההודעה, besonders die Zweifel im Kap. 6. — S. JOEL, *Levi ben Gerson*, S. 47 ff. Vgl. WEIL, *loc. cit.*

[26] *Moreh* II, 33.

[27] *Moreh* II, 32 am Schluß, wo er den נגיד בנעלם מצד הקסם ומצד המשער או מצד חלום צודק (der hebräische Text korrigiert nach MUNK, *Guide* II, S. 267, Anm. 1 und 2) vom eigentlichen Propheten unterscheidet, also gerade diese drei Arten von Vorhersagen, die für GERSONIDES, beim Ausgangspunkte, das Ganze der Prophetie ausmachen. Es ist bezeichnend, daß während MAIMONIDES von einer Verschiedenheit zwischen Traum und Prophetie ausgeht, um sie dann zu verbinden, beginnt GERSONIDES mit deren Identifikation, um sie dann (vgl. oben Anm. 5) auseinanderzuhalten. Noch im Mischneh-Torah (*Jesode-Hatorah* 10) war für MAIMONIDES das Eintreffen der Voraussagen eines Propheten ein wesentliches Kriterium.

[28] Im Kap. 39, nachdem die theoretische Grundlegung beendet war — ואחר שדברנו במהות הנבואה והודענו אמתתה —, kommt MAIMONIDES auf die Wichtigkeit der Torah — als Markstein zwischen der Prophetie vor nund ach Moses — zu sprechen, dann im

Maimonides ist also das Problem zunächst ein immanent psychisches, d. h. die Metaphysik der Erkenntnis betreffendes — wir würden heute sagen: ein erkenntnistheoretisches. Er eliminierte wohl alles Wunderhafte und Wunderliche aus der Untersuchung, war also insofern mit den „Philosophen" einverstanden, das Phänomen als „natürliches" anzusehen — aber eben dieses Natürliche wurde zum Problem; die Prophetie wurde zwar ein Erkenntnisakt, aber einer von ganz exzeptionellem, sonst im System nicht vorfindbarem Charakter.

Als „wahren Begriff und Wesen" der Prophetie nun bezeichnet Maimonides[29] eine Emanation Gottes vermittels des Aktiven Intellekts auf den menschlichen Intellekt sowohl als auch auf die menschliche Imagination. Auf die Bedeutung der letzteren in unserem Zusammenhange werden wir noch zurückkommen. Wir wollen zunächst nur folgendes festhalten: der aktive Weltintellekt ist es, der die Emanation vermittelt; die beiden menschlichen Vermögen, Intellekt und Imagination, sind koordiniert und konstitutiv, in gleichem Maße und zu gleicher Zeit notwendig bedingend für die Entstehung der Prophetie. Sie sind beide die Träger der prophetischen Funktion.

Es bedarf dieser ausdrücklichen Betonung, um schon gleich jetzt, ehe wir noch auf das Problematische an dieser Definition eingehen, eine allgemein angenommene irrige Auffassung richtigzustellen. Nämlich die, daß Maimonides in seiner Prophetietheorie ganz und gar den arabischen Peripatetikern oder Ibn-Daud, der ja deren jüdischer Exponent war, folgt.[30] Die Absicht hier ist eine systematische und

Kap. 40 auf die gesellschaftlich-moralischen Notwendigkeiten und gesetzgeberischen Auswirkungen der Prophetie, was für Saadja der Ausgangspunkt war. Gleichzeitig betont er, daß das Nur-Gesellschaftliche kein Gegenstand der Prophetie, nur des כח המדמה, allein ist. Maimonides lehnt die Einteilung Saadjas in מצוות שכליות und שמעיות ab, eine Einteilung, zu der Saadja durch die soziale Grundlegung der Prophetie gelangt ist; Acht Kap. VI: ויקראו אותם קצת חכמינו האחרונים אשר חלו חלי המדברים מצוות שכליות (Hinweis auf die Abhängigkeit Saadjas von der Mutazila). Über den Grund dieser Ablehnung aus dem Ganzen des Maim. Systems s. Scheyer, *Das psychologische System Maimonides'*, S. 29 (Anm. F).

[29] *Moreh* II, 36. דע כי אמתת הנבואה ומהותה הוא שפע משפע מאת השם יתי באמצעות השכל הפועל על הכח המדמה, allein ist. Das Wort ישפע (ישפע) על הכח המדמה (אלקוה אלמתכיללה) תחלה ואחר כך (אלקוה אלנאטקה) ist wohl im Original nicht enthalten. Auf das etwaige Vor- und Nachher zwischen Intellekt und Imagination werden wir noch zu sprechen kommen.

[30] So Joel, *Die Religionsphilosophie des M. b. Maimon.*, S. 56. (Nachdem er das „Geständnis" Maimonides' zitiert, er habe alles von den Philosophen genommen (s. oben Anm. 17), fügt er in Anm. 2 hinzu: „Interessant ist, Ibn-Sina bei Scharastani zu vergleichen." Ferner in *Levi ben Gerson*, S. 45: „... Maimonides' Abhandlung über Prophetie, die

keine historische, wir werden daher diesen Punkt nur soweit zu klären haben, als er die wesentlichen Momente in MAIMONIDES' System deutlicher hervorhebt; dazu aber müssen wir ein paar Worte dem Historischen widmen, nicht nur um der Wertung der Leistung MAIMONIDES' willen, sondern auch für deren besseres Verständnis.

Nun ist wohl ALFARABI[31] der erste, der den Aktiven Intellekt mit der Prophetie in Verbindung gebracht hat. Nachdem er dem νοῦς ποιητικός — bekanntlich von Aristoteles als immanent gelehrt, von Alexander Aphrodisias dann ins Transzendente erhoben und mit der Gottheit identifiziert — wohl die Transzendenz gelassen hatte, aber nicht die Göttlichkeit, und ihn vielmehr zu einem Mittler, und zwar besonders für das Wohl der Vervollkommnung des vernunftbegabten Menschen, also zur dritten Stufe der Seienden[32] reduzierte, verlieh er ihm gleichzeitig, als einzige, die Funktion, den menschlichen Intellekt zu erleuchten, ihn von der Potentialität zur Aktualität und vom Materiellen zum Göttlichen zu erheben.[33] Im Universum weniger — für den Menschen alles. Es ist daher klar, daß die höchste Stufe der menschlichen Erkenntnis nichts anderes ist als die vollkommene Verbindung mit dem Aktiven Intellekt. Im Bereiche der „Herrschaften" ist diese Stufe die absoluteste — es ist dies der wahre König, der

in der Hauptsache an Ibn Sinas Ansicht lehnt ..." GUTTMANN, *Abr. Ibn-Daud*, S. 168, ist derselben Auffassung über das Verhältnis MAIMONIDES' zu den arabischen Philosophen betreffs der „rationellen Erklärung der Prophetie". — HUSIK, *History of Mediaeval Jewish Philosophy*, S. 276, sagt es ganz entschieden: „here (sc. on the phaenomenon of prophecy) also he (Maimonides) follows Aristotelian ideas as expressed in the writings of the Arabs Alfarabi and Avicenna and was anticipated among the Jews by Ibn-Daud". Dies sind nur herausgegriffene Illustrationen der allgemein geltenden Meinung.

[31] Über ALFARABI als „zweiter Lehrer" (אל מעלם אל ثّאני), nach Aristoteles, s. AHRON BEN ELIA, *Ez Hajim*, ed. Delitzsch, S. 296, Scholion 15. Über seine Theorie des Aktiven Intellekts s. MUNK, *Melanges*, S. 331 und 345 f. — Vgl. STEINSCHNEIDER, *Alfarabi*, S. 90 f. (und Anm. S. 245), S. 114 und Anm. 49 daselbst. Über die Prophetietheorie speziell vgl. HOROWITZ, *loc. cit.*, S. 19.

[32] Die Entwicklung der Lehre des νοῦς ποιητικός von Aristoteles bis zu den Arabern skizziert klar SCHEYER, *loc. cit.*, S. 76 ff. — ALFARABI, התחלת הנמצאים ed. Philipowski in האסיף, S. 1 und 2, unterscheidet zwischen den Sphärengeistern bis zum Monde, die zweiter Ordnung sind (nach Gott), und dem Aktiven Intellekt, der eine Stufe tiefer ist.

[33] *loc. cit.*, S. 2: והשכל הפועל פעולתו ההשגחה בחי המדבר; S. 4: וישים השכל הפועל קצתם שכל בפועל ויגביה אותם מן המדרגה אשר הם עליה מן המציאות אל מדרגה במציאות יותר נכבדת; S. 5: ויחס השכל הפועל מן האדם יחס השמש מן הראות... כן השכל הפועל יקנה לאדם דבר ירשמהו בכח המדברת, יחס הדבר החוא מן הנפש המדברת יחס האור מן הראות... וכו ישוב שכל האדם אשר הוא שכל בכח שכל בפועל ובשלמות... וישוב שכל בעצמותו אחר שלא היה כן... וישוב אלהי אחר אשר היה חמיי.

der Prophetie Würdige.[34] Diese Stufe ist erreicht dank dem Einfluß des Aktiven Intellekts, שכל הפועל, auf den empfänglichen Intellekt, השכל המתפעל — durch Vermittlung des erworbenen Intellekts, השכל הנקנה;[35] wobei sich der empfängliche zum erworbenen und der erworbene zum Aktiven wie Stoff zur Form verhält; und so wird der menschliche Intellekt unmittelbar dem Aktiven Intellekt angeschlossen.

Hier ist also die Prophetie zweifellos nichts anderes als rein intellektuell; sowohl ihr „Stoff" als auch ihre „Form" — beide sind im selben Bereiche. Es wird wohl auch von einer Ansicht Alfarabis berichtet, die die Prophetie allein auf die Einbildungskraft zurückführt;[36] doch wird dort gleichzeitig festgestellt, daß er dieser imaginativen Prophetie gegenüber die Philosophie höher stellt. Diese Art von Prophetie kann auch in Hatchalath Hanimzaim unmöglich gemeint sein, da er ihr doch eine führende und lehrende Funktion zuschreibt, was bei der Imagination unmöglich ist.[37] Somit bleibt als wirkliche höchste Stufe die „philosophische" Prophetie, die den Intellekt allein zum Träger hat.

Dieselbe intellektualistische Einstellung wird durch Ibn-Sina fortgesetzt. Infolge seiner mehr theologischen Einstellung[38] konnte allerdings Ibn-Sina nicht ganz bei der „philosophischen" Prophetie bleiben, sondern mußte sich an das Phänomen des wirklichen, wirkenden Propheten halten und so auf den Grund seiner bildlichen Ausdrucksweise und der Legitimität seiner Offenbarungen näher eingehen. In einer auffallenden Parallele mit seinem Zeitgenossen Saadja —

[34] *Ibid.*, S. 40: ואפנם יהיה זה בבעלי השבעים הגדולים והחשובים באשר דבקה נפשו בשכל הפועל ... ואדנות האיש, S. 41: והאיש הזה הוא טלך באמת אצל הראשונים והוא אשר ראוי שיאמר בו שיבוא אליו הנבואה. הזה הוא אדנות הראשונה ושאר האדניות האנושיות מתאחרות מזאת ומתהוות ממנה

[35] *Ibid.*, S. 41: כי השכל המתפעל יהיה דמיון החומר והנושא לשכל הנקנה והשכל הנקנה דומה לחומר והנושא לשכל הפועל ואז ישפע מן השכל הפועל על השכל המתפעל הכח אשר בו ... ומאת ההשפעה ... היא הנבואה

[36] Ibn-Tophail, *Philosophus autodidactus*, ed. Pococke, S. 18. Vgl. darüber Horowitz, *loc. cit.*, S. 22.

[37] So התחלת הנמצאים, S. 41: והאנשים אשר יתנהגו באדנות האדון הזה (הנביא) הם השובים הנכבדים והמצליחים, S. 43: ומאת היא ההצלחה הגמורה באמת אשר היא כוונת השכל הפועל. Hingegen heißt es über die Imagination *ibid.*, S. 36: כי המדמה והמרגיש אין אחד מהם משער הצלחתו ... Ferner: ובאשר ישתדל האדם להשלים החלק המדבר העיוני ... ויעשה הדברים ההם אשר הוציא מלבו בכלי הכח המתעוררת והעירוהו המדמה והמרגיש ועל זה יהיה מה שיתחדש ממנו רע כלו.

[38] Vgl. Munk, *Melanges*, S. 365: „... le principe moral et le principe religieux occupent une grande place dans la philosophie d'Ibn-Sina", S. 366: „... il ait fait de nombreuses concessions aux idées religieuses de sa nation." Vgl. hingegen die Meinung Ibn-Tophails über die philosophischen Ansichten Alfarabis, die „pleins de doute et de contradictions" sind, bei Munk, *ibid.*, S. 347.

beide von verschiedenen Ausgangspunkten: IBN-SINA von der „ketzerischen" Philosophie ALFARABIS und SAADJA vom dogmatischen Judentum; beide jedoch unter dem Drucke der gleichen Probleme — sieht auch er die Hauptfunktion des Propheten im sozialen Wirken,[39] im Eingreifen, und kommt daher auch auf die Fragen der Wunder,[40] auf die Frage des für die Mutazila so wichtigen „geschaffenen Wortes",[41] ja sogar auf die Frage, warum Gott sich zu Propheten Menschen und nicht Engel auserkoren habe.[42] Zu diesem ganzen Problemenkreis mußte IBN-SINA die Imagination heranziehen, er machte sie zu einem Hilfsmittel der Prophetie, aber keinesfalls zu ihrem Träger. Die Prophetie in ihrer Reinheit war die höchste Stufe der intellektuellen Vollkommenheit — die Imagination trat nur akzidentiell hinzu, nützlich im gewissen Sinne für die Wirksamkeit des Propheten, aber eher ein nützliches Übel. Die Prophetie wird vom Intellekt allein getragen und wird nur manchmal verbildlicht.[43]

[39] *Schahrastani*, S. 394 (Haarbr. II, 282): „... bei dem Verkehre (sc. der menschlichen Gesellschaft) ist eine Regel und Gerechtigkeit notwendig und kann Einer, der die Regel aufstellt und Gerechtigkeit schafft, nicht entbehrt werden ..." Über SAADJA und seine Abhängigkeit von al-Dshubbai (über ihn vgl. *Schahrastani*, S. 54, Haarbr. I, 81 f.) im Punkte der gesetzgeberischen Funktion des Propheten s. GUTTMANN, *Saadja*, S. 141.

[40] *Schahrastani*, S. 395 (Haarbr. II, 283): „Es ist dann aber ein Prophet notwendig, welcher ein Mensch ist, der sich von den übrigen Menschen durch Wunderzeichen unterscheidet" usw.; ferner *loc. cit.*, S. 428 (Haarbr. II, 331), als er von den drei besonderen Qualitäten, die die Prophetie auszeichnen, spricht, nennt er sie „die Eigentümlichkeiten der Wundertaten und Wunderzeichen". Über SAADJA vgl. GUTTMANN, *loc. cit.*, S. 142.

[41] Über die Ansicht der Mutazila s. *Schahrastani*, S. 30 (Haarbr. I, 42): „Sie (sc. die Mutaz.) stimmen ferner darin überein, daß sein Wort etwas Entstandenes, in einem Träger Erschaffenes sei, nämlich Buchstabe und Ton, dessen Abbild in den Büchern als Berichte von ihm niedergeschrieben sei." Vgl. HOROWITZ, *loc. cit.*, S. 29 (über IBN-SINA) und 40 (über SAADJA); SANDLER, *loc. cit.*, S. 20; vgl. GUTTMANN, *Saadja*, S. 119, bes. Anm. 2.

[42] *Schahrastani*, S. 394 (Haarbr. II, 282): „Es ist also notwendig, daß es ein Mensch sei." Über diese Frage vgl. *Schahr.*, S. 433 (Haarbr. II, 340). Vgl. oben Anm. 24.

[43] *Schahrastani*, S. 419 (Haarbr. II, 317). Nachdem er über die verschiedenen Stufen der vernünftigen Seele handelt, heißt es dann: „Die höchste Stufe davon ist aber die Prophetie und zuweilen strömt auf sie und auf die Einbildungskraft von dem Geiste der Heiligkeit ein Intelligibles herab, welches der Einbildungskraft durch sinnliche Abbilder und hörbare Worte mitteilt ..." Diese Stelle bildet den Hauptnachweis über die Inspiration der Einbildungskraft, aber gerade sie beweist, daß die Einbildungskraft in der Prophetie nicht enthalten, noch weniger ihr Träger ist, sondern zu ihr „zuweilen", akzidentiell, hinzutritt. Es ist unbegreiflich, wieso gerade diese Stelle für das Gegenteil angeführt werden konnte. So HOROWITZ, *loc. cit.*, S. 27: „Die höchste Stufe ... ist nach der Erklärung Ibn-Sinas die Prophetie, bei welcher vom

Wie könnte auch die Einbildungskraft konstitutiv sein für die Prophetie, da sie ihr doch prinzipiell widerspricht! Während „die Vollendung, welche der mit Vernunft begabten Seele eigentümlich ist, darin besteht, daß sie eine vernünftige Welt wird, worin die Form des Universums und des Guten, welches von dem Geber der Formen[44] auf das Universum herabströmt, abgeprägt ist“,[45] eine Vollendung, die in einem stufenweisen Aufstieg, ähnlich dem von Platon im Symposion dargestellten, vor sich geht und „die oberste Stufe in dem ... derjenige einnimmt, der mit der Prophetie begabt ist“,[46] so sind es andererseits die „unvernünftigen Seelen, die leer von Gedanken sind und keinen Begriff haben, weder der Vollkommenheit, noch des Mangels der Vollkommenheit, die auf das Niedrigste gerichtet sind, hingezogen zu den Leibern, und es ist für sie Einbildung notwendig und für die Einbildung sind Körper notwendig“.[47] Und gerade der „Zusammenhang mit dem Körper“[48] ist es, der der seelischen Vollendung hinderlich im Wege steht.

Geiste der Heiligkeit auf die Einbildungskraft ein Intelligibles herabströmt.“ Als würde die Prophetie aus jener Influenz auf die Einbildungskraft bestehen! Im Original lautet es מאלדנה אלעליא מנהא אלנבוה ורבמא יסיר עליה א (sc. עלי אלנבוה) ועלי אלמתכילה מן רוח אלקדם מעקול ... Es ist auch bezeichnend, daß während früher, als der Zustand der Erleuchtung beschrieben wird, wovon die Prophetie die höchste Stufe ist, die Rede ist vom „Vorbereitetsein ... um zu der tätigen Vernunft, אלעקל אלפעאל, zu gelangen, vermittelst der ‚heiligen Kraft‘, welche vom Geiste der Heiligkeit stammt (אלקוה אלקדיסה תנאסב רוח אלקדם)“, so ist hier, wenn die Einbildungskraft zur Prophetie dazukommt, von einem „Intelligiblen“, מעקול, also nicht von der tätigen Vernunft, die Rede, die allerdings auch vom Geiste der Heiligkeit herabströmt. Denselben Fehler macht KAUFMANN, *Attributenlehre*, S. 203, Anm. 181, wenn er versichert, „Ibn-Sina erklärt ausdrücklich (!) die Stufe der Prophetie als diejenige, in der vom Geist der Heiligkeit auf die Vernunft und Einbildungskraft ein ‚Intelligibles‘ herabströme“. Und dies auch unter Berufung auf die oben zitierte Stelle in der Übersetzung Haarbrückers! MUNK, *Melanges*, S. 365, hat den rein intellektualistischen Charakter dieser Prophetietheorie erkannt: „Ibn-Sina veut parler de l'inspiration prophétique ... reconnaissant qu'il y a entre l'âme humaine et la première Intelligence un lieu naturel.“

[44] Auf die Bezeichnung des Aktiven Intellekts als „Formengeber“ ואהב אלצור — die auch MAIMONIDES, *Moreh* II, 12, annimmt (נותן הצורה), werden wir noch zurückkommen. ALFARABI, התחלת הנמצאים, S. 2, nennt ihn auch מלכות שטים, אישים, רוח הקודש, הרוח הנאמן. Die ersten zwei auch IBN-DAUD, *Em. Ramah*, S. 58. Dann MAIMONIDES, *loc. cit.* והוא שרו של עולם אשר זכרוהו החכטים תמיד, vgl. STEINSCHNEIDER, *Alfarabi*, S. 245, und die Verweise dort betreffs des Namens אישים. Ebenso s. KAUFMANN, *loc. cit.*, S. 205.

[45] *Schahrastani*, S. 391 (Haarbr. II, 278). — Über die Form als „Präge“ s. STEINSCHNEIDER, *loc. cit.*, S. 245.

[46] *Schahr.*, S. 394 (Haarbr. II, 281).

[47] *Ibid.*, S. 393 (Haarbr. II, 281).

[48] *Ibid.*, S. 392 (Haarbr. II, 278).

Dasselbe sehen wir auch später bei den Träumen. „Wenn die Formen ... aus der Seele in die Vorstellungskraft übergehen ... ohne daß die Einbildungskraft dabei mitwaltet, sind die Träume wahr ..., wenn sie aber in die Einbildungskraft übergegangen sind ..., bedürfen diese einer Auslegung und Erklärung ..., und sobald die Einbildungskraft sich von der Welt der Vernunft nach der Welt der Sinne wendet, sind die Träume verwirrte Träume, welche keine Auslegung haben.“ [49] Dasselbe nun ist bei der Prophetie möglich. Diese „geschieht in der Weise, daß die Seele die verborgenen Dinge durch eine kräftige Auffassung erfaßt ..., zuweilen nimmt sie es aber in schwächerer Weise auf, so daß die Einbildungskraft Macht darüber erhält und es in sinnlicher Form mitteilt“.[50] Weiter wird erklärt, daß auch diese Erfassung der Einbildungskraft, wenn sie auch von innen her kommt, eine sinnliche ist. Die Einbildungskraft hat jedoch ihre nützliche Funktion, indem sie, „was die Seele als schönen Anblick und geordnete Töne erfaßt hat, mitteilt“.[51] Nicht wesentlich verschieden von dieser Anschauung ist die Ibn-Dauds.[52]

[49] *Ibid.*, S. 427 (Haarbr. II, 329).

[50] *Ibid.* (Haarbr. II, 330).

[51] *Ibid.*, S. 429 (Haarbr. II, 332).

[52] Auch Ibn-Daud faßt die Prophetie einerseits rein intellektualistisch, andererseits als Mittel, durch Wunder zu wirken, auf. Nur geht er in bezug auf die Einbildungskraft noch weiter als Ibn-Sina. Während letzterer die Einbildungskraft, als die Prophetie fördernd, in ihrer Mitteilung zumindest, ansah, ist sie für Ibn-Daud geradezu hinderlich. Sie wirkt wohl mit, aber retardierend. Schon im Traume bedarf es einer Korrektur der Vernunft. *Em. Ramah*, ed. Weil, S. 70 (Übers. S. 88): וכאשר ישבתו החושים חזה זה הכח מתבודד להבליו ושקריו, כל עוד שלא יגער בו גערת השכל ויפתה אותו. Unter זה הכח ist hier der מצור zu verstehen, der aber offenbar vom Übersetzer mit dem מדמה verwechselt wurde, wie ein Vergleich mit *Em. Ramah*, S. 30, sofort zeigt. Vgl. hierzu Guttmann, *Abr. Ibn-Daud*, S. 171, Anm.; Horowitz, *Die Psychologie bei den jüdischen Religionsphilosophen*, S. 249, Anm. 88. Dann bei der Prophetie, die eine משיכה מברכות השכל הפועל ist, heißt es, *Em. Ramah*, S. 71: ג״כ הרבה זה הכח המצור (sc. diesen Prozeß) וכבר ימנעו (richtig: המדמה) בהתמדת הביאו אל החוש המשוקף העתועיו והבליו... ולפעמים יפול זה הכח תחת מבשלת השכל מעט והוכנה הנפש המדברת למשוך הנעלם מן העצמים הנכבדים והשתדל זה הכח המצייר להפסיק ביניהם. Was ihr aber nicht ganz gelingt, sondern nur, soweit sie Gedanken in Bilder umsetzt — לפנוש העתידות ולהשיבם על הנפש במשלים. Auch hier ist der Ausgangspunkt die Verifikation des Überlieferten, inwiefern dies für die soziale Weltordnung von Nutzen ist; *Em. Ramah*, S. 70: כהם ישמר סדר העולם ויתמיד בו הישוב — והמקובלות. Und das Kriterium und auch die Hauptleistung des Propheten liegt im Wunder: והאיש החשוב אשר הגיע אל גבול אשר יהיה בו נחר על הנמצאות ויכול לשנות עצמותם שנוי אמתי עצמותי (*Em. Ramah*, S. 93, Übers. S. 118). Ganz wie Ibn-Sina, der diese Eigenschaft als erste unter den „Wundertaten“ des Propheten anführt (*Schahrastani*, S. 428, Haarbr. II, 331). Vgl. Guttmann, *Ibn-Daud*, S. 175.

Wie ist es nun möglich, zu identifizieren oder auch zu vergleichen diese Auffassung der Prophetie, die ja doch durchaus rein intellektualistisch ist, wenn auch die Imagination teils schwächend, teils fördernd, gelegentlich der Ostentation, sich „zuweilen" ihr anschließt, mit der Lehre MAIMONIDES', der in der Imagination einen konstitutiven Träger der Prophetie, ja sogar in dieser die höchste Vollendung der Imagination ebenso wie der Menschheit[53] erblickt?

Wie sehr sie auseinandergehen, läßt sich an noch zwei weiteren Punkten sehen: am Verhältnisse zwischen Traum und Prophetie und an dem Erfordernis der Vorbereitung zur Prophetie. Was nun das Verhältnis zum Traum betrifft, so finden wir bei IBN-SINA (und auch IBN-DAUD) nur eine Analogie zwischen den beiden, und zwar hauptsächlich in den negativen Umständen, unter denen beide zustande kommen, nämlich in der Ausschaltung der Sinnestätigkeit.[54] IBN-SINA geht sogar so weit, wie wir bereits gesehen haben, auch für die Träume, wenn sie wahr sein sollen, die Einbildungskraft auszuschalten, da sie unverläßlich ist. Während für MAIMONIDES Träume und Prophetie im Wesen identisch sind und nur quantitativ-graduell unterschieden;[55] und sie sind identisch, da ihr Gemeinsames ein Positives ist, nämlich dieselbe seelische Kraft, die beider Träger ist, die Imagination.[56]

Interessanter noch ist die Frage der Vorbereitung: Daß ALFARABI, der die Prophetie rein philosophisch sieht, eine intellektuelle, im

[53] *Moreh* II, 36: וזאת (sc. הנבואה) היא היותר עליונה שבמדרגות האדם ותכלית השלמות אשר אשר שימצא למינו והעניין ההוא הוא תכלית שלמות הכח המדמה.

[54] *Schahr.*, 426 (Haarbr. II, 329); IBN-DAUD in *Em. Ramah*, S. 70 und 71. Nur geht IBN-DAUD auch hier weiter, indem er, auch beim Ruhen der äußeren Sinne, noch Störungen durch innere körperliche Vorgänge — und auch durch die Imagination — annimmt. Auch MAIMONIDES hält die Ausschaltung der Sinne für wichtig: *Moreh* II, 36: הגדולה שבמעולותיו והנכבדת שבהם אמנם יהיה בנח החושים ובבטולם מפעולותיהם, s. *Moreh* II, 41.

[55] *Moreh* II, 36: חלום אחד מס' בנבואה, ולא יסול השעור בין שני דברים מתחלפים בסין. Ebenso II, 41, 42 und an vielen anderen Stellen. Nebenbei bemerkt ist der oberwähnte Passus in der deutschen Übersetzung von WEISS, ebenso wie vieles andere, ganz falsch wiedergegeben.

[56] Wir werden später sehen, daß auch MAIMONIDES unter den Träumen zwei Gruppen unterscheidet — den gemeinen, auch wenn er „gerecht" ist, und den prophetischen — doch bleibt auch der prophetische ein Traum. Während etwa bei IBN-DAUD die Imagination dazukommt, um zu schaden, tritt bei MAIMONIDES der Intellekt hinzu, um den Traum in eine höhere Stufe zu erheben.

Bildungsgang erreichte Vorbereitung fordert,[57] ist klar verständlich. Eigentümlich und geradezu paradox ist nur die Stellungnahme zu dieser Frage bei IBN-SINA und MAIMONIDES — verglichen mit deren Grundlehren. Nach IBN-SINA, der durchaus intellektualistisch ist, ist keine Vorbereitung erforderlich, zumindest keine intellektuale, die Prophetie besteht eben nur darin, daß ein unvorbereiteter und nicht ausgebildeter Mensch Erkenntnisse höchster Art erlangt,[58] allerdings wenn er sittlich vollkommen ist; während MAIMONIDES, der doch den Schwerpunkt in die Imagination verlegt, gerade intellektuelle Vorbereitung fordert und die Ansicht der Masse, wonach auch Unwissende der Prophetie teilhaftig werden können, entschieden zurückweist, ja auch die tätige, die moralische Vorbereitung nur als sekundär ansieht, eigentlich nur insofern sie für jede intellektuelle Vollkommenheit erforderlich ist.[59] Das Paradoxon ist aber leicht aufgelöst, wenn man bedenkt, daß IBN-SINA eben vor allem das Wunderhafte in der Prophetie gesehen, ein Wunder an sich als *intellectus infusus* und Wunder erzeugend durch die Beherrschung der Materie,[60] während MAIMONIDES das Wunder ausschaltet[61] und die Prophetie nur als Erkenntnisakt, allerdings als einen besonders qualifizierten, ansieht.

[57] Schon die Annahme, daß die Prophetie vom Aktiven Intellekt auf den erworbenen Verstand (השכל הנקנה) herabströmt, zeugt dafür, da doch letzterer die Realisation von Möglichkeiten voraussetzt. Es heißt auch in der Aufzählung der verschiedenen Grade der „Herrschaft" bei den höheren, *Hatchalath-Hanimzaim*, S. 39: הנה הוא יצטרך בהשגחה שידע ההצלחה וישים אותה תכליתו ונגד עיניו. ועוד יצטרך אחי"ו אל אשר ידע הדברים אשר ראוי שידעם עד שישיג ההצלחה.

[58] *Schahr.*, S. 428 (Haarbr. II, 331): „Die zweite Eigentümlichkeit (der Prophetie) besteht darin, daß die Seele durch eine Reinigung gereinigt wird, welche die kräftigste Vorbereitung für das Zusammenkommen mit der tätigen Vernunft ist. Wir haben aber bereits das Verhältnis der heiligen Kraft angegeben, welche einige Seelen erlangen, so daß sie ... das Denken und Lernen nicht bedürfen." Er vergleicht sie mit Öl, das ohne Berührung mit Feuer leuchtet.

[59] Diese Anschauung MAIMONIDES' kann vielfach belegt werden. S. besonders *Moreh* I, 34, bei Besprechung der vierten Ursache: וזה שכבר התבאר במופת, כי מעלת המדות הם הצעות למעלות הדבריות... ואי־אפשר מבלתי הקדמת הצעת המדות הטובות. Ebenso dann bei der fünften Ursache: יחלשו כשירבו עסקיו באלו הדברים... אפילו האדם השלם... ולא ישיג מה שבכחו להשיג תשוקותיו העיוניות וישתקעו... Vgl. hierzu MUNK, *Guide* I, S. 125, Anm. 2. Ebenso *Moreh* III, 52, wo besonders von der Vorbereitung für den „großen König" d. i. השכל הנפרד עליונו, die Rede ist. Vgl. SCHEYER, *loc. cit.*, S. 100 f.

[60] S. oben Anm. 52 am Schluß.

[61] Er schaltet sogar das vom Propheten erzeugte Wunder aus, „rationalisiert" es, wie man gewöhnlich sagt. So z. B. *Moreh* II, 29 und 35 am Ende. Gegen das Wunder als Kriterium s. *Moreh* III, 24. Vgl. MUNK, *Guide* I, S. 286, Anm. 3 und III, S. 190, Anm. 1.

Für Maimonides ist aber auch die Vorbereitung Alfarabis nicht genug, denn durch den Hinzutritt der Imagination als Träger ist auch ihre Qualifikation erforderlich, und diese ist wohl nicht durch Studium zu erreichen, sondern ist eine konstitutionelle Seinsart im Menschen.[62] Die Vorbereitung durch gute Taten bei Ibn-Sina ist religiös-praktischen, die Vorbereitung bei Maimonides ist philosophischen Charakters.

Eine Ähnlichkeit mit dem Standpunkt Ibn-Sinas in Frage der Vorbereitung findet man bei Gazzali,[63] aber die Ähnlichkeit ist nur äußerlich. Auch Gazzali verlangt oft moralische Vorbereitung durch gute Taten. Bei ihm ist es verständlich, da er in der Prophetie ein dem gewöhnlichen Erkenntnisprozesse Entgegengesetztes sieht;[64] es ist daher natürlich, daß eine intellektuelle Vorbereitung, wie wir sie bei Ibn-Sina erwarten würden, nicht verlangt wird. Aber auch die moralische Vorbereitung bei Gazzali ist mehr negativer Natur und hat nur den Zweck, das Störende und Unreine im Menschen zu entfernen, oder, wie er es bildhaft ausdrückt, den Rost der Seele zu beseitigen,[65] um sie fähiger zu machen für den Empfang der ewigen Wahrheiten. Sieht er doch in der Prophetie eine Art Spiegel, in dem alle Weisheit, die die Weisen mit Mühe herausfinden, von selbst ihr Ebenbild findet,[66] oder einen Quell, der ohne mühselige Grabungen

[62] Wiederholt wird die Seinsart von der Geburt an als ausschlaggebend betont. *Moreh* II, 36: עד שיהובר אליו שלמות הכח המדמה בעקר היצירה בתכלית מה שאפשר. Wenn das Organ hingegen schlecht ist, בשרש היצירה, ist es irreparabel. Dann weiter: כשיהיה האיש עצם הדברי והמדמה על תכלית שלמותם ביצירה: II, 37. — טוחו בעקר בריאתו על תכלית שוויו.

[63] Über die diesbezüglichen Stellen im *Muñkid* s. Horowitz, *Prophet.*, S. 32 f. und Kaufmann, *loc. cit.*, S. 203 (Anm. 181) und S. 214 (Anm. 194), in beiden sind die Verweise auf die einzelnen Stellen in der Schrift Gazzalis angegeben.

[64] So *Mozne-Zedek*, ed. Goldenthal, S. 48: ואולם צד החכמה יש הפרש בו בין דרך כת הצופים: ובין דרך המעינים מאנשי החכמה, שהצופים לא ראו בהשתדלות והטרדנה האחרונה היא סדרנת הנביא; *ibid.*, S. 34: אשר יגלו אליו כל האמתיות או רבם מבלי לטוד וקנין ויגיעה כרבים מבני אדם אשר הגיע להם מהידיעה; *ibid.*, S. 84: באמתת הדברים מה שלא הגיע למבקשי החכמה בלטוד... ואמרו כי כמו זה ג"כ יגיע לזולת הנביאים... וזה בית לא... והשלישית הוא האור אשר יזרח בעולם הדבוק והנבואה ובו יתכן לקנותו בהשתדלות ויגיעה; *ibid.*, S. 126: יתישר האדם למה שלא יתישר אליו בחלק השכל ואפשרות החכמה.

[65] *Ibid.*, S. 35: לזכות הנפש ולטהרה מחלאתה — ואולם עכ"ז יצטרך הכנה עכ"פ לקבל; *ibid.*, S. 44: ויש על המשלים אותה שני דרכים, האחד מהם הוא הזכוך והתטרוק, כלומר הסרת החלודה; *ibid.*, S. 48: ואין עליו אלא ההכנה בנקיון לבד. Vgl. S. 51, 60, 26.

[66] *Ibid.*, S. 52. Das Gleichnis der zwei Gruppen, von denen die eine mühevoll malt, die andere aber nur einen reinen Spiegel gegenüberstellt: הנפש היא מקום ציור החכמות האלהיות ויש בידך להשיגם בשני דרכים, האחד השנת עין הציור... והשני ההכנה לקבל הציור מבחוץ... בחכמות האלהיות... ציור בפעל בהתמדה בלי הפסק. Ebenso S. 44, wo das reine Wasser als Spiegel angeführt wird. Siehe *ibid.*, S. 154.

von selbst hervorbricht.[67] Es ist also einerseits etwas Naturhaftes daran, da dasselbe Phänomen auch bei Kindern zu finden ist[68] und andererseits ein Akt der Gnade Gottes.[69] Was also an Vorbereitung geschehen würde, könnte nur Wiederherstellung der kindlichen Empfänglichkeit bedeuten. Weit entfernt also von MAIMONIDES, der, in diesem Punkte ALFARABI folgend, die philosophische Vorbereitung zur Bedingung hat, läßt sich doch das eine als gemeinsam bei beiden bezeichnen, daß sie beide die Prophetie — beide zum Teil — auf eine natürliche, unabänderliche Veranlagung zurückführen. Allerdings heißt sie bei GAZZALI nicht Imagination — im Gegenteil, GAZZALI wehrt entschiedenst jeden Versuch, die Prophetie durch Nichtpropheten zu erklären, ab[70] —, aber die Anlage im ganzen und besonders seine Auffassung der Imagination, wie wir noch später sehen werden, waren sicher mitbeeinflußend auf die Entstehung der Theorie MAIMONIDES'.

Elemente waren nun MAIMONIDES sicher gegeben: der Intellektualismus ALFARABIS in seiner Ausgestaltung durch IBN-SINA, der nicht intellektualistische „Naturalismus" GAZZALIS; aber was er daraus bildete, die Verbindung von entwicklungsbarer Intellektualität und naturhafter Imagination als Träger der Prophetie, diese waren nicht ein mechanisches Zusammentun, sondern ein Neues, Eigenes, daß er sich systematisch erst ermöglichen mußte.

III.

Denn mit der Aufstellung der Definition war es nicht getan. Sie enthält auf den ersten Blick schier unüberwindliche Schwierigkeiten.

Bevor wir auf die Darstellung dieser eingehen, ist es geboten, die Definition in ihrer Reinheit noch näher herauszuarbeiten. Denn

[67] *Ibid.*, S. 153.

[68] *Ibid.*, S. 84: והשני יגיע בחסד אלהי, כגון שיולד האדם ויהיה הכח בלי מלמד; *ibid.*, S. 85: ואין מן הראוי שיהוהק היות האדם בטבע בתחלת היצירה מישיג מהחכמות ... המדה המובה שעם תגיע בטבע. Diese Theorie nimmt auch Formen der platonischen Anamnesis an, S. 154, 155. Über die Bedeutung des angeborenen Geschmacks bei GAZZALI, im Gegensatz zur Spekulation, vgl. KAUFMANN, *loc. cit.*, S. 214, Anm. 194.

[69] *Ibid.*, S. 35: לא יכנס אחד בנן ואלה הרחמים נתונים המה לפי מישפטי המציאות האלהי; S. 126: וכשיגיע זה ישפיעו עליו הרחמים ויגלה אליו סוד המלכות הקים ויראו לו האמתיות; S. 48: אלא ברחמי השם והשני יגיע בחסד אלהי; S. 84:

[70] *Ibid.*, S. 35: ולא ידע אמתת מדרגת הנבואה אלא הנביא ... וכמו שלא ידע הולד ענין הנער ... כן לא ידע המשכיל מה שנפתח לנביאי השם ... מיתרון הסדיו ורחמיו.

Maimonides hat, neben dem Intellekt und der Imagination, noch zwei Momente, die er oft und oft zusammen mit den ersten zwei unterstreicht, ohne daß es ganz klar wäre, welche primär und welche sekundär sind. Er nennt oft die sittlich-tätige Vollkommenheit als „dritte" der Bedingungen[71] und dann auch einen gewissen, tatkräftigen Mut,[72] die der Prophet nicht allein zur Ausführung seiner Botschaft benötigt, sondern auch zu ihrem Zustandekommen. Dennoch sind die ersten zwei von den letzteren strenge auseinanderzuhalten. Die letzteren sind Bedingungen für die Prophetie oder für den prophetischen Menschen, die ersteren sind die eigentlichen Träger der prophetischen Erkenntnis. Bei den letzteren ist die Frage, was die Prophetie ermöglicht oder fördert, bei den ersteren — was die Prophetie ausmacht.

So hat die sittliche Vollkommenheit, die hauptsächlich in einem Lossagen von materiellen Gütern und Genüssen besteht, für die Prophetie keine spezifische Bedeutung; sie ist für sie ebenso notwendig wie für jede menschliche Erkenntnis, wenn sie vollkommen sein soll.[73] Maimonides spricht im Zusammenhang damit auch vom

[71] *Moreh* II, 36 (Mitte), wo er die מדות אנושיות טהורות שוות und die Lossagung von den körperlichen Genüssen — ויהיה מי שכבר התכשלה מחשבתו ותשוקתו לענינים הבהמיים — in gleicher Ordnung mit der Perfektion des Intellekts und der Imagination nennt; ebenso ibidem bei Aufzählung der drei Vollkommenheiten: שלמות הכח הדבורי בלמוד ושלמות הכח המדמה ביציריה ושלמות המדות. So schon in Einleitung II, 32: אמנם היות יסודנו ההכנה והשלמות במדות ובדבריות עכ"פ. Später II, 40, Die Sitten als Kriterium.

[72] *Moreh* II, 38. Das כח וגבורה der Tibbonschen Übersetzung (arab. קוה אקראם) wird schon von Falaquera (*Moreh-Hamoreh*, S. 155) beanstandet, er meint אקראם enthält mehr das Vorwärtsdringen: וע"כ העתקתו כח קדימה. Munk, *Guide* II, S. 294, Anm. 4, befürwortet die Übersetzung: hardiesse. In beiden Fällen ist hier ein innerer Vorgang der Prophetie, ehe sie zur äußeren Wirklichkeit gelangt, gemeint. — Wie sehr in diesem Punkte Zufälligkeit waltete bei den Darstellern der Maim. Prophetietheorie, mögen folgende Illustrationen zeigen: Sandler, *loc. cit.*, S. 82, spricht von „vier Bedingungen", und zwar Vernunft, Imagination, Divination und jener Mut, von dem hier die Rede ist. Es ist klar, dieser Autor hatte gerade Kap. 38 als wesentlich herausgegriffen — daher die „vier Säulen". Hingegen Schmiedl, *Studien*, S. 187, bezeichnet als Vorbedingungen folgende drei: Vortrefflichkeit der Einbildungskraft, Vortrefflichkeit des Erkenntnisvermögens und die ethische Vortrefflichkeit — also hauptsächlich nach II Kap. 36 orientiert. Wenn übrigens später (*ibid.*, S. 324) derselbe Autor die Einbildungskraft, im Kapitel Aberglauben behandelnd, als von Maimonides durchaus verworfen darstellt, so hätte er gut getan, an seine eigene vorerwähnte Darstellung der Prophetielehre des Maimonides zu denken, wonach die Einbildungskraft die erste Bedingung für die höchste Erkenntnisart ist.

[73] Siehe oben Anm. 59. Auch im Zusammenhange mit der Prophetie wird unter שלמות המדות immer eine Enthaltsamkeit, ein Negatives also, verstanden.

Lossagen von Herrschsucht usw., dies aber ist auch nicht spezifisch, denn gleich darauf kommt die Erklärung, er würde auch nicht das Gegenteil von Herrschsucht, das wahllose Untertauchen unter die Masse, befürworten. Er meint überhaupt Vermeidung jedes überflüssigen Kontaktes mit der gemeinen Masse,[74] was seiner ganzen geistes-aristokratischen Richtung entspricht. War ja die nichtvernünftige Masse nichts anderes als eine Art Materie für ihn.

Ebenso ist der tatkräftige Mut nur von fördernder Bedeutung, nicht von konstitutiver. Er tritt zu Imagination und Intellekt hinzu, um sie zu stärken. Er bedeutet bloß eine Intensivierung des prophetischen Vorganges, und zwar insbesondere im Zusammenhang mit dem Vorherwissen der Zukunft. Am klarsten ist dies ersichtlich bei der Darstellung der Stufen der Prophetie.[75] Da wird als erste Stufe die genannt, worin ein Mensch vom göttlichen Geiste zu einer großen Tat inspiriert wird, also eine Tat, die hauptsächlich durch Mut vollbracht wird. Als zweite, in der aus sittlichen Motiven gepredigt wird. Dennoch aber sind diese Stufen noch keine Prophetie im eigentlichen Sinne; ja die beiden ersten werden nur Vorstufen zur Prophetie[76] und werden nur generalisierend so benannt.

Die eigentlichen Stufen beginnen erst mit Traum und Vision — d. h. in den Fällen, wo Intellekt und Imagination, die Träger der prophetischen Erkenntnis, voll zur Auswirkung gelangen. Hier aber fängt die Schwierigkeit an. Für den Intellekt gibt es keine, ist ja sein ganzes Wirken vom Aktiven Intellekt, der unserem Stern zugeordneten separaten Intelligenz, abhängig und durch diesen vollbracht. Nur für die Imagination erhebt sich die schwere Frage: Kann sie vom Aktiven Intellekt direkt inspiriert werden? Ist dies nicht ein Riß im gesamten System Maimonides'?

[74] *Moreh* II, 36 g. E., wo er die Masse der Menschen mit den „Haustieren oder wilden Tieren" vergleicht, an die man nur denken kann, entweder um sich vor ihnen zu retten oder von ihnen Nutzen zu ziehen. Über diese Einstellung vgl. Achad Haam, על פרשת דרכים IV, S. 10. Vgl. *Moreh* III, 13.

[75] *Moreh* II, 45, da macht Maimonides zum Einteilungsgrund der zwei Hauptgruppen שני השרשים האלה, d. h. חלום ומראה, die er im vorhergegangenen Kapitel erörtert und die aber allein auf Imagination und Intellekt zurückzuführen sind (II, 41). — Aber schon vorher, II, 37, als von den drei Gruppen die Rede ist, je nachdem, welches Vermögen in ihnen inspiriert wird, da erfolgt die Einteilung ebenso nur nach den genannten zwei Vermögen, ohne Rücksicht auf die anderen Vollkommenheiten.

[76] *Moreh* II, 45: אבל המדרגה הראשונה והשנית הם מעלות לנבואה ולא יתנה מי שהגיע למעלה משתיהם נביא מכל הנביאים אשר קדמו הדברים בהם.

Betrachten wir näher die Lehre Maimonides' vom Aktiven Intellekt, so sehen wir, daß dieser bei Maimonides eine viel zentralere Stelle bekommen hat als bei den arabischen Vorgängern. Er hatte zwar die von Alexander gelehrte Identität mit Gott nicht wiedererhalten, wurde aber, zumindest für unsere sublunare Welt, der waltende Mittler Gottes. Alfarabi, der dem Aktiven Intellekt eine dritte Stelle zuweist, ihn also tiefer stellt als die anderen separaten Intelligenzen, war noch viel zu nahe dem ursprünglichen Aristotelismus, der vor der sublunarischen Welt einen dicken Trennungsstrich setzt; Averroës andererseits, der den Aktiven Intellekt mit den anderen Sphärenintelligenzen gleichsetzt, bezeichnet ihn aber als dem Monde zugeordnet; Maimonides hingegen — wohl von Gazzali darin beeinflußt[77] — vereinigt beide Lehren: er ordnet ihn der sublunaren Welt zu und stellt ihn gleich, als zehnten, den anderen separaten Intelligenzen. Für die sublunare Welt nun ist er der „große König", die unmittelbar uns betreffende waltende göttliche Kraft.

Seine Funktion ist nun wie bei den Vorgängern Maimonides' das „Geben der Formen". Dieses „Geben" aber ist nur so zu verstehen, daß die potentiellen Formen aktualisiert werden. Das heißt aber nichts anderes, als daß sich die in der Materie enthaltenen Potentialitäten sich durch Erhebung zum Aktiven Intellekt realisieren. Materie allein kann nicht existieren; aber nicht alle Formung muß gerade vom Aktiven Intellekt ausgehen, sie kann auch andere Ursachen haben.[78] Vom Aktiven Intellekt wird nur potentiell Intel-

[77] Über Alfarabi s. oben Anm. 32. — Averroës, *De Anima* I. III: ... ponamus ipsum (sc. intellectum agentem) esse motorem orbis lunae. — Über Gazzali vgl. Schmölders, *Essai*, S. 237. — Betreffs Averroës vgl. auch Munk, *Guide* II, S. 57 (Anm. 3).

[78] So *Moreh* I, 72: ואי אפשר המצא חוטר מבלי צורה ולא תמצא צורה מאלו ההוים הנפסדים מבלי חוטר. Jedoch vergleichend das Universum mit einem Organismus wird als Herz, d. h. als führendes Hauptorgan, die Sphäre als solche bezeichnet, aus deren Bewegungen, auf mechanischem Wege, die meisten Formungen in der Welt der Elemente entstehen: ויסול ההשתנות בטעורב עד שיתהוה טהם תחלה הקטורים כפי מיניהם החלוקים ואחר כך המחצבים כפי מיניהם החלוקים וטיני הצמחים... כלם. Vgl. Munk, *Guide* I, S. 360 (Anm. 1). Oder später: ודע כי הכחות המגיעות מן הגלגלים לזה העולם... ארבע כחות: כח יחייב העדוב וההרכבה ואין מספק שזה מספיק בהרכבת המחצבים. Vgl. *Moreh-Hamoreh*, S. 46, der hier המחצבים statt הדומם übersetzt, also noch allgemeiner; Munk, *loc. cit.*, I, 362, übersetzt „production", indem er die Lesung תוליד (vgl. Anm. 1 dort) vorzieht. Durch denselben Prozeß werden sogar genera von Lebewesen erzeugt, jene מינים בלתי מכווגים, die sich nicht individuell-geschlechtlich fortpflanzen, wie z. B. die Würmer und die in Mist und Fäulnis entstehenden Tierchen. Vgl. *Moreh-Hamoreh*, S. 90, betreffs Ibn-Sina. Im selben Sinne spricht Maimonides auch *Moreh* II, 10

lektuales aktualisiert. Daher wird er nur in zwei Weisen wirksam: In Begründung der genera in unserer Welt und in der menschlichen Vernunft.[79] Beide sind nur zwei Ausdrucksweisen desselben Vorganges, denn auch die genera haben ja nach dem aristotelischen Nominalismus keine andere als intellektuale Existenz.[80] Halten wir nun diesen Punkt fest und sehen wir, wie MAIMONIDES zu ihm gelangt.

Er gelangt dazu auf zweifache Weise: fortschreitend von oben nach unten und schließend von unten nach oben. Im ersteren Verfahren ist es mehr eine Analogie, im letzteren will es ein Beweis

davon, daß הנהגת זה העולם התחתון ר״ל עולם ההויה וההפסד אפנם הוא בכחות שופעות מן הגלגלים, was er dann näher ausführt und die Theorie der „vier Ursachen" oder „vier Kräfte" — korrespondierend mit den vier Formen der Sphäre — entwickelt. Dies alles als Tätigkeit des Aktiven Intellekts allein aufzufassen (wie SCHEYER, *loc. cit.*, S. 82 tut), erscheint daher unrichtig. Ganz deutlich unterscheidet ja *Moreh* II, 12 (auch von SCHEYER zitiert) zwischen den Formungen, die aus körperlichen Prozessen hervorgehen — מכחם המזגת היסודות, אשר הם נשמים פועלים קצתם בקצתם —, und denjenigen, die nicht aus einem מזג (MUNK: melange) hervorgehen: והם הצורות כלם, für die allein der Aktive Intellekt in Frage kommt. — Kurz, am rein Materiellen werden die „Formen" nicht durch den שכל הפועל erzeugt. — Daß jener Einfluß der Sphären auf die Formung in der Elementenwelt nichts mit Astrologie zu tun hat, ist klar dargetan in dem von MARX veröffentlichten Briefwechsel: *The Correspondence, &c. about Astrology*, bes. S. 45 (Abs. 10) und S. 47 (Abs. 17).

[79] *Moreh* II, 4: הוא השכל הפועל אשר הורה עליו צאת שכלנו מן הכח אל הפועל והיות הצורות הנמצאות ההוות הנפסדות. Über die Verwandtschaft unseres Vernunftvermögens mit den Geschlechtsformen im Gegensatz zu den akzidentiellen Formungen s. *Moreh* II, 73, These 8. — Über die Einwirkung auf die Entstehung der genera vgl. *ibid.* II, 19.

[80] Das intellektuelle Vermögen ist die Genus-Form des Menschen; *Moreh* I, 1: ויהיה הנרצה באמרו נעשה אדם בצלמנו הצורה המינית אשר היא ההשגה השכלית. Und der Mensch, seine eigene Form erfassend, begreift *implicite* alle anderen Formen seiner Welt. Vgl. *Ruach-Chen*, Kap. 9: מי שידע וישכיל מהות האדם וצורתו העצמיות כבר ידע צורת כל הנמצאות... כי הוא המורכב האחרון... כי כל הצורות הנם הם נכללות במהות האדם. Vgl. SCHEYER, *loc. cit.*, S. 35. Andererseits aber sind die genera nur ein Produkt des Geistes; *Moreh* III, 18: כי כבר נודע שאין חוץ לשכל מין נמצא אבל המין ושאר הכללות דברים שכליים. Also ergibt sich eine vollkommene Kongruenz zwischen der menschlichen Erkenntnis, die selber Genus-Form ist und andere enthält, und zwischen dem genus überhaupt, das nur im menschlichen Geist möglich ist. Auf dieser Kongruenz basiert ja MAIMONIDES' Theorie der Providenz. Die von ihm (*Moreh* III, 17) wiedergegebene Theorie des Aristoteles, wonach die Providenz in der sublunaren Welt sich bloß auf die Geschlechter erstreckt, wird von ihm auf die intellektuellen Individuen in der sublunaren Welt ausgedehnt, und dies nur mit Hilfe dieser Kongruenz. Denn nur auf diesem Wege kann der Grundsatz, daß ההשגחה נמשכת אחר השכל, auf dem die Providenz der Sphären und genera beruht, auch auf den die genera in der Elementenwelt produzierenden individuellen Geist angewendet werden. In diesem unseren Zusammenhang ist die sonst wichtige, von SCHEYER hervorgehobene Unterscheidung zwischen דהן und עקל, die beide hebräisch mit שכל übersetzt wurden, nicht von wesentlicher Bedeutung.

sein. Die Analogie ist folgendermaßen: Die Sphären werden durch die ihnen zugeordneten separaten Intelligenzen geleitet; dabei sind aber diese Intelligenzen keine *causae efficientes*, sondern *causae finales*, d. h. die Sphäre wird durch ihr Hinstreben zu ihrer, durch sie vorgestellten Intelligenz bewegt. Die Vorstellung, verbunden mit der sie begleitenden Begierde also ist es, die die Sphäre bewegt. Dies bedingt also die Existenz eines Vermögens für diese Vorstellung, d. h. einen Intellekt in der Sphäre selbst.[81] So hat nun jede Sphäre neben ihrer Seele, die den „Anfang“[82] der Bewegung darstellt, auch einen eigenen Intellekt, der mit der ihr korrespondierenden separaten Intelligenz in Verbindung steht. Soll nun der Aktive Intellekt, als der zehnte der separaten Intelligenzen, der sublunaren Welt zugeordnet sein, so müßte auch diese „Welt der Elemente“, d. h. die Erde, ihren Intellekt haben. Sie hat ihn aber nicht, sie ist keine Sphäre im eigentlichen Sinne, denn sie ist weder lebend noch vernünftig. Es ist aber an ihr unser, der menschliche, Intellekt vorhanden, der die Verbindung mit dem Aktiven Intellekt darstellt. Daher die zentrale Stellung des Menschen, daher die alles überragende Stellung desjenigen Menschen, der seinen hylischen in einen erworbenen Intellekt in höherem Maße umsetzt.[83] Dies wäre aber nicht der Fall, könnte der Aktive Intellekt eine Verbindung eingehen auch mit den leblosen, vernunftlosen Elementen. Würden wir also nicht von der Existenz

[81] Diese Ableitung befindet sich *Moreh* II, 4, wo auch g. E. der Eigenintellekt der Sphäre mit dem menschlichen aktualisierten Intellekt — השכל בפועל — verglichen wird: יחס השכל בפועל הנמצא בנו אשר הוא משפיע השכל הפועל יחס שכל כל גלגל הנמצא בו אשר הוא משפיע הנבדל Vgl. darüber Scheyer, *loc. cit.*, S. 53 und 89. Auch das Vermögen als solches wird so verglichen; *Moreh* I, 72: ויהיה דמיון הכח הדברי כשכלי הגלגלים אשר הם בגופות. In *Moreh* II, 4, wird auch der Charakter der *causa finalis* betont: ובאלה הסגנים אמר שיניע השם הגלגל ר״ל בהיות הגלגל כוסף . . . Vgl. hierzu *Moreh* I, 69 (über die Relation von פועל צורה ותכלית) I, 72, g. E., II, 18, in הדרך השני, III, 13: וזאת הסבה התכליית והיא הנכבדת שבסבות הארבע.

[82] *Moreh* II, 4, über den Anfang als Seele. Der Begriff der ἀρχὴ κινήσεως, der schon bei Platon von großer Bedeutung war (s. z. B. Phaidros, 245 D), wird von Aristoteles, *De coelo* II, 2, für die Sphären erneuert. Vgl. Munk, *Guide* II, 51, Anm. 4 — Über den Begriffsunterschied zwischen ראשון und התחלה (arab. אלאול ואלמבדא) s. *Moreh* II, 30; התחלה wird mit לב verglichen, worüber *Moreh* I, 72 und 39 (כי התחלות הכל מן הלב).

[83] Über die Stellung des Menschen s. *Moreh* III, 13: שהשלם שאפשר מציאותו מזה החומר הוא האדם . . . עד אם יאמר כי כל הנמצאות מתחת גלגל הירח הם בעבורו יהיה אמת מזה הצד תכלית המציאות כלו מציאות מין האדם לכדו. Dann weiter: Wenn er auch dann diese Zwecksetzung als solche ablehnt, die überragende Bedeutung des Menschen bleibt aufrecht. — *Moreh* II, 5 handelt von der Leblosigkeit der Elementenwelt: הארץ אמרה אני ואם נבראנו כאחת, ר״ל הארץ והשמים, העליונים חיים והתחתונים מתים . . . בהיות הגלגלים נשמים חיים לא נשמים מתים מיסודות

unseres Verstandes aus unserer Erfahrung wissen, wir könnten auf sie *per analogiam* schließen.

Der andere Weg nimmt seinen Ausgang von unserer Erkenntnis. Der Übergang unseres Intellekts von seinem potentiellen in einen aktuellen Zustand, seine Verwandlung vom hylischen zum erworbenen, weist hin auf die Existenz einer auswärtigen Ursache. Die Ursache aber muß gleichartig sein mit dem Verursachten, es muß daher, da in uns eine Form entsteht, die Ursache auch eine Form sein und der Hervorbringer des Intellekts selber ein Intellekt — dies ist nun der Aktive Intellekt.[84] Hier ist demnach das Gegebene unserer Erkenntnis, das über sich hinausweist — zur separaten Intelligenz. Man könnte dann wieder umgekehrt auf die Existenz solcher Eigenintellekte bei den anderen Sphären nach der Analogie der unseren schließen. MAIMONIDES spricht auch von der Analogie der Verhältnisse zwischen dem Eigenintellekt der Sphäre und ihrer separaten Intelligenz auf der einen Seite und zwischen unserem menschlichen Intellekt und dem Aktiven Intellekt auf der anderen.[85]

Dieses letztere Verfahren, die Existenz des Aktiven Intellekts aus unserer Erkenntnis zu beweisen — das, soweit mir bekannt, ein eigenes des MAIMONIDES ist —, setzt voraus die Homogenität der beiden Intellekte, setzt aber ferner voraus, daß eine realisierende Einwirkung des höheren Intellekts auf den unsrigen auch nur auf dieser Homogenität basieren muß. Das aber ergibt sich auch aus dem ersten Verfahren. Denn eine Analogie wäre nicht möglich, gäbe es einen Unterschied zwischen dem Aktiven Intellekt und den anderen separaten Intelligenzen, so daß der erstere auch auf vernunftlose Wesen einwirken kann, also nur als *causa efficiens*, während die letzteren doch immer nur Endursachen sind. Das würde bedeuten eine Zerreißung der Kette der *causae finales*, die bei den separaten Intelligenzen untereinander besteht und bis zur ersten Ursache führt. Der Aktive Intellekt wäre dann eben kein Mittler Gottes mehr.

[84] *Moreh* II, 4: והשכל העשירי, הוא השכל הפועל, אשר הורה עליו צאת שכלנו מן הכח אל הפעל וכל מה שיצא מן הכח אל הפעל יש לו מוציא בהכרח חוץ ממנו וצריך שיהיה המוציא מפיו כן בלא כפק נותן הצורה צורה נבדלת ומפיא השכל שכל, והוא השכל הפועל. Dies stimmt überein mit *Moreh* II, 22, Grundsatz 2. Vgl. jedoch MUNK, *Guide* II, S. 173, Anm. 2. — Etwas ähnlich ist auch der Schluß vom Einfluß der Sphären auf die sublunare Welt, auf ihren Eigenintellekt *Moreh* II, 5: ומן השקר שיהיה המנהיג דבר א' לא ידע הדבר ההוא אשר ינהיגהו.

[85] S. oben Anm. 81.

Darum ist es auch keine willkürliche Konstruktion, sondern notwendige Konsequenz, wenn MAIMONIDES lehrt, daß der Aktive Intellekt weder körperlich ist noch einem Körper inhäriert;[86] daß seine Beziehungen zu den Empfängern nicht die körperlicher Natur, von nah und fern und Berührung sein können, sondern die des allseitigen richtungslosen Ausströmens,[87] das erst durch den geeigneten Empfänger Richtung erhält; daß jede Materie als solche für diese Influenz unempfänglich ist, ja ein großes Hindernis und Trennungsmittel für sie bedeutet;[88] und schließlich, daß der menschliche Intellekt, indem er sich aktualisiert und zum erworbenen wird, seine frühere, im hylischen Zustande vorhandene Gebundenheit an die Gesamtseele des Menschen, die ja auch dem Körper inhäriert, verliert, sich loslöst und selbst, ähnlich dem Aktiven Intellekt, mit dem er jetzt verbunden wird, körperlos und selbst ein separater Intellekt wird.[89]

Sehen wir uns auf der anderen Seite die Imagination bei MAIMONIDES näher an. Vor allem betont er wiederholt, selbst in der Darstellung

[86] *Moreh* I, 49: המלאכים ע"כ אינם גשמים אבל הם שכלים נבדלים מהחומר. Über die Gleichsetzung von Engeln und separaten Intelligenzen s. *Moreh* II, 6: יאמר (אריסטו) שהנה התהלפות שם הוא שכלים נפרדים ואנו נאמר מלאכים. Über den Einfluß GAZZALIS vgl. SCHMÖLDERS, *Essai*, S. 236 *Moreh* II, 2: שהשכל הפועל אשר אינו גוף ולא כח בגוף; II, 18: ונפשי שא"א בנבדלים הנפש... שהם לא גוף. Vgl. *Moreh* I, 74: הדרך השביעי. Der Aktive Intellekt wird auch שכינה genannt. S. III, 52 und Kommentar des ABRAVANEL zu *Moreh* I, 28.

[87] *Moreh* II, 12, wo vom Charakter der Unkörperlichkeit und des Fehlens körperlicher Beziehungen von Nähe und Berührung die Wirkung in der Form des Ausströmens שפע (ar. فيض) dargestellt wird und mit der emanativen Wirkung Gottes verglichen wird. Vgl. *Moreh* I, 58 und 69. — Ein wesentliches Charakteristikum hier ist die Konstanz der Wirkung: והוא מתמיד עמידתו בענין אשר יכונה בשפע (I, 69) für Gott, soweit es sich nicht um die Kreation handelt; ebenso für den Aktiven Intellekt: אבל פעולתו תמיד כל אשר יודמן דבר יקבל הפועל ההוא הנמצא על התמידות אשר יכונה בשם שפע.

[88] *Moreh* III, 9: ההחמר מהיצה גדולה ומסך מונע השגת השכל הנפרד כפי מה שהוא עליו. Dann weiter: והשכל הנפרד ע"כ, השגת אמתתו נמנעת לנו מפני החומר החשוך המקיף בנו. Dazu gehört auch *Moreh* I, 68: ר"ל השכל הפועל פעמים יהיה לו מונע מפעלו ואעפ"י שאין המונע מעצמו אלא מחוצה לו. S. auch III, 51; vgl. *Acht Kapitel* VII, wo unter מהיצה noch das rein Ethische verstanden wird. Über die השגת השכל הפועל und ihre Grenzen vgl. SCHEYER, *loc. cit.*, S. 64, Anm. 26.

[89] *Moreh* III, 51: זה השכל אשר שפע עלינו מהשי"ת הוא הדבוק אשר בינינו ובינו. Dasselbe in III, 52, ebenso III, 18: ובאלו האישים נדבק השכל האלהי. Vgl. *Moreh-Hamoreh*, S. 131, bezugnehmend auf *Moreh* II, 12: וע"כ אמר והבינהו מפני שעם השכל יושג השכל לא בדבר אחר. Im *Moreh* I, 72 g. E. wird wiederholt der separate Charakter des menschlichen erworbenen Intellekts betont: יחס האלה יתב' לעולם יחס השכל הנקנה הנאצל לאדם, אשר אינו כח בגוף והוא נכדל מן הגוף הכדל אמתי ושופע עליו. Dann weiter: ציור השכל הנקנה הנאצל אשר הוא נפרד. Die Adjektiva נקנה und נאצל bedeuten wohl dasselbe und IBN-TIBBON verwendet sie für das arab. אלמתפאד. Vgl. Erklärung der Termini des IBN-TIBBON unter שכל נקנה. S. MUNK *Guide* I, 373, Anm. 3 und besonders I, S. 307, Anm.

der Prophetietheorie,[90] daß die Imagination „zweifellos" ein körperliches Vermögen ist, ein Teil nämlich jener fünf Seelenvermögen, die bis auf den vernünftigen „körperlicher" Natur sind. Während in bezug auf den Intellekt auch nur im hylischen Zustand die Anschauung MAIMONIDES' nicht ganz klar ist,[91] steht es fest bei der Imagination, die der Mensch mit den höheren Tieren gemeinsam hat.[92] Auch ist die Frage, ob die beim Menschen und den Tieren mit gleichen Namen bezeichneten Vermögen auch wirklich gleichartig seien, bei MAIMONIDES durchaus nicht eindeutig entschieden.[93] Es steht aber fest, daß auf jeden Fall die Imagination im Verein mit den anderen nur animalischen Vermögen Materie bilden für den Intellekt, der allein als die Form des Menschen anzusprechen ist. Und so ergibt es sich, daß, während der Intellekt, der „nächste" Form ist, die Formen erfaßt,[94] was allein als Erkenntnis zu bezeichnen ist, die Vorstellungen

[90] *Moreh* II, 36: וכבר ידעת ששלמות אלה הכחות הגופיות אשר מכללם הכח המדמה; dann weiter זה הכח המדמה כח גופני והדמיון בעבור שהוא כח גופני im Gegensatz zum שכל.

[91] Das intellektuelle Vermögen wird wohl auch als mit dem Körper verbunden dargestellt: זה הכח המדבר הוא כח בגוף ובלתי נפרד היכנו (I, 72). Doch wird es im *Moreh-Hamoreh*, S. 55, abgeschwächt: ומה שאמר... צריך שיובן מדבריו שאינו נבדל אמתי ע״כ זכר בשכל הנאצל הנבדל אמתי. Vgl. SCHEYER, *loc. cit.*, S. 34.

[92] *Moreh* I, 73, Präm. 10: הנה תדע כי הדמיון נמצא לרוב בע״ח, אמנם בע״ח השלמים כולם, ר״ל אשר להם לב, מציאות הדמיון להם מבואר. Das ist ganz aristotelisch. In *De anima* III, 10 wird den Tieren νόησις und λογισμός abgesprochen und als Höchstes nur φαντασία zuerkannt.

[93] S. *Acht Kapitel*, 1. Wo von den fünf Seelenvermögen die Rede ist und betont wird, daß die auch allen Tieren gemeinsamen doch in ihren Qualitäten verschieden sind: אבל כל מין ומין מאשר לו נפש יש לו נפש אחת בלתי נפש האחר ויתחייב מנפש זה פעולות ומנפש זה פעולות אחרות... פועל הרגשת האדם הוא נפש האדם ופועל הרגשת החמור הוא נפש החמורה... ואין להם ענין שיקבצם אלא שתוף השם בלבד. Hingegen *Moreh*, Introduktion, heißt es: כי חומר האדם הקרוב הוא חומר שאר בע״ח הקרוב, worunter, wie EPHODI und SCHEM-TOB kommentieren, die חיות, d. h. die Einheit des animalischen Lebens, zu verstehen ist. Vgl. SCHEYER, *loc. cit.*, S. 36. — Deutlich aber bei der Imagination wird die Gleichheit hervorgehoben, *Moreh* I, 73 (10); nachdem das Vorhandensein der Imagination bei den meisten höheren Tieren erklärt wird, fügt M. hinzu: ושהאדם לא הובדל בדמיון.

[94] *Miloth-Higaion*, Kap. 9: דמיון זה האדם מן הענינים הטבעיים חמרו הוא החיות... וצורתו הוא הכח המדבר. Acht Kap. I: ודע שזאת הנפש האחת אשר קדם ספור כחותיה וחלקיה היא כחומר והשכל לה צורה. *Moreh* III, 8 ausführlich über das Verhältnis vom Erkenntnisvermögen — זאת הצורה האנושית הנכבדת מאד — zum חמר. Über die Notwendigkeit der vorbereitenden Formen, *Moreh* I, 69 וכן הצורות הטבעיות... שא״א שלא תקדם להם צורה אחרת, wozu EPHODI: ר״ל המשל בזה שא״א שתחול הצורה האנושית אם לא תקדים לה נפש החיונית. Die vorangehende Form wird Materie zur nächst höheren. So auch *Ruach-Chen*, Kap. 8: וכן תאמר בחמר האדם שצורתו היא הנפש המשכלת... וחומר האדם הוא עיקר הדי יסודות וכן נפש החיונית... היא חומר לנפש המשכלת. *Jesode-Hatorah* IV, 8: ואינו אומר על צורה זו הניכרת לעינים... ואינה הנפש המצויה לכל נפש חיה, שכבה הוא מרגיש ומתרחר, אלא הדעה שהיא צורת הנפש.

der Imagination keinerlei Stelle im Intellekt haben.[95] Diese in ihrem Wesen sinnlichen Vorstellungen, die zur Imagination gelangen, sind äußerlich und haben keinerlei Anteil an der Aktualisierung des hylischen Intellekts, die zu seiner Unsterblichkeit führt.[96] Und dies nicht bloß in der theoretischen Vernunft, auch in der praktischen ist die Imagination nicht mitwirkend und daher unverantwortlich. Sogar hier also, wo nicht die höhere intellektuelle Erkenntnis ausschlaggebend ist, sondern vielmehr die Kombination der zwei niederen, animalischen Vermögen: der Empfindung und des Triebes.[97] Darin ist sie dem vegetativen Vermögen, dem tiefsten also, gleichgesetzt.

Aber nicht allein unzulänglich ist die Imagination, sie ist zur Vernunft entgegengesetzt und negierend. Dies wird in verschiedenen Zusammenhängen hervorgehoben.[98] Am klarsten aber in der zehnten Prämisse *Moreh* I, Kap. 73. Dort wird erklärt, daß der Mensch sich im Punkte der Imagination in nichts von den Tieren unterscheidet und daß die Wirkung der Imagination das Gegenteil ist von der des Intellekts; der Intellekt erfaßt die Gattungsformen, die allein zum Beweis führen, die Imagination nur die individuellen, sinnlich gegebenen Existenzen; der Intellekt erfaßt die Substanz, die Imagination nur das Akzidentielle; sie verbindet nur Teile des sinnlich Gegebenen und kann von der Materie zur allgemeinen Form niemals fortschreiten, auch wenn sie die vollkommenste

[95] Während der Intellekt das Vorangehen der Empfindung benötigt (*Moreh* III, 13: ומה שא״א מציאותו אלא אחר הקדמות דבר... כהקדים ההרגשה לשכל), sind die Vorstellungen der Imagination nicht einmal vorbereitend, sondern bleiben חרץ לשכל. S. *Ruach-Chen*, Kap. 5 und 8, g. E. Vgl. dagegen SCHEYER, *loc. cit.*, S. 63.

[96] Auf die Form allein, d. h. auf den Intellekt, erstreckt sich auch die Unsterblichkeit der Seele. Vgl. *Jesode-Hatorah* IV, 9, *Moreh* I, 30 (השגת השכליות אשר יתמיד בהם השארות), I, 70 (über den Unterschied zwischen נשמות und רוחות).

[97] Acht Abschnitte, Kap. II: דע שהעברות והמצוות התוריות אמנם יוצאו בשני חלקים מחלקי הנפש והוא החלק המרגיש והחלק המתעורר לבד... אמנם החלק הזן והחלק המדמה אין מצוה בו ולא עברה. Und dann noch allgemeiner: אבל החלק הזן והמדמה לא יאמר בו לא מעלה ולא סחיתות.

[98] Die Unterscheidung zwischen dem Vernünftigen und Imaginären und ihre Wertung geht wie ein roter Faden durch den ganzen *Moreh*. Nur einige Beispiele. So schon am Beginn der Einleitung die Alternative ob ישאר עם המחשבות ההם oder ימשך אחר שכלו (אלטעתקאדאת אלכיאליה הדמיונית). Dann I, 32 und 34 der Unterschied in jeder Wissenschaft איך היא על האמת oder כפי הדמיונות (בחסב אלכיאלאת). Prinzipieller noch I, 68, wo von dem אלקה אלמתכיללה die Rede ist. (Vgl. hier die Übersetzung MUNK, *Guide* I, 312 und Anm. 3, das.); ebenso I, 49 in bezug auf Engel = Separate Intelligenz; I, 71 gegen die Mutakallimun: ימשכו אחר הדמיון (אלכיאל) ויקראוהו שכל. Ebenso III, 51 im Zusammenhang mit der sittlichen Vervollkommnung durch die Vernunft.

Abstraktion einer Form vornimmt; die Imagination ist daher die Quelle alles Ersonnenen und Erlogenen, sie ist das Dunkel, aus dem der Denkende gerettet werden muß.[99] Darum wird sie ja auch die Ursache aller Irrtümer, wo sie, anstatt des Intellekts, zur Entscheidung in Fragen der Möglichkeit und Notwendigkeit herangezogen wird.

Ja die Unzulänglichkeit, die sich zum Gegensatz zum Intellekt gesteigert hatte, wird sogar zum Urprinzip alles Irrens und *ergo* des Bösen! So wird die Imagination als der böse Trieb bezeichnet,[100] sogar die Urschlange, der Anfang der Sünde, wird als Symbol der Imagination hingestellt.[101]

Wie ist es nun möglich, daß diese Imagination, die dem Prinzip der intellektuellen Erkenntnis widerspricht, sich mit dem Intellekt zu einem gemeinsamen Erkenntnisakt verbindet? Der Intellekt, sagen wir,[102] erkennt nur Formen, die Formen andererseits sind nur intellektuell möglich — im Intellekt, der eben durch diese Erfassung der Form aus seiner Potentialität in die aktuelle Realität tritt; es sind somit aktueller Intellekt und Form ein und dasselbe, was ja in der Formel der Identität der שכל מושכל ומשכיל ausgedrückt

[99] Diese ganze Prämisse handelt von den Irrtümern, die sich für die Auseinanderhaltung von Substanz und Akzidenz aus der Vermischung von Intellekt und Imagination ergeben. Dann aber kommt der besondere Exkurs über den Gegensatz zwischen dem (אלעקל) שכל und dem (אלכיאל) דמיון, wo es nach Anführung der Gemeinsamkeit der Imagination bei Tier und Mensch heißt: ואין פעל הדמיון פעל השכל אבל הפכו, וזה כי השכל יפרק הטורכבות ויפשיטם ויצירם באמתתם ובסבותם... ובשכל יבדל הענין הכללי מן הענין האישי... ובשכל יודע הנשוא העצמי מן המקרי; ואין לדמיון פעל דבר מאלו הפעולות, שהדמיון לא ישיג אלא האישי המורכב... ויעשה מהכל גשם... וזה הנקרא הבדוי והשקר... ולא יוכל הדמיון בשום פנים להשיג הדבר הכללי, להפלש בהשגתו ומה גדלה תועלתו (של העין sc.) למי שירצה מן החומר... ולכן אין בחינה בדמיון. Dann als Abschluß: שינצל מזה החשך ר״ל ללמד מן הדמיון.

[100] *Moreh* II, 12 g. E.: כל זה המשך אחר הדמיון (אלכיאל) אשר הוא גם כן יצר הרע באמת, כי כל חסרון בדבר או בסדות הוא פעל הדמיון או נמשך אחר פעלו.

[101] Dies sagt MAIMONIDES nicht klar heraus, er tut es bloß in Andeutungen in der dunklen Stelle über den Sündenfall im *Moreh* II, 30, wo er vorausschickt: ולזה לא ארבה בפירושם ולא אשימם פשוטים שלא אהיה טגלה סוד נחש. Da spricht er vom נחש und seiner Beziehung zum Menschen. Die Kommentatoren erklären נחש als Imagination (verwandt mit dem Verbum נַחַשׁ). Vgl. auch MUNK, *Guide* II, S. 249, Anm. 1. Den Satz MAIMONIDES' ר״ל שהכח המדמה א״א היות הנחש לא קרב לאדם kommentiert EPHODI (und ebenso SCHEM-TOB): שיעשה פעולותיו בעת היות שכל האדם משכיל במושכלים. Dann weiter über den Haß zwischen der Schlange und den Kindern Evas ר״ל שהשנאה קימת בין המדמה ובין הנפש בכללה... והעיוני הוא רוחני והמדמה הוא גשמי.

[102] Vgl. oben Anm. 78 u. 80. Die markanteste Stelle ist *Moreh* I, 68: וכשישכיל דבר א׳, כאלו תאמר כשהשכיל צורת זה האילן הרטוב אליו והפשיט צורתו מחומר שלו וציר הצורה טופשטת, שזה הוא פעל השכל. Ebenso Mischnah-Kommentar, Aboth III, 14: אמנם השיגנו המושכלות אשר נשיגם אם נפריד הצורה וגשכיל אותה או שנשיג הצורות הנפרדות. Vgl. *Ruach-Chen*, Kap. 3.

wird.[103] Wie könnte nun diese, die Gattungsformen destruierende, alle wahre Erkenntnis verhindernde Imagination, der sogar die Evidenz des Sinnlichen abgeht,[104] mit dem Intellekt auch nur mittun und gar in der höchsten Erkenntnisart, die dem Menschengeschlecht zuteil werden kann. Und dies, ebenso wie alle vollwertige Erkenntnis, unter Einwirkung des Aktiven Intellekts, des Formengebers κατ' ἐξοχήν!

War es ja der Wesensgegensatz zwischen Imagination und Intellekt, der es schon bei Ibn-Sina — wenn auch nicht in so starkem Maße — zu einer Scheidung in zwei Phasen und Prozesse führte.[105] Dasselbe war auch der Grund, daß Gersonides die beiden Vermögen für zwei verschiedene Visionsarten als Träger bestimmte, für den Traum und Zauberei die Imagination und für die Prophetie den Intellekt, wobei auch die Quelle der Inspiration der beiden verschieden ist und auch das Ergebnis anders und manchmal entgegengesetzt.[106]

Aber wie wollen wir dies bei Maimonides erklären, der für den Aktiven Intellekt die höchsten, für die Imagination aber die tiefsten Bezeichnungen findet — wie wollen wir diese Verbindung erklären? Ist da nicht, wenn eine körperliche, materielle Kraft mit dem Aktiven Intellekt in Verbindung gebracht wird, die ganze Beweisführung für seine Existenz in Frage gestellt? Denn ist einmal das Hervorgebrachte nicht reine Form, woher die Konklusion auf den Hervorbringer, daß er Form = Intellekt ist?

[103] Die Ableitung wird im *Moreh* I, 68 gegeben Vgl. die gründliche Erörterung bei Scheyer, *loc. cit.*, S. 48 ff.

[104] Die Sinnlichkeit hat ihre Evidenz. *Moreh* I, 51: כמציאה ענינים רבים מבוארים גלויים מהם מושכלים ראשונים וטורגשים... עד שאפי' הונח האדם כמו שהוא לא יצטרך עליהם טופת, כמציאות התנועה... ושבעי הדברים הנראים לחוש. Vgl. *Moreh* I, 73, Präm. 3 und 12. Von den sinnlichen Wahrnehmungen sind aber die imaginativen Vorstellungen verschieden. *Moreh* I, 3 wird die Dreiteilung aufgestellt: צורת הדבר המושגת בחושים חוץ לשכל — הצורה הדמיונית (אלצורה אלכיאליה) — ענין דאמתי המושג בשכל. Die Imagination aber ist für die Empfindungen ebenso schädlich und irreführend wie für den Intellekt. *Moreh* I, 32: שהנה יקרה בהשגות השכליות... דבר ידמה למה שיקרה להשגות החושיות... ותתחדש לך אז תגבורת הדמיונים... לטרידת השכל ולהכבות אורו כמו שיתחדש בראות בן הדמיונים דמכוכים מיעים רבים עם הולשת כח הראוה. Vgl. Schem-Tob zu *Moreh* II, 30: כי לא לבד יעיק הכח המדמה לשכל אבל יפסיד הנפש הטרגשת.

[105] Vgl. oben Anm. 43.

[106] Vgl. oben Anm. 5. Gersonides (*Milchamoth* II, 6 g. E.) wiederholt oft שאין בדרך הדמיון שיקבל השפע מהשכל הפועל שיהיה השכל הפועל פועל ואת ההודעה, daher kommt er zur Folgerung המגעת בקסם והחלום כאמצעי, לא בעצמו הנרמים השמימיים). Vgl. oben Anm. 78 über die Funktion, die ihnen Maimonides zuschreibt. Auch die Wirkung der Prophetie ist להישיר האנשים אל ההצלחה, während והיה מה הקסם והחלום... שישפע מהם מהמחשבה והדמיון אינו להישיר אל ההצלחה אבל הוא לפעמים מישיר אל הפכה.

Es ist daher verständlich, daß Kommentatoren den Versuch gemacht haben, die beiden Vermögen bei MAIMONIDES zu trennen und sie, statt eines Nebeneinanders, als ein Nacheinander hinzustellen. So vor allem der RUACH-CHEN, der, obwohl in der Auffassung der Imagination viel milder, wie wir noch sehen werden, doch nachdrücklich betont, daß der Aktive Intellekt nur den Intellekt influiert und dieser dann weiter die Imagination; denn der Aktive Intellekt könnte mit den praktischen Dingen, mit denen die Prophetie beschäftigt ist, keinerlei Beziehung haben.[107] Ebenso ausführlich NARBONI.[108] Und schließlich auch ABRAVANEL, der sogar so weit geht, die Anschauung MAIMONIDES' beinahe in ihr Umgekehrtes umzudeuten, und sie der IBN-DAUDS sehr nahe bringt, daß nämlich der menschliche Intellekt die Imagination im Prophetieakte unterwirft und zurechtweist,[109] in welchem Zusammenhang er auch die Einwirkung des Aktiven Intellekts auf ein Minimum reduziert und daher zur Polemik gegen den Meister ausholt. (Dies allerdings in offenbarem Widerspruch mit seiner eigenen Interpretation an einer anderen Stelle.)[110]

Nun gibt wohl MAIMONIDES selbst Anhaltspunkte für eine solche Interpretation. An manchen Stellen scheint er dem Intellekt im Verhältnis zur Imagination auch den zeitlichen Vorrang zu geben. So gleich in der ersten Definition, wenn er sagt „zuerst auf den Intellekt und dann auf die Imagination".[111] Ebenso an einer späteren Stelle, wo er von der Divinationsfähigkeit des Propheten spricht, da heißt es auch, daß die eigentliche Influenz des Aktiven Intellekts sich auf den Intellekt beschränkt und von diesem erst zur Imagination

[107] Kap. 4: Nachdem er die Notwendigkeit der vollkommenen Imagination anführt, da der Prophet praktische Dinge (!) zu lehren hat, setzt er fort: ואין בין השכל הפועל אשר הוא סבת נבואתו ובין אלו הענינים יחס כלל, אך שפע השכל הפועל יבא על הכח השכלי אשר לו... ושפע הכח השכלי ההוא ישפיע על הכח המדמה

[108] Kommentar zum *Moreh*, ed. Goldental, S. 43; da gelangt er zum Ergebnis: אבל בעצם וראשונה הנה השפע שופע מן השכל הפועל על הכח הדברי תחלה, כי הוא המתיחס אליו, ואחר כך על הכח המדמה גם כי ישפיע השבל עליו בקבלו האורה מהשכל הפועל.

[109] Kommentar zum *Moreh* II, 36 (הקדמה ח): והיות הכח המדמה נכנע לשכלו... הוא השפעת השכל אשר יזכיר הרב, לא שהשכל הנבדל ישפיע בנביא שפע מה בעת הנבואה כי אם שהשכל האנושי... יניהג וידריך וינהיג אל הכח המדמה... היא אמתת הנבואה לדעת הרב. Dies wird in verschiedenen Wendungen wiederholt.

[110] Zu Beginn des Kap. 36: ומזה תבין שאומר על הכח הדברי תחלה ואחר כך על הכח המדמה אין ראוי שיובן בקדימה ואיחור זה בזמן כי בשניהם תחול ההשפעה, wovon er dann allerdings in eine beinahe wörtliche Zitierung des NARBONI übergeht.

[111] *Morch* II, 36.

gelangt.[112] Auf diese letztere Stelle nun werden wir noch zurückkommen und sie in ihrem richtigen Zusammenhang beleuchten. Die erste aber war schon von den Kommentatoren[113] nicht anders als bloße Redewendung, ohne wirklich gemeinte Folgeangabe, bezeichnet. Es wäre doch auch vollständige Konfusion, täte man es nicht! Denn wir haben ebenso viele und mehr Belege für das Gegenteil. Vor allem was die Quelle der Inspiration betrifft, betont Maimonides wiederholt, daß sowohl die Imagination als auch der Intellekt ihre Influenz — sei es im Traum, sei es in der Prophetie — von derselben Quelle aus erhalten.[114] Wir haben ferner Stellen, wo die Imagination, im Traum aber auch in der Prophetie, dem Intellekt vorangeht und als „Mittelglied" bezeichnet wird.[115] Ja noch mehr — die Imagination wird wiederholt allein als das Organ, das Instrument der Prophetie genannt.[116] Wie wäre das mit einer Auffassung vereinbar, wonach die Imagination ihre Inspiration nur aus zweiter Hand hätte, vom menschlichen Intellekt her? (Obwohl die Schwierigkeit für den menschlichen Intellekt, nachdem er zum erworbenen — נקנה — realisiert und also auch ein separater[117] geworden war, nicht geringer wäre als für den Zusammenhang mit dem Aktiven Intellekt!) Es bleibt also nichts anderes übrig, als die beiden, Intellekt und Imagination, als koordinierte Träger der prophetischen Erkenntnis zu betrachten und das „zuerst" und „nachher" im Kap. 36 als nur logisch, aber nicht zeitlich zu nehmen. Oder könnten wir uns an die von

[112] *Moreh* II, 38: חה צריך שיהיה כחה הדברי יותר, שאמתת שפע השכל הפועל אמנם הוא עליו... וכן הכח המדבר יגיע השפע לכח המדמה.

[113] S. oben Anm. 110. Ebenso Schem-Tob, der wohl auch fast wörtlich Narboni folgt, jedoch nicht das Zeitliche unterstreicht. Wenn er z. B. bei der Prophetie Moses zum Unterschied der anderen Propheten hervorhebt, והכח המדמה לא היה משתמש באותו השפע, so ergibt sich wohl für die anderen, was er auch andeutet, das Gegenteil!

[114] *Moreh* II, 37 wird als eine der drei Eventualitäten angeführt: ואם יהיה השפע על המדמה לבד ויהיה קצר הדברי שהשפע ההוא בעצמו אשר שפע על הכח. Ganz deutlich II, 38: הוא גם כן ישלים פעל הכח הדברי הדמיוני...

[115] *Moreh* III, 24 wird באמצעות כח המדמה allgemein ohne Bezeichnung der Reihenfolge bezeichnet. Auch *Moreh* II, 6 wird beim Traum die Reihenfolge Seele-Imagination-Intellekt aufgestellt, also Imagination vor Intellekt. Aber am klarsten ist es ersichtlich in II, 36, wo von Moses gesagt wird: לא היה לכח המדמה מבוא בנבואתו אבל שפע השכל עליו מבלתי אמצעיותו, woraus sich in anderen Fällen der Prophetie die Mittlerrolle des מדמה für den שפע ergibt; ebenso II, 45: דע כי הענין כן שהאמצעי הנה הוא הכח המדמה.

[116] So *Moreh* II, 36 g. E.: כי הכלי כבר נתבטל, bezugnehmend auf die früher behandelte Imagination. Dann *Moreh* II, 47: ואת פעולתו רוצה לומר הכח המדמה (sc. בנבואה) שהכלי בה.

[117] Vgl. oben Anm. 89.

Maimonides selbst gegebene Unterscheidung halten, wonach innerhalb der Visions-Prophetie die eine, mit der Erscheinung beginnende, durch ein Vorangehen der Imagination, die andere durch das Vorangehen des Intellekts bei der Inspiration zustande kommt[118] — eine Unterscheidung, die wohl Maimonides selbst nicht genau genommen hat und für uns noch weniger entscheidend sein kann.

Denn für unseren Zweck genügt es, festgestellt zu haben:

1. Daß die Imagination für die Prophetie konstitutiv ist;
2. daß sie von derselben Quelle als der Intellekt inspiriert wird;
3. daß auch die zur Imagination gelangende Influenz eine direkte ist und nicht etwa durch Vermittlung des Intellekts — ja daß vielleicht die Funktion der Imagination als Organ der des Intellekts noch überlegen ist.

Ist dem nun so, so befinden wir uns vor dem unüberbrückbaren Gegensatz zwischen der Erkenntnistheorie Maimonides' im allgemeinen und seiner Lehre von der Prophetie. Denn nimmt man die Möglichkeit einer Verbindung zwischen Imagination und Aktiven Intellekt an, so wird nicht allein, wie oben bemerkt, die Beweisführung für die Existenz eines Aktiven Intellekts gefährdet, sondern, seine Existenz auch angenommen, seine Rolle im regulären Erkenntnisakte durchaus sinnlos gemacht. Und in weiterer Folge: ist einmal dies untergraben, so ist die Notwendigkeit des Intellekts auch in der Prophetie nicht einzusehen, diese Notwendigkeit, woraus sich so vieles an Bedingungen usw. knüpft. So daß durch die Schwierigkeit, die sich aus der Prophetie für die Erkenntnistheorie ergibt, die Prophetie selbst in letzter Konsequenz wieder bedroht wird.

Die Prophetietheorie also ist uns vorläufig bloß Problem.

IV.

Wo ein Problem aus einer Inkompatibilität zweier Elemente entsteht, da ist die Lösung, will man nicht auf die Vereinigung ganz und gar verzichten, nur durch eine nochmalige Prüfung der in Betracht kommenden Komponenten möglich — eine Prüfung unter dem besonderen Gesichtspunkte dieser Vereinigung, d. h. daraufhin, ob sie nicht noch andere Züge enthalten, die, allgemein vernachlässigt, doch in besonderen Fällen einer besonderen Verbindung fähig werden.

[118] *Moreh* II, 41, Anf. Vgl. Ephodi und Schem-Tob z. St.

In unserem Falle also müssen wir sehen, ob einerseits die Imagination nicht auch andere Charakteristika, als die erwähnten, aufweist und, andererseits, ob wir es hier mit jener regulären Influenz zu tun haben, aus der uns die Schwierigkeiten erwachsen sind, oder mit einer spezifischen, von jener verschiedenen. Daraus mag sich als Resultat ergeben, daß das Ganze hier spezifischen Charakters ist, daß also die prophetische Erkenntnis nicht eine gesteigerte oder modifizierte Normalerkenntnis ist, sondern daß wir es hier mit einem Erkenntnisprozeß *sui generis* zu tun haben.

Vor allem darf nicht vergessen werden, daß die Schwierigkeiten, die im vorigen Kapitel hervorgehoben wurden, MAIMONIDES selbst wohl gegenwärtig waren. Er findet es für geboten, einer etwaigen Annahme, die Prophetie, „da sie in Traum und Vision und vermittels der Imagination" entsteht, nicht die volle Wahrheitsgewißheit für den Propheten haben könnte, mit allem Nachdruck entgegenzutreten.[119] Des möglichen Einwandes von wegen der Imagination war er sich also bewußt. Hat er nun aber dennoch der Imagination in der Prophetie eine so wichtige Funktion zugeteilt, so müssen wir sie, die wir bisher in ihren negativen Funktionen gesehen haben, noch näher und auch daraufhin ansehen, ob an ihr nicht auch manches Konstruktive zu finden wäre.

Es ist schon an sich merkwürdig, daß, während im Mischnah-Kommentar und im Mischneh-Torah, wo die Imagination nur als moralisch irrelevant bezeichnet wurden,[120] von ihr im Zusammenhange mit der Prophetie — auch nur als Instrument für die Mitteilbarkeit — keine Rede ist, während gerade im *Moreh*, wo die Imagination die schärfste Ablehnung erfährt, sie diese Funktion in der Prophetie erhält. Aber im *Moreh* selbst ist es doch auffallend, daß dieselbe Imagination, als böser Trieb und Urschlange bezeichnet,[121] an anderer Stelle als Engel, und sicher im positiven Sinne,[122] gedeutet wird; nicht als der Verführer, sondern als göttlicher

[119] Es ist dies an der Stelle, wo MAIMONIDES das Wunderzeichen als Kriterium ablehnt, *Moreh* III, 24: בחלום או במראה... ובאמצעות (sc. הנבואה) שלא יחשוב החושב בעבור שהיא הכח המדמה, שסעתים לא יהיה מה שישמעוהו או מה שיוטשל להם אמת.

[120] Vgl. oben Anm. 97.

[121] Vgl. oben Anm. 100 und 101.

[122] *Moreh* II, 6: הנה כבר בארו לפי שיבין וישכיל, שהכח המדמה נ"כ יקרא מלאך ושהשכל יקרא כרוב. Nun ist zwar der Begriff מלאך bei MAIMONIDES sehr dehnbar und auch der böse Trieb wird als solcher bezeichnet, allerdings etwas zögernd: *Moreh* III, 22, wo von der Identität

Mittler.[123] Und nicht allein im Traume. Auch in der wachen, verantwortlichen Handlung, in der, wie gesehen, die acht Kapitel der Imagination keinerlei Ingerenz zuschreiben, finden wir im *Moreh* Stellen, wo die Imagination in Form von imaginativen Gelüsten u. dgl. aktiv und mitverantwortlich ist.[124] Mehr als dies: eine so bewußte Tätigkeit wie Gesetzgebung und Staatsführung, auch wenn diese gut und zweckentsprechend sind — wofür ja manche Philosophen die Prophetie in Anspruch nahmen[125] —, wird wiederholt der influierten Imagination allein zugeschrieben,[126] und dies, obwohl es an einer

von טלאך המות, שטן, יצר הרע die Rede ist: ואחר שבארו לך שיצר רע הוא השטן הוא טלאך בל"ס, רוצים לומר שהוא גם כן יקרא טלאך... ויהיה נ"כ יצר טוב טלאך באמת. In unserem Zusammenhange ist es aber sicher im guten Sinne gemeint. Vor allem wegen der Fortsetzung mit כרוב, der das dritte Glied in der Kette כרוב — טלאך — נפש ist. Mit כרוב wird der Intellekt in seiner reinsten Form symbolisiert. S. *Moreh* II, 45 g. E., III, 1 g. E. Vgl BACHER, *Die Bibelexegese M. Maimuni's*, S. 124, auch Anm. 1. — Aber noch deutlicher wird es durch die Fortsetzung und die Identifizierung dieser Erscheinungen mit den prophetischen. So die Vergleiche z. B. mit den Visionen Abrahams, die dann (*Moreh* II, 42, 45) als echt prophetisch behandelt werden.

[123] Der Begriff des טלאך war, wie gesagt, bei MAIMONIDES sehr weit und dehnbar, wie er *Moreh* II, 6 des längeren ausführt. Speziell in unserem Falle wird dieser Begriff für alles verwendet. Wir sahen bereits, daß die Imagination als טלאך bezeichnet wird; dann wird der Aktive Intellekt als solcher bezeichnet, da er doch eine separate Intelligenz ist (*Moreh* II, 7); aber auch der Prophet wird so bezeichnet, so *Moreh* II, 34 Anfang oder II, 41: שהנביא פעמים נקרא טלאך (welch letztere Anschauung auch von GERSONIDES im Bibel-Kommentar, Gen. 16, 7 angenommen wird). Betrachtet man die Prophetie als eine Influenz vom Aktiven Intellekt auf die Imagination, wodurch der Mensch zum Propheten wird — so kann טלאך alle drei bezeichnen: das Influierende, das Influierte und das Ergebnis. Es muß daher festgehalten werden, daß aus diesem Begriffe und seiner Anwendung keinerlei Schlüsse zu ziehen sind — was die Mittlerschaft (nicht was die Wertung, s. Anm. 122) betrifft. Darum fallen alle Schwierigkeiten, die die Kommentatoren (EPHODI, ABRAVANEL zu II, 34, vgl. auch MUNK, *Guide* II, S. 275 Anm. 1) in einem Widerspruch zwischen II, 34 und II, 7 gefunden haben, der aber auch in II, 34 selbst, zwischen Anfang und Ende, und ebenso II, 41 sich finden läßt, weg. Von den vielfachen Auffassungen des טלאך, die sich in der philosophischen Literatur finden, sei hier bloß noch die für unseren Zusammenhang interessante Nuancierung GAZZALIS angeführt; im *Mozne Zedek*, S. 60, gibt es eine zweifache Mittlerschaft: שהנביא הוא אמצעי בין בני אדם והטלאכים כמו שהטלאך הוא אמצעי בין האל והנביא. An diese relative Mittlerschaft wird auch MAIMONIDES in den genannten Stellen gedacht haben.

[124] *Moreh* III, 8 über den Ausspruch: והרהורי עבירה קשין מעבירה; daß da nicht an eigentliche intellektuale Tätigkeit gedacht wird, zeigt das weitere: מסגלות האדם הנמשכים אחר צורתו; ebenso ist weiter anstatt des Tibbonschen: זאת הצורה האנושית... וכל כחותיה nach MUNK, *Guide* III, S. 52, Anm. 3, die Charisische Lesung richtiger: זאת הצורה האנושית וכל כחותיה הבאים מצדה. Vgl. zum Ganzen SCHEYER, *loc. cit.*, S. 105 und Anm. 16 das.

[125] So teilweise ALFARABI, besonders SAADJA und IBN-SINA. Vgl. oben Anm. 39.

[126] Nach *Moreh* II, 37 gehören zur dritten Klasse, bei denen nur die Imagination influiert wird, die מנהיגי המדינות מניחי הנמוסים usw. Ebenso II, 39, g. E., wo der Unter-

anderen Stelle als Funktion des intellektuellen Vermögens bezeichnet wird,[127] was also beinahe einer Gleichwertung beider Vermögen ähnlich ist.

Es sind also offenbar zwei Auffassungen von der Imagination, die im *Moreh* parallel nebeneinander laufen, eine, die ihr nur Irreführung und Destruktion durch Materialisierung zuschreibt, die andere aber, die ihr Konstruktives zuerkennt. Auch diese Parallele ist nicht ein Widerspruch und unbewußt. Sie findet auch klare Formulierung. Als direktes Gegenstück zu jener prinzipiellen Verwerfung der Imagination als Gegensatz zum erkennenden Intellekt[128] haben wir im *Moreh* eine Stelle, gewidmet einer ausführlichen Darlegung der Relativität einer solchen Unterscheidung. In keinem wesentlichen Punkte können wir definitiv Entscheidungen treffen: weder in der Frage des Kriteriums, wofür die Imagination und wofür der Intellekt zuständig ist, noch im Gegenstand, was imaginative und was intellektuelle Vorstellung ist, noch im Vermögen selbst, wodurch sich die Imagination selbst vom Intellekt unterscheidet. Es gibt dafür keinen dritten, außenstehenden Richter — es müßte es der Intellekt selbst sein, der aber nur Partei ist.[129] Diese auffallende Milderung der Ansicht zugunsten der Imagination, auch wenn sie mit spezieller Rücksicht auf das Problem der Kreation[130] eingetreten ist — oder vielleicht gerade deswegen —, genügt doch, um zu zeigen, daß Maimonides keinen starren Standpunkt in der Wertung der Imagination hatte, sondern einen beweglichen, anpassungsfähigen.

schied zwischen תורה אלהית und ההנהגות המדיניות כנמוסי היונים usw. aufgestellt wird, und dann II, 40, wo dieser Unterschied ausführlich behandelt und nochmals erklärt wird, daß התורה ההיא נמוסית מניחה כמו שזכרנו מאנשי הכת הגי רי"ל השלישית בכח המדמה לבד. Das in letzterer Stelle erwähnte קצת הצלחה (Charisi: שום הצלחה, Munk, *Guide* II, 311: *certaine* félicité), das M. dieser bloß gesetzgebenden, nicht prophetischen Tätigkeit zuschreibt, erinnert lebhaft an den Begriff הצלחה, der von Farabi (s. oben Anm. 37) für die Prophetie verwendet wird.

[127] *Moreh* I, 53: ואני אמשל לך בכח המדבר הנמצא באדם... ובו בעצמו יתפור... וינהיג המדינה.

[128] In *Moreh* I, 73, Präm. 10 s. oben Anm. 99.

[129] *Moreh* III, 15: ואם בחינת זה הענין ומצרפו בכח המדמה או בשכל ובאיזה דבר יובדל בין המדומה והמושכל, שפעמים שיחלוק האדם על חברו או תחלוק עליו נפשו... ואם יש גם כן דבר שנבדיל בו בין הכח המדמה ובין השכל ואם הוא דבר חוץ לשניהם יחד או בשכל עצמו מבדילים בין המושכל והמדומה. Falaquera, *Moreh-Hamoreh*, S. 123, empfindet lebhaft diesen Widerspruch zu I, 73 und die Bedeutung der Wendung in unserer Stelle: וראה היאך נתחדשה דרך קשה usw.

[130] Es handelt sich um den Begriff des נמנע und der daraus folgenden Schwierigkeiten für die *creatio ex nihilo*. — Daß auch das Phänomen der Prophetie mit dem der Kreation enge verbunden ist, werden wir noch später sehen.

Darin aber war MAIMONIDES keineswegs revolutionär, er vollendete vielmehr einen Entwicklungsprozeß des Imaginationsbegriffes, indem er sich einer der gegabelten Linien anschloß. Die Imagination ist ein echter aristotelischer Begriff — φαντασία. Doch schon ein Blick auf die Anordnung der Seelenkräfte bei Aristoteles, Alfarabi und Maimonides,[131] bei allen an Zahl fünf, zeigt die fortschreitende Höherwertung der Imagination. Aber nicht allein das. Während ALFARABI der Imagination nur eine Wirkungsgemeinschaft mit anderen Seelenkräften zuschreibt, sie selbst aber noch einfach läßt,[132] finden wir später die Imagination selbst mit mehr als einer Funktion ausgestattet, nicht allein sich auf das erinnernde Reproduzieren und Kombinieren, wie ursprünglich bei Aristoteles,[133] beschränkt. Hier aber gehen die Wege auseinander. Auf der einen Seite IBN-SINA, der die Imagination zweifach sieht, je nach ihrer Wirksamkeit im Tiere oder im Menschen; im letzteren nämlich mehr eine Denktätigkeit.[134]

[131] Aristoteles, *De anima* II, 3, zählt folgende fünf Vermögen auf: θρεπτικόν (זן), ὀρεκτικόν (מתעורר), αἰσθητικόν (מרגיש), κινητικόν und διανοητικόν (דבר). Für die Imagination hat Aristoteles keinen Platz unter den regulären Vermögen und er behandelt sie abgesondert. ALFARABI, *Hatchalath-Hanimzaim*, S. 35, hat folgende fünf: המדברת העיונית והמדברת המעשית והמתעוררת והמדמה והמרגשת. Er läßt also das vegetative und Bewegungsvermögen weg, führt den theoretischen und praktischen Verstand gesondert an und führt die Imagination ein. Bei MAIMONIDES (Acht Kap. — Abschn. 1) gibt es הזן, המרגיש, המדמה, המתעורר, השכל. Also eine Kombination beider früherer Einteilungen, indem sowohl das vegetative als auch das imaginative Vermögen aufgenommen, dagegen der praktische Verstand und die Bewegung (vgl. *Moreh* I, 26 u. 46) als akzidentiell weggelassen werden. (Über die Dreiteilung der Seele bei MAIMONIDES vgl. SCHEYER, *loc. cit.*, S. 11.) Auf jeden Fall ist die Imagination bei MAIMONIDES um eine Stelle höher als bei ALFARABI.

[132] S. *Hatchalath*, S. 36.

[133] Wohl hat sie beim Menschen eine höhere Funktion in der ἀνάμνησις als bei der bloß tierischen μνήμη (*De memoria et reminiscentia*, Kap. 2) und das φαντάσμα ist auch zum Prozeß des νοεῖν nötig (*loc. cit.*, Kap. 1). Die eigentliche Tätigkeit bleibt doch die reproduzierende. Die φαντασία bleibt dieselbe bei den Tieren, obwohl sie gar kein Denken usw. haben (*De anima* III, 10), wie beim Menschen.

[134] *Schahrastani*, S. 417, Haarbr. II, 315, da ist die Imagination „die Kraft ..., welche in Beziehung auf thierische Seele Vorstellungsvermögen, in Beziehung auf die menschliche Seele Denkvermögen heißt". Nach einer anderen Darstellung variiert die Funktion, je nachdem sie von der Meinung oder vom Verstande benützt wird. Vgl. HOROWITZ, *Die Psychologie bei den jüdischen Religionsphil.*, S. 246, Anm. 83. FALAQUERA, *Moreh-Hamoreh*, S. 24, führt für IBN-SINA an: וכח המדמה יקרא בהיקש אל הנפש החיונית מדמה ויקרא בהיקש אל הכח המדבר חושב. In beiden Fällen ist es noch die Imagination, die je nach ihrer Beziehung anders bezeichnet wird.

Diese Auffassung wurde von Ibn-Daud vervollkommnet.[135] Bei beiden aber war diese Denktätigkeit vom Intellekt noch wesentlich verschieden, und für die Prophetie, die als Perfektion der Vernunft angesehen war, blieb die Imagination noch immer materialisierend vermittelnd oder gar hindernd.[136] Auf der anderen Seite aber die Deutung Gazzalis, der die Imagination den bewegenden Seelenkräften näher sieht als den denkenden,[137] der sie selbst aus fünf Vermögen zusammengesetzt sieht, worunter eines, ein urteilendes, nichts anderes ist als was wir Instinkt nennen.[138] Für die ersteren spielte nun die Imagination ins Denkhafte hinüber, dies aber nur imitierend und ohne seine eigentliche Form jemals erreichen zu können, für den letzteren war es mit dem Triebhaften verbunden, dies aber erhöhend und mit neuen Funktionen ausstattend.

Maimonides schloß sich der letzteren Richtung an. Das Denken, das er immer nur in seiner höchsten Form, in der des Intellekts,

[135] *Em. Ramah*, S. 29, wo der מדמה und מחשב wohl auf derselben Stufe stehen, jedoch durchwegs verschieden sind bei Tier und Mensch. Eigentlich hat nur das Tier den מדמה, was wohl ein zweckmäßiges, aber nicht ein zweckbewußtes Tun herbeiführt: אין זה הכח בבעלי חיים שכל, und weiter: ואל תתמה ותחשוב שהדבר אינו כן אבל הבעל חיים ישיג תכלית כל מה שיעשה — זה אינו, אלא כמו הצטח שאין בו ידיעה במה שעושה. Hingegen der Mensch hat an dessen Stelle den מחשב, der sich im zweckbewußten praktischen Handeln auswirkt. Allerdings wird dann später der מדמה auch beim Menschen eingeführt, besonders im Zusammenhange mit Traum und infolge des Imitationsvermögens (S. 30: כמו שנזכר ביכולת המחקה). Wenn auch gesagt wird: וזה הכח לפי שהוא בבחינת מה מדמה ובבחינה מה מחשב, als ob es sich um ein und dasselbe Vermögen des Menschen handeln würde, so ist nicht ganz klar, worauf sich dieses וזה הכח bezieht; es könnte sehr gut auf den unmittelbar vorher erwähnten כח המציר bezogen werden. Auch die Fortsetzung hat Unklarheiten, s. Horowitz, *Psychologie*, S. 249, Anm. 90. — Falaquera, *Moreh-Hamoreh*, S. 17, spricht von beiden, sowohl מדמה als auch חושב, beim Menschen: כי הכח החושב הוא כח טפוג הכחות החושיים, כי הכחות החושיים מצטרפים לכח המדמה והחושב... ובלם מפתיעים להמציא דמיון הדבר המוחש בעבור שיעין בו הכח המדבר הנבדל. Sie wirken also im Menschen beide zusammen, als Vorbereitung für den Intellekt, ganz im aristotelischen Sinne (s. oben Anm. 133).

[136] S. oben Anm. 43 und 52.

[137] S. Belege bei Horowitz, *Psychologie*, S. 250, Anm. 92.

[138] *Mozne-Zedek*, S. 30, wird unter den fünf Funktionen des מדמה angeführt: והשלישי הוא כח רעיוני, נמצא בטבע לא בהקדמת למוד... ישיג מאליו ענינים שאינם מורגשים מההרגשות הפרטיות, כגון הכח הנמצא בשה שהזאב ראוי לברח ממנו והבן ראוי לרחם עליו. Diese Instinkt-Funktion bildet bei Ibn-Daud ein besonderes Vermögen, den כח רעיוני (*Em. Ramah*, S. 30), für welches ein Beispiel Gazzalis — כמו משפט השה בשוה הזאב אויב ראוי לברוח ממנו — oder das Kind, das Schutz sucht, angeführt wird, aber nicht das andere, nämlich die instinktive Liebe des Stärkeren zum Schwächeren. Nach dem herangezogenen Vergleich mit dem Auge bei herannahender Hand scheint es eher einer Reflexionsbewegung ähnlich zu sein. Über die Ungenauigkeit des Begriffes, ebenso über seine Stellung bei Ibn-Sina und die Gleichsetzung mit δόξα vgl. Horowitz, *Psychologie*, S. 250, Anm. 93, 94.

gelten lassen konnte, durfte für ihn mit der Imagination nicht verquickt oder gar verwechselt werden. Daher die immer wiederholte nachdrückliche Trennung zwischen den beiden und die Warnung vor der Imagination. Wo er aber diese doch gelten läßt, so ist es nicht als Denkvermögen, sondern als eine andere Instanz, die auch ihre Berechtigung hat. Die Imagination war auch für ihn zum Triebhaften gerichtet und das Organ des Instinktiven; dafür gibt es ausdrückliche Belege.[139] Daraus aber sind auch alle oberwähnten Konzessionen für die Imagination zu verstehen. Die Imagination hatte eben neben der Aufgabe des Erinnerns usw. noch eine Funktion.[140] Darin ist der Fortschritt im *Moreh* gegenüber den früheren Schriften zu sehen.

Darum kommt die Darstellung des *Ruach-Chen* dem wirklichen Standpunkt MAIMONIDES' sehr nahe. Er sieht wohl einen wesentlichen Unterschied zwischen der intellektuellen und imaginativen Erkenntnis. Auf der anderen Seite aber verleiht er der Imagination als dritte Funktion die seelischen Affekte, insbesondere die instinktiven,[141] ebenso die praktisch-vernünftigen Handlungen, die Wahl und Entscheidung,

[139] So wird Jakob an der Prophetie gehindert (*Moreh* II, 36) להתעסק כחו המדמה בהספד יוסף, also bei Verlust des Sohnes war der מדמה angegriffen. Vater- und Mutterliebe werden allein der Imagination zugeschrieben, so wegen der Schlachtung von אותו ואת בנו, *Moreh* III, 48: כי צער בעלי חיים בזה גדול מאד אין הפרש בין צער האדם עליו וצער שאר בע״ח, כי אהבת האם ורחמיה על הולד אינו נמשך אחר השכל רק אחר פעל הכח המדמה. Dasselbe III, 49, wo die Gründe für die Beschneidung zu 8 Tagen angegeben werden: שלא התחזקה עדין הצורה הדמיונית המביאה לאהוב אותו יולדיו. Und wiederholt in diesem Zusammenhang הצורה הדמיונית. MUNK, *Guide* III, S. 419, bemerkt (Anm. 3): Par la forme imaginative, l'auteur entend ici l'affection ou la *sensibilité instinctive* qui ... est en rapport avec la faculté imaginative. Bezeichnend ist, daß alle vorkommenden Beispiele sich auf die Liebe des Stärkeren zum Schwächeren beziehen, wie das zweite Beispiel bei GAZZALI (s. vorige Anm.), nicht auf den reflexiven Schutz des Schwächeren, wie es IBN-DAUD sah. Spontan Triebhaftes oder automatische Selbstwehr — das ist der wesentliche Unterschied. Der Satz *Moreh* I, 47: ולא הושאל לו רעיון אשר הוא הדמיון, im Gegensatz zu מחשבה ותבונה, ist wohl auch in dem hier dargelegten Sinne zu verstehen.

[140] Die Aufzählung der regulären Funktionen der Imagination *Moreh* II, 36, wie וכבר ידעת עוד פעולת זה הכח המדמה זכור המוחשים והרכבתם והחקוי אשר בשבעו, wird eingeleitet mit (arab. וקד עלמת איצא אפעאל).

[141] Vgl. oben Anm. 90. Über die instinktive Funktion wird in Kap. 2 gesprochen, als dritte der Funktionen des מדמה: והני הוא שמתעורר להרחיק הדבר המזיקו ולכוין אל הנאות לו. Dann werden alle möglichen Gefühle angeführt האהבה והשנאה והאכזריות והרחמנות הכעס והרצון. Als Beispiele aber werden angeführt sowohl בריחת הכבש מן הדוב als auch אהבת הבהמה את הולד שלה — also wieder vereinigt, wie bei GAZZALI.

kurz alles, was sittliche Verantwortlichkeit inbegreift.[142] Unrichtig ist die Darstellung nur, wo sie die Imagination in der Prophetie, wohl infolge der Auffassung dieser als primär-intellektuelles Phänomen, von der direkten Inspiration ausschaltet.

Die Imagination hört dadurch nicht auf, physischer Natur zu sein, noch verliert sie ihre eigentliche und erste Funktion, der Behälter des von den Sinnen dargebotenen Abbildes zu sein. Allein, da sie in ihrer Tätigkeit von der unmittelbaren sinnlichen Rezeption unabhängig ist, kann sie — neben dem kombinativen Spiel mit den reproduzierten Bildern, das irreführend und schädlich sein kann — eben dank dieser Losgelöstheit über das rein Sinnliche hinaus zu den Dingen eigene gefühlsmäßige Beziehungen finden. Beziehungen, die nicht von der Natur des intellektuellen Denkens sind, ja nicht einmal mit Ahnung, wie wir noch sehen werden, identifiziert werden können — die eben eine neue Kategorie bilden. Dies ist die andere, spezifische, positive Seite der Imagination.

Aber ebenso wie der Empfänger ist auch die Influenz in der Prophetie spezifischer Natur. Es kann sich hier keineswegs um den normalen, für die Weltordnung konstitutiven Aktiven Intellekt und um seine permanente Ausströmung handeln, sondern um eine Influenz besonderer Art: höher als der Aktive Intellekt und daher auch zu tieferen Empfängern hinabreichend. Schon in der Definition ist die Rede von einer Influenz, die von Gott ausströmt vermittels des Aktiven Intellekts.[143] Da Wesen und Funktion des Aktiven Intellekts ebenso wie die Art seiner Influenz schon längst ausführlich erörtert[144] und, seither als bekannt, immer mit dem bestimmten Artikel angeführt wurden,[145] ist doch diese unbestimmte Art der Erwähnung, als handelte es sich um die Einführung eines neuen Begriffes, nicht

[142] In Kap. 4 wird unterschieden zwischen dem מדמה beim Menschen und Tier, ähnlich wie bei IBN-DAUD: Der Mensch handelt בכח השכל המעשי הראשון שהוא באמת הכח המדמה. Doch wird hier dieser שכל המעשי הראשון, der dem מחשב bei IBN-DAUD entspricht, mit dem מדמה identifiziert. Weiter heißt es: וכן הרחקות המעשים הרעים ובחירת המעשים הטובים הוא מן הכח המדמה. Ebenso Kap. 6: יקראו מצוות השכליות לפי ששכל המעשי אשר באדם והוא מן המדמה מקבל אותם לא שיהיו נודעת מצד השכל העיוני. Über das Verhältnis zur Inspiration s. oben Anm. 107.

[143] *Moreh* II, 36: שפע שופע מאת השם יתי באמצעות השכל הפועל (arab. فيض يفيض) ohne Artikel; MUNK, *Guide* II, S. 281, übersetzt: *une* émanation de Dieu (die deutsche Übersetzung von WEISS, II, 238, hat, falsch wie oft, „die Emanation" usw.).

[144] *Moreh* II, 4, wo er schon gleich mit dem bestimmten Artikel sagt והשכל העשירי הוא השכל הפועל.

[145] So vor unserer Definition *Moreh* II, 10, 11, 12, 18 u.v.a.

zu übersehen. Es heißt auch weiter, daß unter den gegebenen günstigen Bedingungen auf die Imagination „eine gewisse" oder eine „bestimmte" Ausströmung, welche die Ursache sowohl der Träume als auch der Prophetie ist und, wie MAIMONIDES betont, sich immer, in beiden Fällen, wesentlich gleich bleibt.[146] Es kann sich also doch nur um eine von der in jedem Erkenntnisakt mitwirkenden Ausströmung des Aktiven Intellekts verschiedenen Influenz handeln.

Dies wird auch klar, wenn man sieht, wie überall, im Zusammenhang mit der Prophetie, die Rede ist von der „göttlichen" oder von „jener" Ausströmung.[147] Ganz besonders deutlich ist es an der Stelle, wo, entsprechend den influierten Vermögen, der Unterschied zwischen dem Philosophen, bei dem der Intellekt allein influiert wird, und dem Propheten oder auch Phantasten, bei welchen die Imagination mitinfluiert sind, erörtert wird. Daß hier nämlich ganz genau abgegrenzt beim Philosophen nur von der intellektuellen Influenz, bei den anderen aber von „jener" bestimmten die Rede ist.[148]

Diese Behauptung bedarf aber nicht des interpretativen Schließens, da MAIMONIDES selbst, jeden Zweifel ausschließend, dies wiederholt erklärt. Erstens bei der Deutung des Wortes רוח; da führt er unter anderem zwei Bedeutungen an: die eine, was vom Menschen unsterblich ist, also der akquirierte Intellekt, der eben durch sein Eingehen und Identischwerden mit dem Aktiven Intellekt unsterblich wird,[149] und

[146] *Moreh* II, 36: או ישפע עליו קצת שפע (arab. יסיּן עליהא סיּן מא). MUNK, *Guide* II, S. 282: une *certaine* inspiration. Daß es sich um dieselbe „gewisse" Ausströmung auch bei der Prophetie handelt, wird klar, wenn man später liest: ואמנם יתחלף ברב או במעט לא בטין, im Singular an Stelle des Tibbonschen יתחלפו, das MUNK, *loc. cit.*, Anm. 7, als falsch nachweist.

[147] So spricht ja die Einleitung zum *Moreh* durchwegs von den prophetischen Lehren als חכמה אלהית und von הכונה האלהית אשר שמה האמתיות המיוחדת בהשגתו, ebenso I, 21 und 46: ותארוהו לנו שהוא מדבר, ענינו שיגיעו ענינים מטנו יתעלה לנביאים. וזהו ענין הנבואה. So III, Vorrede נבואה אלהית als Gegensatz zum normalen Denken; III, 18: אחר שהשיעור ההוא משפע השכל האלהי הוא אשר שם דבר בפי הנביאים; II, 38: כאשר היב הענין האלהי. II, 29: אבל הייתה באה אליהם הנבואה מהשם כמו שהשפע ההוא, dann באמצעות שפע השכל האלהי עליו; II, 39: שזאת ההנהגה מאתו יתב׳ שבארנו ומי שהרבה עליו השפע ההוא, dann: נבואות אמתיות ר״ל אלהיות; II, 40: ושהתורה ההיא אלהית; II, 41: השפע הרוח u.v.a.

[148] *Moreh* II, 37: Im Anfang wird vom טבע המציאות בוה השפע האלהי gesprochen; dann gegen Ende wird bei den Gelehrten und Denkern vom השופע על כח האיש מהם השכלי gesprochen, wovon dann gesagt wird טבע השכל כן הוא שישפיע לעולם, worunter, wie wir noch sehen werden, der Aktive Intellekt zu verstehen ist, während beim Propheten השפע ההוא האלהי genannt ist.

[149] S. oben Anm. 89 u. 96.

als anderes „die göttlich-intellektuelle Ausströmung, die er auf die Propheten influiert und sie prophezeien".[150] Es ist also dies eine besondere, für sich bestehende Art der Inspiration — verschieden von jenem mit dem Aktiven Intellekt vereinigten Intellekt. Jeden Zweifel ausschließend aber ist die Stelle, wo MAIMONIDES diese Ausströmung, die von Gott ausgeht und die Propheten betrifft, geradezu als Analogie für die Ausströmung, die beim Aktiven Intellekt stattfindet, also als etwas von dieser Verschiedenes, zur Rechtfertigung des Terminus שפע für den Aktiven Intellekt anführt![151] Es wäre nicht nötig, diesen eigentlich klaren Sachverhalt so zu betonen und zu belegen, wenn nicht alle Kommentatoren und Darsteller konsequent vom Aktiven Intellekt, wie er in seiner normalen Wirksamkeit bekannt ist, im Zusammenhange mit der Prophetie sprächen. Nur an einer Stelle scheint SCHEM-TOB dies andeuten zu wollen,[152] er verliert sich aber dann in der üblichen Anschauung.

Nun, die Wirksamkeit des Aktiven Intellekts bei der Prophetie ist ja zuerst von ALFARABI dargestellt worden, allerdings sich beziehend nur auf den menschlichen Intellekt,[153] und auch er erwähnt Gott. Während aber für ihn wesentlich der Aktive Intellekt influiert und Gott nur als letzte Ursache, wie überhaupt in der Welt, genannt werden kann,[154] ist es bei MAIMONIDES gerade im Gegenteil: Gott ist der eigentliche Influierende, der Aktive Intellekt wird von ihm nur als Instrument, auch in diesem Spezialfalle, benützt. Wir sahen

[150] *Moreh* I, 40: והוא ג"כ שם הדבר הנשאר מן האדם אחר המות אשר לא ישיגהו ההפסד und dann והוא ג"כ השפע השכלי האלהי אשר ישפיע על הנביאים ויתנבאו בו. SPINOZA, *Tract. theol. pol.* I, 25 ff., widmet diesem Wort רוח lange und eingehende Auseinandersetzungen, um es von seinem intellektualistischen Charakter bei der Prophetie zu befreien. Dies widerspricht keineswegs der hier erwähnten Anschauung MAIMONIDES', wenn richtig verstanden. Gerade dies als „Polemik gegen Maimonides" aufzufassen, wie JOEL (*Spinozas theol. pol. Tract.*, S. 20) tut, ist nicht gerechtfertigt.

[151] *Moreh* II, 12, wo die Unkörperlichkeit der Relationen des Aktiven Intellekts erklärt wird, da wird als Vorbild Gott angeführt: כן הבורא... וכן יאמר שהוא השפיע הכמתו על הנביאים.

[152] Kommentar zu II, 36: אמר שפע להורות שאינו כשכל הפועל בעצמו. Dann weiter heißt es aber, im Fahrwasser der allgemeinen Auffassung, והסבה... הוא מה שהרב הניח שהשכל הפועל הוא המשפיע השפע, und der כסף גדול, der ihm einfällt, ist nur der von GERSONIDES erhobene Einwurf. MUNK in seiner Übersetzung fügt oft, aus eigenem, dem Worte „intellect" in Klammern „actif" hinzu.

[153] S. oben Anm. 34 und 35.

[154] *Hatchalath*, S. 41: בעבור כי שכל הפועל נשפיע בעבור נציאות הסבה הראשונה הנה אשר בעבור זה שיאמר כי הסבה הראשונה היא נותנת את הנבואה אל האדם הזה באמצעות השכל הפועל.

ja auch bei IBN-SINA, daß, wo die Imagination auch nur mitzuwirken begann, ein neues göttliches „Intelligible" eingeführt wurde.[155]

Nur an einer Stelle in unserem Zusammenhange wird deutlich vom „eigentlichen" Aktiven Intellekt gesprochen; an dieser Stelle wird auch von dem Vorangehen des menschlichen Intellekts vor der Imagination gesprochen.[156] Diese Stelle betrifft hauptsächlich das Divinationsvermögen, das wohl in der Prophetie eine große Rolle spielt, aber für den prophetischen Erkenntnisakt keineswegs konstitutiv ist.

Dieser Punkt ist von Wichtigkeit und soll nach Möglichkeit geklärt werden. Die Divination[157] erscheint manchmal sehr nahe verwandt mit der Imagination oder gar ein Teil von ihr. Wenn MAIMONIDES an einer Stelle von den Weissagern — durch Zauberei und Divination oder durch gerechte Träume — als von Nichtpropheten spricht[158] und dann eben diese Sorte von Zauberern oder Träumern als Leute jener dritten Klasse darstellt, bei denen nur die Imagination allein, ohne den Intellekt, influiert wurde,[159] so könnte man leicht die beiden Vermögen infolge der Ähnlichkeit ihrer Produkte vermischen oder verwechseln. So hat sicherlich IBN-TIBBON, als er seine Übersetzung machte, gesehen,[160] und so referiert auch RUACH-CHEN, der

[155] S. oben Anm. 43.

[156] *Moreh* II, 37: וזה צריך שיהיה בכח הדברי יותר, שאמתת שפע השכל הפועל אמנם הוא עליו. Es gibt noch eine andere Stelle, die so verstanden werden konnte; II, 36: והוא שיגיע לכח המדמה... ABRAVANEL versteht es: טשלמות השכל הפועל והשפעתו מפני שיגיע לכח המדמה משלמות הפעל. dies im Sinne NARBONIS Kommentar, S. 46. Dies ist unrichtig. Das פעל hat hier mit dem שכל הפועל gar nichts zu tun, sondern bedeutet die Leistung des מדמה sowie kurz vorher כך פעל הכח המדמה. Diese Stelle: והו אן יחצל ללקוה אלמכילה מן כמאל אלפעל (nicht אלפעאל) übersetzt MUNK, *Guide* II, S. 283: car il arrive à la faculté imaginativ d'agir si parfaitement.

[157] D. i. הכח המשער *Moreh* II, 38.

[158] *Moreh* II, 32: כי כל מגיד בנעלם מצד הקסם ומצד המשער או מצד חלום צודק (zitiert nach MUNKs Korrekturen das.).

[159] *Moreh* II, 37: ואם יהיה השפע על המדמה לבד... ואת הכת הם... והקוסמים והמנחשים ובעלי החלומות הצודקות. Vgl. auch II, 38 g. E.

[160] Sein דמיונו ומשערו (II, 38) wird schon von FALAQUERA, *Moreh-Hamoreh*, S. 156 zurückgewiesen: העתיק "מי שדמיונו ומשערו" וזו שגיאה גדולה כי אין טבוא לדמיון בזה העניין וזן שתי מלות (משער, חדם) מורות על ענין אחד והיא מהירת ההבנה. Über חדם vgl. auch MUNK, *Guide* II, S. 345, Anm. 6. Auch SCHEM-TOB scheint משער mit מדמה identifiziert oder verwechselt zu haben, wenn er, Komment. z. II, 38 g.E., folgende eigentümliche Aufstellung macht: מה שיתבאר בזה הפרק, כי כל נביא אמתי יש לו שני כחות, כח הגבורה... וימצא לו ג' כ משער גדול וצריך שיהיה שלם בכח הדברי ושהשכל הפועל ישפיע על אלו השלשה כחות.

die Divination als „von der Imagination herkommend“ darstellt.[161] Daß dies aber nicht der Fall ist, könnte gerade aus der vorerwähnten ersten Stelle, worin eben Divination als etwas von der Zauberei und den gerechten Träumen Verschiedenes genannt wird, erwiesen werden. Sie ist aber ganz klar und unzweideutig als menschliches Vermögen — von dessen Existenz MAIMONIDES versichert, lange nachdem von der Imagination wiederholt gesprochen worden war — neu eingeführt.[162] Das Divinationsvermögen hat nichts mit Reproduktion, geschweige denn mit Produktion, von Vorstellungen zu tun — sie ist nur beschleunigend und den Weg abkürzend. Sie ist eine Art von vorwärtsstrebendem Mut, mit dem sie auch in einem Atem, allerdings auch von diesem verschieden, genannt wird.[163] Und sie beschleunigt hauptsächlich den Denkprozeß, also den Anteil des Intellekts am prophetischen Erkenntnisakt. Ihre Tätigkeit ist die Akzeleration, was in diesem Falle gleichbedeutend ist mit dem Überspringen von Prämissen, um zu richtigen Schlüssen zu gelangen.[164]

Aus den verschlungenen Gedankengängen läßt sich folgendes herausfinden: Es gibt eine „gemeine“ Divination,[165] ebenso wie es eine gewöhnliche Imagination gibt. Beide sind unzulänglich. Die erste kann nur in besonders starken Fällen kurze Strecken dem normal schließenden Verstand vorauseilen; die andere führt zu falschen Weissagungen. MAIMONIDES warnt ausdrücklich davor, die Erscheinungen inspirierter Imagination mit divinierender Prophetie zu verwechseln.[166] Die Imagination, auch wenn sie inspiriert wird, bedarf des Korrektivs

[161] Kap. 4: ויתחזק כח המשער הבא מכח הנדמה בעבור שקבל שפע אלהי und vorher כן כח המשער אשר באדם שיגיד בו עתידות עצומות הוא משלמות הכח הנדמה.

[162] Nach der Einführung des vorwärtsdrängenden Mutes (*Moreh* II, 38) heißt es: וכן כח המשער הזה הוא נמצא בכל האנשים und sein Vorhandensein wird dann begründet.

[163] Vgl. oben Anm. 72.

[164] *Moreh* II, 38: שמכח זה המשער יעבור השכל על ההקדמות ההם כלם ויוליד מהם בזמן מועט. Dann weiter: ויניע לו זאת ההשגה כאלו השינה מהקדמות עיוניות, dann: והוא השנת מה שלא השיגהו בהקדמות ותולדה ומחשבה.

[165] *Moreh* II, 38: המשער הכולל. Das arab. אלחדס ואלשעור אלעאם übersetzt MUNK, *Guide* II, S. 297, la conjecture et la divination *vulgaire*. Nach der, oben Anm. 160, angeführten Auffassung FALAQUERAS über חדס und שער wäre wohl an unserer Stelle ebenso סברא ומשער הכולל durch ein Wort zu ersetzen.

[166] Am Schlusse von II, 38. Während die influierte Imagination nur bereits reproduzierte Elemente lebendig macht, ist es bei der Prophetie anders. Erst nach Erklärung der Divination kann MAIMONIDES die psychologische Begründung der in II, 37 dargestellten „dritten Gruppe“ geben — da sie äußerlich mit der Divination verwandt zu sein scheint. Das Kriterium bleibt ja nun doch der Intellekt.

des Intellekts. Nur im Falle der Prophetie, wo eben beide, Imagination und Intellekt, inspiriert werden, tritt, infolge des Divinationsvermögens, im Intellekt eine Beschleunigung ein, die dem in der Imagination stattfindenden Prozeß analog ist.[167] Ebenso wie die Imagination der unmittelbaren sinnlichen Perzeption nicht mehr bedarf, verzichtet der Intellekt auf den langen syllogistischen Weg. Die Imagination ist tätig ohne Sinneseindrücke, der Intellekt ohne Prämissen. Was für die Imagination gleichsam im Raume sich abspielt, findet bei der Divination in der Zeit statt. So löst MAIMONIDES nebenbei die später für GERSONIDES so zentral gewordene Frage des Vorherwissens, das für MAIMONIDES bei der Prophetie wohl mit auftritt, aber nicht ihr Wesen ist. Allein auch Vorherwissen ist Wissen; es unterliegt daher zunächst den Gesetzen der normalen Erkenntnis und daher die Funktion des Aktiven Intellekts hier, und „dieser", nämlich der Aktive Intellekt, hat zunächst nur mit dem Intellekt Berührung, und von diesem aus kann auch die Imagination beeinflußt werden.[168] Gerade wenn man die präzise Anwendung der beiden Begriffe — der „göttlichen Ausströmung", sobald es sich um die Prophetie als Ganzes handelt, und des Aktiven Intellekts, sobald es den menschlichen Intellekt betrifft — in diesem Kapitel über die Divination genauer ansieht, wird man sich dieses Unterschiedes ganz klar.

Nun aber sind wir ganz hart an den Kern der Lehre herangekommen, an das spezifische Wesen der prophetischen Erkenntnis. Wir wissen bisher, es ist dies ein Erkenntnisakt *sui generis*, zustande gekommen durch eine Verbindung der Imagination und des Intellekts, die eine besondere göttliche Inspiration erfahren haben. Was bewirkt diese Inspiration und worin besteht das Besondere dieser Erkenntnis?

Wir müssen da auf einen Punkt zurückgreifen, den wir oben kurz berührt haben. Da MAIMONIDES die Prophetie in zwei Formen, Traum und Vision, und nur in diesen sieht, da er von der Ursache vom

[167] *loc. cit.* שהשפע ההוא בעצמו אשר שפע על הכח הדמיוני עד שהשלימו, nämlich die nichtsinnlichen Inhalte als sinnlich zu empfinden, הוא גם כן ישלים פעל הכח הדברי, nämlich die nicht durch Prämissen erreichten Erkenntnisse als syllogistisch gerecht anzusehen.

[168] *loc. cit.* וזה צריך שיהיה בכח הדברי יותר. Auch ALBERTUS MAGNUS hat, ähnlich wie GERSONIDES, die Divination als Ausgangspunkt für die Prophetie genommen, also eine Frage, die bloß das Wissen betrifft. Er mußte daher, ähnlich GERSONIDES, zu einer strengen Teilung zwischen Prophetie, Vision, Traum gelangen, je nachdem, ob der Intellekt oder die Phantasie die influierten Vermögen sind. S. die Darstellung bei JOEL, *Verhältnis Albert d. Großen zu M.* MAIMONIDES, S. 22 ff.

„gerechten" Traum und Prophetie aussagt, sie sei dieselbe und nur graduell verschieden,[169] muß auf einen Unterschied aufmerksam gemacht werden, der zwar nirgends deutlich als Gegenüberstellung durchgeführt ist, der aber für MAIMONIDES zweifellos besteht. Es ist der Unterschied zwischen dem „gerechten" Traum und dem prophetischen Traum. Vom „gerechten" ist die Rede an den Stellen, wo der Traum als Gegensatz zur Prophetie gesprochen wird, als Nichtprophetie; er gehört zu den Produkten der „dritten Klasse", wo nämlich nur die Imagination influiert wird. Ohne Mitwirkung des Intellekts.[170] Der Unterschied zwischen beiden ist für unsere Frage wesentlich. Der gemeine Traum und auch seine vollkommenste Form, der „gerechte", besteht im Wachrufen und Verlebendigen von verdrängten und unterbewußten Gedächtnisresten; ihr Inhalt war einmal apperzipiert, war psychisch bewußtes Eigentum des Subjektes und verschwand oder schien verschwunden zu sein — und erhielt nur im Traume neues Leben.[171] Wesentlich anders ist der prophetische Traum: hier handelt es sich nicht um alte Erlebnisreste, sondern um neue Erfahrung. Und zwar eine Erfahrung, die auch von der Imagination ihren Ausgangspunkt nimmt, wobei aber die Imagination nicht die konservierende Funktion hat, sondern eine neue, den sinnlichen Empfindungsvermögen analoge. Die Tätigkeit der Imagination ist hier nicht reproduktiv, sondern produktiv.

[169] *Moreh* II, 36: והוא חסבה בחלוטות הצודקות והוא בעצמו סבת הנבואה, dann wieder zerfällt auch נבואה in Traum und Vision, ר״ל במראה ואלו שני החלקים בהם מדרגות הנבואה כלם... או בחלום.

[170] Die בעלי החלוטות הצודקות werden, *Moreh* II, 37, zu jener dritten Gruppe gezählt, ebenso, II, 32, auf den Vers וקניכם חלוטות יחלוטון וכו wird das Weissagen מצד חלום צודק als nichtprophetisch bezeichnet.

[171] *Moreh* II, 38: ואולי העניינים ההם... הם דעות היו להם ונשארו רשומיהם חקוקים בדמיונם עם כל מה שבכח המדמה וכאשר בטלו דמיונות רבים והשביתום נשארו מקומות הדעות ההם לבד ויראו להם ויחשבום כאלו הם דברים מתחדשים ועניין בא מחו״ץ. An Stelle von מקומות korrigiert FALAQUERA, *Morch-Hamoreh* 156, רשומים. Daß der Prophet keiner vorherigen Eindrücke bedarf, wird von NARBONI, *Komment.*, S. 44 und SCHEM-TOB, *Komment. z. St.* als sehr bedeutend mit den fast gleichen Worten hervorgehoben: והמשל שהביא סד אלהי נפלא מאד. Während aber NARBONI den Grund dafür darin sieht, daß sich dem Propheten keine Widersprüche ergeben: שלא יהיה שם אף לנביא דעת קודם שלא יהא הנראה בשינה אי זו שתהיה דעת שכבר האמינו בעת היקיצה סותר לאמת, heißen die letzten Worte bei SCHEM-TOB: שלא יהיה הנראה... איזה דעת שכבר האמינו בעת היקיצה מכחיש, wonach also die Tatsache allein des Nichtvorhandenseins vorangegangener Eindrücke das Wunderbare ist. Die Auffassung (oder Lesung?) SCHEM-TOBS scheint dem wahren Gedankengange gerechter zu werden.

An Stelle der Sinne, und möglichst zur Zeit ihrer Ausschaltung, tritt die Imagination, die die Empfindung oder den „Inhalt" zentral erzeugt. An Stelle der Perzeption von der Außenwelt ins Innere tritt die Projektion des inneren Erlebnisses in die Außenwelt.[172] Der Inhalt ist dem sinnlich perzipierten gleich und gleichwertig, ohne jedoch je sinnlich gewesen zu sein. Sicherlich sind hier Motive, also zentrale Ursachen, vorhanden, die die Inhaltsbildung der Imagination anregen und sogar in bestimmte Richtungen leiten. Diese Motive können emotioneller Natur sein oder auch nur rein sprachlichen Charakters, in welch letzterem Falle eine doppelte Umsetzung stattfindet: die vom Wort ins Bild und vom Bild in den Erkenntnisinhalt.[173] Doch in beiden Fällen wäre die Imagination, von sich aus, dazu nicht imstande. Sie ist nur in ihrer instinktartigen Funktion das

[172] *Moreh* II, 36: Die Sinne werden am besten ganz ausgeschaltet: שהגדולה שבמעלותיו והנכבדת שבהם אפנם יהיה בגה החושים ובכטולם מפעולותיהם. Das ist allen Philosophen gemeinsam. Neu ist hier die projektive Tätigkeit: ויהא שיניע לכח המדמה משלטות הפעל ער שיראה הדבר כאלו הוא מחוץ ויהיה הענין אשר נולד בו כאלו בא לו ע"ד ההרגשה היוצאת (Dies נולד בו an Stelle der Tibbonschen יראהו, nach Munk, *Guide* 283, Anm. 4). Ebenso II, 38, von der Vollkommenheit der Imagination: וישגיחו כאלו הם ענינים כבר הרגישו בהם החושים והגיעו אל זה הכח המדמה מצד החושים und dann: והוא השנה מה שלא יגיע אליו מן החושים. Ruach-Chen faßt dieses Phänomen als Materialisierung der vom Intellekt dargebotenen Inhalte auf. Kap, 4: יבעבור שכח המדמה הוא כח נוסני בלא כסק לא יוכל להמלט להשגתו מן הנשמות. Dann am Schluß: ואחר מן ישפע השפע ההוא שן השכל אל המדמה עד שישיג עתידות והנחגות כוללות ויהיו נדמים לו כאלו באו אליו מן ההרגשות החצוניות ולא באו אליו רק מצד שפע השכל. Hier ist in einem Satz alles enthalten, was uns an der Auffassung des Ruach-Chen unrichtig erscheint: die Reihenfolge Intellekt-Imagination, der מדמה als Organ der Divination, der materialisierende Charakter der Projektion in die Außenwelt.

[173] Obwohl bei der Prophetie in der Imagination keine Reste reproduzierter Inhalte vorhanden sind, wie *Moreh* II, 38 betont (s. oben Anm. 171), so sind es doch bewußt gewesene Wünsche, die sich in Motive umsetzen. So schon II, 36 beim gemeinen Traum: שהענין אשר יהיה האדם בעת יקיצתו והשתטש חושיו מתעסק בו מאד שוקד עליו נכסף לו, הוא אשר יעשה כח המדמה בו בעת השינה. Wobei allerdings die Begier des Propheten, seiner Vorbereitung im Intellektuellen und Sittlichen gemäß — und dazu ist die Vorbereitung nötig — nur auf Höheres gerichtet ist: ויהיו תשוקותיו כלם לדעת סודות זה המציאות... ומחשבתו לעולם נשקפת לענינים אשר לאל בעניים הנכבדים בהם השגחה גדולה מחשבתו משוטטת בהם. Aber nicht allein Gleichnisse sind es, die die Imagination hervorbringt, sondern sie bringt auch Transformationen von Worten, die den Motiven entsprechen, so II, 43: כאלו פעל כח המדמה הוא לראות דבר יש לו שם משותף יורה אחד בעינינו על ענין אחר. Wozu dann als Beispiele בקל שקד bei Jeremias, das eine Umsetzung des Verbums שקד, und כלוב קיץ bei Amos, das die Umsetzung von קץ bedeutet, angeführt werden. Ja sogar Umstellungen von Buchstaben innerhalb der Worte, die zu Bildern werden, wie חבל und בחל bei Zacharias. Wie sehr das Ganze an die Theorie Freuds von den Träumen und ihren Symbolen erinnert, kann hier nicht des weiteren ausgeführt werden.

zu dieser Produktion geeignetste menschliche Vermögen, dessen sich die göttliche Inspiration bedienen kann. Ihre Bilder sind Gleichnisse, gelten aber als Empfindungen.

So nun ist die prophetische Erkenntnis ihrem Prozeß nach der vollkommensten Art der normalen menschlichen Erkenntnis durchaus gleich. Es gibt ja drei Arten von theoretischer Erkenntnis für Maimonides (von der praktischen Erkenntnis, die keine ist im eigentlichen Sinne, soll abgesehen werden): eine axiomatische, die aller Erkenntnis vorangeht und an sich keinen Akt darstellt; eine vergleichende syllogistische, die aller Erkenntnis folgen kann, die aber zum Gegenstand bereits erworbene Erkenntnisse hat; und endlich die mittlere, die die eigentliche menschliche Erkenntnisart ist: die intellektuelle Anschauung. Diese letztere allein ist realisierend, sie allein bedeutet die Aktualisierung des menschlichen Intellekts, sie bildet den „erworbenen" Intellekt, der sich mit dem Aktiven Intellekt vereinigt, separat wird und unsterblich. Diese Erkenntnisart nun besteht notwendigerweise aus dem Zusammenwirken von Sinnlichkeit und Verstand, sie muß ein Gegebenes haben, an dem der Intellekt das *genus*, d. h. sein allgemeines Wesen, das „Realallgemeine" erkennt.[174] Empfindung allein hat wohl seine Evidenz, bedeutet aber keine realisierende Erkenntnis;[175] intellektuelle Erkenntnis allein wäre abstrakt. Sie müssen daher beide verbunden werden, um eine vollständige objektivierende[176] Erkenntnis zu erlangen.

Denselben Prozeß nun und dieselben Faktoren sehen wir auch in der prophetischen Erkenntnis. Auch hier müssen „Empfindung" und Intellekt zusammenwirken. Denn ist es imaginative „Empfindung" allein, wird es Traum oder Zauberei; ist es Intellekt allein, wird es nur philosophisch; es muß beides sein, um prophetisch zu wirken. Formal also dasselbe, ist es doch inhaltlich verschieden. Die „Empfindung" hier, das Gegebene, ist nicht den rezipierenden Sinnen entnommen, sondern der produktiven Phantasie; die Influenz ist nicht die des Aktiven Intellekts, sondern eine göttliche besonderer

[174] Diese Darstellung beruht hauptsächlich auf den verläßlichen Ausführungen von Scheyer, *loc. cit.* — Über die drei Erkenntnisarten s. S. 16, über das Realallgemeine s. S. 41 ff. S. auch oben Anm. 80 und 95.

[175] Denn die wahre Erkenntnis findet nur dort statt, wo משכיל שכל und מושכל identisch werden. S. *Moreh* I, 68 und Scheyer, *loc. cit.*, 47 f.

[176] Über die Notwendigkeit des Objektivierens und des Begriffs השכל בחינת und משכל s. Scheyer, *loc. cit.*, S. 60, Anm. C.

Art, und auch der Intellekt — auch abgesehen von seiner divinatorischen Beschleunigung und Wegabkürzung — erreicht hier, dem höheren Charakter des Gegebenen entsprechend, höhere Erkenntnisse. Führte die normale Erkenntnis zur Erkenntnis des Wesens der Dinge, so führt diese prophetische Erkenntnis zum Wissen von Gott und den Engeln[177] — von denen doch der „Inhalt" herkommt. Ist die normale Erkenntnis eine intellektuelle Anschauung, so ist die prophetische ein visuelles Denken.[178] Allerdings, auf den höchsten Stufen, wie bei Moses, ist es das Denken allein, das auch das visuelle, empfindungsmäßige Element konsumiert, dies aber ist eine über der Kategorie der Prophetie stehende Inspiration, die von dieser Behandlung ausgeschlossen bleibt.[179]

Wir wollen noch durch einen Vergleich das Eigentümliche dieser Erkenntnis bei MAIMONIDES anschaulicher machen. 1. Bei der normalen Erkenntnis sahen wir den Weg: Sinnlichkeit—Intellekt, das ist identisch mit: von außen nach innen; die Teilakte waren: Rezeption, Abstraktion, Objektivation. 2. Die Prophetie, bei IBN-SINA

[177] Schon als Motiv ist die Tendenz zu diesem Wissen notwendig; *Moreh* II, 36: והשגחתו אמנם היא בידיעת האל ובחינת פעולותיו ומה שצריך שיאמן בזה, welch letztere Worte EPHODI erklärt: כמציאות השכלים הנבדלים וכיוצא בהם. Ferner II, 40, wo das Wissen um Gott als Kriterium für die Göttlichkeit einer Lehre aufgestellt wird: ותשים כוונתה ... וכשתמצא תורה לתת דעות אמתיות בשם יתּ תחלה ובמלאכים ... תדע ... שהתורה ההיא אלהית, Es erscheint beinahe als Zirkel: was auf Gott wieder zurückführt, das ist göttlich und dadurch ist die Göttlichkeit der Inspiration erwiesen. Auf die Rückprojektion werden wir noch später zu sprechen kommen.

[178] Dies insbesondere bei der höheren Art der Prophetie, der מראה, die einen ausgesprochenen Denkcharakter hat. Schon *Moreh* II, 41 wird die Vision als im Wachzustand erfolgend dargestellt und primär intellektuell, daher heißt es dort ויבוא השפע אליו אתודע במראה, noch mehr intellektualisiert: ההוא לכח הדברי וישפע ממנו על הכח המדמה. (Vgl. oben Anm. 118.) Später aber, II, 45, wird der Charakter der Vision, auf Grund des Bibelverses שם למראה הדבקות השכל והשפעתו אבל במראה הנבואה לא יושג בו אלא מושלים או השגות שכליות יגיעו בעבורם אל ענייני חכמות כמה שיגיע מן העיון. Darum ist es auch, mit Ausnahme von Moses, nicht denkbar, daß der Prophet in der מראה Gott sieht, wie im Traume, wohl sieht er aber alle niedrigeren Formen, wie Mensch, Engel usw. — machen doch vier Stufen die verschiedenen Grade aus. Und sogar wo Gott in der Vision erscheint, sucht MAIMONIDES dies durch eine Kombination von Traum und Vision zu erklären. Auf jeden Fall ist das visuelle Moment wesentlich.

[179] Die Prophetie Moses wurde gleich *Moreh* II, 34, also noch in der Einleitung, von der Behandlung ausgeschlossen: אמנם נבואת משה רבנו לא אדבר בה באלו הפרקים אפילו מלה אחת לא בביאור ולא ברמיזה. In II, 36 wird als sein Charakteristikum das Ausschalten der Imagination angeführt: אבל שפע השכל עליו מבלתי אמצעיותו. Und II, 45, wo von der Unmöglichkeit der Gottesvision gesprochen wird, wird hinzugefügt: ואחר ההתנות הנ"ל, oder wie CHARISI besser übersetzt: ואחר שנוציא מן התנאי משה רבנו. Vgl. MUNK, *Guide* II, S. 344, Anm. 1.

etwa, hatte den umgekehrten Weg:[180] Intellekt—Sinnlichkeit, d. h. von innen nach außen; die Teilakte sind: abstrakte Erkenntnis, Verbildlichung des Erkannten (Mitteilung). 3. Die Prophetie nach Maimonides ist der normalen Erkenntnis, ihrem Verlauf nach, gleich, der Weg ist: Sinnlichkeit—Intellekt, also anders als bei Ibn-Sina, doch ist es hier von innen nach außen, also umgekehrt als bei der normalen Erkenntnis und in diesem Punkte gleich wie bei Ibn-Sina; und die Teilakte sind: Produktion in der Imagination, Projektion, Objektivation. Die „Sinnlichkeit" wird, wie bereits gesagt, hier durch die Imagination vertreten, welche hier, anstatt ihrer üblichen konservierenden und kombinierenden Funktion, ihre andere, mehr dem Triebhaften zugewandte, ihre Instinktfunktion zur Aktion bringt. Doch wird hier nicht der Instinkt allein etwa zu einer Intuition entwickelt,[181] sondern er wird Materie zum Intellekt, der in seiner ihm eigentümlichen Weise das von der Imagination Gegebene zu Erkenntnissen verarbeitet.

So ist auch zu verstehen die sonst ziemlich nichtssagende Deutung des ונביא לבב חכמה, die Maimonides als besonders wissenswert betont.[182] Bloß um zu sagen, der Prophet müsse weise sein, hätte es dieser gewagten Exegese nicht bedurft. Er wollte aber gefunden haben, der Prophet sei ein weises Herz, wobei Herz als zentrales Lebensorgan und auch als Sitz der Imagination bezeichnet wird.[183] Es soll also die eigentümliche Kombination beim Propheten zum Ausdruck gebracht werden: produktive Sinnlichkeit verbunden mit Weisheit.

[180] Vgl. Horowitz, *Proph.*, S. 27, der eine richtige Darstellung dieser Umkehrung gibt; s. hingegen oben Anm. 43.

[181] Man wäre leicht versucht, diese Prophetielehre mit modernen Intuitionslehren (etwa Bergsons) zu vergleichen oder gar gleichzusetzen. Das ist jedoch nicht richtig. War ja für Maimonides schon die normale Erkenntnis eine vollkommene, das Wesen der Dinge erfassende — es bedurfte keiner Prophetie dazu.

[182] *Moreh* II, 38, g.E., den Vers ונביא לבב חכמה, wo doch נביא eine Verbalform von בוא ist, deutet Maimonides: יאמר שהנביא באמת הוא לבב חכמה וזה גם כן מטה שצריך שיודע. Nur um die Notwendigkeit der חכמה beim Propheten hervorzuheben, wäre doch auch diese Betonung nicht am Platze.

[183] Der Begriff לב hat mehrere Bedeutungen, *Moreh* I, 39 vorwiegend Wille und auch Verstand. Auf jeden Fall aber ist es der „Anfang", d. h. soviel wie (bewegende) Seele (s. *Moreh* II, 4) für die Lebewesen; I, 39: כי התחלות הכל נתן הלב; II, 30: כמו שיאמר שהלב התחלת החי. Die Imagination befindet sich bei Tieren אשר להם לב, I, 73, 10 Präm. Einen anderen Sitz für die Imagination, etwa im Gehirn, wo alle Vorgänger dieses Vermögen lokalisiert haben, findet sich bei Maimonides nicht.

Dies ist der Erkenntnis-Prozeß *sui generis*, den MAIMONIDES in der Prophetie sieht. An sich klar, läßt er doch noch einen Punkt offen, den seiner Einordnung ins Ganze unseres Weltbildes, der noch einer Klärung bedarf.

V.

Wenn wir sagen, der „Inhalt" der prophetischen Erkenntnis wird im Innern der Propheten, bezw. seiner Imagination, erzeugt, so darf dieser nicht etwa als Halluzination u. dgl. aufgefaßt werden. Diese Art von bloß subjektiver Vorstellung, ohne jegliche objektive Bedeutung, findet sich bei den Leuten der dritten Klasse,[184] ihr entspricht eher der „gerechte" Traum, aber nicht der prophetische. Für MAIMONIDES war der prophetische Erkenntnisinhalt um nichts weniger von objektiver Gültigkeit als der durch die Sinne gewonnene. Darum auch gibt es für ihn kein Problem der Sicherheit, daß eine prophetische Eingebung wahr sei. Dieses Problem der Evidenz, das sowohl SAADJA[185] als auch SPINOZA[186] beschäftigt hat, indem sie nach einem Kriterium suchen mußten, dies war für MAIMONIDES gar nicht vorhanden. Denn die Konzeption dieser Erkenntnisart schloß von vornherein die Evidenz in sich ein. Es genügt ihm daher, wenn er jeden Zweifel an der Evidenz, etwa wegen des Ursprungs in der Imagination, kurzerhand zurückweist.[187]

Woher nun diese Evidenz und woher der Inhalt überhaupt? Von der Außenwelt kommt der Inhalt nicht; im Wege der sinnlichen

[184] Bei der Darstellung dieser Klasse, *Moreh* II, 38, wird immer das subjektive Moment hervorgehoben: ויחשבו ... ויראו להם, dann חזהו מקום מן המקומות המטעים המטירים. Besonders deutlich wird der Unterschied, wenn man die beiden in bezug auf ihre Mitteilbarkeit betrachtet. In II, 37, wo von den zwei Arten der Inspiration die Rede ist, die eine, die für den Besitzer genügt, und die zweite, die auch auf andere übertragen wird, da wird diese zweite Art nur bei den Propheten und Weisen gefunden, während die der „dritten Klasse", die Träumer, ihre Erlebnisse niemals anderen mitteilen können, wenn mitteilen im engeren Sinne verstanden werden soll.

[185] Neben der Beglaubigung des Propheten bei den Menschen besteht für SAADJA das Problem der Beglaubigung für ihn selbst. Vgl. GUTTMANN, *Saadja*, S. 142 und 144: HOROWITZ, *Prophetologie*, S. 43; vgl. oben Anm. 23.

[186] *Tract. Theol. Pol.* II, 4: ... hinc sequitur prophetiam per se non posse involvere certitudinem quia ... a sola imaginatione pendebat, et ideo *propheti non certi erant* de Dei revelatione *per ipsam revelationem* sed per aliquod signum ... Allerdings folgt später auch eine moralische Gewißheit. Vgl. JOEL, *Spinozas theol. pol. Tract.*, S. 30 ff.

[187] *Moreh* III, 24: להודיע אותנו איך יאמינו הנביאים באמת מה שיבואם מאת השם בנבואה, שלא יחשוב החושב ... ורצה להודיענו שכל מה שיראה הנביא בנראה הנבואה הוא אמת ויציב אצל הנביא ... ודינו אצלו כדין הענינים הנמצאים כלם המושגים בחושים או בשכל.

Empfindung hat er also nicht die Evidenz dieser. Von innen allein etwa als bloße Einbildung subjektiven Ursprungs kann dieser Inhalt auch nicht sein, er wäre sonst relativ, unsicher und unbedeutend. Wohl kommt er durch göttliche Influenz, aber wir wissen, daß außer den axiomatischen Erkenntnissen, den מושכלות ראשונים, die doch bloß formaler Natur sind, keine Erkenntnis ohne Empfindungsinhalt stattfindet — wie sollen wir nun den Akt oder den Prozeß der Entstehung dieses Inhaltes in der Prophetie bezeichnen? Was geschieht, daß der Inhalt entsteht?

Darauf hat Maimonides nur die eine mögliche Antwort: er wird erschaffen. Gottes Wirken in der Welt ist entweder in der „Natur",[188] d. h. in der einmal geschaffenen Weltordnung, in der Gott die oberste Ursache bleibt, wo aber alles mittelbar durch die einmal geschaffenen Zwischenkräfte geschieht; oder aber im Erschaffen. Die Prophetie ist ein Akt dieser Art; es ist dies ein unmittelbarer Akt Gottes, auch wenn er sich dazu eines vorhandenen Mittlers, hier etwa des Aktiven Intellekts, bedient. Denn nicht das Zustandekommen allein, sondern die Initiative Gottes ist es, die der prophetischen Erkenntnis den kreativen Charakter gibt. Und das Kreatorische ist gleich, ob es sich um eine einzige Vision eines Propheten handelt oder um das Universum; es ist gleich im Prinzip. Dafür daß Maimonides diese Konzeption hatte, gibt es mehrere Belege. Schon die Tatsache, daß die Lehre von der Prophetie unmittelbar den Fragen der Weltschöpfung im zweiten Teil folgt und nicht etwa im Zusammenhange mit den Erkenntnisfragen im ersten Teil behandelt wird, spricht dafür. Auch der Vergleich der drei Ansichten mit den Ansichten über Weltschöpfung — ebenso wie er nicht wegen der Dreizahl allein angeführt worden sein kann, wie es die Kommentatoren empfunden haben — wäre auch nicht ganz gerechtfertigt, wenn es sich nur um das Äußerliche der

[188] Der Begriff der Natur für Maimonides enthält vor allem die Organisiertheit des universellen Seins — seine konstante Ordnung und reziproken Beziehungen, wie *Moreh* I, 73, wo diese Kraft im Universum mit der im Individuum verglichen wird: והרבה סעמים יקראוהו טבע. Daher die Vernunft in der Natur, s. III, 25. Diese Ordnung beruht auf einer unveränderbaren Gesetzmäßigkeit, wie II, 29 dargetan: ונאמין שזה המציאות לעולם נצחי על זה הטבע אשר רצהו יתעלה . . . ושלא יעדר זה אשר המציא ולא ישתנה לו טבע und dies ohne Rücksicht auf die in ihr enthaltenen Individuen, III, 34. Dies ist der Begriff der Natur, wiewohl seine Anwendung durch unseren Verstand eine Relativität aufweist und wir z. B. von טבע המציאות in potentieller und aktueller Form sprechen können, wie es Maimonides zur Ermöglichung der Schöpfung *ex nihilo* II, 17, darlegt.

Ansichten und nicht um zwei auch innerlich verwandte und analog zu behandelnde Fragen gehandelt hätte. Aber wir sind nicht allein auf die Schlußfolgerungen angewiesen, MAIMONIDES sagt es viel deutlicher. Als er von der Anwendung des Begriffes Ausströmung (שפע) für Gott spricht, so führt er dafür zwei Beispiele an: Gottes Wirken beim Erschaffen der Welt und seine Inspiration der Propheten.[189] Oder wenn er es ablehnt, von dem Phänomen der Prophetie auf die Erschaffung der Welt zu schließen, heißt das bloß, daß aus dem einen kreatorischen Akt für einen anderen (und, wie wir sehen werden, auch nicht ganz gleichartigen) nichts folgen kann. Das aber gerade zeigt, daß es sich bei der Prophetie um ein Erschaffenes handelt. Das ergibt sich aus der Stelle, wo MAIMONIDES erklärt, daß die Erschaffung der Welt wohl sehr das Verständnis der Prophetie und alles damit Zusammenhängenden wesentlich erleichtert.[190]

MAIMONIDES sagt es aber auch ganz klar und deutlich, daß alle Gestalten, die die Propheten in ihren Visionen sehen, erschaffene Gestalten sind, von Gott erschaffen, und daß alles, was in der Prophetie erscheint, Erschaffenes ist.[191]

[189] *Moreh* II, 12: כן הבורא יגדל שמו, כאשר התבאר שהוא בלתי נוף והתקים שהכל סעלו... נאמר: שהעולם נתחדש כשפע הבורא וכן יאמר שהוא השפיע חכמתו על הנביאים. S. oben Anm. 151 (und den dazugehörigen Text).

[190] MAIMONIDES wollte die beiden Fragen — Schöpfung und Prophetie — nur soweit auseinanderhalten, als ihm von einer etwaigen Theorie der Ewigkeit der Welt eine Gefahr für die Prophetie erwachsen könnte, denn diese wollte er um jeden Preis erhalten. Darum lehnt er diesen Einwand ab, I, 71: ולא תאמר איך תתאמת הנבואה אם העולם קדמון, d. h. ja nur, daß der kreatorische Charakter bei der Prophetie auch dann zugegeben werden muß, wenn er bei der Welt (*ex nihilo*) geleugnet wird. Das ist noch klarer II, 16: כמו שאבאר שהנבואה לא תבטל ואפילו על דעת מי שיאמין הקדמות. Daß aber die Annahme einer Kreation der Welt *ex nihilo* für die Prophetie von entscheidender Bedeutung ist, war MAIMONIDES wohl bekannt; II, 25: ודע כי עם האמנת חדוש העולם יהיו האותות כלם אפשריות ותהיה התורה אפשרית ותפול כל שאלה שתשאל בזה הענין עד אם יאמר למה שם השם נבואתו בזה ולא נתנה לזולתו. (Dies scheint ja, auf den ersten Blick, im Widerspruch zur dritten Meinung zu sein, die II, 32 dargestellt wird, da doch diese zunächst nur von einem präventiven Eingreifen Gottes spricht. Es muß eben das Ganze in seinem Zusammenhang gesehen werden.) Doch war für ihn das zukünftige Schicksal der Welt in dieser Beziehung belanglos, II, 27.

[191] *Moreh* I, 46: כי אלו הצורות כלם אשר ישיגום הנביאים כלם במראה הנבואה הם צורות נבראות, הש"י בוראם, והוא האמת, כי כל צורה מדומה היא ברואה. (Anstatt צורה מדומה übersetzt CHARISI כל צורה אשר תעלה על המחשבה; es ist klar, daß die TIBBONsche Übersetzung dem arab. צורה מתכילה gerechter wird.) Ebenso am Ende des Kapitels. So auch II, 5 nach Erörterung prophetischer Erscheinungen: אבל אשר יחלוק אריסטו בזה כולו הי.תו מאמין אלה הדברים קדומים ושהם ענינים מחויבים מטנו יתעלה כן ואנחנו נאמין שכל זה נברא. Daß aber eine so kreierte, nicht-naturhafte Lehre Einwirkung auf die Natur haben kann, mußte erst besonders begründet werden II, 40 (ולזה אומר שהתורה אע"י שאינה טבעית יש לה מבוא בענין הטבעי).

Wenn wir von der Alternative Natur — Kreation sprechen, so soll damit eines ausgeschlossen sein: das Wunder. Die Wunder nach Maimonides sind bekanntlich Teile der Natur, nämlich Prädispositionen, die zu einer bestimmten Zeit zur Verwirklichung gelangen.[192] Daß Maimonides dem Wunder als Tat des Propheten keine wesentliche Bedeutung beimißt, haben wir bereits gesehen, ja er warnt davor als Kriterium, und, anstatt es als Bestätigungsmittel für die Prophetie zu betrachten, wie viele taten, will er im Gegenteil die Wundertat verifiziert wissen durch das Mögliche.[193] Aber mehr noch als die Wundertat wäre es für Maimonides undenkbar, etwa die Prophetie selbst als Wunder zu erklären. Denn auch jene Prädisposition für Wandlungen der ganzen Natur angenommen, die menschliche Natur ist von jedem Wunder ausgeschlossen.[194] Was also im Menschen nicht regelrechte Natur ist, kann nur Erschaffenes sein. Und so ergibt sich für Maimonides fast das Gegenteil von der dogmatischen Auffassung über Wunder und Prophetie in ihrer gegenseitigen Beziehung. Für die naive dogmatische Auffassung ist das „Unnatürliche", das Erschaffene im Wunder; der Prophet ist bloß Mittler dazu; für Maimonides ist das Wunder das Natürliche, denn in der Natur prädisponiert, das Erfassen des Zeitpunktes aber durch den Propheten, die Eingebung, das ist das Erschaffene.[195] Aber diese Eingebung ist an sich, prinzipiell gesehen, um nichts mehr als eine andere, die keine Wunder erzeugt. Daher muß gerade eine sich auf diese Weise offenbarende Inspiration noch vorsichtiger behandelt werden. Und selbst bei dieser Auffassung des Wunders ist bei Maimonides deutlich die Absicht bemerkbar, das Wunder mehr ins Subjektive, mehr ins Innere, ins seelische Geschehen des Propheten zu verlegen. Der Prophet, wenn er auch sein Wunder = Erlebnis projizierend zu objektivieren, ja es auch „einzelnen" suggestiv mitzuteilen vermag, es

[192] *Moreh* II, 29: כשבוא הש"י זה המציאות והטביעו על אלו הטבעים, שם בטבעים ההם שיתחדש בהם כל טה שיתחדש מהנפלאות בעת חדושה. S. auch II, 25; III, 31.

[193] Vgl. oben Anm. 61. — *Moreh* III, 24; nach der Warnung von der Irreführung falscher Propheten durch Wunder heißt es: כי לא יועיל עשית המופת רק לאומר האפשר. Vgl. *Hil. Jesode-Hatorah* VIII, 2.

[194] *Moreh* III, 32: ... והתשובה ... תשובה אחת כוללת, והיא שהאותות כלם אף על פי שהם שנוי טבע ... טבע בני אדם לא ישנהו השם כלל על צד המופת.

[195] *Moreh* II, 29: ואות הנביא שהודיעהו השם בעת אשר יאמר בו טה שיאמר ויפעל הדבר כמו ששם בטבעו בשורש טה שהישבע. II, 25, wo die Abhängigkeit der Prophetie von der האמנת חדוש העולם erklärt wird (s. oben Anm. 189), heißt es weiter: ולמה ייחד הנביא באלו הנפלאות הנזכרות ולא היו זולתם.

bleibt doch ein innerer Vorgang. Nur Moses bildet darin eine Ausnahme, indem er auch vor der ganzen Welt, vor Feinden und Gegnern Wunder vollbringen kann — er bleibt aber auch, und mit aus diesem Grunde, außerhalb der von MAIMONIDES gedeuteten Prophetie.[196]

Der Begriff der Schöpfung ist für MAIMONIDES enge verbunden mit der Konzeption des göttlichen Willens. Wo immer vom Erschaffen der Welt oder von schöpferischen Akten gesprochen wird, ist es als Willens- und Entscheidungsakt Gottes aufgefaßt.[197] Dies ist ja auch notwendig, um viele Schwierigkeiten der Kreation *ex nihilo* von vornherein zu beseitigen. In unserem Falle wird nun auch vom Willen Gottes gesprochen, aber im präventiven Sinne.[198] Doch bedeutet auch diese Prävention ebenso Entscheidung wie die Setzung — und das ist für den kreatorischen Charakter maßgebend. Auch beim Aktiven Intellekt wird von Hindernissen gesprochen, doch bedeutet gerade seine Ausströmung, daß die Prävention nicht an ihm liegt, sondern an der Beschaffenheit und Empfangsdisposition des Empfängers.[199] Hätten wir daher hier nur mit dem Aktiven Intellekt in seiner normalen Form zu tun, so wäre es undenkbar, daß ein

[196] In *Moreh* II, 35 werden ausschließlich die Unterschiede der Wunder Moses' und der anderen Propheten erörtert; während in bezug auf die Erkenntnis selbst auf Mischnah-Kommentar und Mischneh-Torah hingewiesen wird. Bei den Wundern nun aller anderen Propheten הגידו בהם יחידים מבני אדם, das Wunder in Gibeon wird als reine psychologische Täuschung dargestellt. Hingegen MOSES והשונא לעיני האוהב יעשה אותות בפרהסיא und dann ולכל עבדיו ולכל ארצו החולקים עליו והיה נ״כ לעיני כל ישראל הנמשכים אחריו.

[197] *Moreh* II, 25: יהיה מענה אלו השאלות כלם שיאמר כן רצה או כן גזרה חכמתו, כמו שהמציא העולם כשרצה על זאת הצורה ועל כרחם יאמרו כמאמר כל מי שיאמר בחדוש העולם שכן רצה השם; III, 25: שהדברים אשר ירצם השם יעשו בהכרח ואין שום מונע מהעשות רצונו אלא שהוא לא לעלה אחרת, dann weiter: יתע׳ לא ירצה אלא אפשר; II, 29, wo auch alle künftigen wunderhaften Änderungen in der Natur als beim Akt der Schöpfung durch göttlichen Willen festgelegt erklärt werden: אבל היה לו מתח ותחלה שלא היה שם דבר נמצא כלל אלא השם וחכמתו גזרה שימציא היצור בעת שהמציא. Vgl. in der Einleitung die Auseinanderhaltung: כאלו החכמים והיודעים נמשכים אחר הענין הזה ברצון אלהי כמו שימשכום עיניהם הטבעיים.

[198] *Moreh* II, 32: וזה שאנחנו נאמין שהראוי לנבואה המכין עצמו לה אפשר שלא יתנבא וזה ברצון אלהי... שהענין הטבעי שכל מי שהוא ראוי... שיתנבא. Allerdings heißt es gleich weiter im positiven Sinne והוא שהשם יביא להנבא מי שירצה מתי שירצה — aber wegen der scheinbaren Übereinstimmung mit der zweiten Meinung wurde nur das Präventive gesehen.

[199] *Moreh* I, 68: והשכל הנפרד נ״כ, ר״ל השכל הפועל, פעמים יהיה לו מונע מפעלו ואעפ״י שאין המונע בהכרח תהיה עלת העדר הפעולה ההיא טעצמו אבל הוצה לו. Das wird dann II, 12 näher erklärt: העדר הכנת החומר ההוא לקבלת פעולת הנכבל. Die göttliche Wirkung dagegen kann zwar von keinem Hindernis zurückgehalten werden (wie I, 68 betont), hängt aber mit dem Willen Gottes enge zusammen, wie die zwei Beispiele II, 12 zeigen.

gut vorbereiteter Empfänger am Inspiriertwerden verhindert wäre. Gerade eben, daß auch der Bestvorbereitete durch den „Willen Gottes" verhindert wird an der Prophetie,[200] beweist, daß wir es hier mit jener kreatorischen Ausströmung Gottes selbst zu tun haben, die nicht gleichbleibend ist, sondern von einem Entscheidungsakt abhängt. Der wesentliche Unterschied zwischen den beiden ist: Ist das Hindernis nur am Empfänger oder geht es vom Spender aus? Maimonides entscheidet sich für das letztere. Und so wird es verständlich, wieso Maimonides in diesem Punkte von Jehudah Halevi differiert, der meint, jeder Vorbereitete könne Prophet werden, da Gott keinen Geiz kennt.[201] Man hätte doch die entgegengesetzten Standpunkte erwarten sollen. Für Jehudah Halevi war doch die Prophetie eine wirkliche göttliche Gabe, allerdings an verschiedene objektive Bedingungen geknüpft,[202] während sie für Maimonides auf den ersten Blick als „natürliches" Phänomen erscheint! Es wäre doch dann konsequent, daß Halevi die Prävention durch Gott lehrt und Maimonides das automatische Eintreten der Prophetie bei den entsprechenden natürlichen Bedingungen.

Nun aber, da wir das besondere Hervorheben des schöpferischen Momentes bei Maimonides sahen, ist es nicht mehr eine Frage von göttlicher Güte oder Geiz, wie für Halevi, sondern die Frage der Abhängigkeit von einem Entscheidungswillen. Darin liegt auch der Unterschied von Ibn-Daud, der diese Auffassung in bezug auf Geiz fast wörtlich von Halevi übernimmt.[203] Ibn-Daud, der in der Prophetie

[200] Die Diskussion der Kommentatoren, ob das Beispiel von Baruch (II, 32) und der Ausspruch שהנבואה בחק ברוך נדולות einen Widerspruch zu seiner vorangegangenen Theorie bedeutet (Narboni, Ephodi) oder durch das Darauffolgende wieder aufgehoben wird (Abravanel) — vgl. Munk, *Guide* II, 264, Anm. 1 —, ist für unseren Gedankengang nicht von Wichtigkeit, da wir ja auch dies nicht als Mangel an Vorbereitung, sondern als individuelles Verhindertsein auffassen können.

[201] *Kusari* V, 10 ואין כילות אצל העינן האלהי. Ein ähnlicher Ausdruck wird auch später gebraucht. Kaufmann, *loc. cit.*, S. 246, Anm. 245 führt auch die Stelle *Schahrastani* 279 (*Haarbr.* II, 112) an, wo dieser Ausspruch im Namen Sokrates' angeführt wird, und vermutet eine Quelle dafür. Die Quelle ist der wiederholt bei Platon variierte Satz: φθόνος γὰρ ἔξω θείου χοροῦ ἵσταται (*Phaidr.* 247 A); ähnl. *Tim.* 29 E. Vgl. *Phaidros* hebr. Übersetzung durch Diesendruck, S. 81, Anm. 53.

[202] Volk und Land S. Kusari II, 10—13.

[203] Em. Ramah 74: וכאשר הוכנה הנפש הושפעה הנבואה, כי אין שם כילות, obwohl auch bei Ibn-Daud objektive Faktoren maßgebend sind, wie Zeitpunkt und Ort, *ibid.* וכאשר ילבור שיש לזה זמן מיוחד הנתלמד המדות החשובות הושפע עליו הרוחניות, אבן בתנאי זמן מיוחד, dann weiter: מיוחד . . . וג"כ מקום מיוחד על הרוב והוא ארץ ישראל.

nur einen gesteigerten intellektuellen Prozeß sah, konnte eben hier keine Ausnahme für den Aktiven Intellekt machen; nach genügender Vorbereitung muß eben der Erfolg eintreten. Es sollte eigentlich dieser Punkt der Prävention allein genügen, um den prinzipiell verschiedenen Charakter der Lehren von IBN-DAUD und MAIMONIDES zu beweisen. Denn es sind nicht differierende Zutaten, sondern beide mußten konsequenterweise zu diesen entgegengesetzten Anschauungen gelangen.

Wichtig ist auch der Vergleich mit dem Mischnah-Kommentar. Wir sahen bereits, daß MAIMONIDES dort von einem Gotteswillen im positiven Sinne spricht.[204] Vergleichen wir aber eine an anderer Stelle gegebene Erklärung des Begriffes „Gottes Willen" als die in der Natur festgelegte Weltordnung,[205] so folgt daraus, daß dieser „Willen Gottes" in der Prophetie nichts Übernatürliches, oder gar Kreatorisches, bedeuten muß. Mit einem Worte: es ergibt sich uns, daß der „Willen Gottes" im Mischnah-Kommentar, trotzdem er positiv ist, eigentlich weniger Ereignishaftes bedeutet als im *Moreh*, obwohl er hier nur im präventiven Sinne erwähnt wird; denn hier ist er mit dem kreatorischen Moment nahe verwandt. Der Begriff des „Willen Gottes" scheint eben nach dem Mischnah-Kommentar eine prägnantere Bedeutung erhalten zu haben.

Und noch ein Punkt soll hier berührt werden. Die Erschaffenheit, wie sie sich MAIMONIDES in der Prophetie denkt, darf nicht verwechselt werden mit der erschaffenen Stimme oder Lichtglanz, wie sie von SAADJA, teilweise mutazilitischem Muster folgend, eingeführt wurden.[206] Von allen Schwierigkeiten, die sich daraus bei SAADJA ergeben, abgesehen, sicher aber sind die Stimme und Lichtglanz, als solche sogar sinnlich wahrnehmbar, aus dem Nichts erschaffen und dienen gleichzeitig als die prophetische Mitteilung und auch als

[204] S. oben Anm. 13.

[205] Acht Kapitel VIII: אך הרצון היה בששת ימי בראשית שימשכו הדברים כלם על טבעם תמיד. Die ganze Abhandlung dort ist darauf gerichtet, den Begriff des „Willens" bei Gott ins Naturhafte umzudeuten — dies wegen der Notwendigkeit, die Freiheit der menschlichen Handlung zu sichern. Eine Erneuerung göttlicher Willensakte wird nachdrücklichst abgelehnt, zwar zunächst für die natürlichen Geschehnisse und die Wunder — doch wird die Ausnahme der Prophetie, wie *Moreh* II, 25, hier nicht gemacht.

[206] S. HOROWITZ, *Proph.*, S. 42 ff., wo das Verhältnis von אור נברא und קול נברא eingehend erörtert wird. Vgl. KAUFMANN, *loc. cit.*, S. 66 (Anm. 124); MUNK, *Guide* I, 286, Anm. 3. S. oben Anm. 40.

Kriterium der Sicherheit; also als Form der Inspiration und als Zeichen der Evidenz zugleich.[207] Dies war auch als Kriterium für KRESKAS und AHRON BEN ELIA gedacht.[208] MAIMONIDES' Beziehung dazu ist wesentlich anders. Ein Kriterium für die Evidenz brauchte er nicht, wie wir bereits gesehen haben;[209] am wenigsten konnte ihm dazu das „Zeichen" dienen. Er operiert auch mit dem Begriffe der erschaffenen Stimme nur im Zusammenhange mit der Sinai-Offenbarung, wo er ohnehin mit Schwierigkeiten zu kämpfen hatte, und eben diese Offenbarung, ebenso wie das andere Extrem, Moses, von der eigentlichen, von ihm behandelten Prophetie von vornherein ausschließt.[210]

[207] S. BACHER, *Die Bibelexegese der jüdischen Religionsphilosophie*, S. 19 (Anm. 2); HOROWITZ, *loc. cit.*

[208] KRESKAS, *Or Adonai* II, 4, 3, wo der Vorzug der prophetischen imaginativen Empfindung in einer besonderen Kundgebung an den Propheten — האות האמתי אשר יודע לנביא היותו מנבא ואם היה חולם — besteht. Ähnlich AHRON BEN ELIA in *Ez Hajim*, ed. DELITZSCH, S. 168, wo auch von einem „Zeichen" gesprochen wird, das nach dem Erwachen zum prophetischen Traum hinzukommt.

[209] S. oben Anm. 119 und 187.

[210] Daß die erschaffene Stimme nicht zur Prophetie gehört, ist klar ersichtlich, *Moreh* I, 65: וכל אשירה ודבור שבאה מיוחסת להשם הם... אם כנוי על הרצון והחפץ או כנוי על הענין המובן מאת השם והוא אחד אם נודע בקול נברא או נודע בדרך מדרכי הנבואה. Vgl. I, 27 (Versuch zu deuten אור נברא כלומר שכינה או השגחה). Das קול נברא gibt MAIMONIDES nur bei der Sinai-Offenbarung ohne Vorbehalt zu, II, 33, obwohl auch da zwei Gedankengänge sich kreuzen. Als er von den ersten zwei Geboten spricht — und nur diese interessieren uns hier — gibt er als Grund für deren unmittelbares Empfangen durchs Volk zunächst an, daß diese Gebote theoretischer Natur sind und nicht echt prophetischer: בישפט הנביא בו ומשפט כל מי שידעהו שוה אין יתרון ולא נודעו שני השרשים האלה מצד הנבואה לבד. Demnach war hier weniger an Offenbarung nötig. Dann aber, wenn von der Stimme die Rede ist, heißt es, daß gerade hier ein קול נברא gehört worden sei: אמנם קול ד', ר"ל הקול הנברא... לא שמעוהו אלא מעם אחת בלבד... והוא הקול אשר יצאה נשמתם בשמעו והשיגו בו שתי הדבירות הראשונות. Sie waren demnach Offenbarung ganz besonderer Art. Dies mutet wie ein Widerspruch an (abgesehen von der Unklarheit in bezug auf die anderen acht Gebote. Vgl. MUNK, *Guide* II, 270, Anm. 4). Doch dürfen wir nicht unbeachtet lassen, daß MAIMONIDES sich schwer zur Annahme eines קול נברא entschlossen hat und es nur im äußerst nötigen Falle zugab; und auch da war ihm eine metaphorische Auffassung dieser Stimme, für theoretische Erkenntnisse, lieber. So I, 5, g. E. in bezug auf die אותות ברואים, die er als עין השגה שכלית לא ראות sehen möchte und sie als sinnliche Wahrnehmungen nur für בקצרים להגיע לזאת המדרגה אשר נשתדל עמו לעלותה als harmlos zuläßt. Ebenso I, 21, g. E., wo er es frei läßt — בחר אי זה מן הדעות שתרצה — eine Bibelstelle als intellektuelle Erkenntnis — אשר השיג הכל שכלי אין חוש בו — oder als erschaffene Stimme anzusehen. Ebenso im Briefe an Hasdai Halevi (*Kobez* II), wo er die Meinung, die Stimme, die Moses hörte, sei nur intellektueller Natur, sehr gerne angenommen hätte — יאלו לא שנה הכתוב לומר וישמע את הקול מדבר אליו, הייתי מודה בכך. Nur gezwungenermaßen gibt er zu, daß קול נברא הוא שנמצא מן השמע. Demnach wären die beiden Auffassungen bezüglich der ersten zwei Gebote nicht so weit auseinanderliegend: קול נברא und intellektuelle Erfassung sind sehr verwandt in der Termino-

In der Prophetie ist für ihn die Schöpfung keine Schöpfung *ex nihilo*, Darin unterscheidet sie sich eben von der Weltschöpfung. Eine Schöpfung *ex nihilo*, wie sie in der Auffassung des erschaffenen Wortes und Lichtes bei den anderen Philosophen enthalten ist, hätte eben jedem menschlichen Wesen passieren können, und dies würde der Meinung der unwissenden Masse entsprechen.[211] Die Schöpfung in der Prophetie war eben nur eine Formgebung, eine Produktivierung. Die sonst materielle Imagination wird in ihrem triebhaften, instinkthaften Vermögen geformt, d. h. zur Erzeugung von empfindungsähnlichen Inhalten ohne sinnliche Rezeption befähigt. Das Kriterium liegt in der vollkommenen Beschaffenheit dieses imaginativen Vermögens und in der Mitwirkung des Intellekts.[212] Sind diese beiden gegeben, so ist eine andere, äußerliche Verifizierung nicht mehr nötig.

Ein im Innern sich vollziehender Prozeß ist also dieser kreatorische Akt, das Produktivwerden der Imagination zur Erzeugung eines Erkenntnisinhaltes, der vom Intellekt, wie jeder andere Inhalt, hier nur beschleunigt durch die Divination, erfaßt wird. An Stelle der Sinne ist die Imagination; deren Empfindungen aber keine nur subjektiven Halluzinationen sind, sondern Anspruch erheben auf objektive Gültigkeit; der Inhalt wird in die Außenwelt projiziert Das ist die Projektion, um den Inhalt zu objektivieren, sie ist sozusagen zentrifugal. Daneben aber gibt es für Maimonides in der Prophetie noch eine andere Projektion, die in der entgegengesetzten Richtung verläuft — nämlich zentripetal. Diese finden wir vor allem im Zurückgehen auf die erste Ursache. Hier ist das Gegebene eine Tatsache der Außenwelt, die aber, unter Weglassung aller natürlichen Erklärung, unmittelbar auf Gott bezogen wird. Hier ist die Prophetie deutend in ihrer Projektion, und Maimonides schreibt dieser Funktion

logie Maimonides'. Die Besonderheit der Sinai-Offenbarung wird auch III, 9, hervorgehoben. Vgl. Schmiedel, *Studien*, S. 256; Bacher, *Bibelexegese Maimuni's*, S. 87, Anm. 3 und 5; Munk, *Guide* I, S. 290, Anm. 2. Vgl. auch Joel, *Spinozas theol. pol. Tract.*, S. 24 ff.

[211] Bezeichnend ist hier die verschiedene Auffassung der ersten Offenbarung an Samuel (Sam. I, 3). Für Saadja und deutlicher Ahron ben Elia hat sich daraus die Notwendigkeit des sichtbaren Zeichens, des אור נברא neben der Stimme (vgl. Horowitz, *loc. cit.*), ergeben. Während Maimonides, *Moreh* II, 44, die Unsicherheit Samuels nur aus seiner Unerfahrenheit erklärt: הוא באשר לא היה יודע או שדבר השם לנביא יהיה בזאת הצורה ולא נגלה לו ערין זה הסדר d. h. er wußte noch nicht — was die Wahrheit ist — daß kein sichtbares Zeichen erforderlich ist.

[212] S. *Moreh* II, 38 g. E.; II, 40 g. E.

große Bedeutung zu.[213] Diese rückführende Projektion aber hat noch eine andere Form. Was wir soeben bei einer außenweltlichen objektiven Tatsache sahen, das geschieht auch innerhalb der prophetischen Vision. Das in der Vision gesehene Bild wird statt in die Außenwelt auf Gott rückprojiziert. Die Erscheinung wird als ihr Urheber gesehen — die Gestalt als ihr Gestalter.[214] Diese doppelte Projektionstätigkeit, die vom zentralen Erlebnis der Imagination in die Außenwelt und wieder zurück zur göttlichen Ursache, das Maimonides als wirklich bewundernswerte „große Leistung" ansieht, dies ist wohl der innerste und eigentümlichste Punkt in der prophetischen Erkenntnis. Hier hört sie schon durchaus auf, dem normalen Erkenntnisakt analog zu sein. Hier ist Erkenntnis und Deutung zugleich; und ist die erste von Gott gegeben, so ist die Deutung spontane Reaktion der prophetischen Persönlichkeit. Daß diese Rückprojektion in beiden erwähnten Formen nichts zu tun hat mit jener die syllogistischen Mittelglieder auslassenden, früher erwähnten Divination[215] — das braucht wohl nicht wieder betont zu werden.

Diese beiden Projektionen in ihrer Kreuzung bilden den Einteilungsgrund für die Stufen der Prophetie. Nicht die „Zeichen" oder sonst was[216] unterscheiden die Propheten voneinander, sondern die Lebhaftigkeit der ersten Projektion, in die Außenwelt, und die Intensität und Reichweite der zweiten Rückprojektion, zurück zur erzeugenden Ursache. Die erste teilt das ganze Gebiet in zwei Teile: Traum und Vision.[217] Diese Teilung wird kombiniert mit dem Gesichtspunkt der anderen Projektion und danach gibt es Stufen vom Gesicht eines sprechenden Menschen oder eines Engels oder Gottes selbst.[218] Natürlich wäre die höchste Stufe das Sehen Gottes und in der Vision — davor aber schrickt Maimonides in der Dar-

[213] *Moreh* II, 48: es ist dies ein Überspringen der Zwischenursachen, וטעני זה יהסרו הנביאים סעמים בדבריהם הסבות ההם האמצעיות כלם וייחסו זה הפועל האישי הסתחדש אל הבורא ויאמרו שהוא יתעלה עשהו. Ähnlich Spinoza an verschiedenen Stellen des *Tract. Theol. Pol.* I.

[214] *Moreh* I, 46 über den Midrasch גדול כחן של נביאים שהם מדמים צורה ליוצרה heißt es וכאלו הם אומרים מה גדול מה שהוצרכו הנביאים לעשותו בהיותם מורים על עצמו יתי בענינים הנבראים אשר בראם, והבן זה מאד. S. auch I, 49.

[215] S. oben Anm. 160, 164, 165.

[216] S. z. B. die erste von Ahron ben Elia, *loc. cit.*, S. 168, überlieferte Einteilung.

[217] Schon *Moreh* I, 27 wird dieser Unterschied hervorgehoben. Dann II, 43, 44. Vgl. oben Anm. 118.

[218] *Moreh* II, 45; die ersten fünf Stufen sind im Traum: Gleichnis, Wort, Mann, Engel, Gott; die weiteren vier sind in der Vision. Dieselben — bis auf die letzte.

stellung zurück. Diese Stufen betreffen wesentliche Qualitäten in der prophetischen Offenbarung — sie betreffen nicht allein eine Art der Mitteilung. Dafür hat MAIMONIDES eine andere Einteilung, die der „Formen"; [219] darin handelt es sich bloß um die Art, wie der Prophet seine Vision verständlich macht. Zwar sind die Mitteilungsformen den abgestuften Visionen sehr ähnlich, aber ihr Einteilungsgrund ist verschieden. Allerdings, wie man aus einer gegebenen Prophetenstelle entscheiden soll, ob es seine Stufe ist oder nur seine Mitteilungsform — dies hat MAIMONIDES offen gelassen.

Auch sind dies Stufen der Prophetie, nicht die des Propheten — denn ein und dieselbe Persönlichkeit (z. B. Abraham Kap. 45) kann mehrere Stufen durchmachen.

Aus dem Bisherigen hat sich uns nun die Lösung der Schwierigkeiten, die wir im ersten Kapitel erwähnt haben, von selbst ergeben. Der Unterschied zwischen der dritten und zweiten Auffassung im *Moreh* II, 32 ist mehr, als es auf den ersten Blick erscheint. Die Prävention der dritten Meinung, da sie am Spender liegt, bedeutet nichts weniger als die Verbindung der prophetischen Erkenntnis mit der Gottheit und dem göttlichen Willen, der aber hier kreatorisches Wirken bedeutet. Ebenso die andere Frage, wieso die dritte Ansicht der platonischen Auffassung der Weltschöpfung entspricht — auch sie ist ganz geklärt. In beiden wird eine vorhandene Materie durch einen Schöpfungsakt geformt. Wäre es eine Schöpfung *ex nihilo*, d. h. für jeden Menschen zugänglich — wie nach der naiven Meinung der Masse, aber auch nach der Theorie von dem erschaffenen Lichtglanz und Stimme —, so würde das MAIMONIDES' Ansicht über die Weltschöpfung entsprechen; wäre es nur eine Aktualisierung des menschlichen Intellekts durch den Aktiven Intellekt, wie nach der zweiten Meinung der Philosophen, wozu auch IBN-SINA und IBN-DAUD zu zählen sind, so würde es der aristotelischen Ansicht in bezug auf den Anfang der Welt, der darin nur eine Aktualisierung sieht, entsprechen. Nun aber ist es eine kreatorische Formgebung — dies ist in der Weltschöpfung platonisch.

Es ist aber nicht allein die Analogie mit dem platonischen Gesichtspunkt, die hier wichtig ist. Die ganze Auffassung der Prophetie ist eine Annäherung zur platonischen Lehre von der menschlichen

[219] *Moreh* II, 41: וכבר באה ההגדה על הדבר המגיע לנביאים לפי מה שבא בו הספור בספרי הנביאים על ארבע צורות.

Seele und dem Erkennen — und eine Abkehr vom Aristotelismus. Der Rahmen dieser Arbeit verbietet es, auf eine nähere Beweisführung einzugehen. Der Kundige sei nur erinnert an die Bedeutung und Funktion, die das produktive, rückverweisende Gedächtnis, das doch für uns hier in der Imagination vertreten ist, bei Plato und Aristoteles hat, um die Schlüsse zumindest auf die Tendenz MAIMONIDES' ziehen zu können. Sicher ist diese Lehre der Prophetie eine Abkehr von jedem Intellektualismus und ein Einführen des nichtintellektualen — aber auch nicht sinnlichen — Vermögens in den Bereich der Erkenntnis, und einer Erkenntnis von besonderem und höherem Grade. Für MAIMONIDES hat sich dies hier ergeben aus seiner antinomischen Auffassung der Imagination — indem er beide Beurteilungen, für und gegen, bleiben läßt und so zu einem Dritten, Neuen, gelangt.

Es ist dies aber ein Zug in der Philosophie des MAIMONIDES, der sich nicht allein auf die Prophetie beschränkt. Die Gesamtdarstellung dieses antinomischen, eher erkenntniskritischen Verfahrens und des damit verbundenen Aufgebens des bloßen Intellektualismus, das auch in den anderen Teilen seiner Lehre nachzuweisen ist, ist eine noch zu lösende Aufgabe — will man den wahren Intentionen des Philosophen gerecht werden.

EINIGE NEUERE THEORIEN ÜBER DEN URSPRUNG DER PHARISÄER UND SADDUZÄER

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Israel Abrahams' letzte große wissenschaftliche Untersuchung galt dem Pharisäertum.[1] Er hat es in seiner Erscheinungsform studiert, wie es sich im Leben darstellte, namentlich in den zahlreichen Beziehungen, in denen es in den Evangelien angeführt wird. Er hat das Pharisäertum als fertige Erscheinung, als Faktum im jüdischen Leben hingenommen. Der Frage nach dem Ursprung dieser Richtung, nach dem Anlaß zu ihrem ersten Auftreten und zu einer Unterscheidung der Parteigruppen unter den Juden ist er nicht nachgegangen — sie ist für sein Thema auch bis zu einem gewissen Grade irrelevant. Zur Zeit Jesu und erst recht zur Zeit, wo die Evangelien niedergeschrieben wurden, hatte das Pharisäertum bereits eine ganz ausgeprägte Gestalt.

Das Problem, wie es entstanden, wann und weshalb es zuerst aufgetreten ist, hat noch keine Lösung gefunden, die Forscher mühen sich noch immer vergeblich damit ab. Es sei gestattet, an dieser dem Andenken Israel Abrahams' gewidmeten Stelle zu einigen wichtigen neueren Thesen kritisch Stellung zu nehmen.

I.

Eduard Meyer hat das Problem im Zusammenhang der Untersuchung über *Ursprung und Anfänge des Christentums* behandelt,[2] und sein Auge ist ganz auf dieses Ziel eingestellt. Er sieht die Pharisäer im Lichte des Evangeliums, und diejenigen Quellen, denen er am meisten Wert beimißt, sind Evangelien und Kirchenväter. Nach ihm wäre vom Beginn der Makkabäerkämpfe an ein Gegensatz hervorgetreten „zwischen den zu energischer Kriegführung entschlossenen Phanatikern, die sich um Judas und seine Brüder scharten, und den eigentlichen ‚Frommen', den Chasidäern" (S. 282). In den Chasidäern, die 163

[1] I. Abrahams, *Studies in Pharisaism and the Gospels*, Cambridge 1917; Second Series, 1924.

[2] Eduard Meyer, *Ursprung und Anfänge des Christentums*, II, Stuttgart 1921.

entschlossen waren, Alkimos anzuerkennen, sieht er die natürlichen Gegner der Hasmonäer und mit WELLHAUSEN[3] die Vorläufer der späteren Pharisäer. Daß, wie hier behauptet wird, der Bruch mit den Hasmonäern dauernd war, wird nirgends bewiesen, und daß die Chasidäer aus dem Verrat des Alkimos an ihren Führern gar nichts gelernt haben sollen, ist sehr unwahrscheinlich. Aus der damaligen Separation wird nun der Name der Pharisäer, Peruschim (= die Abgesonderten) abgeleitet, es ist jedoch sehr unwahrscheinlich, daß aus jenem, nirgends als entscheidend erklärten Schritte ein derartiger Parteiname gebildet worden sein soll.[4] Als geschlossene Gruppe hätten sie schon vor dem Bruch mit Johann Hyrkan bestanden, wenn sie auch erst später als Partei aktiv hervortraten (S. 283). „Daß in einer Partei, deren Ziel ist, lediglich die Gebote Gottes zu erfüllen, ohne irgendwelche andere Rücksichten weltlicher Art, die Schriftgelehrsamkeit einen maßgebenden Einfluß hat, ist selbstverständlich" (S. 284). Es wird mit Recht hervorgehoben, daß weder alle Schriftgelehrten Pharisäer waren, noch daß alle Pharisäer nur Schriftgelehrte waren, daß vielmehr die Partei weit über sie hinausreichte, daß sie großen Anhang im Volke hatte. Als fest organisierte Gruppe wird ihr Anhang nach dem Vorgehen der meisten modernen Historiker[5] auf 6000 geschätzt. Die Ziffer nennt Josephus, und zwar, wie MEYER bemerkt (S. 286, Anm. 2), „zweifellos nach Nikolaus Dam., der in der Lage war, sich darüber genauer zu informieren". Es ist jedoch zu beachten, daß dort nur von denjenigen Pharisäern die Rede ist, die dem Herodes den Eid verweigert hatten, daß also diese Ziffer durchaus nicht mit der Gesamtzahl der Pharisäer identisch sein muß. Ferner aber ist die Zahl 6000 bei Josephus ein wenig verdächtig, da sie im Zusammenhang mit den Ereignissen jener Zeit noch zweimal in anderer Verbindung vorkommt.[6]

[3] J. WELLHAUSEN, *Die Pharisäer und die Sadduzäer*, S. 85.

[4] חברים in der Mischna sind nicht ganz dasselbe wie פרושים, vgl. auch weiter zu II. Noch weniger darf man die Bezeichnung חברים, die hier rein technische Bedeutung hat und sich auf die Stellung zu den Gesetzen über Priesterabgaben und Levitische Reinheit bezieht, mit der Mitteilung des Josephus gleichstellen, daß die Pharisäer φιλάλληλοι sind, wie MEYER, S. 284, Anm. 2, tut.

[5] Die Zahl 6000 auch bei HERFORD (s. II), S. 34.

[6] Ant. XIII, 13, 5 läßt Alexander Jannai 6000 Pharisäer niedermetzeln. Ant. XIII, 14, 2, versammelt Alexander 6000 Juden um sich, die das Mitleid mit seinem Geschick zu ihm trieb.

Aber wie dem auch sei, die Pharisäer sind die auf religiösem Gebiete politisch aktive Gruppe, sie sind diejenigen, welche die Gesetze am eifrigsten studierten, sie richtig auslegten und am peinlichsten befolgten, und zwar nicht nur die geschriebene Lehre Mosis, sondern auch die Überlieferung der Väter.[7] MEYER bringt nun diesen Standpunkt in Verbindung mit der Grundthese seines Buches, daß im Judentum die Fortbildung und Verinnerlichung der Religion nicht von den Gelehrten, sondern von den innerlich gepackten Schichten des Volkes, den Stillen im Lande, ausging (S. 41). Er sieht im Betonen der mündlichen Lehre die Bejahung des „in den Jahrhunderten seit der Einführung des Gesetzes entwickelten Herkommens" und darin die Begründung für die Popularität der Pharisäer (S. 288). Nun ist diese Anschauung überhaupt sehr angreifbar — Einzelheiten können an dieser Stelle nicht erörtert werden — und in ihrer Anwendung auf die Pharisäer mehr als problematisch. Zunächst ist fraglich, ob bei Einführung des Gesetzes das gesamte Herkommen kodifiziert wurde und nicht schon damals mancherlei „der mündlichen Lehre" überlassen wurde. Ferner aber ist zu untersuchen, wieviel denn in den Forderungen der Pharisäer wirklich neu war, ob es sich nicht vielfach nur um Übertragung von schon vorhandenen priesterlichen Bräuchen auf das ganze Volk[8] und endlich um die Anlehnung von verbreiteten Bräuchen an die Thora handelte.[9] Jedenfalls erkennt MEYER in dem Wirken der Pharisäer ein lebendiges Prinzip an.

„Diesen populären Tendenzen standen nun aber die bisherigen Leiter der Gemeinde, die Priesterschaft von Jerusalem und der um sie gebildete Kreis von Schriftgelehrten ablehnend gegenüber." Ihre Schriftgelehrsamkeit bildet die legitime Fortsetzung der von Sirach gerühmten. „Für sie gilt lediglich das Schriftwort, so wie es dasteht; alles andere sind Neuerungen und zum Teil sogar offenkundige Abweichungen vom göttlichen Gebot, gegen die sie ihre Autorität um so mehr einsetzen, da sie vor der großen Krise im Besitz der Macht gewesen waren und da sie mit Recht erwarten dürfen, daß die neue hohenpriesterliche, schließlich sogar mit der Königswürde geschmückte Dynastie sie nicht werde entbehren können, sondern in

[7] Die S. 287, Anm. 2, als Beispiel angeführte Auseinandersetzung bei Marcus, Kap. 7 ist in ihrer Echtheit angefochten, vgl. ABRAHAMS, II, 200.

[8] Vgl. z. B. ABRAHAMS das.

[9] Das. Vgl. S. FUNK, *Die Entstehung des Talmuds*, Kap. II—IV.

ihnen einen Rückhalt gegen die volkstümlichen Agitatoren werde suchen müssen, der dann auch ihnen wieder zu der alten Machtstellung verhelfen werde" (S. 289). Das sind die Sadduzäer, die MEYER im Gegensatz zu WELLHAUSEN[10] nicht vom Priestergeschlecht der Söhne Zadok, sondern unter Berufung auf die Abot di R. Natan und die Kirchenväter[11] von einem Stifter oder bedeutenden Lehrer namens Zadduk herleiten will. Mit Recht tritt unser Verfasser dem in der späteren jüdischen Tradition entworfenen Bilde von den Sadduzäern entgegen, das sie als Parteigänger des Hellenismus, als verkappte Epikuräer, das heißt als Freidenker und Lüstlinge hinstellt (S. 292 f.). In Wirklichkeit sind sie nur, wie überall der Adel, die Altgläubigen, die eigentlichen Orthodoxen, die an den alten Anschauungen festhalten und von den Neuerungen nichts wissen wollen. „Aber eben dadurch sind sie zur Stagnation und schließlich zum Absterben verurteilt; es fehlt ihnen ein lebendiges, schöpferisches Prinzip, sie können lediglich negieren"[12] (S. 294). Hier ist doch zu erwägen, ob man in den späteren Priestern der Hasmonäischen Königszeit noch durchaus die gleichen Kreise sehen darf wie vor der Religionsnot; man darf hier das von MEYER gegenüber WELLHAUSEN gebrauchte Wort anwenden, „er übersieht, wie so viele, den tiefen Einschnitt, der durch die Religionskrisis geschaffen ist" (S. 290, Anm. 3).

Aus dem Kern des Streites, der Anerkennung der mündlichen Tradition neben dem starren Buchstaben der Schrift, ergaben sich die vielen Auseinandersetzungen über halachische Fragen, die mit allen, auch den gewaltsamsten Mitteln der Interpretation des Textes betrieben wurden, aber doch nur Lappalien betreffen, „die sich zwar vortrefflich dazu eigneten, die Gegner zu verketzern und die Menge aufzuregen, ähnlich so vielen der mit äußerstem Fanatismus durchgekämpften dogmatischen Streitigkeiten der Christenheit, denen aber irgendwelcher innerer Wert nicht zukommt" (S. 295). Während er die halachischen Streitpunkte bagatellisiert, legt MEYER den rein religiösen, die er davon

[10] S. 290, wird als Urheber dieser Ansicht irrtümlich GRAETZ statt GEIGER genannt.

[11] Die Berufung auf die Kirchenväter, S. 291, Anm. 1, und 292, Anm. 2, führt nicht weiter. Sie haben über diese Fragen nicht mehr gewußt als sie von ihren jüdischen Lehrern erfahren konnten und wir in der jüdischen Tradition lesen.

[12] S. 295, Anm. 1 heißt es: „Leszynsky betont mit Recht, daß Jesus der Pharisäischen Παράδοσις gegenüber auf demselben Standpunkt steht, wie die Sadduzäer." Das ist nicht ganz richtig; der Widerspruch der Sadduzäer ist ein prinzipieller, der Jesu ein gefühlsmäßiger, er bekämpft sie, wenn oder weil sie das Religiöse zerstört.

trennt, die größte Bedeutung bei, nämlich „den Fragen nach der Gestaltung des Weltbildes und des göttlichen Reiches, nach dem Ursprung und Wesen des Bösen, nach der Verantwortlichkeit des Menschen, nach Auferstehung und Weltgericht. Auch hier vertreten die Pharisäer die modernen Anschauungen, die bei der Masse zur Herrschaft gelangt sind, bilden sie weiter und bemühen sich, sie aus der Schrift zu begründen, so ferne sie dieser in Wirklichkeit gelegen haben“ (S. 296). In diesem Zusammenhang kommt Meyer auf die von Josephus ausführlich mitgeteilten Streitpunkte zu sprechen, wobei er die verschiedenen voneinander abweichenden Berichte des Josephus richtigzustellen und im Einklang mit anderen Quellen zu interpretieren sucht. Im großen und ganzen ist hierzu schwer etwas Neues zu sagen — soviel muß aber bemerkt werden, daß gerade hier die Beeinflussung des Verfassers durch das Neue Testament ganz deutlich hervortritt, denn in der jüdischen Tradition kommt all diesen Fragen keineswegs diejenige Bedeutung zu, welche ihnen von ihm beigemessen wird. „Die Leugnung der Engel und Geister durch die Sadduzäer“ erwähnt nur die Apostelgeschichte, aber selbst wenn die Pharisäer sie bejahten, so können sie in ihrem Gesamtsystem keine beherrschende Bedeutung gehabt haben, denn die Mischna, die gewissermaßen das pharisäische System zusammenfaßt, erwähnt sie nicht ein einziges Mal.[13] Was Josephus über die Willensfreiheit mitteilt, ist einigermaßen konfus; Meyer, der sich um die Entwirrung dieser Angaben redlich bemüht, bemerkt mit Recht, daß der von Josephus gebrauchte stoische Terminus εἱμαρμένη sich mit der jüdischen Vorstellung nicht deckt (S. 301, Anm. 1); im „Jüdischen Krieg“, wo er zuerst die Frage behandelt hat, muß Josephus einen aramäischen Terminus verwendet haben, etwa גזרא, und unter Berücksichtigung dieses Begriffes müßte die ganze Frage geklärt werden. Bei Besprechung der Auferstehung wird der seltsame Satz aus Webers *Jüdische Theologie* (S. 390 ff.)[14] zitiert: „Die Ungelehrten (die ʿAmme ha ar'sot) werden nicht auferstehen.“ Man kann wohl aus Maimonides[15] folgern, daß diejenigen, welche des ewigen Lebens teilhaftig werden sollen, philosophische Bildung gewonnen haben müssen, und S. D. Luzzatto hat diese

[13] Abrahams, I, 110; D. Neumark, *Philosophie of the Bible*, 286, *Geschichte der jüdischen Philosophie*, I, 44.

[14] Dieses oft genug als verfehlt erwiesene Buch wird auffallend häufig benutzt.

[15] ה' תשובה IX.

Meinung mit scharfer Entrüstung zurückgewiesen,[16] aber der pharisäischen Auffassung liegt das vollständig fern. Sie unterscheidet wohl Gute und Böse, nicht aber Gelehrte und Ungelehrte. Maimonides hat in seiner Mischneh Thora die Auferstehung kaum gestreift und sich mit der Anführung des Satzes, daß in der künftigen Welt alle Erscheinungsformen des irdischen Lebens fortfallen, begnügt. Die materielle Auffassung der Auferstehung, welche die Sadduzäer im Evangelium in einem rein dialektisch gewählten Schulbeispiel vertreten, „die Jesus natürlich verwirft" (S. 297), wird auch von den Pharisäern durchaus nicht gebilligt.

So anregend Meyers Auffassung auch für die Forschung werden mag, sie bleibt darum unbefriedigend, weil sie die weitere geschichtliche Entwicklung nicht zu erklären vermag. Diese Theorie legt zu viel Nachdruck darauf, daß die Pharisäer „eine theologische Schule sind" und daß ausschließlich Schriftgelehrsamkeit Gegenstand ihres Interesses ist, und kann daher die späteren politischen Zusammenstöße und Machtkämpfe nicht erklären. Die Annahme, daß die Thora die Fremdherrschaft voraussetzt, daß daher die Lehrer der Thora notgedrungen Zusammenstöße mit weltlichen Herrschern haben mußten, verkennt die Möglichkeiten der Auslegung. So gut wie später die verschiedensten politischen Richtungen innerhalb des Christentums mit der Bibel, Alten und Neuen Testaments, fertig geworden sind, hätten auch die Pharisäer vermittels der Exegese dieses Problem bewältigt. Um die späteren scharfen Kämpfe zu erklären, muß zu der Hypothese gegriffen werden, daß im Anschluß an die Pharisäer eine extreme Richtung derselben Art wie später Zeloten und Sicarier sich gebildet habe, die selbst Hand ans Werk legen und aus ihren Lehren die vollen Konsequenzen ziehen wollte (S. 309). Ebensowenig erklären die gesuchten, rein politischen Motive für Alexander Jannais Einlenken (S. 310) den geschichtlichen Vorgang, daß nach seinem Tode eine neue Partei ans Ruder kommt und das ganze Regierungssystem geändert wird.

II.

Im Gegensatz zu seinem ersten Buche *Pharisaism* (1912) hat R. Travers Herford in seiner neuen Bearbeitung des Stoffes (*The Pharisees,* 1924) auf die historische Erklärung des Ursprungs der beiden

[16] Vgl. z. B. אגרות שד"ל 247.

Parteien Gewicht gelegt und sich ganz besonders darum bemüht, den Grund dafür zu finden, warum die beiden Parteien gerade in jener Zeit, gegen Ende der Regierung Johann Hyrkans, in die Erscheinung treten. Er hält sich an die Wortbedeutung von Peruschim = Abgesonderte und sieht gemäß der Mischna Ḥagiga II, 7 die Absonderung als einen der Grade der Levitischen Reinheit an, also eine Absonderung von der großen Masse des Volkes, den Am-ha-arez, so daß die Bezeichnung Peruschim mit der anderen חברים identisch wäre. Freilich würden die Pharisäer nur die niederste Ordnung dieser Gruppe bilden, daher auch am zahlreichsten sein (S. 31 ff.). Diese Identität erklärt auch ihr Auftreten in der Zeit Johann Hyrkans. Da dieser König zuerst die strenge Überwachung der Entrichtung der Priesterabgaben, Hebe und Zehnt, eingeführt hat,[17] kam in seiner Zeit die Scheidung in חברים und עמי הארץ auf. Da nun alle, die sich streng zum Prinzip der חברים bekannten, zuerst diesen Grad der פרישות[18] durchmachen mußten, wurde der Name auf die ganze Richtung übertragen. "That was the primarily distinctive name which applied to them all, and the only one of general importance. And that remained their name as distinguishing them from the Sadducees; because the latter, while quite as eager for the maintenance of levitical purity, &c., differed from those who had come to be called Pharisees in respect of their views upon the interpretation of Torah" (p. 33).

„Sie stellen zwei sich bekämpfende Anschauungen über die wahre Meinung der Thora dar und reichen in die Frühzeit des Sanhedrin zurück" (S. 35). Das Heraustreten gesonderter Parteien kann nicht vor die Zeit Hyrkans fallen, da erst in seinen Tagen der Begriff פרישות aufkam,[18] aber auch nicht in eine spätere Zeit, da in der Erzählung des Talmuds, b. Kidduschin 66a, die Bezeichnung פרושים bereits gebraucht ist (S. 34). Das letztere freilich ist kein durchschlagender Grund, da die Redaktion dieser von Herford sehr feinsinnig behandelten Stelle (S. 39 ff.) sicher jünger ist als die erzählten Ereignisse; sie erwähnt am Schluß die Wendung unter Simon ben

[17] Beide Versionen werden von Herford (S. 30f.) angeführt, aber das Wort וגזרו kann in jenem Zusammenhang nur Polizei bedeuten, die zentrale Behörde des Synhedrions konnte sich unmöglich um diese Einzelheiten kümmern. Rein sprachlich betrachtet, macht die Wendung בטל את הדטאי keinen guten Eindruck, besser müßte es lauten: גזר על הדטאי und בטל את הודוי.

[18] Seltsam ist H.s Bemerkung S. 34 o., daß Perischut erst im Mittelalter vorkommt. Es ist ein gut tannäisches Wort, vgl. Levy s. v. und Herford, *Pirke Aboth*, S. 84f.

Schetach, identifiziert auch bereits im Sinne der späteren Auffassung die „thoratreue" Partei mit den פרושים.[19] Soviel aber ist sicher, daß der ganze Vorgang eine bereits vorhandene Spaltung und Gruppierung voraussetzt.

Den Anlaß zu dieser sieht HERFORD in der alten Meinungsverschiedenheit über die Verbindlichkeit der mündlichen Lehre, die zurückgeht auf die Zeit der Anfänge des Synhedrions. Dieses ist mit der von Josephus (Ant. XII, 3, 3) in dem Schreiben Antiochos des Großen erwähnten γερουσία gleichzusetzen, ist 196 entstanden und bildet den ersten Versuch zur Einrichtung einer religiösen jüdischen Behörde, die auch Laien einschloß. Das Datum wird aus dem von S. SCHECHTER entdeckten Fragment über den neuen Bund von Damaskus hergeleitet. Dort heißt es gleich am Anfang, daß 390 Jahre nach der Auslieferung an den König von Babylon Gott aus Israel und Aaron eine Wurzel seiner Pflanzung hervorsprießen ließ. 390 Jahre, von 586 ab gezählt, ergibt das Jahr 176, die vereinte Pflanzung aus Israel und Aaron wäre die neue Institution des aus Laien und Priestern zusammengesetzten Synhedrions; die 20 Jahre des blinden Umhertastens wiesen auf die Meinungsverschiedenheiten innerhalb dieser Völkerschaften. Auch EDUARD MEYER[20] hat diese chronologische Angabe seiner Erklärung des „Fragments der Zadokiten" zugrunde gelegt, auch er setzt die Schrift in die Zeit der Religionswirren um 170 v. Chr. Freilich hat MEYER gewisse Bedenken gegen die vorliegenden Ziffern leise angedeutet (S. 48, Anm. 1 und 2). Beide Ausleger haben eine Bemerkung übersehen, die LOUIS GINZBERG in seinem viel zu wenig beachteten Buche *Eine unbekannte jüdische Sekte*[21] über die Zeitangabe gemacht hat, daß nämlich die rabbinische Tradition für die Zeit der Perserherrschaft nur 52 Jahre rechnet, so daß 390 Jahre nach der Zerstörung des ersten Tempels das Jahr 30 v. Chr. ergibt. Es wäre sehr seltsam, wenn ausgerechnet dieser neue Bund von Damaskus in diesem Punkte von der gesamten jüdischen Chronologie abgewichen wäre und an Stelle der aus der Bibel eruierten Zahl die geschichtlich richtige gekannt

[19] Die Erklärung, daß die Bezeichnung פרושים aus נבדלים hervorgegangen ist und durch den brüsken Abschied bei jenem Fest veranlaßt wurde (S. 41), ist unhaltbar. Das Wort נבדל kommt schon in der Bibel zur Zeit Esras vor.

[20] II, 47 f.

[21] S. 364, Anm. 1. Der überwiegende Teil des Buches ist in der Monatsschrift für Geschichte und Wissenschaft des Judentums, LV—LVIII, erschienen, das ganze New York 1922.

hätte. So schwierig die Auslegung der Stelle ist und so wenig die bisherigen Erklärungen befriedigen mögen,[22] so viel steht fest, daß sie nicht zum Ausgangspunkt einer Berechnung dienen kann, die in das Jahr 196 führt. Auch die 20 Jahre des Umhertastens können im Sinne des Damaskusbundes nicht auf „Meinungsverschiedenheiten innerhalb des Synhedrions" (HERFORD, S. 25) bezogen werden, es sind im Sinne dieses Bundes nicht Jahre des Abfalls, sondern, im Gegenteil, sie führen zur Entsendung des wahren Lehrers.[23] HERFORD schließt aus den in der Zeit der Religionsnot offenkundigen feindlichen Strömungen, daß sie auch schon vorher lange Zeit bestanden und Kraft gewonnen haben müssen. Er sucht die Zeit noch weiter zu umgrenzen, indem er auf Jose b. Joezer verweist, der Zeitgenosse der Makkabäischen Erhebung war und gleichzeitig dem ersten Geschlecht der Zugoth angehört haben muß, d. h. jenen, die als Führer der antihellenistischen Partei aufgetreten sind.[24] Persönlich neigten sie zu den Chassidim, den intransigenten Vertretern der Thora, während es auch andere, gemäßigtere Anhänger dieses Prinzips gab.

Nach der Durchführung des Kampfes gestaltete sich die Lage so, daß auf der einen Seite die der Regierung nahestehenden Kreise, der priesterliche und der weltliche Adel, sich stark mit Politik beschäftigten und keinerlei Neigung hatten, durch ihre Anhänglichkeit an die Thora die Freiheit der politischen Arbeit für die neue Dynastie beschränken zu lassen. Auf der anderen Seite befanden sich diejenigen, welche zwar nicht zum Throne, aber zum Volke enge Beziehungen unterhielten und es als ihre hauptsächlichste Aufgabe ansahen, die Thora in ihrer Reinheit als Erbe des ganzen Volkes zu erhalten, und zwar nicht nur das geschriebene Wort, sondern auch die mündliche Überlieferung. Die Sadduzäer aber lehnten diese mündliche Überlieferung ab, für sie war Thora nur, was Esra vorgelesen hatte und was die

[22] GINZBERG, das., 365 f. und die Anmerkungen.

[23] Vgl. SCHECHTER, *Documents of Jewish Sectaries*, I, 1, l. 9 ff. ויהיו כעורים וכיסנששים דרך שנים עשרים. ויבן אל אל מעשיהם כי בלב שלם דרשוהו. ויקם להם מורה צדק להדריכם בדרך לבו וכו'.

[24] HERFORDS Versuch, eine Verbindung zwischen Jose ben Joezers Verordnung über das Ausland und die Niederlassung der Anhänger des neuen Bundes in Damaskus herzustellen (S. 26), ist völlig abwegig. Ebenso schließt der Text die vorgeschlagene Rückwärtsdatierung dieser Maßregel völlig aus. Eine Kritik der gesamten Überlieferung über diese Frage findet man bei TAUBES, הנשיא בסנהדרין הגדולה (Bettelheim Memorial Foundation, vol. II), S. 17 ff., dessen Aufstellungen freilich häufig Widerspruch herausfordern.

Häupter des Volkes anzunehmen sich verpflichtet hatten (S. 28, 29). Das ist nun meines Dafürhaltens eine Erklärung, die auf modernen Anschauungen beruht, aber nicht zur Mentalität der Pharisäer des 2. Jahrhunderts v. Chr. paßt. An einer späteren Stelle sagt Herford mit Recht, daß Esra nichts von der modernen Quellenscheidung im Pentateuch wußte (S. 55), aber genau so wenig wußte das jüdische Volk von einer Begrenzung der Verpflichtung auf die 444 besonders beschworene Thora und nichts weiter. Wäre dies der Streitpunkt gewesen, so müßte in der Überlieferung irgendeine Erinnerung daran erhalten geblieben sein, an irgendeiner Stelle hätte sich bei Josephus oder im Talmud oder im Neuen Testament ein Hinweis darauf finden müssen, daß dies der eigentliche Kern der Kontroverse war. Die Auffassung stimmt auch nicht einmal mit dem Text in Neh. VIII, 8 überein, denn dort ist nicht lediglich von einer trockenen Vorlesung, sondern auch von einer Verdeutlichung gesprochen. Man braucht in dieser nicht alles zu sehen, was die spätere rabbinische Auslegung darin gefunden hat, aber davon, daß die übernommene Verpflichtung nur dem damals geschrieben vorliegenden Gesetz und keinem Wort mehr gegolten habe, kann keine Rede sein.

Diese Differenz aber in der Anerkennung der mündlichen Lehre betrachtet Herford als die grundlegende und entscheidende. Die politische Rolle und Auffassung erklärt er für völlig nebensächlich; wenn die Sadduzäer stark an der Politik beteiligt waren, geschah das nur, weil sie mit dem zur Regierung gehörenden Kreise identisch waren, aber nicht wegen ihres sadduzäischen Prinzips (S. 36). Andererseits blieben die Pharisäer unpolitisch und hielten sich von dem späteren Bruderkrieg und den folgenden inneren Kämpfen vollständig fern (S. 45).

Es ist Herfords großes Verdienst, die religiöse Bedeutung der Pharisäer und ihren Zusammenhang mit der späteren jüdischen Tradition richtig erkannt zu haben, aber mit der Einseitigkeit, mit der er die Entstehung des Parteigegensatzes geschichtlich zu erklären versucht, kann man sich keineswegs einverstanden erklären. Wäre seine Auffassung richtig und der Parteigegensatz um diesen Hauptpunkt konzentriert, so bliebe der gesamte politische Kampf der Folgezeit, vor allem der Bürgerkrieg unter Jannai, unerklärlich. Unerklärlich bliebe auch, was Josephus über die Beliebtheit der Pharisäer im Volke und über die Behinderung der Sadduzäer, ihre eigenen Grundsätze

in der Praxis durchzuführen, berichtet. Daran kann kein Zweifel sein, daß die damaligen Kämpfe nicht ausschließlich sich um ein religiöses Prinzip konzentriert haben können, sondern daß es Kämpfe um die Macht im Staate waren; war ja doch ein wichtiges Gebiet der religiösen Praxis die gesamte Rechtsprechung, die Verwaltung des Tempels und vielleicht sogar die Bestimmung über Krieg und Frieden.

III.

Im Gegensatz zu den beiden besprochenen Werken, die in den Pharisäern hauptsächlich eine theologische Schule sehen, erblickt Simon Dubnow[25] in der Spaltung der Pharisäer und der Sadduzäer „den bedeutsamsten nationalen Streit — den Streit über den nationalen Typus selbst, das ist darüber, ob das Judentum eine weltliche oder eine geistige Nation, ein Durchschnitts- oder ein eigenartiges Glied der internationalen Familie sein soll". Es ist zunächst stark übertrieben, hier von „dem bedeutsamsten nationalen Streit" zu sprechen, die Entscheidung darüber, wie weit die jüdische Nation sich als weltliche betätigen konnte, lag in jener Zeit nicht bei ihr, sie wurde in Rom und nicht in Jerusalem gefällt. Aber sieht man auch hiervon ab, so bleibt doch die ganze Auffassung des Problems unhaltbar. Seite 143 wird das Dilemma wie folgt dargelegt: „Sollte das jüdische Volk zu einer politischen Nation werden, gleich den anderen Völkern seines Ranges, oder sollte es vornehmlich eine geistige Nation mit einer nach dem Abstreifen des fremden Joches nur zu freierer Entfaltung gelangten theokratischen Verfassung bleiben? Sollte das zu einem selbständigen Staate gewordene Judäa sich von der vorhergegangenen Jahrhunderte langen Evolution lossagen und zu einem gewöhnlichen Staatswesen werden, das gleich jedem anderen regen Anteil an dem Getriebe der internationalen Politik nimmt, Krieg führt, Bündnisse schließt und die Erweiterung seines Landgebietes und seiner Einflußsphäre anstrebt?" Die Frage der Bündnisse war durch Juda, Jonathan und Simon gelöst, sie waren mit Rom in Verbindung getreten, kein Mensch hatte, soweit wir unterrichtet sind, widersprochen, die Autonomie der Gemeinden in der römischen Diaspora war dadurch begründet

[25] Simon Dubnow, *Weltgeschichte des jüdischen Volkes*, Band 1, S. XVII; die folgenden Zitate sind aus Band 2. Eine eingehende Kritik des Buches siehe Monatsschrift für Geschichte und Wissenschaft des Judentums, LXX, 1926, S. 145 ff. In seiner Grundanschauung über unsere Frage berührt Dubnow sich stark mit J. Klausners היסטוריה ישראלית.

worden, und nur vermöge dieser „politischen Aktion" war die „geistig-nationale" gesichert. Die Dinge gehören so eng zusammen, daß sie nicht geschieden werden können, und auch Dubnow hat sie trotz der scharfen Hervorhebung des Gegensatzes nicht zu scheiden vermocht und z. B. die Differenz über die „mündliche Lehre" in die politische Erörterung hineinziehen müssen. „Die Verwandlung Judäas in einen gewöhnlichen militärpolitischen Organismus" wird als das Ziel der Sadduzäer hingestellt. „Sie und ihre Anhänger waren bestrebt, eine Trennung von Staat und Religion herbeizuführen, soweit dies bei einer auf der Thora als der unwandelbaren jüdischen Verfassung begründeten Gesetzgebung möglich war. Sie behielten nur die äußeren Formen, den Buchstaben dieser Verfassung bei, bauten aber in Wirklichkeit ihren Staat nach dem Vorbild aller politischen Organisationen des hellenisierten Orients auf. Die Sadduzäer waren die unmittelbaren Nachfolger jener gemäßigten Hellenisten, die in der Epoche der griechischen Herrschaft der weltlichen Kultur den Vorrang vor der geistlichen im jüdischen Leben zu verschaffen bestrebt waren. . . . Von dem Wunsche erfüllt, die Entwicklung Judäas in die Bahn derjenigen anderer Staaten der damaligen zivilisierten Welt zu lenken, suchten die Sadduzäer die die Juden von den anderen Kulturvölkern unterscheidenden und so sehr hervorstechenden nationalen Eigentümlichkeiten auf jede Weise abzuschwächen. Sie erkannten freilich die Thora als die heilige Verfassung Judäas an, achteten sie jedoch nur als ein Erbe der Vorzeit, als ein Vermächtnis der Ahnen, das man zwar in allen Ehren hält, von dem man sich aber im praktischen Leben nur selten leiten läßt. Man solle, meinten sie, den Buchstaben der Thora in aller Form befolgen, jedoch nur auf genau begrenzten Gebieten, ohne ihren Geist und Sinn auf das ganze Leben des Menschen erstrecken zu wollen. . . . Zur alten schriftlichen Lehre sollte keine neue ‚mündliche' in der Form von Überlieferungen oder Interpretationen hinzugefügt werden." Zu solchen Konsequenzen führt die Anschauung, daß die Sadduzäer als Verräter gegenüber der Nation, als „in der eigenartigen Volkskultur nie verankert" dastehen. Und doch war das die Gruppe, die der nationalen Dynastie nahestand, von ihr als die alleinige Stütze von Thron und Altar anerkannt wurde! Auch sollen „in der Epoche der Agonie Judäas" die „revolutionären Zeloten" aus ihrer Mitte hervorgegangen sein! Und die Partei der Priester, „des offiziellen Klerus" (S. 310), wird nun als eine Gruppe von Freigeistern und

Rationalisten (S. 191) hingestellt; diejenigen, die sich mit der Befolgung der Thora im wörtlichen Sinne abmühten, sollen sich dagegen ausgesprochen haben, das Leben durch die Religion zu reglementieren! Darüber darf man sich ja doch keiner Täuschung hingeben, daß die Sadduzäer an der Überlieferung mit außerordentlicher Zähigkeit festhielten und daß trotz aller späteren „Umzäunungen um das Gesetz" dieses durch die Auslegung aufgelockert wurde, während die wörtliche Befolgung in allen Gebieten zu derselben Strenge und Starrheit führte, die im Rechtsleben ausdrücklich überliefert ist.

Im Gegensatz zu dieser Richtung wären die Pharisäer, „die unmittelbaren Nachfolger der Chassidäer und Sopherim", „bestrebt, Judäa aus der Menge der es umgebenden Staaten herauszuheben und hier eine geistige Republik zu begründen, wo das Recht mit der Moral, mit dem göttlichen Gesetz Hand in Hand gehen, wo die religiösen, die sittlichen Heldentaten, nicht aber militärische oder politische Erfolge am höchsten bewertet werden sollten. . . . Im Judaismus als einer religiös-sittlichen und nationalen Weltanschauung erblickten sie jene schöpferische Kraft, von der alle Gebiete des Volkslebens durchdrungen werden sollten. Sie schätzten allerdings die politische Unabhängigkeit Judäas. Jedoch nur als eine zur Erhaltung des Kerns, der kulturellen Eigenart der Nation, unentbehrliche Umhüllung. An der Spitze der Pharisäerpartei standen Männer, die sich durch edle geistige Gaben, durch Schriftgelehrsamkeit, frommen Lebenswandel und sittlichen Rigorismus auszeichneten." „Für die Pharisäer gingen die Interessen der Nation denjenigen des Staates voran" — eine prachtvolle Formulierung, nur ist es sehr unwahrscheinlich, daß die alten Pharisäer sie verstanden hätten. So staats- und machtfremd, wie es nach der obigen Schilderung scheint, waren die Pharisäer denn doch nicht. Sie haben in den verschiedenen Kämpfen mit Hasmonäern und Herodianern ihren Mann gestanden und nicht nur passiven Widerstand geleistet, sondern direkt nach der Macht gestrebt. In der S. 572 zum Beleg herangezogenen Zeit der Salome Alexandra hatten die Pharisäer gar nichts dagegen einzuwenden, daß die Königin Söldner warb (Jos. Ant. XIII, 16, 2), und wenn Aristobul zu den Sadduzäern überging, so tat er nur, was alle unbefriedigten Kronprinzen in der Geschichte getan haben, daß er bei der Opposition Zuflucht suchte. Und als es notwendig wurde, erwachte in den Pharisäern der *furor judaicus*, und sie brachten aus ihrer Mitte die Zeloten hervor!

Von der politischen Antinomie scheidet Dubnow scharf den „Kulturkampf zwischen den Sadduzäern und den Pharisäern“ (§ 35, 187 ff.), aber diesen Streit läßt er erst in späterer Zeit hervortreten. Die verschiedene Einstellung zum Staate, sagt er, mußte sich notgedrungen auf das kulturelle Gebiet übertragen: auf das der Religion, des Kultus, der Dogmatik. Hier liegt ein Widerspruch. Wenn der politische Kampf sich „notgedrungen“ auf das kulturelle Gebiet erstrecken mußte, dann ist es nicht mehr angängig, die beiden Phasen in dieser Schärfe zu scheiden. Es geht auch nicht an, die Frage der Rechtsprechung ausschließlich in das kulturelle Gebiet zu verweisen (S. 190), die des Kampfes um den Einfluß im Synhedrion völlig zu übergehen. Man kann ferner unmöglich von den Sadduzäern sagen: „Für sie war der Judaismus erstarrt, in seiner Entwicklung an einem toten Punkt angelangt.“ Uns mag heute ihre Auffassung so erscheinen, daß sie zur Erstarrung führt, aber sie selbst können unmöglich ihr Prinzip als ein todbringendes angesehen haben, sie hätten niemals einem solchen Satze zugestimmt: „daß das politische und soziale Leben mit dem Judaismus parallel laufen konnte, aber dabei nicht so sehr auf dessen geistige Ideale als vielmehr auf die eigenen praktischen Prinzipien und Interessen Rücksicht zu nehmen brauchte“ (S. 192). Es kann nicht oft genug gegen eine so ungerechte Verurteilung der Sadduzäer Front gemacht werden. Sie waren von der Wahrheit der Offenbarung überzeugt und davon durchdrungen, daß die Lehre Mosis von keiner anderen späteren übertroffen werden konnte und daß sie allein die Aufgabe hatte, das ganze Leben maßgebend zu beeinflussen. Nichts lag den Sadduzäern ferner, als eine frivole Anschauung über Fragen, die durch die Thora geregelt waren!

Juli 1926.

TIT-BITS FROM THE GENIZAH

RICHARD GOTTHEIL (NEW YORK)

Our learned friend, out of respect for whom and in memory of whom these pages are written, naturally had a great interest in the Genizah find made in old Cairo (Fostat) and in the cemetery outside the new city. As the pupil and the close friend of SCHECHTER; as the student of everything that appertained to Jewish history and to Jewish literature; as Professor of Rabbinics at Cambridge, where the greatest mass of the material is preserved—he could not help being so interested. He has, himself, made some most worthy contributions to our knowledge, drawn from these sources. Cf. e.g. his articles in *J.Q.R.* XI, 291, XVIII, 427.

Curious and interesting for scholars are the lists of books which have been found in the Genizah; and of which, at an early date a specimen was given by SCHECHTER himself out of "a box marked Catalogues," and reprinted in his *Saadyana* (Cambridge 1903).[1] Such lists were not unknown in the West also.[2] Quite a number of such lists have been published, of which POZNAŃSKI has given an account in the article cited. The latest that I have seen written on the matter is the excellent treatise of Professor JACOB MANN entitled "Listes des Livres provenant de la Gueniza."[3] In the following pages there will be found five more fragments of such lists. Probably, the pious wish expressed by SCHECHTER (*loc. cit.*) that "they are to be edited soon in toto" will come true. Certainly, it ought to.

These lists possess a peculiar value. At times they give us titles of books which have not been known previously. These titles are very valuable, as they increase our knowledge of the wide extent of Hebrew and Jewish literature. But, they also show us what books

[1] pp. 78–79. Cf. POZNAŃSKI's detailed explanation of the same in his *Schechter's Saadyana*, 1904, pp. 20 seq. (republished from the *Zeitschrift für Hebräische Bibliographie*, VII, 1903).

[2] See POZNAŃSKI in *Z. f. H. B.*, XII, 111.

[3] *R.É.J.*, LXXII, 163 seq.

were being used—were being bought and sold; and, therefore, were in high esteem among the reading and studying public. Sometimes they are lists merely of books which a shop-man or bookseller is holding for sale, and to each book in which he has attached a price. Again, they may and do represent the catalogue of a scholar's library. And lastly, they are at times an inventory of books and of religious paraphernalia belonging to a Synagogue.

As is to be expected, the language used in these lists is not always elegant. Such lists do not call for elegance. The people using those that have come from the Genizah spoke Arabic; and we get from these lists a still further insight into the manner in which the Hebrew terms—that were as familiar to them as they are to us—were dressed in Arabic forms,[4] as we ourselves have Anglicized a number of them.

A peculiarity of these lists is that they mention so many *portions* merely of works and not the whole works themselves. I should look for an explanation of this partly in the unbound condition in which books are often used and read in the Near East: I have myself seen portions of such unbound books loaned by a man to his friend. In addition, it is possible that these portions may only be remnants of the books mentioned. We might, then, be dealing with a Genizah fragment taken from another Genizah!

No. 1

MS. Oxford, Heb. b. 3. 35 v; 14 lines on the last half page of a volume; the rest has some scribbling in Arabic, e.g. אדר שני = ادار ثانى.

Text

1. תפסיר קהלת י דה, כראים מן תרי
2. עשר? סתה דרא הלכות אלפאסי
3. שו דרה חסוכי בגדים ה דרא נצף
4. כתאב אלאמאנאת ד דרא תפסיר
5. איכה יב דרה וכתאב אטלאק אל
6. אכל אלאליה שו דרה כתאב גדיד
7. נצף דינ סדר מן אלמשנה ג דרא
8. ודניאל ב וכראים ה דרא וכתא[ב]
9. אלשהאדאת ואלותאיק יב דרה

[4] See Bacher in *R.É.J.*, XL, 55.

10. [כ]תאב אלעדד בַּ דַּרַא ישעיה
11. ונצף ירמיה כַּה דַּרַה מצחף יז מצחף ב ??
12. יוסף נתנאל אברהם יאיר ושמים ??
13. צדקה שמואל ארבעת חמודין
14. ? יאש ד נ״ע נתנאל הששי.

Translation

1. A commentary on Ecclesiastes[5] (worth) ten dirhems. Some quires from
2. The Minor Prophets?[6] Six dirhems. The Halakhot of Alfasi (worth)
3. fifteen dirhems. (The book entitled) "The Clotheless Ones"[7] (worth) five dirhems.
4. Half of the book "al-Amānāt"[8]—four dirhems. A commentary on
5. Lamentations, (worth) twelve dirhems; and the book (entitled) "The Freeing"
6. "of the one who eats the sheep's tail"[9] (worth) fifteen dirhems. A new copy (worth)[10]
7. half a dīnār. An "order"[11] of the Mishnah (worth) three dirhems.
8. The Book of Daniel (worth) two; and some quires (worth) five dirhems; and the book (entitled)
9. "Decisions and Contracts"[12] (worth) twelve dirhems.

[5] It is useless to speculate by whom the Commentary was written. Probably the name of the author was not mentioned. One thinks, at once, of that of Isaac ibn Gayyat.

[6] Some letters are given here; but what they are, I can not make out.

[7] חסך = Biblical חשך. Cf. וחסוכי בגדים בטנע Kelim 1, 2. See KOHUT's *Arukh ha-Shalem*, III, 454. I can find no mention of such a title in Jewish Literature.

[8] Of course, he refers to Saadia's *Emunoth* in its Arabic form.

[9] The sheep, being an animal used for sacrificial purposes, was not to be eaten—especially it's most delicious part, the fat tail. The title is partly in Arabic, partly in Hebrew. I take it that the book dealt with the attempt made to free the eater from the death penalty. Cf. *Leviticus*, VII, 25. For the controversies on the subject, see *Jewish Encyclopaedia* s. v. *Fat*.

[10] Of the same book?

[11] סדר i.e. a number of treatises dealing with the same subject.

[12] الشهادات والوثائق. In the list published by BACHER, *R.É.J.*, XXXIX, p. 200, line 37, we have a title simply אלשהאדאת, which may refer to the same book. In the list published by BROYDÉ and ADLER, *J.Q.R.*, XIII, p. 55, line 78 we may have the same, reading את ואלותאיק (אלשהאד), as the word ואלותאנק gives no sense. If this is so, I do not consider BACHER's translation (*loc. cit.*, p. 203) proper. It is a work of Saadya. See *J.Q.R.*[2], XIII, p. 392. (Here ותאיק but otherwise ומואתיק.)

10. The "Book of that which is counted,"[13] (worth) two dirhems. The Book of Isaiah
11. and half of the Book of Jeremiah, (worth) twenty-five dirhems. A volume[14] (worth) seventeen (dirhems); a volume??
12. Joseph, Nathanael, Abraham Yā'ir??[15]
13. ?? Samuel, the four sons of Josiah[16]; may his rest be in Paradise! (signed) Nathanael the Sixth (from the head).[17]

Appendix dealing with the Second Half of No. 1

He who pretends to read Arab proper names when they are not vocalized fully, knows the burden that he is taking upon his shoulders. To try and make out the proper names from the mass of quickly and badly-written characters at the bottom of the present page is courting the criticism of the wise. I have made the try because—in one family-name at least—there is contact with the text of fragment No. 2.—al-Sharābī; and the question arises naturally as to the measure in which the Jews in Egypt made use of Arabic characters. This is not the place to answer the question.

We have a list of names, very often separated one from the other by a blotch rather than a point. For what reason the list was drawn up I do not know. It may be a list of customers; it may be one of friends. I can make out the following:—

1. ابو سعيد ..... الطبيب حلف العطار
   اخوه
2. بن الشرابى بن مرزوخ علان عروس
3. المحلى ابن عمير ابن نسيم
4. الحميد؟؟ الفرج بن المحمل ابن الظاهر الشرابى
5. ..... ابن حارث ابن القياسة

[13] If my reading is right, this must refer to some work on Arithmetic. If the reading is אלעדד, cf. Mann in *R.É.J.*, LXXII, p. 171; Verso, line 11.

[14] Does this mean a volume of the Bible? One can not say; for in the first of the lists published by Mann we have the word used (מצחף חסבי) as a common noun (*loc. cit.*, p. 169, line 1).

[15] This line is quite unintelligible at the end, as is the beginning of line 13. Who are the four sons? I have tried to indicate them.

[16] Most uncertain. The letters look like יאש ד. I hazard the suggestion that יהו = ה though I have never seen the name written in this fashion.

[17] See Mann, *The Jews in Egypt*, i, p. 272 seq.

6. بن العضفى ?? بن الاعمانى

7. بن אל ??תמבאני יעקב אלחרירי

8. ابو ..... بن العطار

9. سالم . بن صالح ..... بن رحامو ?

10. بن احيين صهره. ابن الناقد. ابو المما الفارسى ?? بن المرّى

11. احوه ? بن نصير. بن العراقى. الحلبى. بن صالح ? ابو الحسَيّن

12. يوسف بن موسى القراز ??

i.e.

1. Abu Sa'īd.....the physician.[18] Ḥalaf al-ʿAṭṭār[19]
his brother
2. Ibn al-Sharābī ibn Marzūkh.[20] ʿAllān ʿArūs
3. Al-Maḥallī Ibn ʿUmair ibn Nasīm[21]
4. Al-Ḥumaid[22] Al-Faraj ibn al-Bajīl[23] Ibn al-Ṭhāhir al-Sharābī.
5. ? ? ? ? ? ? Ibn Ḥārith Ibn al-Ḳiyāsah
6. Ibn al-ʿAsphī[22] Ibn al-ʿAmānī[24]
7. Ibn al—? ? ? ? ? ?[24] Jacob al-Ḥarīrī[25]
8. Abū al—? ? ? ibn al-ʿAṭṭār[19]
9. Sālim. Ibn Ṣāliḥ.....[26]
10. Ibn Aḥmīn (?),[27] his brother-in law.[28] Ibn al-Nāḳid. Abu al ? ? ?
al-Fārisī. Ibn al-Murrī.[29]
11. His brother Ibn Nuṣair.[30] Ibn al-ʿIrāḳī. Al-Ḥalabi.[31] Ibn Ṣāliḥ[28]
Abu al-Ḥusain
12. Yūsuf ibn Mūsa al-Fa ? ? ?

[18] Though this may be simply الطيّب.
[19] Or, "the druggist."
[20] Or "Mardhūkh." Perhaps, we have here a misspelling for مرزوق.
[21] Or = Hebrew נְסִים.
[22] Very uncertain reading!
[23] A pure guess!
[24] In Hebrew characters!
[25] In Hebrew characters. The letter before the last may, perhaps, be a ב and not a ר.
[26] Perhaps بن رحاس.
[27] Is this for the Coptic Akhmīm?
[28] After certain names there is a sign or a letter, which I can not make out.
[29] Or السرّى?
[30] Or, Naṣīr.
[31] i.e. The Aleppan.

No. 2

An unnumbered Oxford fragment, covering $\frac{1}{3}$ of a page. The other $\frac{2}{3}$ of the page are covered with Arabic scribble, containing a number of Jewish names, one or two of which are in Hebrew characters, e.g. בן אלעמאני and יעקב אלחריזי. It contains a list of books, belonging —evidently—to some private scholar, as no prices are attached to the individual numbers.

Text

1. עדה אלדפאתר
   מגלד סלמה תורה
2. מצחף תורה ומעה ספר ישעיה. ומצחף צגיר
3. תפסיר קהלת. בבא קמא. דפתר תלמוד
4. דפתר מסאיל פי אלליה. תפסיר ישעיה גזו[ין]
   ענד אלישראבי
5. תפסיר ירמיהו. כתאב אלשהאד[א]ת.
6. מקאלה מן כתאב אלאמאנאת. נבוה מיכה
7. תפסיר. אלכלאם פי אלסראג. כתאב אלחלק.
   ענד אלרים
8. כתאב אלעדה. כתאב פיה חסוכי בגדים.
9. סדר נזיק[ין]. כ[ר]ארים צנאר.

Translation

1. List of Books[32]
2. A volume of the Pentateuch, bound and in good condition;[33] and with it the Book of Isaiah; and a small copy of the Pentateuch.[34]
3. A commentary on Ecclesiastes.[35] Baba Ḳamma.[36] A copy[37] of the Talmud.
4. A treatise (entitled) "Questions concerning the fat tail of the sheep."[38] A commentary on Isaiah—two parts.

[32] الدفاتر pl. of دفتر. I have translated the word by "books"; though it is hard to see the difference in use of دفتر and كتاب. The present list has a remarkable similarity to List No. 1. On the use of دفتر for a definite part of a book or for a book itself, see Schechter, *Saadyana*, p. 55.

[33] These words are above the line.

[34] Above the line.

[35] By Saadyah?; but see Poznański in *J. Q. R.*², XIII, 388.

[36] There is some word inserted above the line and before the following word, which I can not make out.

[37] دفتر again, which may mean simply "a treatise."

[38] אליה = اللية. See Dozy s. v. and cf. note 9 in No. 1.

5. A commentary on Jeremiah—which is in the possession of al-Sharābī.[39] The Book of Decisions.[40]
6. A chapter from the book "Amānāt"[41] (Beliefs). The Prophecy[42] of Micha.
7. Commentary[43] on the Controversy concerning the (Sabbath) Lamp.[44] The Book of Creation.[45]
8. The Book on Numbers[46] in the possession of the Head of the Community.[47] The Book in which is (the work entitled) "The Clotheless Ones."[48]
9. The treatise Nezīḳīn[49]—in small quires.

No. 3

Bodleian MS. Heb. d. 66+131, recto.

Evidently a bookseller's list, as the prices are attached. The recto and the verso do not contain the whole list, as the first words of the lines upon the whole of the following page show that it was a part of the list. Sufficient, however, does not remain to make any sense out of it.

Text

Recto

1. בשמך רחמ̄
2. תרגום אפאטיר אלפרה — דינארין
3. עראקי מגלד מלוח
4. חלכות ר׳ יצחק — עשרה דנ̄
5. ג̄ מסכתות מן אלתלמ̄

[39] الشرابيّ. For a similar name see e.g. Ibn Abi Usaibia, 'Uyūn al-Anbā, ed. Müller, p. 301. I suppose that the book was loaned to him.

[40] See note 12, No. 1.

[41] Of Saadyah.

[42] نبوّة.

[43] In spite of the point after the word תספיר, I connect it with the following. Otherwise we should have to refer it back to the נבוה טיכה on the preceding lines, when it ought to be placed before the words.

[44] سراج السبت of Saadyah. See *J.Q.R.*, XIII, 78 and Poznański, *ibid.*, p. 329. The work is mentioned by Abraham ibn Ezra. Cf. also *J.Q.R.*², XIII, 395.

[45] Is this the ספר יצירה in Arabic? For an Arabic commentary on the same, see *R.É.J.*, XLII, 187.

[46] A work on Arithmetic. See No. 1, line 10 and note.

[47] On the dignitary here mentioned, see Mann, *The Jews in Egypt*, I. 262, = ראש מתיבתא.

[48] See No. 1, line 3.

[49] Either of the Mishnah or the Talmud.

6.	כתובות וסוטה וגיטין	
7.	ויבמות	
8.	כאמלה וכראים	ג דג
9.	ובעץ קידושין	
10.	גירהא מקטועה	
11.	מן מואצ̈יה מכתלפה מן אלתלמוד	
12.	תפסיר תרי עשר	דינ
13.	גזוין מגלדה ברק	
14.	גזו מגלד באסוד פיה	??? דינ
15.	שעות קדים	
16.	מגלד באחמר	
17.	גזו פירוש יבמות	תלת דינ
18.	לרבנו שמואל	
19.	גזו פיה	
20.	פירוש כתובות לשמואל	
21.	מגרד עאנז בראסה	רבע דינ
22.	מן וסטה	
23.	גזו מגלד פיה אגדה	
24.	שיר השירים	
25.	גזו רק מגלד בגלד אחמר	רבע דינ
26.	פיה אגדה א׳כה	
27.	גזו מגלד פיה נצף	
28.	ויקרא רבה וגזו מגלד פיה	רבע דינ
29.	אלכלאם פי אלחלומות ?	
30.	תלמוד ברכות	

Verso

1.	גזו מגלד פיה דראיש	תלת דינ
2.	ללאפסאקאת	
3.	לר׳ תנחומה	
4.	גזו מגלד פיה דראשאת	רבע דינ
5.	י״ג כראסה אחדתהם	
6.	רק בכט רבנו נסים ז״ל	
7.	פיהא תשובות שאלות	
8.	לרבנו האיי ואלפאט שבת	
9.	ועירובין וזרעים וטהרות	
10.	ותפסיר אלהלכה אלאולה מן	נצף ורבע
11.	ברכות	
12.	מסאיל בן באבשר	נצף דינ
13.	גזו פיה פירוש ברכות	

14. לרבינו האיי מגרד	תלת דינ
15. כראריס רק כבאר קדם	
16. פיהא תשובות ללגאונים	
17. הראשונים ז״ל	סדם דינ
18. גזו רק מגרד פיה	
19. תפסיר יהושע	
20. ...קין וגזו רק מגרד	תלת דינ
21. פיה אלפאץ הלכות גדולות	
22. [גזו רק] פיה אגדת רות	
23. וגזואני רק פיה אגדת	
24. שמואל	
25. גזו פיה דרג תשובות שאלות	
26. אולו ראובן אית ליה ממונה	
27. לא שמעון בעדים ובשטר	

Recto

TRANSLATION

1. In Thy name, O Merciful one![50]	
2. Targūm of the Haftārah "Parah"[51]	Two Dīnārs
3. in Babylonian Script,[52] bound (and) provided with glosses.[53]	
4. The Halakhoth of Rabbi Yiẓḥaḳ[54]	Ten Dīnārs
5. Three treatises of the Talmud.	
6. Kethubhoth, and Sotah and Giṭṭīn	
7. .....and (also) Yebhāmōth.....[55]	
8. Complete, and some folios[56] (in addition).	Three Dīnārs

[50] The writer evidently is following his Mohammedan fellow-men and is reproducing at the head of the list the equivalent of بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم.

[51] The Pārāshat Pārah is usually read on the Saturday after Purim. In the year 1927, it fell on March 26th. The ordinary Haftārah that goes with it is taken from Ezekiel XXXVI, 16 et seq. But, I do not know what ritual the writer is following. Notice the Arabicized form افاطير! Cf. فراريشى = פרשות, &c. *R.É.J.*, XXXIX, p. 208. سدادور = סדורים.

[52] عراقى cf. *J.Q.R.*, XX, 459, 28 نخط عراقى.

[53] As explained by Professor GOLDZIHER. See *J.Q.R.*, XV, p. 77, note ملوح. Cf. XX, 459, line 22.

[54] Alfasi.

[55] At the beginning of the line a word has been crossed out. I can not read the end of the line—the whole having been inserted after the following one had been written.

[56] كراريس. Here, also, Arabic models have been followed—quires are numbered and not pages. These quires, in Arabic MSS., number usually between seven and ten pages. כאמלה = كاملة.

9. Also, a part of Ḳiddūshīn
10. In addition, portions
11. from various parts of the Talmud.[57]
12. A commentary on the Twelve Minor Prophets. One Dīnār
13. Two portions[58] bound in Vellum.[59]
14. One portion bound in black,[60] in which are ? Dīnār
15. .....[61]
16. bound in red.
17. A portion (containing) the Commentary on Yebhāmoth ⅓ Dīnār
18. by Rabbenu Samuel.[62]
19. A portion containing
20. The commentary to Kethuboth by Samuel[63]
21. unbound, worn out[64] at the beginning ¼ Dīnār
22. of the middle part.
23. A portion (of a book) bound, in which is the Haggadah[65] ⅓ Dīnār
24. to the Song of Solomon.
25. A portion—paper—bound in red leather[66] ¼ Dīnār
26. in which is the Haggadah to Lamentations.[67]
27. A portion (of a book) bound, in which is one-half of
28. Wayyiḳra Rabbah; and a portion—bound—in which is ¼ Dīnār

[57] תלמוד مختلفة فى مواضية من مقطوعة غيرها. Cf. קטעטין טכתלפה, *J.Q.R.*, XX, 459, line 33.

[58] جزوين.

[59] برق Poznański (*Zeitschrift für Hebräische Bibliographie*, XII, 122) is inclined in some cases to translate برق by "paper"! In *R.É.J.*, XXXII, 127, 6 ורק = ورق.

[60] Black cloth? The number before דינר is unreadable.

[61] I can not make out this line. The last word may be the Hebrew קדים or the Arabic قدس. תלת = ثلث.

[62] Who this R. Samuel is, I do not know. He can hardly be Samuel ha-Nagid, as we have no reference to any commentary to parts of the Talmud written by him. The same can be said of Samuel ben Ḥananyah. The reference, evidently, is to Samuel ben Ḥofni (died 1034). In another list there is distinct mention of סיר' יבמות לבן חפני. See *J.Q.R.*, XIII, p. 54, line 56. Cf. also, *R.É.J.*, LXXII, 171; Recto, line 6.

[63] See previous note.

[64] = عاجز "old." The Arabic is bad: عاجز براسه من وسطه, yet I do not see what other meaning can be gotten out of the words. רבע = ربع.

[65] הגדה in these fragments and lists is probably used as we would use the word מדרש—a moralizing explanation of a portion of the Bible. For those on the Song of Songs see *Jewish Encyclopaedia*, VIII, p. 564; and Schechter, *Agadath Shir Ha-Shirim*, Cambridge 1896.

[66] بجلد احمر.

[67] I do not know that any such exists.

29. The discussion concerning "Dreams"[68] (which is in)
30. the Talmud (treatise) Berākhōth.

Verso

1. A portion (of a book), bound, in which there are Derāshōth[69]
2. on the Pesiḳtas $\frac{1}{3}$ Dīnār
3. of Rabbi Tanḥūmah.[70]
4. A portion (of a book), bound, in which there are Derāshōth $\frac{1}{4}$ Dīnār
5. 13 quires—which I procured[71]
6. (on) vellum[72] in the handwriting of Rabbēnū Nissīm[73]—may his memory be blessed!—
7. in which are legal decisions
8. by Rabbēnū Ḥai,[74] and explanations[75] of the words used in the (treatises) Shabbāth
9. and ʿErūbhīn, and Zerāʿīm and Ṭohorōth;
10. and a commentary upon the first Halākhah of
11. Berākhōth. $\frac{1}{2}+\frac{1}{4}$ Dīnār
12. "Questions of Ibn Babishr."[76] $\frac{1}{2}$ Dīnār
13. A portion (of a book), in which there is a commentary on Berākhōth

[68] The reading is not quite certain, as there seems to be a letter after the word חלוטות. The reference is to Berākhōth 55a—57b et seq. (Louis Ginzberg).

[69] i.e. homiletic expositions. דראש is an Arabicized broken plural (فعال) the equivalent of דרשות in Hebrew; on line 4, the Hebrew word is used.

[70] One of the three collections of Haggādhōth to the Pentateuch that are ascribed to Rabbi Tanhūmah bar Abbā, an early Palestinian haggadist.

[71] = احدتهم.

[72] Or "paper."

[73] Perhaps R. Nissīm bar Jacob of Kairuan, of the eleventh century. That the handwriting was a matter of concern, see *R.É.J.*, XXXII, 127, 11 בכט יד שלטה.

[74] i.e. Ḥai ben Sherirah, Gaon of Pumbedita (lived 939—1038); famed for his legal decisions or Responsa. See *Jewish Encyclopaedia*, VI, p. 153 and *J.Q.R.*, New Series, IV, p. 419.

[75] אלפאט = الفاظ. Evidently a lexicographic study of difficult words in the various treatises mentioned. Cf. Poznański in *J.Q.R.*, XIII, 326, line 45; who supposes that a title אלפאט ברכות refers to some such work by either Sherirah or Ḥai. The title אלפאט occurs often in these lists of books. It is also written לפצה; cf. *R.É.J.*, LXXII, 170, line 8, where Mann translates ἀπαξειρημένα, *ibid.*, XL, 57 אלאלפאץ.

[76] I am not certain of the reading of the name. The last letter looks rather like ד than ר. If it is ד, the name must be Persian. I have—provisionally—equated it with the Arabic بن ابى بشر. מסאיל (مسائل) is the straight Arabic translation of שאלות. Evidently, the work was written in Arabic, cf. *R.É.J.*, XXXIX, 200, 1. 37, מסאיל לרבנו סעדיה ז"ל. The work may, also, refer to "questions" concerning the Twelve Minor Prophets. Cf. *J.Q.R.*², XIII, 382.

14. by Rabbēnū Ḥai[77]—unbound. ⅓ Dīnār
15. Brochures of paper, large, old
16. in which are the "Decisions" of the early
17. Geōnīm[78]—May their memory be blessed! ⅙ Dīnār
18. A portion (of a book), unbound, in which is
19. a commentary on Joshuah.
20. .....[79] and a portion (of a book), paper, unbound ⅓ Dīnār
21. in which are explanations of the words used in the Halākhōth Gedhōlōth.[80]
22. (a portion of a book),[81] paper, in which is the Haggādhāh to Ruth
23. and two portions (of a book), paper, in which is the Haggādhāh
24. to Samuel.[82] [¼ Dīnār
25. A portion (of a book), in which is a tract[83] containing "Ritual Decisions"
26. the beginning of which is "Reuben has money;
27. not Simeon; (this is verified) by witnesses and by a legal document."[84]

No. 4

Cambridge MS. Feb. 56. C. 2821. fol. 49.

This and the following list contain inventories of the volumes and other paraphernalia belonging to certain synagogues. The present one concerns the Synagogue of the Palestinians in Fostat.

Recto

.1 תבת מא תסלמה טאהר
.2 בן אלשיך מחפוט אלכאדם
.3 מן מוגוד כניסה אלשאמיין
מרחשון אתצח

[77] Probably a portion of his commentary on the Mishnah; in which many philological remarks are to be found. In this connection, one thinks also of his important dictionary of the difficult words in the Talmudic literature (al-Ḥāwi).

[78] The well-known חשובות הגאונים. סדם = سدس.

[79] The word is unreadable. From the last letters one would suppose the word to be גיקין, but that would be out of place here.

[80] The well-known work of Simeon Ḳayyārah (ninth century), cf. Poznański, *Studien zur gäonäischen Epoche*, I, 19. Cf. *R. É. J.*, XXXII, 127, line 13.

[81] The first letters are all smudged over. I read גו רק.

[82] I do not know of any collection of Haggādhōth to the Books of Samuel.

[83] דרג = درج, see Lane s.v. or درج Muḥīṭ al-Muḥīṭ, s.v. p. 238 الدرج مصدر والدى يكتب فيه.

[84] I am not sufficiently versed in the Responsa literature to be able to identify the passage, and, therefore, the tract.

ג דפאת

4. מצחף תורה בדסתין לכניסת הירושלמיין מצחף תורה

5. מצחף תורה איצא ג דפאת מצחף תורה איצא ג דפאת
6. מצחף תורה איצא ג דפאת מצחף תורה ג דפאת
7. מצחף תורה בג דפאת מצחף גאמע ללמקרא
8. מצחף תורה איצא ג דפאת מצחף תורה איצא ג דפאת
9. מצחף תורה איצא ג דפאת מצחף תורה איצא ג דפאת
10. מצחף תורה איצא ג דפאת מצחף גאמע פיה אלמקרא
11. מצחף תורה כביר ג דפאת מצחף צגיר פיה אלתורה ג דפאת
12. מצחף צגיר פיה אלתורה דפתין מצחף צגיר פיה אלתורה נאקץ
13. מצחף תורה נאקץ כראיס מצחף תורה נאקץ אולה ושמרתם
14. מצחף תורה נאקץ אולה והיה העלמה היצאת
15. מצחף תורה נאקץ מצחף תורה צגיר נאקץ
16. מצחף נביאים פיה ארבעה אלאכיר ג דפאת
17. כראיס מן ד אלאכיר מצחף פיה אלתמאניה נביאים
18. מצחף פיה ארבעה אלאול מצחף פיה ארבעה אלאול
19. מצחף פיה ארבעה אלאול וספרין מן ארבעה אלאכיר

Verso

20. מצחף פיה ארבעה אלאול וספרין מן ארבעה אלאכיר
21. מצחף פיה אלכתובים. מצחף צגיר פיה ארבעה אלאול
22. מצחף אלתאג מצחף כתומים ענד אלדיאן ד מנשה
23. מצחף תורה ענד אלש אבו אלפכר בן אלנזר קבץ.
24. כמסה מצאחף תורה ומצחף כתובים
25. תאגין פצה וג אזואג רמאמין פצה
26. אתנין ועשרין נמט חריר ומן גמלתהם נמט ממזג
27. ואיצא נמטין אלנמיע ארבעה ועשרין
28. וסתה ותלתין טבק וקנדילין נחאס כבאר
29. וקנדילין צנאר נחאס אלנמיע תסלמה טאהר
30. ותסלם טאהר איצא
31. תאגין פצה וה אזואג
32. רמאמין

Note:

ואנצאף אלי דלך
מצחף תורה גדיד
אסתנסכתהא סתנא
אלרקאמה ואקדשתה
לכניסת אלשאמיין

Recto TRANSLATION

1. 2. Inventory[85] of that which Ṭhāhir[86] son of the Sheikh Maḥfūṭh,[87] the beadle[88]
3. has received of that which was found in the Synagogue[89] of the Syrians[90] (in the month of) Marḥeshwan 1498.[91]
4. A volume of the Pentateuch in two quires,[92] belonging to the Synagogue of the Jerusalemites.[93] A volume of the Pentateuch in three quires.[94]
5. A similar volume of the Pentateuch in three quires. A similar volume of the Pentateuch in three quires.
6. A similar volume of the Pentateuch in three quires. A volume of the Pentateuch in three quires.
7. A volume of the Pentateuch in three quires. A volume containing the entire Bible.[95]
8. A similar volume of the Pentateuch in three quires. A similar volume of the Pentateuch in three quires. A similar volume of the Pentateuch in three quires.
9. A similar volume of the Pentateuch in three quires. A similar volume of the Pentateuch in three quires.
10. A similar volume of the Pentateuch in three quires. A volume[96] containing the whole Bible.
11. A large[97] volume of the Pentateuch in three quires. A small volume, in which is the Pentateuch, in three quires.

[85] i.e. ثبة. Cf. *R.É.J.*, XXXIX, p. 199, where BACHER has not quite caught the meaning of the title ثبة ما حارج "List of that which is to be excepted."

[86] ظاهر.

[87] محفوظ.

[88] الخادم = חַשָּׁמָשׁ.

[89] Read בי כניסת.

[90] See my account of this Synagogue in *J.Q.R.*, XXIX, 506.

[91] Seleucid Era = 1186/7 of the common era.

[92] The letters are quite plain בדסתין بدستين. "Dast" is "a quire, or twenty-five sheets folded together, of paper." (LANE.) This is the only place in which this word is used.

[93] I do not know to which Synagogue he is referring.

[94] I have translated دفة by "quire," as this seems to fit the sense best. It means really "the two sides or boards of a book." (LANE s. v.) In Algeria, according to Helot, it means "page d'un livre." (DOZY s. v.) In line 7, we have בב' דמאת, with the preposition.

[95] مصحف جامع للمقرا. Cf. line 10. אלמקרא مصحف جامع فيه.

[96] The word איצא was written, but has been crossed out.

[97] صغير—كبير. Care is taken to state whether or not the volume is large.

12. A large volume, in which is the Pentateuch, in two quires. A small volume, in which is the Pentateuch—incomplete.[98]
13. A volume containing the Pentateuch—wanting certain folios.[99] A volume of the Pentateuch in three folios, commencing with the words: "And ye shall keep."[100]
14. A volume of the Pentateuch, incomplete, commencing with the words: "And it shall come to pass when the virgin cometh forth."[101]
15. A volume of the Pentateuch, incomplete. A small volume of the Pentateuch, incomplete.
16. A volume of the Prophets, in which are the last four,[102] in three quires.
17. Some folios from the last four (Prophets). A volume in which are the eight Prophetic books.[103]
18. A volume in which are the first four (Prophets). A volume in which are the first four.
19. A volume in which are the first four; and two books of the last four.

Verso

20. A volume in which are the first four; and two books of the last four.
21. A volume in which are the Hagiographa. A small volume in which are the first four.
22. A volume (entitled) "The Crown."[104] A volume of the Hagiographa, in the possession of the Dayyān Rabbi Menasseh.[105]
23. A volume of the Pentateuch in the possession of the Sheikh[106] Abū al Fakhr[107] ibn al-Nazar.[108] Already returned.[109]

[98] ناقص.

[99] ناقص كراريس.

[100] Exodus XII, 17, though there are many passages commencing with this word.

[101] Genesis XXIV, 43.

[102] i.e. נביאים אחרונים, the purely prophetic writings. So, also, in line 17–19, &c.

[103] i.e. נביאים ראשונים and נביאים אחרונים.

[104] This can not be the تاج العارفين of Abraham Maimuni (see STEINSCHNEIDER, *Arabische Literatur der Juden*, p. 223), as the author lived in Cairo during the early part of the thirteenth century. Is he, perhaps, referring to the כתר מלכות of Solomon ibn Gabirol?

[105] A Menasse ben Joseph is mentioned as Dayyān (judge) in Cairo towards the end of the twelfth century. See MANN, *The Jews in Egypt*, II, p. 317.

[106] אלש = الشيخ.

[107] Cf. فخر الدين.

[108] Cf. نزار.

[109] قبض.

24. Five volumes of the Pentateuch and a volume of the Hagiographa.
25. Two Sepher-crowns made out of silver, and three pair of pomegranates[110] made of silver.
26. Twenty-two Sepher-covers[111] made of silk; some of the Sepher-covers brocaded[112] with gold.
27. In addition, two Sepher-covers; all in all, twenty-four (such covers).
28. And thirty-six plates;[113] and two large candelabra made of copper.[114]
29. And two small candelabra of copper. All of this Ṭhāhir received.
30. And Ṭhāhir received also
31. 32. two Sepher-crowns made of silver, and five pairs of pomegranates. Note:[115] And there was added[116] to this, a volume of the Pentateuch, newly written,[117] which our sister al-Rakāmah has had written[118] and which she has presented[118] to the Synagogue of the Syrians.

No. 5.

Cambridge MS. Feb. G. 56. c. 2821 (p. 50).

An inventory of the books belonging to the Synagogue of the Mesopotamian Jews.

Recto

תבת מה תסלמה מחפוט
.2 אלכאדם פי כניסת אלעראקיין אתצנ ותסלם דלך סאלם
.3 מצחף מלווח תורה אלדי אשתרי מן אבנא בן אלמרנאני
.4 מצחף צגיר דפתין מצחף צגיר קרא ותרגום
.5 מצחף מלווח תורה עליה הקדיש אותו משה בן צלחק
.6 מצחף תורה בתלתה דפאת הקדיש אותו שמריה בר דוד
.7 מצחף תורה הקדיש אותו שמריה בר יוסף מצחף תורה הקדיש אותו
.8 שמריה בר עמרם לכניסה דמוה מצחף תורה דפתין עליה הקדיש ???
.9 מצחף כתיב הקדיש אותו בנין בר יעקב מצחף כתיב
.10 מצחף כתיב הקדיש אותו אפרים הרופא בי׳ר יפת בר יצחק

[110] i.e. to be hung on the Scroll of the Law; cf. Exodus XXVIII, 34. The word is an Arabicized plural of רִמּוֹן.

[111] نمط.

[112] ممزّج. See Dozy s. v.

[113] طبق plates for ceremonial use, e.g. during the Passover festival.

[114] وقنديلين نحاس كبار.

[115] The note is in a different hand.

[116] وانضاف الى ذلك.

[117] جديد.

[118] استنسختها, but something is wrong, as the word is usually masculine in gender; as is seen in the word واقدشته = הַקְדִישָׁהּ.

11. ארבע אלאכיר קרא ותרגום מצחף כביר פיה אלארבע אלאול עליה
12. אלישיך אבו מנצור אלטביב אקאם בנצף תמנה מן מאלה ואלבאקי מן אלקחלה
13. כתיב נאקץ אולה ביתּ האלהים אלמן .מצחף פיה אלתורה נאקץ ואלכתובים
14. נאקץ איצא מצחפין צגאר פיהמא ארבעה אספאר מן אלנביאים
15. פי אחדהמה שמואל ומלכים ואלאכר ישעיה וירמיה מצחף פיה
16. אלארבעה אלאול עליה מכתוב הקדיש אותו מבשר בר יצחק
17. מצחף נביאים פיה אלתמאניה עליה הקדיש אותו שלמה בר נתן החבר
18. וענד אבוסחק אלמעלם מתחפין תורה כט ר זכאי וארבעה אלאול
19. מצחף כביר קרא ותרגום אטבאין סבעה ותלתין ועקרבין וגנביי

Verso

20. ועת בה מני אלגמיע תסלמה מחפוטׂ אלכאדם שמואל
21. מנשה בן אלעזר
22. ותסלם דלך גמיעה מן מחפוטׂ אלשמש אבו אלפרג
23. בן אלשיך אבו סעד אלמצרי ענד מא תסלם כדמה
24. אלעראקיין ותסלם מצחף אלי דלך גזו פיה ספר
25. במדבר וגזו פיה ספר ואלה שמות ומגלסיהן
26. ודאעה למנצור אבו סתות אללוי אלסמסאר בדאר צוף
27. שמואל. אלעזר ביתּ מיכאל נעׂ
28. ואנצאף אלי מא תסלמה אבו אלפרג אלכאדם אלמדכור
29. חסב מא הו משרוח לעיל מצחף תורה דפתין
30. כאן ענד אלדיין אלותיק נעׂ אכד בעד רפאתה
31. שמואל. ואנצאף אלי דלך גזוין מלוחה פיהמא
32. אלתורה מכמלה תסלמהמא ללכניסה אלמדכורה
33. שמואל הלוי. ואנצאף אלי דלך מצחף תורה צגיר מלוח
34. אקדישה תמים אלצבאג בן אלנסתאם
35. ואנצאף אלי דלך מצחף נביאים פיה אלתמאניה אספאר
36. קרא ותרגום כאן פי אלכזאנה יסלמה איצא אבו אלפרג
37. אלמדכור שמואל הלוי. ואנצאף אלי דלך מצחף תורה
38. גדיד אסתנסכתה אסתנא ואקדשתה ללכניסה אלמדכורה

Margin:

ואיצא מצחף מן אלקאהרה ואנצאף אלי דלך מצחף צגיר פיה ספר ברשית
ואלה שמות הקדישה אותו בחייה לכניסה הכבליין שמואל

Translation

Recto

1. 2. Inventory of that which Maḥfūṭh the beadle has received in the Synagogue of the 'Irāḳians[119] (in the year) 1493,[120] and he has received it in good condition:

[119] Cf. my note in regard to this Synagogue in *J.Q.R.*, XIX, 509.

[120] Seleucid Era = 1181/2 of our present era.

3. A volume of the Pentateuch with glosses, which he has bought from the sons of Ibn al-Marjānī.
4. A small volume—two folios; a small volume (containing) text and Targum.
5. A volume of the Pentateuch with glosses—upon which are the words[121] "Moses ben Ṣalḥaḳ has donated it."
6. A volume of the Pentateuch in three quires, which Shemariah bar David[122] has donated.
7. A volume of the Pentateuch which Shemariah bar Joseph has donated. A volume of the Pentateuch, which has donated
8. Shemariah bar Amram for the Synagogue of Dūmuh.[123] A volume of the Pentateuch, in two quires—upon it are written "B...[124] has donated it."
9. A volume of the Hagiographa; Binyan[125] bar Jacob has donated it. A volume of the Hagiographa....[126]
10. A volume of the Hagiographa; Ephraim, the physician, son of Rabbi Yefeth[127] bar Isaac has presented it.
11. The four last books (of the Prophets)—text and Targum. A large volume, in which are the first four parts (of the Prophets); upon it is written:
12. "The Sheikh Abū Manṣur, the physician, acquired it by paying one-half of its price out of his own pocket[128]; and the rest from the funds of the community."

[121] i.e. عليه مكتوب.

[122] Is this the same as the Nagid Shemariah ben David? MANN, *loc. cit.*, I, 250?

[123] See my article above mentioned, p. 502. The correct pronounciation has been fixed by the late Professor C. F. SEYBOLD (*Z.D.M.G.*, LXII, 565) on the basis of Yāḳūṭ's *Mushtarik*, &c. I had myself transcribed it in this manner: but I referred to the Paris MS. of al-Sambārī, where the name is written דאבואה?...

[124] The name is in a corner and not legible easily. It looks like ...בנינה בת. If reference is had to a woman, the verb ought to be in the feminine. The Arabs have a name بنين. See Dhahabīs' *Mushtabih*, ed. DE JONG, p. 57.

[125] See note 124; or is בנך a mistake for בנימין? A Benjamin bar Jacob is mentioned by MANN, *loc. cit.*, II, 335. But there are no means to tell us that he is the man referred to here.

[126] I can not make out the last two words. The first letter is ה; then comes a *lāmedh* changed to a ḳoph; and then possibly the word הדנת!! I have translated כתוב here, and in other places as if it were the equivalent of כתיבה, which occurs in line 13. But in the same line we find כתוב נאקן!

[127] Cf. MANN, II, 330.

[128] من ماله.

13. The Hagiographa, incomplete; commencing with the words: "The house of the Lord..." [129] A volume, in which is the Pentateuch, incomplete; and the Hagiographa,
14. also incomplete. Two small volumes, in which [130] are four books of the Prophets;
15. in one of them are the Books of Samuel and Kings; in the other Isaiah and Jeremiah. A volume in which are the first four books (of the Prophets), upon
16. which is written: "Mebasser bar Isaac has given them."
17. A volume of the Prophets, in which are the eight: upon it (is written) "Solomon bar Nathan ha-ḥāber [131] has given them."
18. In the possession of Abu Isḥaḳ al-Mu'allim are kept [132] a volume of the Pentateuch in the handwriting of Rabbi Zakkai, and the first four (books of the Prophets).
19. A large volume (of the Bible), text and Targum..... [133]

Verso

20. .....All these beadle Maḥfūṭḥ received. (Signed by) [135]
21. Samuel (and) Menasseh ben Eliezar.
22. All this was handed over by Maḥfūṭḥ the beadle [136] to Abū al-Faraj
23. ibn al-Shaikh Abū Sa'ad al-Miṣrī, [137] together with that which was handed over by the servants of the 'Irāḳians. [138]
24. There was handed over, in addition to this, [139] a volume (containing)

[129] The third word is difficult to read; and I have been unable to identify the passage.

[130] فيهما.

[131] وعند ابى اسحق المعلّم, i.e. "the teacher."

[132] متحفّيين.

[133] The words seem to be added by a later hand; though the first words on the verso are also unintelligible. אטבאין is perhaps أُطِبَأْيين, a plural derived from the word طَبْئَى or from ظَبْئَى "a wild goat." Then we should have "thirty-seven wild goats, and scorpions and thieves."

[134] Are we to read وعتّبه منى "and he took them from me"? But this gives no sense.

[135] The following notes are all signed by Samuel—except the first one, which is signed also by Menasseh ben Eliezer. Who this Samuel Halevi was I do not know.

[136] Here the Hebrew word שַׁמָּשׁ is used.

[137] "The Egyptian."

[138] i.e. The Congregation of the 'Irāḳians.

[139] مُضاف الى ذلك.

25. the Book of Numbers, and a volume containing the Book of Exodus and their discourses.[140]
26. He summoned him[141] before al-Manṣūr abu Satūt[142] al-Lāwī,[143] the broker in the Dār Ṣūf.[144]
27. (Signed) Samuel Eliezar son of Rabbi Michael—may his soul rest in Eden.
28. There was added to that which Abū al-Faraj the afore mentioned beadle received,
29. as has been explained above,[145] a volume of the Pentateuch (in) two quires.
30. It had been in the possession of the distinguished Dayyān—may his soul rest in Eden. It was regained[146] after his death. (Signed)
31. Samuel. There were added to this two portions with glosses,[147] in which was
32. the whole of the Pentateuch, which were given over to the above mentioned Synagogue.
33. (Signed) Samuel ha-Levi. There was added to this a small copy of the Pentateuch with glosses,
34. which had been given[148] by Tamīm al-Sabbāgh[149] ibn al-Nistās.[150]

[140] وَمَجْلِسَيْهِنَّ. This seems to be a post-classical use of the word مجلس. See LANE s.v. "Leçon d'un professeur," DOZY s.v. It may, here, have some different meaning; their being no reason apparent why the "discourses" contained in the book should receive special mention.

[141] I have translated as if the word was derived from the root دعى. It might come from ودع, "he left them with." The following preposition would be peculiar.

[142] Or Situt = סתות. "Das Behauen der Steine"; KOHUT, *Aruch Completum*, VI, 151.

[143] = הלוי.

[144] I can not find such a name in PAUL CASANOVA's *Essai de reconstitution topographique de la ville d'al Foustat ou Miṣr* in the *Mémoires* published by the Institut français d'archéologie Orientale du Caire 1916, et seq.; nor in WORMAN's *Notes on the Jews in Fustat*, *J. Q. R.*, XVIII, 3 et seq.

[145] לעיל حسب ما مشروح, a mixture of Arabic and later Hebrew.

[146] أَخَذَ.

[147] Text has מלוחה?

[148] اقدشه = הקדישו.

[149] الصبّاغ "the dyer."

[150] I am guessing at the punctuation. It is a name common today in Syria, but usually carried by Christians, and is supposed by them to be derived from "Athanasius." In Egypt Ἀθανάσα. See PREISIGKE, *Namenbuch, enthaltend alle Menschennamen, soweit sie in griechischen Urkunden Ägyptens sich vorfinden*, p. 10. Or, have we here a form of the name Νεσθνῆφις; *ibid.*, p. 230?













35. There was added to this a copy of the Prophets, in which were the eight books,
36. text and Targum. They had been in the cupboard.[151] This, also, Abū al-Faraj,
37. already mentioned, took over. (Signed) Samuel ha-Levi. There was added to this a copy of the Pentateuch,
38. new, which our mistress had had copied and had given[152] to the above mentioned Synagogue.

Marginal Note: And, also, a volume (of the Pentateuch) from Cairo. To this was added a small volume in which were the Books of Genesis and Exodus. Buhaiyyah[153] had presented it to the Synagogue of the Babylonians.[154] (Signed) Samuel.

[151] Or, "in a box."
[152] واقدشته = והקדישתהו.
[153] بُهَيَّة. Cf. al-Dhahabī, *loc. cit.*, p. 59.
[154] Notice the use of "Babylonians" for "Irāḳians."

Note:—In connection with note 47, Professor Samuel Krauss advises me that such a commentary does exist; the same holds true in regard to the collections referred to in notes 67 and 82.

JEWISH LIFE IN ANCIENT ROME

HUGO GRESSMANN

A number of things about the Jews and Jewish life in Rome can be gleaned from literature. These accounts, however, receive life and color primarily when we consult the photographs, which give us a more explicit picture. When correctly studied, both the text and the pictures mutually complement each other, and enable us to look deep into the spiritual life and the intellectual currents of that time. These pictures are derived almost exclusively from the catacombs, and it is therefore necessary that I lead you into the realm of the dead, in order to make you acquainted with the living. Up till now, six positively Jewish catacombs have been discovered in Rome. Most of them, however, have already gone to ruin, because, I am sorry to say, no one had any special interest in them. They have not even been scientifically described in a satisfactory manner. The inscriptions alone, attractive to the philologist, are to a certain degree accessible. Little attention has been paid to the pictures, with the result that we know them for the most part only through bad sketches and unsatisfactory reproductions. Nevertheless, we have to be thankful for this much; for something is better than nothing. The paintings from the newly discovered catacomb in front of the Porta Pia, under the Villa Torlonia, have been re-photographed by Dr. LIETZMANN and have not yet been published.

I

The oldest report which we have concerning the Jews in Rome is very peculiar, and sounded so improbable to previous investigators that they could make no sense out of it. The writer Valerius Maximus, who lived under the Emperor Tiberius, informs us, basing himself upon older sources, that in 139 B.C. the Roman spiritual constabulary under the Praetor Cornelius Hispalus drove the "Chaldeans" out of Rome.

"He also compelled the Jews, who had dared to corrupt Roman morals through the cult of Zeus Sabazios, to reclaim their houses through legal procedure." As is easily understood, scholars thought at first of a confusion between the Phrygian God Zeus Sabazios and the Jewish God Kyrios Sabaoth, "Lord of the heavenly hosts," as Jahwe is often named in the sacred Scriptures. Such a confusion, however, is in itself improbable, and such an assumption is in any event only then permissible, when every other explanation fails.

The worship of Sabazios can be traced back to Phrygia and if the report of Valerius Maximus is true, then it becomes necessary to think of the Jews of Asia-Minor, to be more exact of Phrygia.

The mother of the gods in Asia-Minor came first to Rome in 204 B.C. On an altar, now in the Capitolian Museum in Rome, the transportation of the image of the goddess on the ship "Salvia" is pictured, in connection with a tradition handed down by Ovid. Since the Tiber, as a result of a dry spell, had but little water, the ship grounded, and in spite of all efforts could not be floated again. Thereupon Claudia separated herself from the group of matrons; she had undeservedly received a bad reputation, and now requested the goddess to prove her purity through a miracle and to restore her good reputation. She had hardly touched the hawser, when the ship followed her willingly, and let itself be dragged by her to Rome. Since the time the Idaeian mother goddess had entered Rome, there came soon other deities out of Asia-Minor, and they began to disintegrate the Roman religion. Among them was the Phrygian Sabazios, whom we know from many monuments. The main field in the middle shows the bearded Sabazios in the purple-colored cap, the long-sleeved over-garment, the trousers and shoes; the garments are made of purple silk. The god wears the Phrygian costume. It claims our attention, because we have to think of the Jews of Asia-Minor in Rome in the same costume.

Out of the manifold details, with which the picture is covered, only one thing interests us; what conception of god is here expressed. In the tympan, Helios in his four-horse chariot appears between two five-rayed stars; and in the two corners, right and left, stand the two Dioscuri, to indicate morning and evening. In the mainfield, on the top to the right, the bust of the sun-god is pictured; to the left the bust of the moon-goddess. All that means very clearly: This

God is the God of the heavens, whom sun, moon, and stars have to obey; and so he is named innumerable times in the inscriptions: *Hypsistos*, the most high, the god of the heavens, who guides the destiny of the world and together with the planets rules the hearts of mankind. On the peculiar bronze hands, which are consecrated to Sabazios, two busts have been placed, to the right that of Sabazios himself, to the left that of Hermes-Mercury, the leader of the dead. In the Phrygian inscriptions, we come across at times, in addition to the "most high god," the good or "the divine angel," whom we may consider as identical with this Hermes-Mercury.

It has been maintained, that Sabazios received his title, "the most high god," through the influence of Judaism. That would be quite possible; for since the time of the Seleucids (about 200 B.C.) there were large numbers of Jews in Phrygia, and in fact the Jews liked to characterize their god as the "most high." The city Apameia was the centre of Phrygian Jewry, and we still have an obvious testimony of the esteem which Jewry there enjoyed, also in heathen circles, in the bronze coin, from the time of Philippus Arabs (about 242 A.D.), now in the Berlin coin collection. To the right on the water floats the ark, with the inscription NWE; out of it emerge the body of a man and of a woman. On the opened lid is a dove; a second one flies up with an olive-branch. To the left we see the same married couple, Noah and his wife, standing on dry land; they have left the ark and stand worshipping with the right hand lifted up. How does this Jewish picture appear on the coin of a heathen city? The officials of the mint Artemas and Alexander have no Jewish names; just for that reason it has been supposed that they were Jews, without, however, sufficient reason. In all probability the picture means to explain the name of the city: Apameia κιβωτός, "the city of the chests." Then it was a great commercial center. Looking for a good idea for a coin, they found it in the Jewish tradition concerning Noah and his "ark" or chest. So did the Jews, without doubt, influence their heathen surroundings, and therefore it would not seem impossible to derive the title of "the most high god" from Judaism. Recently, however, the tendency has been to look for its origin in the Chaldean astral-religion. In favor of this notion is the prevailing polytheism (Sabazios and Hermes), and especially the astral background. Nevertheless the Jewish influence remains;

it becomes evident in the naming of the god of destiny as the "most high god," and of Hermes as the "good angel."

The Jews of Phrygia, however, did not only influence heathendom but were themselves also influenced by it. We learn positively from the Talmud that they had abandoned their belief, and had broken off every connection with the mother-city, Jerusalem. This process lasted certainly for centuries. At first there were only a few, who renounced their faith for Sabazios; gradually the number grew. The connection with Jerusalem was still very close in the year 62 B.C. We know from Cicero, that the Propraetor of Asia, Flaccus, did not permit the delivery of the annual gold tax of the Phrygian Jews to Jerusalem. He confiscated the money and handed it over to the Roman state treasury. However, already in the middle of the second century B.C., there must have been Jews, of the Asia-Minor colony in Rome, who believed in Sabazios, if we may trust the report of Valerius Maximus. It is possible, that they may have been driven out of Rome for a period, but as soon as the Asia-Minor colony was re-established, we may assume that there was again a large percentage of Jews there. And these Jews, at least some of them, believed in Sabazios. We have evidence of that in the Christian catacomb of Praetextat from the time of about 250 A.D.

The tomb of Vincentius belongs to this catacomb. The paintings represent first of all "the seven pious priests" at the banquet of Vincentius. He himself, with his name over his head, is young and beardless; he wears the Phrygian cap; cap and cloak are made up of purple silk. The dining-room is festooned with flowers; around the semi-circular shaped table is a bolster-like cushion, upon which those who are at dinner support themselves. They are celebrating a sacramental meal: poultry, rabbits, pies, fish, and eight round loaves of bread ornament the table.

"The abduction of Vibia and her descent," as the marginal note reads, is a copy of the abduction of Proserpine. Vibia, the wife of Vincentius, is carried away by the god of the dead. Pluto, laurel-crowned, seizes his prey and is about to mount the chariot, which is drawn by four horses and led by Mercury. Mercury takes hold of the reins, in order to guide the four horsed chariot into Hades. He is lifting his left foot, in order to descend into the opening of the underworld, which looks like the hole of a big overturned cask.

At the trial of Vibia, "*Dispater,*" "the rich father," Pluto or Sabazios, sits on a stone throne, together with his wife "*Aera cura*" (the transcript is wrong!) = Hera kyria. Below, to the right, one sees Mercurius *nuntius* "the messenger (who leads souls)"; he walks in ront of two women, Vibia and Alcestes. He brings them to the two throned deities and to the three deities of destiny, who are standing to their left, the *fata divina.* These three fates should be feminine; and the middle figure is depicted with a beard only through a mistake of the copyist. All three wear a veil, their heads drooping, their hands reverentially in their cloaks. They stand in meek attitude before Pluto, who with a gesture bids them discharge the duties of their judicial office. Alcestes is chosen as illustration of the faithful wife; she is the guardian-angel of Vibia, pleads for her and gives testimony of her faithfulness before the throne of the almighty judge of the dead.

The main painting represents the banquet of the blessed. To the left is the bringing in of Vibia through the "good angel" Hermes-Mercury. After she has passed the examination of the "good" or rather of the cruel judges, she joins the other "judged ones," and receives her place of honor in the midst of the blessed ones, who recline at table, supporting themselves with their left arms. On the table are poultry, fish and pies; to the right a big jug shows that there was no lack of wine even in heaven. To the left, a servant brings in a dish. The banquet takes place in Paradise. Trees jut out behind the table, and in front of it the affodil meadow grows verdant. Two blessed ones are picking flowers on it or are playing dice.

The inscription reads: "You see here the resting place of Vincentius. Many have gone before me. I await all. Eat, drink, play and come to me. As long as you live, do good; you will take that with you. This Vincentius is the high priest of the god Sabazios and has fulfilled the holy commandments, god-like, pious minded." The request to eat, drink, and play naturally refers to the participation in the sacramental banquets, drinking-bouts, and performances in the miracle-plays of the Phrygian God. Vincentius was thus certainly a believer in Sabazios. He was, however, undoubtedly also a believer in Christ; for he is after all buried in a Christian catacomb. He was probably also a Jew, or at least his wife was Jewish. The names are indeed not Jewish, but the name of Vibia is certainly, that of Vincentius probably assumed.

Two reasons argue for Judaism: the laying value upon charitableness and the characterization of Mercury as an angel. In the third century B.C., when mystical religion flourished, there were many seekers after God also among the Jews, who did not know in the lap of which religion they wanted to lay their heads. Just as this Vincentius, so also in the beginning of the second century B.C. the singer of the "Odes of Solomon" was Jew, Christian and heathen at the same time. And since this mixture of religions begins already in the time of Alexander, it is possible that as early as in the second century B.C. Jews who believed in Sabazios lived in Rome and disquieted the hearts of the Roman overseers of religions.

The tomb of Vincentius has given us a uniform picture of a part of Judaism, which has retained almost nothing Jewish, unless it be the searching for God. It becomes clear to us that among the Phrygian Jews there were many tribal differences which manifested themselves outwardly, in differences of dress, as well as in divergent religious points of view. Still more things of a similar character could be shown, if we wanted to follow the traces of Jewish influence in the Christian catacombs. Judaism was the fostering-soil for Christianity, and we need not be surprised to meet both in the tombs of the dead near each other, it being oftentimes hardly possible to distinguish the one from the other. I should like however in the second part of this study to present only the Jewish symbols, as we come across them in the distinctly Jewish cemeteries of the Vigna Randanini and on Monteverde, and similarly in the golden glasses, which probably, for the most part, come out of these two burial places.

II

I should like to begin with the monument, which visualizes for us the utensils of the Jewish temple, the Titus arch in Rome, which was erected in memory of the triumph of the Emperor Titus over Jerusalem in 70 A.D. Not so well known is the relief, which reproduces the Jordan. It depicts oxen as sacrificial offerings, people with baskets of fruit, Senators in their long togas, and soldiers. What most captivates our interest is the figure of an old man, who lies on a bier, supported against a vase, carried by three Romans. Such personifications of rivers in conquered provinces, according to literary reports, are said to have been often represented in triumphal processions. Preserved is

only this picture, which does not rank very high artistically; the figures are loosely arranged next to each other, and the entire theme leaves us cold.

All the more artistic is the effect of the well-known relief with the temple utensils. It may be estimated as one of the handsomest Roman reliefs in the first century A.D. In picturesque procession the unarmed, laurel-crowned Roman soldiers march in through the arch of triumph, which appears in perspective on the left side. Whether or not Jews stride alongside of the soldiers, is questionable. In front of every group is carried a tablet, upon which, we may assume, the booty following it was listed. First (from right to left) the show-bread table, upon which a goblet stands. On the spikes hang the two silver trumpets, then the seven-branched candelabra, and a last piece of booty which because of lack of room was no longer reproduced.

According to Josephus, who has described the festive procession in detail, the Torah was displayed, behind the candelabra, and therefore presumably there should follow here on the Titus-arch a scroll of the Scriptures. We must now examine more exactly the candelabra. The arms, the shaft, and the stand are adorned with almond-blossom-like calixes. The stand consists of two eight-cornered plates, the side-fields of which are provided with animal figures. We hear about these animal figures neither in the description of the candelabra in Ex. 25, nor in Josephus. It has been suggested that the Roman sculptor did not have the model in front of him, and that he added there animal figures on his own artistic impulse. But if everything else is "genuine," then certainly even this detail, which indeed astonishes us at first, is correct. However, the more we learn about the Jewish art of the catacombs and the synagogues, the more we are in a position to understand it.

According to the description in Josephus, the candelabra was made out of gold, while the lamps, which belonged to it, were of brass. Similarly instructive is the table of show-bread with the two trumpets It is not the table of the second temple, which Antiochus Epiphanes had plundered, but that of Judas Maccabeus. The feet are (despite the drawing, which we have here) unfortunately so badly mutilated, that one cannot recognize with certainty whether or not they were feet of animals. Altogether astonishing is the cup on the table. Perhaps there were originally two vessels there. It is

held to be either an incense-vessel, or a ceremonial goblet, out of which libation offerings were made. This goblet is indeed nowhere mentioned in the law, except in Esra, and the conception appears to me to be the correct one.

We find none of these vessels on the golden glasses in the same form in which we have them on the arch of Titus. This is a certain proof that the vessels, which are represented on the golden glasses, do not belong to the temple but to the synagogue. We know Jewish and Christian golden glasses. The larger ones, which measure about 15 cm in the diameter, are like our bowls, the smaller ones are like our wine-glasses; they were originally probably a cheap substitute for expensive vessels of precious metal. Between two flat or slightly arched panes of glass there is inlaid, on the bottom of the cup, a leaf of gold, upon which a drawing has been executed with the etching needle. The technique presupposes a highly developed glass-making art, which probably originates from the Phoenician city of Tyre. The Jews seem to have had a large part in the diffusion of this art. On festive occasions, gold drinking glasses were given as presents to relatives and friends. This explains the customary drinking formula written on them *pie zeses* "drink and you will live," sometimes with the addition *cum omnibus tuis* "with all your relatives," or, as here, *cum eulogia* "with blessings." Golden glasses, however, were also given to the dead, to accompany them into the world beyond and the representation of holy cups by the Jews and of holy scenes by the Christians teaches clearly, that not ordinary, but festive or sacramental banquets are meant. The golden glasses which we still have, belong, for the most part, to the third century A.D.

First of all the Torah-shrine is represented here. Architecturally, it is fashioned like a house; on the top crowned with a tympan, and in front embellished with two pillars. Through the opened doors the compartments can be seen. in which the scrolls of the Scriptures rest. One parchment roll has been taken out and stands, that is, lies to the left of shrine. We ask, what thought is expressed by the fact that the Torah-shrine has been given the form of a house. There are two possibilities for an explanation: either the idea of the synagogue, or the idea of the temple was present. Reasons can be given for both; we can make a decision only later on. On both sides of the shrine are two seven-branched candle-sticks, the left one being

higher than the right, with superimposed oil-lamps. The Torah-shrine and the candle-sticks are probably on the same board, upon which are also other objects. Especially clear is the ram's horn. Peculiar in this representation is the plate with the fish, in the foreground to the left. Behind it we see a piece of the semi-circular shaped, bolstered resting-place, upon which the diners were accustomed to lie. It has been supposed that they are the Presbyters (the elders) who had their places facing the community, with their backs to the Torah-shrine. These pictures would then, so to speak, give us a view of the inside of a synagogue with its equipment, and one would have to assume that also the fish-meal of the Presbyters was celebrated in the synagogue—which is a very improbable assumption. It is much more obvious to think of the banquet of a family, which takes place in the home. The pious sentiment of the Jews demanded also at home the same objects as in the synagogue; and we must presuppose the presence of the seven-branched candle-stick in a Jewish house of Roman times. Nevertheless, this representation is not yet completely explained. The likeness to the picture from the grave of Vincentius rather indicates a meal in the other world, such as we shall see in other representations still more clearly.

A parallel is to be found on a golden glass in the Kaiser-Friedrich-Museum in Berlin. The Torah-shrine, to which five steps lead, occupies the middle of the upper row. The door-wings are opened, the curtains are drawn back. We see the scrolls of the Scriptures, separated by compartments. The shrine is flanked by two seven-branched candle-sticks with superimposed lamps. Two palm-fans have been placed above the candle-sticks. Next to the right candle-sticks we notice a Lulab, or festive bouquet and an Ethrog; next to the left candle-sticks a two-handled wine jar and the ram's horn. Also here in the foreground is a plate with fish. On both sides we still recognize the plaited bolster for the diners. Also on the border in the four corners fishes are drawn, but according to heathen custom, as dolphins with the trident of Poseidon or Neptune in their mouths. We have here certainly nothing more than an influence of the outer form. It is however very characteristic to notice how little afraid the Jews of that time were, and how gladly they let themselves be influenced by the artistic standard set by non-Jews.

As on this golden glass the opened Torah-shrine stands in the upper row, on a base, the slanting line to the right indicates the curtain, which usually guarded the scriptural-scrolls, and is now drawn aside. Next to the shrine two lions rest opposite one another. We know from various synagogues of the Middle-Ages and of modern times that lions were placed as ornaments on the Torah-shrine, or were woven into the curtains. In the synagogue in Ascoli, in Italy, two wooden lions stand on the steps which lead up to the ark. We shall thus have to assume that we have here the reproduction of the plastic ornamentation, such as was customary in the third century B.C. in the Roman synagogues, and perhaps also in private homes. It is possible, that just as in the form of armorial antithesis, ancient Semitic traditions persist in the thought-motive. The lion and other animals in Oriental countries had been considered from times immemorial as the guardians of the sanctuary and the palace.. In the foreground, we see the customary symbols: the burning seven-branched candle-sticks, two ram's horns, the Lulab, Ethrog and the wine-jar. The shape of the candle-sticks is everywhere different, different also from that of the Titus-arch.

There the shaft and the arms were adorned with almond blossoms. This ornamentation is almost completely absent here. There the under-support consisted of two eight-cornered plates; here it is formed differently, in semi-circular fashion. On these carefully engraved candle-sticks of the Monteverde-catacomb the super-imposed bronze lamps stand out clear; on the left side of the lamp the flame of the lighted wicks bursts through. To the right, next to the candle-sticks lies an object, which has been assumed to be a writing tablet, with a column in the middle and two borders on the sides; since, however, profane objects can otherwise not be authenticated with certainty, this explanation is to be rejected. It is more likely to be a representation of the scroll of the Law, which is opened, that is to say, rolled up on both sides.

The marble-plate of Gaudentia also comes out of the Monteverde-catacomb. "Here lies Gaudentia, of priestly family, twenty-four years old. May she rest in peace!" The seven-branched candle-stick has again a different shape than on the Titus-arch, which they always had in sight, or could always look at. The candle-stick is evidently not that of the temple, but is supposed to be the symbol of the

synagogue. The Torah-shrine is likewise not supposed to remind us of the ark of God, the shape of which is entirely different, nor of the tablets of the covenant of Moses, but of the sacred Scriptures of the synagogue. Through five boards six partitions are divided off from one another, in which the scrolls of the Scriptures are supposed to be; but they are no longer indicated here.

The inscription of Samuel on the marble-tablet out of the Montevarde-catacomb reads: "Here lies Samuel, a child not of age, one year and five months old. May he rest in peace! Be comforted, Samuel, no one is immortal,"—a heathen formula of consolation, meaning that no one lives for ever. Opposed to this inscription are others, which know of a life beyond. The most important thing is placed in the middle: the Torah-shrine, flanked on each side by a candelabrum. It has also here a three-cornered tympan, as well as both wings of the door opened, and the steps leading up. Two compartments are visible, in which six Torah-scrolls are lying.

The carved work occupies almost the entire space on the marble slab of Eulogia. In the opened Thora-shrine lie again six scrolls, altho the compartments are missing. Of the two candle-sticks only the one to the right is seven-branched; the one to the left, however, has five arms, a type which we occasionally encounter elsewhere.

We are now perhaps in a position to understand one of the most interesting golden goblets, which were found in Rome in 1882. The inscription reads: "The house of peace. Take the sanctification-cup, drink and you will live and all of your family." It proves, in the first place, that golden glass in general denotes sanctification-cup—the Greek expression εὐλογία corresponding exactly to the Jewish כוס של ברכה. Language usage can prove what the goblets are unable to demonstrate. Already in St. Paul εὐλογία had the same meaning: "sacramental cup," and therefore there can hardly be any doubt, that he took over this expression from Jewish circles and that the custom of the Christian communion goes back to Jewish originals, although indeed, the significance of the Jewish sacramental cup must have been different from that of the Christian Eucharist. Moreover, the temple of Solomon is certainly depicted. In the tympan-field stands the seven-branched candle-stick, which is repeated in front of the temple. The two dark-toned pillars on both sides of the entrance are supposed to correspond to the two pillars

of the temple, Jachin and Boaz. Four steps lead up to the vestibule, which is supported by four red pillars. In the background the richly ornamented door is visible. A colonnade goes around the court; the pillars here have a white color. The two buildings in the same style to the right are probably gateways; next to each entrance grows a palm tree, so common in the Orient. In the foreground to the right we see, next to the seven-branched candle-stick, two jars with handles; the objects to the left can not be explained with certainty, but are probably Lulab and Ethrog, which indicate especially the festival of Tabernacles, and the cup of consolation may also belong to it.

What, however, is the significance of the temple of Solomon here? It undoubtedly represents the otherwise known Torah-shrine, which has here been reproduced by an artist in the form of the sanctuary of Solomon. According to the marginal note, it is the "house of peace"; the Hebrew בית שלום could easily be a clever allusion to בֵּית שלמה "the house of Solomon." However, we can perhaps go a step farther. Since these glasses accompanied the dead person, and since the symbols of this world were to go with him into the world beyond, in order that he might have his Torah-shrine, his seven-branched candle-stick, his sacramental cup there also, and above all that he might be not deprived of his precious festival of Tabernacles, I am inclined to believe that the heavenly temple is really meant here, or more exactly the heavenly Torah-shrine in the form of the heavenly temple. The thought of a heavenly temple was indeed otherwise very prevalent. The artist, confronted with this problem solved it by taking as model the most beautiful sanctuary that he knew, the temple of Solomon. That was verily "the house of peace," where the dead, who rest "in peace," could celebrate their heavenly banquet in blissfulness. The possibility is, however, not excluded, that Torah-shrines in the form of the temple of Solomon were actually erected in the synagogues.

This becomes still more probable, when we remind ourselves of the chariot, which is represented on a door-lintel of a synagogue in Tell Hum. The chariot has here also a temple-like construction, with five pillars on the long sides and with a panelled double-door on the small side; the roof is vault-shaped. The whole body rests on four wheels, two of which, each with six spokes, can easily be recognized. The luxurious chariot is perhaps copied from the holy

chariot of the Ephesian Artemis, whom we know from the coins of the time of Antoninus Pius Gallienus (about 260 A.D.). The only difference is, that instead of five, only four pillars were erected. This is reminiscent of the Roman state-chariot (*carruca,* Hebrew *ḳrukîn*) and it has been supposed that the chariot of the Jewish Patriarch in Capernaum is represented here. He had permission to use such a state-chariot. We do not know, however, whether or not the Roman state-chariot actually looked like that. Much more probable is the allusion to a transportable Torah-shrine, modelled after a temple, especially since we are acquainted with Torah-shrines not only in Rome, but also in the synagogues—for instance in Chorazin, which are shaped like temples, small temples supported by pillars. The question, which was previously raised is answered herewith: we will have to assume everywhere that the Torah-shrine was put together in the form of a house, and furthermore was meant to represent not the synagogue but the temple. And that is very characteristic of the Jewish religion; its chief object of veneration was not an image of a god, which almost all other religions placed in their temples, but the Holy Scriptures. The Scroll of the Law, and not the candle-stick, is the primary symbol of the synagogue.

And now let us consider the funereal tablet of Donat from Monteverde—of "Donat, the scribe of the synagogue of Vernaclorum." We see from the right to the left: a seven-branched candle-stick, an Ethrog, a two-handled jar, a Lulab with the palm-fan and again a seven-branched candle-stick. It is significant that here in the middle a two-handled jug is placed as the chief object. It is usually supposed to be an oil-jug, because, it appeared formerly only together with the candle-stick. This is, however, erroneous because we now possess pictures in which the jug appears without the candle-stick. Moreover, this explanation is not appropriate here, because the oil-jug cannot occupy the central place; only the wine-jug, which corresponds to the sacramental cup, can be in the centre. To be sure, Judaism is here dependent upon the miracle-religions of that time; the sacramental cup became so significant for the Jews, because the Christians possessed as their chief symbol their communion-cup, or the consecrated vessels of Iris, Mithras, Demeter, &c.

On a Jewish grave-stone, which was found in Syracuse, a mighty palm-branch is represented on a step-like base. From the palm-

branch hang two fruits, which indicate the date-palm. Dates are a favorite food in the Orient, and at one time must also have been characteristic for the festival of Tabernacles. To their left are six loaves of bread, round flat-cakes with a circle in the middle, and finally a two-handled jug. Here also a wine-jug is certainly meant, corresponding to the breads; in addition the candelabra are absent here. Furthermore, the fish appears again, as the main food of the dead. The doves, which everywhere represent souls, indicate that it is the dead who are thereby symbolized.

The utensils which belong to the seven-branched candelabra are pictured sometimes next to it: the wick-shovel, in which the consumed wicks were kept, and the snuffers, used to keep the wicks in order, with a horizontal pin to draw the wick out of the lamps.

Especially interesting is the Indian cross (Swastica). It is next to an ivy-leaf on the newly discovered grave-slab in the catacomb of the Villa Torlonia. The ivy-leaf is nothing more than an ornamental decoration, very frequent on Jewish grave-inscriptions, at the beginning or the end of a text or a line, especially when space has to be filled in. There are also such leaves on Christian grave-inscriptions, in large quantity. Here Jews as well as Christians follow heathen precedents. The *Swastica* on the contrary manifests itself here in a Jewish catacomb for the first time. It is, however, not unknown in Italy, where it is a recognized symbol on house urns, ossuaria, chests for bones and metal-vessels of the last bronze and of the following iron period. Whether or not it was originally a sun-symbol and was connected with astral religion is not certain; later on it was considered as a token which brought good fortune, or was a shield against misfortune. On Palestinian soil we seldom meet the regular *Swastica* with the straight-lined arms, bent at right angles. At the excavations of Ghezer a painted potsherd was found, which dates back to about 1200 950 B.C. While the drawing in the middle reveals a system of horizontal and perpendicular lines, which cut themselves approximately at right angles, to the left a palm-branch is represented, and to the right perhaps a *Swastica*. It is just the palm-branch which seems to prove that we may recognize in the *Swastica* not an accidental plaything, but a definite symbol. Perhaps we may assume a connection with astral-symbols, for to the left of the palm-branch the rest of a sun-wheel is visible; sun-wheel and *Swastica* would complement one

another. However, the sun-wheel here is just as uncertain as the *Swastica*. It is also questionable if the potsherd comes from Semitic circles; it belongs possibly to the ceramic of the Philistines and would then perhaps point to Cretan-Meicenian culture, in which to be sure the *Swastica* is but seldom in evidence. It is very worth while noticing, that among the symbols of the catacombs the penta ("the seal of Solomon") and the hexagram ("the shield of David") are wanting although we meet them in the synagogues of Galilee as ornaments; also on a Jewish grave-stone in Tarent from the third century A.D. the hexagram is carved in before the name of David. If we survey the representations on the catacomb-inscriptions, it is really significant that here appear exclusively religious symbols of Judaism, an indication of the love of the Jews for their faith and of their emphasis on the religious point of view. The Jewish golden glasses, upon which profane objects are completely absent, confirm the fact that this is not accidental.

III

The picture changes somewhat, when we turn our attention in the third part of our investigation, namely to the sarcophagus-representations which have been found—unfortunately only in fragments—in the Jewish catacombs, first of all in the newest catacomb under the Villa Torlonia. When we see the sarcophagus, adorned with pillars and the two masks over the capital, one is inclined to doubt that a Jew is buried in it.

The notion that here, through some accident perhaps, heathen sarcophagi came by chance into the Jewish catacombs, is still more strengthened, when we see the human figures: the torso of a naked youth, his cloak falling from his shoulders; from below a hand reaches into the picture. Or a hunting scene: the man has a lamp in the left hand; a dog springs up against his left foot. Or the representation of a naked youth; only the upper part of the body has been preserved and the right thigh. He carries a skin-bag on his shoulder. The fragments are often very small: up above to the left lies a fat, naked man; underneath again a half-nude youth; up above to the right, a horse-head, and beneath it a naked knee, upon which a basket rests.

However, every doubt may be dismissed, when one finds the same pictures or motives again in the Galilean synagogues. The winged Eros, plucking grapes, comes out of the catacomb of the Villa Torlonia. Compare this picture with the representation on a frieze in the synagogue of Chorazin. Between the windings of the vines, covered with grapes, we see in the left circle a man standing, a thick staff in his raised right hand, a grape in his lowered left; in the second circle to the left, a man is standing and to the right a woman sitting, in her left hand a grape; a grape, which has not been worked out, hangs between their heads. In the third circle (to the right) two men with bare feet, are treading the wine-press, and a big grape hangs over them. The sarcophagus fragments from the catacomb of the Vigna Randanini certainly belonged to Jews.

No. 18 (above to the right): in the middle, framed in by two high stakes, are the seven-branched candelabra, whose shaft and branches here are richly adorned, and with superimposed oil-lamps. On both sides two date-palms rise up, both laden with fruits. The candelabra stand consequently in a landscape. At the foot of it, there follow one another, from the left to the right: an empty plate, an Ethrog, a Lulab and a questionable object. To the right of the candelabra the objects repeat themselves in the reverse order: the questionable object, Lulab, Ethrog, and the plate, this time with fruits. The date-palms are probably meant to indicate the heavenly paradise, where the banquet of the blessed one takes place, on the day of the festival of Tabernacles.

No. 19. Here stands in a ring the seven-branched candle-stick, its oil-lamps burning. It is held armorial-like, by two winged genii. Under it we see a vat, adorned with the head of an ox and of a human-being, filled to the very top with grapes, therefore a wine-press. Three nude figures, which mutually support themselves, are drawing off the wine; the two end men have in addition a big shepherd's staff, upon which they are leaning, in order not to slip while treading the grapes. To the right, is again a winged figure, in the right hand a basket with fruits, in the left two geese, with beating wings, their heads to the ground. At their feet are playing two child-like figures, which seem to ride on animals. The motifs, which are united here, certainly originate from heathen models, with the exception of the seven-branched candelabra, which appear quite

strange in these surroundings. Here also we will have to think of a connection with the harvest, that is, the festival of Tabernacles.

No. 20 represents a griffin, which, perhaps, is supposed to correspond to the cherubim of the Scriptures. The Jewish strain is thus not altogether absent in the sarcophagi, but it is nevertheless very slight. This fact becomes understandable, in that the sarcophagi, which was contrary to Jewish usage, were for the most part purchased ready-made, and therefore had to be accepted together with the heathen pictures.

But also the pictures on the ceiling of the Vigna Randanini catacomb, which were certainly executed to order, betray the same strong influence of heathen art and its motives. In the middle of the ceiling to the right, is a nude, wreath-crowned youth, in his right hand a branch, in his left hand a cornucopia; next to him a goddess of victory, in the left hand a palm-branch, in the right a wreath, which she holds over the cornucopia. On the edge we see four peacocks on a flower-vase like ornament, in between vases of flowers and two birds next to each vase. The left ceiling contains in the middle the representation of a woman in an armless tunic with a cloak, in her left hand a cornucopia, in the right hand a bowl, out of which she seems to distribute presents. In the corners pictures of birds and fishes vary with other ornaments. On the lower border, to the left, several individual pictures are placed together: a Pegasus, a rooster, a bird in a flower landscape, a floral pillar with peacocks, one female and one male, a ram with a herald's staff, leaned against a pillar, and finally another Pegasus. Even if the artistic value is slight, the catacomb must have once, in comparison to others, been prettily adorned; the drawings give us but a poor impression.

IV

We receive a better impression, when we descend together into the newly discovered city of the dead, under the Villa Torlonia, and visualize its three photographs. Just as in the home-land, in Palestine, and generally in the East, so also in Rome Jews were interred in the ground. The specifically Roman custom of cremating corpses had not yet been established among Roman Jews. We now know, however, from the Jewish inscriptions in the Egyptian

Leontapolis, the city of Onias, that the Jews did not everywhere object to this custom. Where they remained true to their native custom of burial, they put the graves in the earth. With the large number of the dead, there soon arose a confusion of dark passages, places, stairs, which seems labyrinthian to the uninitiated, wherein one can actually lose one's way, even tho the interior, in all its details seems to be well planned and architecturally well executed. The persecuted found in these grave-yards for the most part safe refuge, since they were holy places, which even the pursuers did not like to desecrate, especially since the penetration into the mazes of the passages, which constantly crossed one another, was fraught with danger. There are oftentimes several stories above one another, and a system of unregulated or seemingly unregulated galleries blocks the steps of the visitor. Here and there, one looks into the various kinds of graves, in which the dead were bedded, for the most part without coffins, perhaps clothed only with a shroud and equiped with jewelry and useful objects: bracelets, inlaid with precious stones, amulets, lamps, glasses, copper-coins and other things—all of which have been found there.

We enter one of the rooms. The cross-arched vault is supported here by four pillars, which are worked out of tuff, and which rest on round supports. Even capitals, with acanthus leaves, standing erect, are indicated. The pillars are colorfully pointed, so that they appear like marble. The ceiling is divided uniformly: in the middle is a seven-branched candle-stick; it is surrounded by four semi-circles, in each of which a dolphin is pictured. In the corners, three times the Ethrog and once the horn, enclosed by a grape-ornament; and a small circle shows up resplendently. The dolphin, with the trident of Neptune in its mouth, has a dark red body; the back and tail are black. It emanates, to be sure, from heathen mythology, as the trident indicates, representing however only the fish, which symbolizes the *cenapura*, the banquet on Friday evening, and the banquet of the blessed.

The candle-stick is painted green-blue, and ornamented with thick black spots; red flames burst out of the oil-lamps. It appears to rest here on a tripod; it is enclosed in a smaller red and in a larger blue-green circle. The horn (*šophār*), whose blowing ushers in the New Year on New Year's day, is not missing here; it is hardly an

indication of the last day and its symbol. The Ethrog appears in the front and in the back. There is a pomegranate on the other side, painted red, hanging gracefully and delicately from a green stem, again enclosed by two half-circles; it is represented certainly only because it also was a favorite fruit on the festival-day. On the back-wall we recognize first of all grooves running upwards; to the left we see a lion's head with a large ring in its mouth. Next to it the same motif is repeated, only that the grooves extend to the right; under them again the lion's head with the ring in its mouth. The whole picture is the imitation of a grooved marble-sarcophagus with a lion's head as ornament; this fragment was actually found in the catacomb, so that there can be no doubt as to the heathen model.

The right side-piece of the grave, however, is real Jewish: a single Torah-roll, in blue-green color, with thick red spots. The heathen sarcophagus models did no damage to the emphasis of the Jewish faith. The back-wall is strongly damaged. We still recognize, however, the red-shaded timbered roof of a house, above which to the left the waning moon is shown in red, and to the right the waning moon in blue—therefore a Torah-shrine under the free night-heaven, as it were. Semi-circular lines in brown, blue-green and red color enframe the entire picture.

We glance into another burial-chamber and see a peacock there in profile, which is picking with its beak the grass and the flowers. Its outline is black-brown, the feathers gleam resplendent in all colors: blue-green, brown, black and yellowish—a wonderful animal, that fits well in the heavenly meadow. The field of the pea-cock is framed in by a thin black line, from which hang down a band as garland, each with three tassels. Again, in another chamber, we see to the right and to the left on the back-wall two large seven-branched candle-sticks in a lighter and darker brown and with green spots. In between is the Torah-shrine, a richly ornamented gable-structure, in brown, with green ornaments. To its left the green sun breaks through the clouds, which are striped black, green and red. To the right is the moon, also between strips of clouds. A dark star shines over the house. We have properly here a scene under the free-heavens, that is, of the heavenly meadow of the blessed. Smaller symbols are scattered in between: the light-brown cedar-fruit, a knife with a light-brown handle in a blue-green case,

a dark horn, a bottle. The outer outline is green and is probably meant to reproduce glass; the inside is red, and that argues decisively for a wine-glass, especially since the candle-stick is missing here, to which an oil-flask could belong. Then a deep-red fruit (probably a pomegranate) and the palm-branch of the Lulab.

The knife is a new symbol, which we get to know here clearly for the first time. A representation of the catacomb of Monteverde is not so distinct and could not previously be explained. Next to the seven-branched candle-stick (up above to the left) is the two-handled wine-jug, painted between the letters; and below we meet the knife again, drawn a bit farther out of the case, and double-bladed. The loop, present in both instances, indicates that the knife was hung up, put aside and used only for circumcision. Similarly, the utensil on the grave of Tychikos is probably not a "spade," as has been maintained, but a circumcision knife, the point of which has been broken off along with the stone.

Finally there is the engraving of a sailing vessel, which recalls to us the ships of the dead of ancient mythology. When the Jews, like the Christians, at times put coins in the graves of their dead, that corresponds to the heathen custom. With the coin the dead person pays the ferryman Charon, who ferries him over the water of death into the world beyond.

It is not a great art, only ordinary handicraft, which we meet with in the catacombs, but it is precious and valuable to us, because it gives us a picture of the every-day life of that time. Thus the walls of the houses were painted, as we know from Pompey, although indeed the motifs of the "eternal house" of the dead are other than those of the houses of the living. They betray to us, however, also something of the spiritual-religious life of the people, who were buried here. We saw in the Vincentius-tomb a Judaism, that had preserved practically nothing of the faith of its fathers, that had succumbed entirely to mystery-religion, just as another and a larger portion of Judaism had gone over to Christianity. However, there must have been large circles, which remained faithful, and to whom the symbols of the synagogue were the most cherished attendants in the world beyond. To be sure, they also had to pay tribute to the spirit of the times, but instead of being sorry about this, we are happy that they were not cut off as in the ghetto from the outer

world, but remained in touch with it, and unprejudiced, were influenced by it.

He who becomes acquainted with these pictures for the first time, and who sees them only in detail, may be inclined to believe that the Judaism of Rome was lax in its point of view. That is, however, by no means the case, or one would have to maintain the same about the Jews of Galilee, where we meet identical or similar evidences. The synagogues of Galilee and the catacombs of Rome compel us to revise our notions concerning Judaism of that period, and it can not be doubted that at that time animal and human representations, which we have met in such large numbers, were held to be compatible with the Torah. To be sure, much may have been created by strange artists, since golden glasses and sarcophagi could be bought as ready-made articles; many things having been taken over by the Jews without much reflection, without their becoming clearly conscious of the contradictions against their own religion. This explanation fails, however, when, for instance, in a grave-inscription from Eudoxios, we hear of a Jewish animal-painter (ζώγραφος) or when we find such typical characteristics of Judaism as the seven-branched candlestick in the hands of winged genii.

To be sure, in certain times and in certain groups Jews were very sensitive about pictures. Zealots tore down the eagle of Herod on the temple in Jerusalem and animal pictures on the palace of Herod Antipas brought about its destruction. The Torah, however, forbids the making of pictures only for the purpose of worship; and in the Babylonian Talmud it says expressly: "All pictures are permitted except those of human beings." One went at times still farther, and recognized in addition to animal pictures also the pictures of human-beings, even if they were painted or represented in reliefs; they objected only to statues, because the danger of worshipping was bound up with them. A pious, but innerly free generation was generally not averse even to little cupids or goddesses of victory and enjoyed the harmless ornaments of the so-called heathendom, just as we do today. For many, these pictures of the Jewish faith, which are preserved in the catacombs, will amount to a revelation. For the fact that they are colored with the history of their time, and betray, despite their real Jewish spirit, a certain strain of the mystery-religions, which had their main blossoming period at that time, shows that the Jewish religion

Coin of Noe
(Gressmann, *Old Oriental Texts and Pictures*)

Tomb of Vicentius
(Garrucci, *Mystères*, p. 5 above)

Vibia
(Garrucci, *Mystères*, p. 8)



Rome, Arch of Titus (The inner wall)

View in the Cubiculum Paribeni 2
with the whole Arcosole behind
(Prof. Lietzmann)

Temple-chariot-frieze
Synagogue of Capernaum
(Orfali, *Capharnaum et ses ruines*, p. 36, picture 52)

Cub. Par. 2
Arcosole left, middle piece right
of the Arcosole-vault
(Prof. Lietzmann)

Torah-shrine
(Monteverde, Rome, Müller-Bees, p. 152, No. 173)



Cult vessels
(Monteverde, Rome, Müller-Bees, p. 101, No. 111)

was a living force, capable of adapting itself to the surrounding world, accepting what was pleasing, rejecting what was contradictory to it. The study of these pictures is worth while, not only because of the details, but also because of the whole, and one can only wish that the catacombs may become more and more the special theme of investigation of ancient Judaism. Here there are still many unexcavated treasures, which will vividly illustrate Jewish life in Ancient Rome.

ELIA DEL MEDIGOS VERHÄLTNIS ZU AVERROËS IN SEINEM *BECHINAT HA-DAT*

JULIUS GUTTMANN (BERLIN)

Elia del Medigo, der begeisterte Verehrer des Averroës, verwendet auch in seiner kleinen religionsphilosophischen Schrift *Bechinat ha-Dat* Gedanken seines Meisters, ohne freilich seine Abhängigkeit von ihm erkennen zu lassen. Daß er die Schrift des Averroës *Harmonie der Religion und Philosophie*[1] stark benutzt, wurde, nachdem Marcus Josef Müller sie durch seine Edition und Übersetzung zugänglich gemacht hatte,[2] von dem gelehrten New-Yorker Rabbiner A. Hübsch in der „Monatsschrift für Geschichte und Wissenschaft des Judentums“[3] nachgewiesen. In seiner Entdeckerfreude bemüht sich Hübsch jedoch, Elia del Medigo zu einem bloßen Nachbeter des Averroës zu machen. Seiner Auffassung nach ist das *Bechinat ha-Dat* in seinen eigentlich philosophischen Teilen nur ein Auszug aus der Schrift des Averroës, der seine Abhängigkeit von seiner Vorlage vergeblich durch veränderte Gruppierung der Gedanken und durch allerhand nicht zur Sache gehörige Einschübe unkenntlich zu machen sucht. Um diesen Nachweis zu führen, trägt Hübsch auch in solche Stellen des Buches, die von Averroës weit entfernt sind, durch teilweise recht gewaltsame Umdeutung die Gedanken des arabischen Philosophen hinein. In

[1] Der arabische Titel der Schrift lautet: כתאב פצל אלמקאל ותקריר מא בין אלשריעה ואלחכמה מן אלאתצאל.

[2] M. Josef Müller, *Philosophie und Theologie des Averroës*, in *Monumenta saecularia*, herausgegeben von der Bayrischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, München 1859. Derselbe: *Philosophie und Theologie des Averroës, aus dem Arabischen übersetzt*, München 1875. Edition und Übersetzung enthalten neben dem *Faṣl el-maqāl* noch das sich an es anschließende כתאב אלכשף עי מנאהג אלאדלה עי עקאיד אלמלה, das die Glaubenslehren des Islams behandelt und demgemäß von Müller *Spekulative Dogmatik* genannt wird. Ich zitiere im folgenden nach der zugänglicheren deutschen Übersetzung.

[3] A. Hübsch, *Elia del Medigos Bechinath ha-Dath und Ibn Roschds Faṣl ul-maqal*, Monatsschrift, Band 31, S. 555 bis 563, Band 32, S. 28 bis 46.

Wirklichkeit ist die Position Elia del Medigos in entscheidenden Punkten eine wesentlich andere als die des Averroës. Seine Schrift ist nicht eine Reproduktion der des Averroës, sondern eine Auseinandersetzung mit seiner ungenannten Vorlage, von der er nur soviel übernimmt, wie sein grundsätzlich anderer Standpunkt gestattet. Die Klarstellung dieses Sachverhalts darf wohl einen Platz in dem Gedenkbuch zu Ehren des verewigten Gelehrten finden, dessen letzte Abhandlung Pico von Mirandola, dem Freunde und Gönner Elia del Medigos, gewidmet war.

Die Abhandlung des Averroës will das Recht der philosophischen Forschung vom Standpunkte des Islams aus beweisen. Sie stützt sich dabei auf die Aussprüche des Korans, die zur Betrachtung der Schöpfung und zur Erkenntnis Gottes durch sie auffordern.[4] Da eine solche Betrachtung der Schöpfung in vollkommener Form nur nach den Methoden wissenschaftlicher Erkenntnis und nur im Zusammenhange systematischer wissenschaftlicher Untersuchung möglich ist, so enthalten diese Aussprüche des Korans die unzweideutige Rechtfertigung der Wissenschaft. Nicht nur das Recht, sondern selbst die Pflicht des Erkennens ergibt sich aus ihnen.[5] Demgemäß kann es auch keinen Widerspruch zwischen der Wahrheit der Wissenschaft und der der Offenbarung geben. Wo der Wortlaut des Korans mit den Ergebnissen der wissenschaftlichen Demonstration in Widerspruch zu stehen scheint, läßt sich bei tieferer Betrachtung stets eine Umdeutung der Schrift auffinden, die ihren Einklang mit der Wissenschaft herstellt, und der aufmerksame Erklärer der Schrift wird in allen solchen Fällen einen Hinweis in ihr finden, der zu der Umdeutung auffordert.[6] Daß der Wortlaut des Korans der Vernunft oft widerstreitet, hat seine Ursache darin, daß die Offenbarung nicht nur für den Denker, sondern für die Gesamtheit der Gläubigen bestimmt ist und sich darum ihrer Fassungskraft anpassen muß.[7] Daraus folgt, daß die Umdeutung des Wortlauts der Offenbarung nur denen gestattet ist, die zur wissenschaftlichen Erkenntnis der Glaubenswahrheiten imstande sind. Der Zweck des göttlichen Gesetzgebers würde vereitelt werden, wenn sich auch die Masse statt des für sie bestimmten Wortsinns den tieferen

[4] *Philosophie und Theologie*, S. 1 bis 2.
[5] a. a. O., S. 2 bis 6.
[6] S. 7.
[7] S. 8, 14, 19.

Sinn des Korans zu eigen machen wollte. Die Umdeutung, die für den Denker Pflicht ist, ist für die Menge Sünde.[8] Der gleichen Sünde machen sich diejenigen schuldig, welche die nur für die Denker bestimmten Wahrheiten der Menge mitteilen. Auch literarisch darf der tiefere Sinn der Offenbarungslehre nur in einer Form behandelt werden, die allein dem Denker verständlich ist. Jede Popularisierung ist streng verboten.[9] Genauer unterscheidet Averroës drei Erkenntnisstufen, entsprechend den drei Formen der Beweisführung: der demonstrativen, dialektischen und rhetorischen. Die erste ist die des Mannes der Wissenschaft, die zweite die „des Dialektikers" (hierher rechnet Averroës die Anhänger des Kalam),[10] die dritte die des wissenschaftlich ganz Ungebildeten.[11] Der Dialektiker steht auch in bezug auf die Frage der Umdeutung zwischen der Menge und dem eigentlichen Denker. So weit seine Erkenntnis reicht, ist ihm die Umdeutung geboten, darüber hinaus wird sie für ihn ebenso wie für die Menge zur Sünde.[12] Die unter den christlichen Averroisten weit verbreitete und späterhin oft dem Averroës selbst zugeschriebene Lehre von der doppelten Wahrheit ist diesem demnach durchaus fremd. Sein Standpunkt ruht, wie bereits oben bemerkt, ganz auf der Voraussetzung der Identität von Offenbarungs- und Vernunftswahrheit. Diese Einheit aber versteht er so, daß die Vernunft sich in voller Freiheit zu entfalten und die Offenbarung durch Umdeutung ihrem Ergebnis anzupassen hat. Für diese Umdeutung gibt es keinerlei Schranken. Die einzige Ausnahme, die Averroës macht, wenn er die Umdeutung in dem Falle verbietet, in dem alle drei Formen der Beweisführung

[8] S. 17, 20. Ausgenommen sind nur die Fälle, in denen sich die uneigentliche Bedeutung des Textes unmittelbar aus ihm selbst ergibt. Vgl. S. 20 und in der *Spekulativen Dogmatik* S. 116.

[9] S. 17, 21.

[10] Deutlich spricht sich Averroës hierüber in der *Spekulativen Dogmatik* aus. Vgl. S. 64 bis 69, besonders S. 65.

[11] S. 6, 20f. Für die bei den islamischen und jüdischen Aristotelikern allgemein verbreitete, ihrem Kerne nach aristotelische Unterscheidung der drei Arten der Beweisführung vgl. Maimonides, ביאור מלות ההגיון, Kap. 8. Die Eigentümlichkeit der untersten, rhetorischen Beweisart besteht nach dieser Stelle darin, daß sie sich mit Prämissen begnügt, die glaubhaft überliefert sind. Danach würde die Anwendung auf das religiöse Gebiet ergeben, daß die Menge die Glaubenswahrheiten nur auf Grund der Überlieferung hinzunehmen habe. Indessen läßt Averroës zu der Autorität der Überlieferung noch einfache, allgemeinverständliche Beweise für die Glaubenswahrheiten hinzutreten. Vgl. S. 40 bis 44.

[12] S. 20.

den Wortsinn des Korans bestätigen,[13] ist nur eine scheinbare. Denn auch in diesem Falle liegt die Entscheidung bei der Vernunft selbst, die selbstverständlich zu keiner Umdeutung des Wortsinns Veranlassung hat, wenn er mit ihren eigenen Ergebnissen übereinstimmt. Ausdrücklich verwahrt sich Averroës dagegen, daß das auf dem Gebiet der religiösen Praxis gültige Prinzip der Übereinstimmung der Gläubigen auch auf theoretische Fragen anwendbar sei und der Umdeutung bestimmte Grenzen vorschreiben könne.[14] Um die volle Freiheit der Forschung zu sichern, hebt er noch hervor, daß den Mann der Wissenschaft auch dann kein Verschulden treffe, wenn er infolge eines wissenschaftlichen Irrtums in der Umdeutung der Offenbarung über das sachlich berechtigte Maß hinausgehe.[15] Der Radikalismus dieses Standpunktes wird durch die strenge Scheidung zwischen esoterischem und exoterischem Sinn der Offenbarung ermöglicht. Averroës kennt keine doppelte Wahrheit im Sinne eines Widerstreits von Vernunft und Offenbarung, aber er kennt dafür den gottgewollten Widerstreit zwischen den beiden oder genauer den drei Auffassungsformen, in denen die Offenbarungslehre je nach der Erkenntnisstufe der Gläubigen verstanden werden soll.

Wie Averroës geht auch Elia del Medigo von der Frage der religiösen Zulässigkeit der Erkenntnis aus, und wie Averroës aus Sätzen des Korans beweist er aus Bibelstellen, daß die Erkenntnis religiös nicht nur gestattet, sondern sogar empfehlenswert ist, wenn er sie auch nicht als schlechthin geboten bezeichnet.[16] Dabei unterscheidet auch er in der Weise des Averroës zwischen dem zu demonstrativer Beweisführung fähigen „Einzelnen“ und der auf die dialektische und rhetorische Beweisführung beschränkten Menge, wobei er freilich die Mittelklasse der Dialektiker fallen läßt und dialektische und rhetorische Beweisart zusammennimmt.[17] Die Menge hat die religiösen Wahr-

[13] S. 14, 15.

[14] S. 9.

[15] S. 13, 14. Auch hier wird für die Fälle, in denen alle Beweisarten übereinstimmen, eine Ausnahme gemacht, die jedoch in diesem Zusammenhange bedeutungslos ist.

[16] בחינתהדת, ed. Wien, S. 4, 5. Die Wiener Ausgabe, nach der ich im folgenden zitiere, gibt den im תעלומות חכמה, Basel 1628, gedruckten Text getreu wieder und hat nur in der antichristlichen Stelle, S. 16, einige Kürzungen und Milderungen. Auch die Basler Ausgabe ist freilich nicht fehlerfrei, doch ist für den Zweck dieser Arbeit eine Berichtigung des Textes nicht erforderlich.

[17] S. 5.

heiten nur der Thora zu entnehmen, für die Auserwählten ist es nützlich, ja „gleichsam notwendig", sie auch auf spekulativem Wege zu erkennen.[18] Die Frage nach der Zulässigkeit der Erkenntnis aber wird für del Medigo sogleich zu der Frage nach den Grenzen der zulässigen Erkenntnis. Die Erkenntnis ist insoweit zulässig und erwünscht, als ihre Ergebnisse mit dem Inhalt der offenbarten Lehre in Übereinstimmung stehen und sie den Gläubigen nur dazu führt, die ihm von der Offenbarung her bereits gewisse Wahrheit auch logisch zu bestätigen. Im Falle eines Widerspruchs beider Erkenntnisquellen dagegen ist für den Auserwählten ebenso wie für die Menge die Thora maßgebend.[19] Dann wenigstens, wenn es sich um die Grundlehren der Religion handelt. Nur in solchen Fragen, von denen diese Grundlehren nicht berührt sind, darf der Gelehrte den Widerspruch durch Umdeutung der Thora beseitigen.[20] In striktem Gegensatz zu Averroës setzt del Medigo hier der Umdeutung der Offenbarungslehre feste Schranken. Die Philosophie hat nicht von sich aus den Sinn der Offenbarungslehre zu bestimmen, sondern auf den unabhängig von ihr bestehenden Unterschied zwischen Grundlehren der Religion und sonstigem Offenbarungsinhalt Rücksicht zu nehmen. Demgemäß schränkt sich auch der Unterschied zwischen esoterischem und exoterischem Sinn der Offenbarung auf solche Fragen ein, die nicht die Grundlehren der Religion betreffen. Denn auch in solchen Fragen ist die Umdeutung der Offenbarungslehre nur dem Gelehrten gestattet, der Menge aber verboten.[21] Für diese Fragen also schließt sich del Medigo der Auffassung des Averroës an, daß im Inhalt des Glaubens zwischen den Gelehrten und der Menge ein Unterschied besteht. Sonst dagegen muß der Inhalt des Glaubens für beide der gleiche sein. Ein Unterschied besteht zwischen ihnen nur in der Methode des Fürwahrhaltens, und auch das nur bei denjenigen Punkten, in denen Erkenntnis und Offenbarung zusammenstimmen und bei denen für den Gelehrten zum Glauben auf Grund der Offenbarung noch die Überzeugung auf Grund wissenschaftlicher Argumen-

[18] S. 6.

[19] S. 6, 7. S. 7, Zeile 4, ist für das sinnlose ולכן zu lesen: וכן.

[20] S. 7. Hübsch, Monatsschrift, Band 32, S. 28 ff., liest selbst in diese Stelle die Theorie des Averroës hinein und stellt sie mit *Philosophie und Theologie*, S. 7 und 17, zusammen, was so ziemlich das Gegenteil der Meinung Elia del Medigos ergibt.

[21] S. 7, 50 ff.

tation hinzukommt. Sofern dagegen in den religiösen Prinzipienfragen ein Gegensatz zwischen Vernunft und Offenbarung besteht, ist auch die Art des Fürwahrhaltens für die Gelehrten und die Menge die gleiche, die Anerkennung der Offenbarung.

Neben der Forderung des Averroës, daß die Offenbarung nach den Ergebnissen der Vernunfterkenntnis zu interpretieren sei, ist in diesen Ausführungen noch ein anderer seiner Gedanken preisgegeben: die Annahme der Identität religiöser und wissenschaftlicher Wahrheit. Denn so wenig wie eine Anpassung der Offenbarung an die Vernunft will del Medigo eine Anpassung der Vernunft an die Offenbarung dulden. Den Versuch, den Widerspruch der wissenschaftlichen Erkenntnis gegen Grundlehren der Offenbarung durch eine Widerlegung der glaubensfeindlichen Ansichten der Wissenschaft zu beseitigen, erklärt er für unzulässig. Er begründet das zunächst einigermaßen naiv damit, daß eine Prüfung der zwischen Religion und Wissenschaft bestehenden Gegensätze diese Streitfragen zum Problem mache und somit wenigstens im Ausgangspunkt der Untersuchung einen Zweifel an den Lehren der Offenbarung involviere, der unzulässig sei.[22] Doch zeigt der Fortgang seiner Darstellung deutlich, daß dieser Grund für ihn nicht der entscheidende ist. Seinen eigentlichen Grund spricht er aus, wenn er solchen Ausgleichsversuchen vorwirft, daß sie Wahrheiten, die nur aus der Thora erkennbar seien, mit den Mitteln der Wissenschaft begründen wollen.[23] Von den früheren jüdischen Philosophen, die eine wissenschaftliche Begründung dieser Wahrheiten versucht haben, erklärt er, sie hätten die verschiedenen Erkenntnismethoden in unzulässiger Weise vermengt und sich in eine Mittelstellung zwischen Thora und Philosophie begeben, in der sie weder wirkliche Thoragläubige noch wirkliche Philosophen mehr seien.[24] Den Vorwurf, Religion und Philosophie zugleich zu schädigen, den Averroës gegen diejenigen richtet, welche die philosophische Interpretation der Offenbarung popularisieren,[25] überträgt er, wie vor ihm schon Isaac Albalag,[26] auf die Philosophen, die die Gegensätze von Philosophie und Offenbarung harmonisierend verwischen wollen. Der Standpunkt, den Elia

[22] S. 8.
[23] S. 11.
[24] S. 18, 52, 53.
[25] *Philosophie und Theologie*, S. 17.
[26] Vgl. Schorr, החלוץ, Band 4, S. 86.

del Medigo in alledem vertritt, ist offensichtlich der der doppelten Wahrheit. Seine Abweichungen von den Anschauungen des Averroës beruhen darauf, daß er diese im späteren Averroismus weit verbreitete Anschauung übernommen hat.

Die Kluft zwischen Averroës und del Medigo scheint sich freilich zu verringern, wenn wir den Standpunkt des Averroës nicht nur nach seiner Schrift *Über die Harmonie der Religion und Philosophie* beurteilen. Im Gegensatz zu dem radikalen Rationalismus dieser Abhandlung finden sich sowohl in seiner *Spekulativen Dogmatik* wie besonders in seiner Verteidigung der Philosophie gegen die Angriffe Ghazalis, dem *Tahâfut et-Tahâfut*, eine Reihe von Äußerungen, nach denen die Offenbarung auch solche Lehren enthält, die die Fassungskraft der menschlichen Vernunft übersteigen und die nur auf die Autorität der Offenbarung hin anzunehmen sind, ohne daß wir ihre Gründe kennen. Insbesondere verlangt Averroës, daß der zu den Prinzipien der Religion gehörende Wunderglaube auch von den Philosophen anerkannt werde.[27] Da auch diese Schriften des Averroës Elia del Medigo bekannt waren,[28] so könnte es scheinen, als ob er seine Einschränkungen an dem radikalen Rationalismus der ersten Abhandlung Averroës selbst entnommen habe. Freilich gehen die Urteile der neueren Forschung über die Tragweite dieser antirationalistischen Äußerungen des Averroës weit auseinander. Während man früher in ihnen nur eine diplomatische Rücksicht auf den offiziellen Glauben des Islams sah,[29] und während dann mehrere Forscher dem Averroës umgekehrt die gläubige Anerkennung einer übervernünftigen Offenbarungswahrheit zuschrieben,[30] hat man neuerdings zu zeigen versucht,[31] daß sie eine Überlegenheit der Offenbarung über die Vernunft nur in dem Sinne anerkennen, der sich aus der philosophischen Theorie des Averroës über die Prophetie folgerichtig ergibt. Darnach würde es sich bei den der Vernunft verschlossenen Bestand-

[27] GAUTHIER, *La théorie d'Ibn Rochd (Averroës) sur les rapports de la religion et de la philosophie*, S. 126 bis 129. Vgl. *Philosophie und Theologie*, S. 87 bis 94.

[28] Der auf S. 20 gegen die islamischen Philosophen gerichtete Vorwurf, mit der von den alten Philosophen vermiedenen Kritik der Offenbarungslehre begonnen zu haben, ist sicherlich dem *Tahâfut* entnommen, wo mehrfach der gleiche Vorwurf gegen Ibn Sina erhoben wird.

[29] RENAN, *Averroès et l'averroïsme*, S. 162 ff.

[30] MEHREN, *Étude sur la philosophie d'Averrhoës*, in *Le Muséon*, Band 7 und 8.

[31] GAUTHIER, S. 138 bis 158.

teilen der Offenbarung nicht um metaphysische Wahrheiten, sondern um die prophetische Erkenntnis der Zukunft und um die in der Offenbarung enthaltenen, für die Menge bestimmten praktischen Forderungen handeln. Ebenso würde sich der Wunderglaube des Averroës auf die Anerkennung solcher Wirkungen beschränken, die sich aus den besonderen Kräften des Propheten ergeben, ohne die Gesetze der Natur zu durchbrechen. Für das Verhältnis Elia del Medigos zu Averroës sind diese Unterschiede der Interpretation indessen nicht von entscheidender Bedeutung. Selbst wenn man dem Averroës die Anerkennung einer übervernünftigen Offenbarungswahrheit zutraut, so fehlt bei ihm doch das, was für Elia del Medigo das Charakteristische ist, das Verbot, bestimmte Lehren der Offenbarung einer philosophischen Umdeutung zu unterziehen. Die grundsätzliche Anerkennung der Möglichkeit übervernünftiger Offenbarungswahrheiten führt nicht dazu, daß der Vernunft in der Deutung der Offenbarung von vornherein eine bestimmte Grenze vorgezeichnet wird. Vor allem aber kennt Averroës, wenn man seine antirationalistischen Äußerungen ernst nimmt, wohl eine übervernünftige, aber keine widervernünftige Wahrheit. Der Gedanke Elia del Medigos, daß gewisse Glaubenslehren im Gegensatz zur wissenschaftlichen Wahrheit stehen und daß ein Ausgleich dieses Gegensatzes dem Gläubigen verwehrt sei, ist etwas radikal Anderes als jene Anerkennung einer übervernünftigen Wahrheitssphäre.[32] Mit ihm schließt sich Elia del Medigo der Lehre von der doppelten Wahrheit an. Einzelne Wendungen, wie die vorhin erwähnte, lassen an eine Abhängigkeit von Isaac Albalag denken, der die Äußerungen des Averroës, die eine übernatürliche Glaubenswahrheit anerkennen, im Sinne dieser Lehre umbiegt. In der Hauptsache steht del Medigo indessen wohl unter dem Einfluß des christlichen Averroismus, mit dem er sich, wie bald zu zeigen sein wird, ausdrücklich auseinandersetzt.

Von der Kühnheit, mit der diese Lehre in christlichen Kreisen vielfach vertreten wird, ist er freilich weit entfernt. Er umgibt sie mit soviel Kautelen, daß eine sehr lahme und inkonsequente Kom-

[32] RIPPNER, *Elia del Medigo, ein jüdischer Popularphilosoph*, Monatsschrift, Band 20, S. 484 und 485, mißversteht freilich Elia del Medigo dahin, daß er nur ein Gebiet übervernünftiger Glaubenswahrheiten annehme, und identifiziert seinen Standpunkt mit dem des Thomas von Aquino, dessen Anschauung er auf jüdischen Boden verpflanzt haben soll.

promißhaltung dabei herauskommt. Da wo die religiösen Wahrheiten von der Philosophie bestätigt werden, empfiehlt er den Gläubigen, diese Bestätigung kennenzulernen. In Fragen, die nicht die Grundlehren der Religion betreffen, ist er sogar mit einer Umdeutung der Offenbarungslehren einverstanden. Unter diesen Umständen wirkt es wie eine Willkür, wenn er sich bei Gegensätzen in dogmatischen Fragen auf das Prinzip der doppelten Wahrheit zurückzieht und jede Diskussion dieser Gegensätze verbietet. Die Gründe, mit denen er diese Inkonsequenz verteidigt, machen die Schwäche seiner Position vollends deutlich. Auch in den Fragen, in denen Übereinstimmung zwischen Offenbarung und Philosophie bestehe, wie z. B. beim Dasein, der Einheit und Unkörperlichkeit Gottes, solle der Gläubige seine Überzeugung nicht von philosophischen Gründen abhängig machen, sondern sich nur davon überzeugen, daß die ihm von der Offenbarung her bereits gewisse Wahrheit auch durch philosophische Gründe bekräftigt werde. Außerdem herrsche in diesen Fragen unter den Philosophen vollkommene Einigkeit. In den Streitfragen zwischen Philosophie und Religion dagegen seien auch die Philosophen unter sich uneinig, und ein Versuch, hier den religiösen Standpunkt philosophisch zu vertreten, könnte im Falle seines Mißlingens leicht zu einem Zweifel entweder an der Religion oder an der Vernunft führen.[33] Man fragt sich vergebens, warum der Gläubige nicht auch an diese Fragen mit der festen Überzeugung von der Wahrheit der Offenbarung herantreten und den Versuch machen kann, die ihm gewisse Wahrheit gegen die Einwendungen ihrer Gegner zu vertreten. Daß die Philosophie hier in sich uneins ist, spricht nicht gegen, sondern für einen solchen Versuch. Doch von der Schlüssigkeit der Gründe del Medigos ganz abgesehen, zeigen sie jedenfalls, daß er sich bei der Scheidung von erlaubtem und verbotenem Verstandesgebrauch nur von der historischen Zufälligkeit leiten läßt, daß gewisse Glaubenslehren in der Philosophie Widerspruch gefunden haben, ohne den Unterschied zwischen Religion und Philosophie irgendwie prinzipiell zu begründen. Ja er behauptet nicht einmal mit bestimmten Worten, daß ein solcher Gegensatz notwendig besteht, sondern warnt nur vor dem gefährlichen Versuch, die historisch vorhandenen Gegensätze ausgleichen zu wollen. Das klingt mehr wie ein Gebot der Vorsicht als wie der Ausdruck

[33] *Bechinat ha-Dat*, S. 10 bis 12.

eines philosophischen Prinzips. Trotzdem kann kein Zweifel daran sein, daß im Hintergrunde des Ganzen die Lehre von der doppelten Wahrheit steht. Denn im Zusammenhange dieser Ausführungen erklärt er, daß der Versuch, die Religion gegen die widersprechenden Anschauungen der Philosophie zu verteidigen, eine Anwendung der logischen Argumentationsweise in einem Gebiet bedeutet, das nur der Bewahrheitung von seiten der Thora aus zugänglich sei.[34]

Dieses Ergebnis wird auch durch seine Auseinandersetzung mit den christlichen Anhängern der Lehre von der doppelten Wahrheit bestätigt. Sie fanden in ihr die Möglichkeit, die christlichen Dogmen trotz offener Behauptung ihrer Widervernünftigkeit doch, gleichviel ob ernsthaft oder nur zum Schein, anzuerkennen. Der jüdischen Apologetik raubte dieser Standpunkt ihre schärfste Waffe. Ihre Kritik der Vernunftwidrigkeit des christlichen Dogmas versagte, wenn ein Widerspruch zwischen religiöser und wissenschaftlicher Wahrheit grundsätzlich als möglich anerkannt wurde. Um sich dieser Konsequenz zu entziehen, schränkt Elia del Medigo die Lehre von der doppelten Wahrheit in sehr enge Grenzen ein. Gegenüber den letzten axiomatischen Gewißheiten des Verstandes oder den unmittelbaren Aussagen der Sinne läßt er sie nicht gelten. Wenn die Thora Lehren enthielte, die einer von diesen beiden Instanzen widersprechen, wenn sie etwa behauptete, daß Gott ein körperliches Wesen sei, daß Akzidenz Substanz werden könne oder daß irgendeinem bestimmten Gegenstande gegenüber die Wahrnehmungen aller Menschen notwendig irrig seien, so würden wir die Thora nicht als wahr anerkennen, da sich die uns von Gott selbst eingepflanzten Erkenntniskräfte gegen die Annahme einer solchen Lehre sträubten.[35] Derartige Lehren seien auch keine notwendigen Voraussetzungen für die Möglichkeit einer offenbarten Religion, sondern hätten den Charakter der Willkür.[36] Wie sie selbst, ständen auch die Gründe, die zu ihrer Aufstellung führten, sogar mit dem gewöhnlichen Verstand der Menge im Widerspruch.[37] Von solcher Art aber seien die Grunddogmen der christlichen Religion. Die Dreieinigkeitslehre

[34] S. 11 unten.

[35] S. 12 bis 14.

[36] S. 15.

[37] So verstehe ich den dritten Grund, der zunächst mit dem ersten Argument zusammenzufallen scheint. Gemeint ist entweder die Unzuverlässigkeit der christlichen Tradition oder die Abhängigkeit z. B. der christlichen Abendmahlslehre von den ebenso widervernünftigen Dogmen der Erbsünde und der stellvertretenden Genugtuung.

sei logisch widerspruchsvoll, die Abendmahlslehre enthalte einen Widerspruch gegen die Aussagen der Sinne.[38] Diese Unmöglichkeiten könnten nicht damit gerechtfertigt werden, daß man sage, unserem Verstand seien diese Lehren unbegreiflich, aber die Offenbarung überzeuge uns von ihnen. Ebenso nichtig sei der Einwand, die auch vom Judentum gelehrte Allmacht Gottes könne auch das ermöglichen, was unserem Verstand unmöglich erscheine. Denn auf logisch Unmögliches wie die Vereinigung widersprechender Bestimmungen oder eine Änderung des göttlichen Wesens erstrecke sich die Allmacht Gottes nicht. Die hier dem Gegner in den Mund gelegten Argumente könnten zunächst im Sinne der geläufigen Unterscheidung der christlichen Scholastik zwischen vernünftiger und übervernünftiger Wahrheit gedeutet werden und enthielten dann keinen Bezug auf die Lehre von der doppelten Wahrheit in sich. Allein die von Elia del Medigo bekämpfte Behauptung, die göttliche Allmacht sei auch über die Gesetze der Logik erhaben und könne auch das Widersprechende möglich machen, ist nur auf einem Standpunkt möglich, der die Unterscheidung von Übervernünftigem und Widervernünftigem aufgibt und auch das letztere religiös für möglich hält. Auch dabei brauchte man nicht unbedingt an die Lehre von der doppelten Wahrheit zu denken, es könnte auch ein extremer theologischer Irrationalismus gemeint sein, der dann freilich sehr leicht in jene Lehre umschlägt. Der Zusammenhang der ganzen Stelle jedoch, in der sich Elia del Medigo dagegen wehrt, daß man aus seiner Ablehnung eines Ausgleichs etwaiger Widersprüche zwischen Vernunft und Offenbarung die Konsequenz ziehe, auch die Widersprüche des christlichen Dogmas seien kein Beweis gegen seine Wahrheit, zeigt deutlich, daß er sich gegen unerwünschte Konsequenzen aus dem Prinzip der doppelten Wahrheit schützen will. Man wird also daran festhalten dürfen, daß es ihm um eine Abgrenzung seines Standpunkts gegen eine extreme Fassung dieser Lehre zu tun war, wie sie im lateinischen Averroismus öfters vertreten wurde und ihm in Padua, der Hochburg des Averroismus in Italien, begegnet sein kann. Die Art, wie er diese Abgrenzung vollzieht, ist freilich wenig durchsichtig. Wie es scheint, läuft sie darauf hinaus, daß zwar eine Anerkennung von Lehren, die den unmittelbaren

[38] Der S. 16, Zeile 3, fortgelassene Satz lautet nach der Edition Basel: ואולם שיקבצו הסותרים טבואר מטאמרם המסורסם באחדות האל ואולם שיכחישו הטוחש ויניחו יתר הענינים אשר פסרנום טבואר טענין קרבנם. Daselbst, Zeile 7, ist nach אין דרך השכל להשיג אלה ausgelassen: אבל הנבואה והנביאים אטרום.

Gewißheiten unseres denkenden und sinnlichen Bewußtseins widerstreiten, schlechterdings unmöglich sei, daß wir uns dagegen bei Lehren, die das Ergebnis komplizierter logischer Argumentation seien, mit einem Widerspruch von Religion und Wissenschaft abfinden und auf die Aufdeckung der etwaigen Fehlerquelle verzichten müßten.

Der Eindruck der Schwäche der Position Elia del Medigos wird dadurch verstärkt, daß die Wissenschaft bei ihm als ein gegebenes und fertiges Ganzes erscheint. Er spricht nicht von dem Konflikt zwischen wissenschaftlicher und religiöser Wahrheit, der sich für den Forscher selbst ergibt, sondern von den Gegensätzen, die zwischen der Offenbarung und einer bereits abgeschlossenen Wissenschaft bestehen, und zeigt, wie sich der Offenbarungsgläubige ihnen gegenüber zu verhalten hat. Dieser Eindruck mag freilich zum Teil darauf beruhen, daß er den Gegensatz nur von der Seite der Religion aus beleuchtet. Er zeigt, daß der Gläubige als solcher eine wissenschaftliche Behandlung der Streitpunkte zwischen Religion und Wissenschaft zu vermeiden habe. Damit ist indessen noch nicht gesagt, daß er auch als Philosoph diesen Fragen aus dem Wege zu gehen hat. Auf den ersten Blick scheint zwar das Verbot del Medigos ein absolutes zu sein, aber bei genauerem Zusehen bemerkt man doch, daß er immer nur eine Erörterung dieser Frage vom Standpunkt der Religion aus verbietet. Von sich selbst bekennt er, daß er in manchen seiner früheren Schriften, bei denen wohl an seine Averroës-Kommentare zu denken ist, den Standpunkt der Philosophie entwickelt habe,[39] und man wird zweifeln können, wie ernst es ihm mit dem Ausdruck seines Bedauerns hierüber ist. So läßt er uns hier über seine letzte Absicht einigermaßen im dunkeln. Er läßt nicht erkennen, ob er dafür ist, im Streite zwischen Philosophie und Offenbarung beiden Seiten ihr Recht zuzubilligen, wie es die Lehre von der doppelten Wahrheit meint, und als Philosoph den philosophischen, als Gläubiger den religiösen Standpunkt zu vertreten, oder ob er von dem Gläubigen verlangt, sich allein auf den Standpunkt des Glaubens zu beschränken und der Erörterung der Fragen ganz aus dem Wege zu gehen, in denen ein unaufhebbarer Gegensatz zwischen Offenbarung und Vernunft besteht.

[39] Die nicht ganz klare Stelle kann freilich auch meinen, daß er sich früher den Philosophen angeschlossen habe, die den Gegensatz von Philosophie und Offenbarung auszugleichen versuchten.

Das Verbot einer Umdeutung der biblischen Lehren im Sinne der Philosophie gilt, wie wir oben dargelegt haben, nur für die Grundlehren der Offenbarung. Bei der Bedeutung, die damit der Unterschied zwischen den Grundlehren und den übrigen Teilen der Offenbarung gewinnt, sind die Kriterien, nach denen er diese Grundlehren bestimmt, für seinen Standpunkt von ausschlaggebender Wichtigkeit. Wie er selbst angibt,[40] bestimmt er sie nach zwei Gesichtspunkten. Einmal richtet er sich nach den Aussagen der Bibel und des Talmuds, und zwar, wie seine Ausführungen im einzelnen zeigen, derart, daß er diejenigen Lehren als Grundlehren betrachtet, denen dort bereits ausdrücklich eine allgemein verpflichtende Geltung zugeschrieben wird. Daneben bestimmt er sie nach ihrer Notwendigkeit für den Bestand der offenbarten Religion. Solche Prinzipien, die notwendige Voraussetzungen für die Offenbarungslehre sind, erweisen sich damit als Fundamentallehren, die jeder Gläubige anerkennen muß. Beide Gesichtspunkte beleuchten noch einmal sein Verhältnis zu Averroës in interessanter Weise. Das zweite, logische, Kriterium ist dem Averroës entlehnt, der zeigt, daß das Dasein eines vergeltenden Gottes und ein zukünftiges Leben von jeder positiven Religion notwendig gelehrt werden müssen. Mit dem Glauben an die Offenbarung als den Quell jeder positiven Religion zusammen ergeben sich so drei Grundlehren, ohne die keine offenbarte Religion möglich ist. Ohne diese drei Lehren ausdrücklich als die jeder offenbarten Religion zugrunde liegenden Dogmen zu bezeichnen, hat Averroës damit der Sache nach die allen Offenbarungsreligionen gemeinsamen Dogmen mit vollkommener Klarheit bezeichnet.[41] Durch die Aufstellung solcher Dogmen wird die von ihm in Anspruch genommene Freiheit in der Deutung der Offenbarung nicht beeinträchtigt. Denn es handelt sich hier um solche Lehren, die auch die Vernunft als notwendig anerkennt. Dieser Gedanke des Averroës, aus dem Begriff der Offenbarung seine notwendigen Voraussetzungen herzuleiten und darnach den Begriff des Dogmas zu bestimmen, wird seit Crescas von den jüdischen Philosophen, die sich mit dem Dogmenproblem befassen, allgemein aufgenommen, und Simon ben

[40] S. 23.

[41] In der *Harmonie der Religion und Philosophie*, S. 14, werden die drei Prinzipien nur als Grundlehren des Islams genannt. Als notwendige Voraussetzungen jeder Offenbarungsreligion ergeben sie sich im *Tahâfut*, vgl. dazu GUTTMANN, *Religion und Wissenschaft im mittelalterlichen und im modernen Denken*, S. 35.

Zemach Duran sowie Albo übernehmen auch die drei erwähnten Grunddogmen.[42] Ebenso macht sich auch del Medigo diesen Gedanken des Averroës zu eigen, wenn er ihn auch, gleich seinen erwähnten jüdischen Vorgängern in stärker dogmatischem Sinne als Averroës verwendet. Mit seinem anderen Kriterium setzt er sich dagegen in bewußten Gegensatz zu Averroës. Dieser hatte, um der Philosophie die volle Freiheit in der Deutung des Korans zu sichern, die Annahme zurückgewiesen, daß es auf dogmatischem Gebiet ebenso wie auf religionsgesetzlichem eine Übereinstimmung der Gläubigen gebe, die der Umdeutung bestimmte Grenzen vorschreibe.[43] Del Medigo, der die Offenbarung gegen die schrankenlose Willkür philosophischer Umdeutung schützen will, gewinnt die Möglichkeit dazu, indem er den von Averroës bekämpften Gesichtspunkt aufnimmt und von ihm aus die allgemeinverbindlichen Dogmen fixiert. Insbesondere seine Berufung auf die im Talmud vorliegenden dogmatischen Bestimmungen erweist sich deutlich als Anwendung dieses Prinzips.[44] Daß er das volle Bewußtsein davon hatte, zeigt vor allem der Anfang seiner Schrift, in dem er darüber klagt, daß die Zerstreuung Israels die Kontinuität seiner Tradition und die Erhaltung seines alten Schrifttums beeinträchtigt habe und darum die Feststellung der Grundlehren des Judentums erschwere, dennoch aber glaubt, mit Hilfe der gelegentlichen Aussagen der Propheten und des Talmuds noch zu einer Bestimmung derselben kommen zu können.[45] Auf dem gleichen Gesichtspunkt beruht auch seine Polemik gegen die Kabbala, gegen die er im wesentlichen einwendet, daß es ihren Lehren an der übereinstimmenden Anerkennung fehle, die auf dem Gebiete des Traditionswissens das allein gültige Kriterium sei.[46]

Die Grundlehren des Glaubens, zu denen er auf diese Weise gelangt, sind die bekannten dreizehn Glaubenslehren des Maimonides, für deren Aufstellung er die von Maimonides selbst nicht angegebenen Gründe beizubringen versucht.[47] Dabei aber ist deutlich zu erkennen, daß er zugleich die am Anschluß an Averroës von Simon ben Zemach

[42] Vgl. GUTTMANN, a. a. O., S. 35 und 36.
[43] *Philosophie und Theologie*, S. 8 bis 11.
[44] *Bechinat ha-Dat*, S. 23, 24, 27.
[45] S. 1 bis 4.
[46] S. 38 bis 48, besonders S. 45, 47.
[47] S. 28.

Duran und Albo aufgestellten drei Grunddogmen: Dasein Gottes, Prophetie und Vergeltung, im Auge hat und die dreizehn Glaubenslehren des Maimonides als deren Besonderungen begreift, was in der Tat ohne jeden Zwang durchführbar ist. Aus seinen ganz an der Oberfläche bleibenden Einzelausführungen ist nur ein Punkt von Interesse. Mit Maimonides rechnet er die Unkörperlichkeit Gottes zu den Grundlehren des Judentums. Gegenüber dem Einwande, daß diese Lehre bei der Menge, die sich ein Existierendes nur als körperlich vorstellen könne, den Glauben an die Existenz Gottes gefährden müsse, antwortet er, daß eine solche Gefahr früher zwar bestanden habe, aber seit Maimonides, der diese Wahrheit zum Gemeingut des Judentums gemacht habe, beseitigt sei.[48] Diese Ausführung will seinen beiden Autoritäten, Averroës, der aus dem angegebenen Grunde die Bekanntgabe der Unkörperlichkeit Gottes an die Menge verbietet,[49] und Maimonides, der sie fordert, zugleich gerecht werden. Sie tut es um den Preis, diese Lehre zugleich als ein Grundprinzip des Judentums zu erklären und zu behaupten, daß bis auf die Zeit des Maimonides ihre allgemeine Bekanntgabe gefährlich gewesen sei.

Auffällig ist, daß del Medigo sich bei der Behandlung der Glaubenslehren nicht über die Frage ausspricht, um derentwillen er das ganze Problem in seiner Schrift zu behandeln hat. Er sagt nichts darüber, welche von diesen Dogmen von der Philosophie bestritten werden. An anderer Stelle nennt er als solche Streitpunkte neben dem Wunderglauben, den er selbst nicht unter die eigentlichen Dogmen gerechnet sehen will, den Glauben an die Prophetie und an die göttliche Vergeltung.[50] Beide werden jedoch von Averroës, den wir in erster Reihe als Repräsentanten der Philosophie bei del Medigo zu betrachten haben, ebenfalls anerkannt. Er entfernt sich von der Religion nur in der Art ihrer Auffassung, indem er beide auf die Gesetzmäßigkeit der Natur, nicht auf das freie Walten Gottes zurückführt. Man wird annehmen dürfen, daß Elia del Medigo gerade in diesem Unterschiede der Auffassung und den sich aus ihnen ergebenden Konsequenzen den Streitpunkt sieht. Dafür spricht, daß er bei der Erwähnung dieser beiden Punkte bemerkt, es seien Grundlehren des Judentums, daß Prophetie und Vergeltung existieren, „so wie es von den Anhängern

[48] S. 25.
[49] *Philosophie und Theologie*, S. 58 bis 62.
[50] *Bechinat ha-Dat*, S. 8 und 9.

der Religion allgemein anerkannt ist".[51] In ähnlichem Sinne fügt er bei der Ableitung der einzelnen Glaubenslehren zu diesen beiden hinzu, daß sie das Wissen und die Vorsehung Gottes involvieren.[52] Zu dieser Auffassung seiner Worte paßt es gut, daß neben diesen beiden Punkten noch der Wunderglaube von ihm genannt wird, bei dem es sich ebenfalls um die Frage handelt, ob es ein über die Naturgesetzlichkeit hinausgehendes freies Walten Gottes gibt.[53] Wenn wir seine Andeutungen recht verstehen, so ist diese Frage für ihn der eigentliche Streitpunkt zwischen Vernunft und Offenbarung, und liegt hier für ihn die Grenze, die der philosophischen Deutung der Schrift vorgezeichnet ist.

Für die Fragen, die nicht von dogmatischer Bedeutung sind, schließt er sich, wie oben bereits dargelegt ist, ganz dem Standpunkt des Averroës an. Mit ihm lehrt er, daß hier eine Umdeutung der Offenbarung gestattet ist, verbietet aber, sie der Menge mitzuteilen. Seine Anwendung des Gedankens auf die konkreten Verhältnisse des Judentums, die mehr als die Hälfte seiner Abhandlung umfaßt, läßt auch im einzelnen überall den Einfluß des Averroës erkennen. Wenn er die talmudische Deutung der biblischen Gesetze mit in die Frage nach dem Recht der Umdeutung des Offenbarungsgesetzes einbezieht und ihre Berechtigung ausführlich nachzuweisen sucht,[54] so folgt er mit dieser innerhalb des Judentums einigermaßen ungewöhnlichen Betrachtungsweise genau dem Averroës, der ganz in der gleichen Art die juristische und die philosophische Interpretation des Korans unter einen Gesichtspunkt stellt.[55] Auch in diesem Teil seiner Schrift sucht er freilich die strenge Konsequenz, mit der Averroës seinen Standpunkt durchführt, durch allerhand Kompromisse zu erweichen. Er erkennt das Recht der philosophischen Umdeutung in den angegebenen Grenzen an, will aber von ihr keinen allzu ausschweifenden Gebrauch gemacht sehen.[56] Auch das Verbot, die philosophische Deutung der Schrift der

[51] S. 9.

[52] S. 26.

[53] Wie oben, S. 6 und 7, erwähnt, finden sich zwar auch bei Averroës Äußerungen, die das Wunder anerkennen. Wie immer das Mittelalter sie verstanden hat, jedenfalls ist es die durchgängige Meinung der mittelalterlichen Philosophen, daß die Konsequenz seines Systems die Anerkennung des Wunders ausschließt, und wir dürfen annehmen, daß auch del Medigo ihn so aufgefaßt hat.

[54] S. 29 bis 38.

[55] *Philosophie und Theologie*, S. 3.

[56] *Bechinat ha-Dat*, S. 48 bis 51.

Menge mitzuteilen, führt er nicht mit der rücksichtslosen Konsequenz des Averroës durch, sondern will es dem Ermessen der maßgebenden jüdischen Autoritäten überlassen wissen, wieweit die Ergebnisse der Forschung auch der Menge mitgeteilt werden dürfen.[57] Doch ergibt das Einzelne seiner Ausführungen, so lehrreich es für Elia del Medigos Auffassung des Judentums ist, für die philosophiegeschichtliche Einordnung seiner Schrift, um die es uns hier zu tun war, nichts Neues. Was sie nach dieser Richtung hin bieten, bestätigt nur unser bisheriges Ergebnis: Elia del Medigo verbindet mit der ursprünglichen Lehre des Averroës die spätere Theorie von der doppelten Wahrheit und fügt diese beiden kühnen und radikalen Theorien zu dem merkwürdig zaghaften und übervorsichtigen Halbrationalismus zusammen, den wir als das Wesentliche seines Standpunkts erkannt haben.[58]

[57] S. 52 und 53.

[58] Daß sich del Medigo auch in seinen älteren, rein philosophischen, Schriften zu der Lehre von der doppelten Wahrheit bekennt und aus ihr das Recht ableitet, sich als Philosoph mit den Lehren der Religion in Widerspruch zu sehen, zeigen, wie ich nachträglich sehe, die bei PERLES, *Beiträge zur Geschichte der hebräischen und aramäischen Studien*, S. 196—198, abgedruckten Stellen aus der Abhandlung „De primo motore" und den „Annotationes in librum de physico auditu". Von den im wesentlichen übereinstimmenden Äußerungen sei nur der Schluß der ersten Abhandlung angeführt: „Si quid tamen dictum sit contrarium legi, non mirum est, quia tantum intentiones philosophorum secundum fundamenta eorum dicere volui. Scitur enim quod via legis, cui magis creditur, alia est a via philosophica." Auch in den von STEINSCHNEIDER (Monatsschrift, Band 37, S. 187—188) veröffentlichten Stellen aus der hebräischen Abhandlung über den Intellekt bekennt er, den Philosophen in ihren der Religion widersprechenden Ansichten gefolgt zu sein, hält hier aber einen Ausgleich von Religion und Philosophie für möglich, wenn beide „richtig verstanden werden". Auf diese Schriften bezieht sich offenbar in erster Reihe die oben besprochene Äußerung des *Bechinat ha-Dat* (S. 21), daß er in seinen früheren Schriften öfters den Standpunkt der Philosophen vertreten habe.

THE SEPARATION OF CHRISTIANITY FROM JUDAISM

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Every historian of Christianity has of necessity given an account of the process by which the Christian religion claimed and acquired a separate existence apart from the Jewish. He has had to trace its development, so far as it did develop, out of Judaism, making what allowance he may deem justified for the elements in Christianity which were either original to Jesus or not Jewish. And his task is, or should be, completed (so far as this particular chapter of his history is concerned) when he has shown how the separation was carried out, and also how the two parties were affected by the process.

It is perhaps natural that the Christian historian should have confined his attention almost exclusively to the Christian factor, with but little interest in or knowledge of the Jewish factor, and of its subsequent condition. And indeed, having the New Testament as his main authority, the words of Jesus and of Paul as his sufficient guide, why should he spend any time in describing what became of the miserable corpse which was left after it had given birth to Christianity? It is not to be expected that the Christian historian should deal at any length with the subsequent history of Judaism; but he should know that it had a history, and a history which extends to the present day. Failure to recognize this fact has had serious consequences alike for Christianity and Judaism, because it has misrepresented the relation in which they actually stand towards each other. Judaism through all the Christian centuries has been treated unjustly, because the premises, on which the judgment of condemnation passed upon it were based, were partly incomplete and partly false. And Christianity has suffered by maintaining a false position, however sincerely and conscientiously it has done so. It is the purpose of the following pages to draw attention to one factor in the problem

which, so far as the present writer is aware, has been scarcely, if at all noticed by those who have dealt with the subject.

It goes without saying that the views of Christian historians in regard to the nature and significance of Judaism have been based in the first instance upon the statements contained in the New Testament, more particularly the words of Jesus in the Gospels and of Paul in his Epistles. Jesus condemned the Pharisees; Paul proclaimed that Judaism was superseded. In each case an opposition regarded from the Christian side as triumphant, completely and finally. The declarations that Scribes and Pharisees were hypocrites, that the Law was done away with by the coming of Christ, that the Jews were no longer the chosen people but were replaced by the new Israel, under a new covenant, these and similar sayings were, quite naturally, accepted as general statements of permanent validity. Henceforth and for all time, the Jews were and would continue to be such as those statements implied, no longer under the favour of God, the proper object of disapproval in the eyes of all Christians. And if any confirmation of this view was needed, it was soon provided by the capture of Jerusalem and the destruction of the Temple in A.D. 70 and the final overthrow of the Jewish national existence in A D. 135. Against such arguments who could prevail? If, in the very beginning, anyone had been inclined to question their validity, to do so was no longer possible after the New Testament had come to be accepted as Holy Scripture, of equal or superior authority to the Hebrew Scripture as the revealed word of God.

Nevertheless, the theory of the relation between Christianity and Judaism which was based on the statements above referred to, was not in accordance with the facts of history. The theory asserted that Christianity had superseded Judaism, so that the latter was left a worthless remnant of what it had once been. But, in actual fact, Judaism was hardly at all affected by the rise and separation of Christianity, except while the process was going on. The stream of Pharisaic Judaism, which had been flowing for four centuries before the Christian era, flowed on in its own channel with no interruption at that time and ever since. Judaism had terrible trials to meet in the first and second centuries, but they were not due to Christianity directly or indirectly. Judaism took but little notice of Jesus and none whatever of Paul, so far as the Talmudic literature is evidence;

and whatever was the worth of the Jewish religion before Christianity appeared, it certainly was not less afterwards. To the leaders of Christian movement, then and since, it did not matter what the actual condition or spiritual worth of Judaism might be, even if they had been in a position to understand it. The Church took up the attitude toward the Jewish religion founded upon the utterances of the New Testament, and asked no questions nor would allow them to be asked.

Yet, if those statements do not correspond with the facts of history, what is to be made of them? If Judaism was not superseded or suppressed, if the Torah remained as venerable as ever in the eyes of the people most vitally concerned, if that people still knew their way, through the gates of prayer and the doings of good works, to draw near to God, as they assuredly did, then there must be something amiss with the utterances of the New Testament or rather with the interpretation of them involved in the Christian theory. As general declarations of permanent truth they are condemned as false, because history shows that the subsequent development of Judaism after the rise of Christianity was quite other than that which the theory required. On the other hand, the New Testament is itself a document of history; the statements contained in it were made; Jesus did say the words ascribed to him, or words to that effect; Paul did write the passages in his Epistles which have to do with Judaism. And all these are, in a general sense, contemporaneous with the rise of Christianity, therefore of first-rate importance. As the usual and ancient interpretation of these statements is clearly wrong, as already shown, what other and better can be offered in its place?

The period during which the separation of Christianity was effected was about fifty years. It began with the ministry of Jesus and it ended when the declaration against the Minim (Jewish Christians) was officially made by the assembly of Rabbis at Jabneh, in the year 80 or thereabouts. These fifty years were a time of confusion and strife, especially towards the end of the period when the opposition between the Jews and Christians was becoming more intense. But, in comparison with the more than two thousand years of Pharisaic and Rabbinic Judaism, a period of fifty years is very short and affords a basis far too narrow for general assertions about the nature

and significance of Judaism. Who would deduce a theory as to the character and significance of the Roman Empire from the reign of Augustus alone; yet that lasted just over fifty years, and was moreover precisely the period in which the Roman Empire was born.

The study of the actual length of the period of fifty years assigned to the process of the separation of Christianity from Judaism may usefully be carried somewhat further. It begins with the ministry of Jesus, which according to the Synoptic Gospels, lasted for about a year, according to the Gospel of John, three years. That is but a short time in which to pronounce a definite judgment of permanent validity upon the character and moral worth of the Jews, or even of the Pharisees whom he especially condemned. Or rather, a judgment based on the experience of so short a time is not likely *a priori* to be permanently valid.

Again, within that short ministry, even admitting the three years claimed for it in the Fourth Gospel, the opportunities of acquiring a thorough and comprehensive knowledge of Judaism, such as would justify a general declaration on the subject, were not abundant. Jesus was certainly not a Pharisee, nor a Sadducee, probably not an Essene. If he can rightly be classed under any of the then usual names, he was an *Am-ha-aretz*, outside the ecclesiastical bounds then recognized. He saw Sadducees only in Jerusalem, and probably had nothing to do with them. He might meet Pharisees in Galilee, but he would mostly find them in Judaea. Even there they formed, if the name be strictly interpreted, only a small fraction of the whole population, and Jesus cannot have come in contact with more than a few of them. Of Pharisaism as a system he had (to judge by his recorded words) only an imperfect knowledge. Whence it follows again that a judgment based on such a limited experience is not likely, *a priori* to be permanently valid.

In regard to Paul the argument from limited experience will not apply. He was, by his own account, brought up in the strictest Pharisaic discipline, so that he had ample opportunity of forming a judgment upon the character and significance of Judaism, and of formulating a theory which might be permanently valid. But all that is known about Paul and his opinions is known from documents written by him long after he had become a Christian. A convert is notoriously an unreliable witness as to the character and worth of

the religion which he has abandoned. Even if Paul had written in cold passionless prose instead of in the impetuous style which marks all his Epistles, he could not have concealed, even if he had desired to do so, the fact that he had entirely changed his point of view, so that he looked upon life no longer as a Jew but as a Christian, and expressed his religion no longer in terms of Torah but in terms of Christ. Whether or not it was possible for him to give an objective impartial account of the Judaism in which he had grown up and which he had abandoned, the fact remains that he did not do so. Every one who knows Judaism from the inside knows that Paul's presentation of it in his Epistles is very far from the truth. To regard his declarations of the insufficiency and transient character of Judaism as a statement having permanent validity is only possible when the evidence to the contrary is ignored or suppressed.

The fallacy underlying the usual Christian conception of the relation of Christianity to Judaism is that the younger has been regarded as the successor and superseder of the older. If Judaism be represented as a movement in a certain direction, then Christianity is regarded as a continuing movement in the same direction. Judaism lost, on this theory, all its momentum and came to rest. Christianity went on, having acquired the momentum of Judaism and having received a new impelling power in addition thereto. This is what is implied in the claim, made at a very early stage in the rise of Christianity, that the Christians were the new Israel, to whom had been transferred all the privileges of the old Israel as the chosen people of God. It was perhaps natural, as it was certainly ingenious, to put forward such a claim on behalf of the nascent Christian Church: but the fact remains, plain to be seen by anyone who will look for it, that Christianity did not begin to move in the same direction as that in which Judaism had moved hitherto; Judaism co tinued to move on in the same direction as it had formerly done, and Christianity, from its point of origin, moved in a quite different direction. Judaism did not give up its momentum to Christianity and remain motionless. Christianity started by reason of a fresh impulse, otherwise there would have been no Christianity.

The astronomers tell us that there was a time when what are now the earth and the moon formed one body, moving in a certain orbit. Various causes, internal and external, led at last to the breaking

up of the one body into two, the one becoming the earth and the other the moon. The earth continued to move, perhaps not in exactly the same orbit as before but in one not very different. The moon began to move in a new orbit, at first not far removed from that of the earth but in course of time diverging further and further from it. The illustration is not quite complete but it may serve. Now let Judaism be represented by the composite body before the separation and by the earth after it; and let Christianity be represented by the moon. On the lines of the usual theory, the earth after producing the moon would have come to a stand-still having transferred its energy to the moon, while the moon would have gone forward in the original orbit by reason of the energy transferred to it together with any new impulse imparted to it in the process of separation. On the lines of the theory I am suggesting, or rather on the lines determined by what actually took place in history, the earth, i.e. Judaism, continued to move forward in approximately its former orbit, and the moon, i.e. Christianity, began to move in a new orbit, at first not far from that of the earth but gradually diverging from it more and more widely. The illustration is meant merely to refer to the case of one body breaking away from another which is precisely what Christianity did in regard to Judaism. It is not meant to suggest any comparison between them in regard to the relative importance and spiritual worth of Judaism and Christianity. That lies entirely outside of the present consideration.

What really came to pass, in regard to the two religions, was that Judaism continued in much the same orbit, so to speak, as before while Christianity broke away and moved henceforth on a new orbit of its own, and one which diverged more and more widely from that of Judaism as the centuries passed by. The process by which Christianity arose was therefore the formation of a new religion but not the stoppage and supersession of the old one. Until Christianity appeared, Judaism had been beyond any question, the highest type of spiritual religion then existing. After Christianity had appeared, Judaism did not cease to be as spiritual as before and did not decline from the height to which it had previously attained. It went on its way, and did what God gave it to do. But alongside of Judaism there was henceforth a quite new type of spiritual religion, Jewish in its origin and in some of its contents, but in principle

fundamentally different. The two were and are, incommensurable and incapable of ever being combined. Assimilation can only mean the adoption by one of the fundamental principle of the other and the abandonment of its own.

To say that there is not room within the range of the divine purpose towards mankind, for two great religions related to each other in the manner suggested, is to set arbitrary limits to what may be possible to God. And not only so, but there the two great religions actually are, and always have been from the beginning of Christianity down to the present day. Moreover, if it be thought incredible that Judaism and Christianity should both be, at the same time though in different ways, divinely appointed to fulfil each some part of the divine purpose, what is to be said of the other great religions of the world? The time has long gone by when these could all be dismissed as false. Every one of them represents some revelation from God, imperfect doubtless but yet affording some means of communion between man and God. If "God fulfils himself in many ways," each is no doubt the best to those who walk in it, but it is not for them to say that theirs is the only way; still less is it for them to say that when their way was opened out a former way was stopped up, and that those who would follow the old way must now walk in their new one, or stand still and arrive nowhere.

It is not necessary for the present purpose to dwell at length upon the fundamental difference of principle between Judaism and Christianity. I may be allowed to refer to my book *The Pharisees* where (especially in the last chapter) the relation of the two religions is more fully dealt with. It is sufficient if I have shown that the separation of Christianity from Judaism was the appearance of a new religion out of and alongside of the old one; and that the new did not supersede or destroy the old one, but left it much as it had been before while itself (i.e. the new one) pursued its own path and did its own work in its own way.

The process of separation could not be other than painful, since it meant the violent opposition of incompatible ideals. On either side was the vision of divine truth; and the form in which the ideal was perceived and expressed on the one side was unintelligible to those on the other side. To change from one form of heathen religion to another was easy enough. Probably no one ever died for

believing in Jupiter and refusing to worship Mithras. But Judaism had scaled the heights of spiritual religion, and stood upon the summit. And so had Christianity, however it came there. For each of them, what was challenged and defended was the best and holiest that God had revealed, and to assail it must needs appear as hostility towards God. Such a controversy could not but rouse strong feeling on each side; and human nature being what it is, the conflict was sharp and bitter, with anger and illwill not on one side alone. Whether or not the process of separation could have been carried out without hot words and recrimination, it certainly was not so carried out; and the New Testament is witness to the fact. For the New Testament is the product of the period of separation between Judaism and Christianity; and while the controversy is there presented solely from the Christian side, it appears plainly enough as a controversy and not as a peaceful development from one stage to another of a spiritual organism.

Here is to be found the key to the interpretation of the statements of the New Testament in regard to Jews and Judaism, more particularly the words of Jesus and of Paul. They are not deliberate judgments containing declarations of permanent validity. They are sharp sayings flung out on the spur of the moment, prompted by the challenge of the immediate occasion. The words of Jesus are the words of a man fighting for a cause, not those of a teacher laying down general principles. He came into conflict with the Judaism of his time, and especially that of the Pharisees, because his conception of religion was different in principle from theirs, though there was much common ground between them. He said things which seemed to them to be an assault on what to them was most holy, as indeed it was. They denounced him and opposed him, and said of him the scurrilous things which may be read in the Talmud. They, on their side, taught a form of religion which readily lent itself to abuse, in the shape of hypocrisy, and he lashed them with stinging words, for that and kindred vices. He spared them the less because he was being driven to bay, and was in no condition either to weigh or to measure his words. This is true of course especially in regard to the great series of " Woes " in Matt. XXIII if that was spoken in the closing days of his career. But it is true to some extent of all that he said from the first occasion on which he came into conflict

with the Pharisees. His attitude to them is always that of an opponent, never of a conciliator. There could indeed be no place for conciliation where the conflict was over fundamentals; but, if that is admitted, then it follows that all the words of Jesus which have reference to Jews and Judaism, including those addressed to Scribes and Pharisees, are words of temporary not of permanent validity. They were born of the occasion, and they had no significance beyond the occasion. This is not to say that there were no hypocrites among the Scribes and Pharisees of his time. There were plenty, and the Talmud is quite as severe against them as Jesus was. But it is to say that it is unwarrantable to take the utterance about hypocrites as being a general statement true for all time. So of all the rest of his words in this connexion. They have meaning and relevance only when connected with controversy; they are part of the conflict which ended when the Christian Church was finally separated from Judaism. After that time they are merely historical, having no bearing on later events and, what is more important, no vital and permanent truth to teach as to the character of Jews or the significance of Judaism.

If the sharp words of Jesus were flung out against opponents as the weapons of controversy, much more are the words of Paul the words of a fighting champion. It was he who completed what Jesus began; and while it may well be doubted whether Jesus had any idea that he was founding a religion which must of necessity break away from Judaism, Paul was perfectly clear on the subject and saw that Christianity must at any cost be cut loose from Judaism. The work which, in his view, the Christian Church was appointed to do could not be done so long as it was entangled in the bondage inherent in its Jewish origin. Paul was, in every sense of the word, "a good soldier of Christ," as he called himself; and he could not be that without fighting. When the Gospel had to be carried out into the Gentile world, he would fight to the utmost against any who would hinder or stop him.

Now he was met at the outset by a very formidable difficulty. He had to preach Christ to the Gentile world,— to the Jews also if they would listen to him,— and the cornerstone of his preaching was "Christ crucified." His chief argument was to show from the Hebrew Scriptures, the oracles of God as he called them, that Jesus was the Christ foretold by the prophets, sent in the fulness of time in order

to redeem the world from the bondage of sin, and bring salvation not to Jews only but to Gentiles. Paul, as a wandering missionary, came into frequent contact with Jews; he seems to have gone to cities where he would be likely to find a synagogue for his starting point. And he was met by the difficulty that Jews were by no means ready to accept his interpretation of their Scriptures, and further that those same Scriptures represented the Jews as from the beginning the Chosen People of God under his special favour, and the recipients of special revelation made to them through Moses. If that were true, how could the Christian claim be valid that the Jewish Law, with all that was involved in it, was done away in Christ? How could it be supposed that God would go back on his own word? Paul had to meet this difficulty somehow. Until some way could be found of virtually getting rid of Judaism, the Christian Church could not make any progress. With Jews themselves who remained in their old religion there was nothing to be done. But in the case of those who were open to conviction and were inclined to accept the Christian gospel, and in the case of Gentiles to whom also the arguments from the Scriptures must of necessity be presented, Paul had to find some means of removing the difficulty created by the past history and the present existence of Judaism as a living religion.

Such was, in brief outline, the position in which Paul found himself, in performing his task of carrying Christianity out into the world. How he solved the problem may be read in his Epistles, especially those to the Romans and the Galatians. He there puts forward a theory to explain the place of Judaism in the general scheme of providence, the past history of the Jews as the chosen people of God and their relegation to a back place on the appearance of Christ. It is not necessary here to go into any detail; Paul's own words can be read and are familiar to everyone. The point at present is this, that Paul's theory of the nature and significance of Judaism is a theory devised to meet a pressing difficulty, it is not a calm and deliberate exposition of a carefully reasoned theological system. It has been truly said that Paul was never a theologian; what he wrote was written under stress of circumstance, and has both the excellences and the defects of words so written. When he wrote to the Romans or the Galatians or the Corinthians about the Jews and their relation to the Christian Church, he was not calmly pondering

and elaborating in his study a systematic exposition of the ways of Providence towards Israel, he was hastily putting together the best case he could think of in order to meet the difficulty which would wreck the Christian Church if it were not removed. If he had taken time to think it all out, he would have seen, as any Jewish reader of his words sees at a glance, how weak and defective his theory was, a mere patched up makeshift, plausible on the face of it, but very far from a true representation of Judaism either then or at any time. In short, Paul's theory of Judaism is a document of the period of the separation of Christianity from Judaism, it was a powerful instrument in effecting that separation, and having served that purpose it had, and has, no further value. To regard it, as it has been regarded from Paul's time to the present day, as a statement of general truth and permanent validity, to say nothing of a divinely inspired Scripture, is to contradict or ignore plain facts of history as they are to be read elsewhere.

In regard to the separation of Christianity from Judaism and the New Testament evidence bearing thereon, Jesus and Paul are the two whose words are of supreme importance. But what has been said of them applies in a lesser degree to whatever else the New Testament contains on the subject. It is all the product of a time of stress and conflict, and can only be understood when read as such. This is not to say that there is not in the New Testament very much that is of imperishable value; but it is to say that, in regard to the relation between Judaism and Christianity, the utterances of the New Testament belong only to the time of separation, they express the mind of men engaged, in the struggle, fighting opponents straining against difficulties, catching at any help or any hope. And when the strife was over, and the separation finally effected, the words spoken or written in the heat of it have no longer any value except as memories of the conflict. To treat them as permanently valid is to do a wrong to those who said or wrote these things, by putting on them an interpretation they will not bear and ought never to have been made to bear.

Jesus said words which have hurt Jews ever since he said them. Paul wrote what Jews have never ceased to feel as a cruel injustice. But it is one thing if those words were flung out in the heat of conflict, or written hastily to meet the need of the moment, it is

quite another thing if they were deliberately intended to go down through the ages as declarations of permanent truth. It has been the grievous misfortune alike of Jews and Christians that the words at present in question have been read in the latter sense and not in the former, as permanent not as transient. They have helped to widen the breach between the adherents of the one religion and those of the other. Christianity and Judaism can never blend without the surrender by one or the other of its fundamental principle. But they could learn to understand and respect each other, and recognize that each religion has God's work to do, and cannot do it without the help and presence, yes, even the sympathy of the other. And it would greatly help to this end if it were recognized that the hard things spoken and written of old, belonged to the old time alone, and have no meaning now. Let the dead past bury its dead.

It is with the thought in my mind of Israel Abrahams, who was always by way of promoting peace and friendship, and who always looked for the good on the other side, that I have written these lines and offer them as a tribute to his memory.

ROYAL HEBRAISTS*

GEORGE ALEXANDER KOHUT (NEW YORK)

While collecting material for an anthology of Hebrew writings by eminent Christians whose letters to noted Jewish scholars and whose poems and introductions to learned works are sporadically scattered through periodicals that are no longer readily accessible to the student except in large libraries, the present writer has come across interesting evidences to prove that not only Orientalists, who were directly engaged in the study of Hebrew, for professional reasons, or for purposes of scholarly research, have been interested in the study of Hebrew, but that from very early times, ante-dating the period of the Reformation, when Hebrew learning received its greatest impetus, there have been emperors, princes and other members of royal houses and the aristocracy who have given considerable attention to the study of the Hebrew language and its literature.

So far as I know there is no special article or monograph dealing with this phase of the subject, although STEINSCHNEIDER, in his interesting list of "Female Hebraists,"[1] has enumerated quite a number of ladies, of gentle birth, who had gained extraordinary proficiency in the sacred tongue. One looks in vain, however, for a record of their achievements in special works of reference, such as GEIGER's *Das Studium der hebräischen Sprache in Deutschland* (Breslau 1870) which covers the period from the end of the fifteenth to the middle of the sixteenth century, or in the same author's numerous essays on this topic, contributed to various learned periodicals. Not even STEINSCHNEIDER's catalogue of "Christian Hebraists"[2] mentions more than two or three of these royal scholars, and it is indeed surprising that so many of them, who have a place in our sketch, should have escaped his eagle eye.

The purpose of this brief paper is to give a comprehensive summary, setting forth, for the first time in tangible form, the part which these

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men of the castles and palaces have played in the encouragement and promotion of Hebrew learning, from Julian, the Apostate, to the days of King Oscar of Sweden. As a pioneer effort, it will have numerous faults and gaps which only special research can correct and fill up, but I believe that it will be a service to the scholar as well as to the layman to draw up this résumé, which presents to us one of the curiosities of literature.

The first starting point* for our inquiry is the alleged friendship between the famous Rabbi Judah Ha-Nasi II and the Emperor Marcus Aurelius, who, according to the evidence of the Midrash, carried on a symbolic correspondence in Aramaic. (See references in the *Jewish Encyclopaedia*, vol. 1, pp. 656–657.) The Talmudic records are probably apocryphal and we can not ascertain, with any definiteness, who the Judah and who the Emperor were, figuring in these traditions.

Nor is it possible to establish as authentic the claim of some writers that the Emperor Julian, who flourished about the middle of the fourth century, was conversant with Hebrew, although we know him to have been well versed in the Old Testament and to have had strong Hebraic sympathies. An admirable monograph has been written on the subject of the "Emperor Julian and the Jews"[3] by the Reverend Michael Adler, where much matter pertinent to our theme will be found. It is but fair to state that Dr. Adler maintains that Julian knew little or no Hebrew.

The first authentic record of a learned female Hebraist is Paula Cornelia, widow of a Roman nobleman (died 408 C.E.), who is stated to have attained a remarkable mastery of Hebrew and to have inspired Hieronymus to write his commentaries. Steinschneider, in his characteristic manner, adds: "Ihr enger Verkehr mit demselben wurde verdächtigt." She and her daughter, Julia Eustochium, who is designated as a "prodigium orbis novum," of her time, both understood Greek and Hebrew and sang the Hebrew psalms without the "Latin accent." The Hebrew learning of another Roman maiden is praised by Hieronymus. She was Blesilla, whom Rieger[4] mentions as Paula Cornelia's daughter. Of her the great Church Father says: "In paucis non dicam mensibus, sed diebus ita Hebraeae linguae vicerat difficultatem ut in discendis, canendisque Psalmis cum matre contenderet."

* Some authorities maintain that Cleopatra, Queen of Egypt, who died about 30 B.C., understood Hebrew.

This quotation would indicate that she is, in truth, one of the daughters of Paula, of whom Rieger reports the episode of the chanting of Hebrew psalms.

And now we come to Frederick II of Hohenstaufen (1194–1250), the distinguished and broad-minded prince of the thirteenth century, who is on record as perhaps the greatest royal patron of Jewish learning of all times. As Güdemann has pointed out, he was an uncommon individual in every respect. An Italian by birth, a German by descent, a Christian by education, an agnostic by conviction—once a zealous leader of the Crusades, then again flirting with Islam —he is certainly a riddle to historians and to literary men. In his attitude toward the Jews also, to judge from the various accounts we have of him, he, at times, displays enlightened toleration on the one hand and unyielding rigor on the other. Be that as it may, it is to him that we owe the impetus which Hebrew, Arabic, and scholastic learning received, at his court, where he entertained in intimate intercourse some of his erudite contemporaries, among whom we find some Jewish thinkers, who have enjoyed his patronage and with one of whom he corresponded.

Gaudius, the Master of the Mint, whom he calls "fidelis noster," was a Jew, and while he allowed or countenanced anti-Jewish ordinances, we know him to have shown the utmost liberality toward a few chosen ones, who were so fortunate as to gain his confidence and good will. In Rabbi Jehiel ben Jekutiel's "Sefer Ma'aloth ha-Midoth," written in 1278 and published in Cremona, 1556, p. 31, one of the Emperor's traits is held up for emulation, and in other Jewish sources his opinions are quoted with reverence and approval, which plainly indicates his popularity among Hebrew writers. Judah ben Solomon Cohen Ibn Matka, of Toledo, another of his protégés, writing in 1247, reports that many letters were exchanged between him and the Emperor's philosopher (Theodorus?), extending over a period of years, and he describes his visit to the Court, whereof he speaks in appreciative terms.

This correspondence, begun in Judah's eighteenth year, is preserved in the Bodleian Library, at Oxford, and a copy of it has been made by Steinschneider, with a view to publication. It is to be hoped that it may soon appear in print. Undoubtedly it will throw considerable light on the *Gelehrtengeschichte* of that epoch and prove a distinct

contribution to philosophical literature. Frederick has himself made some characteristic comments, interpreting Jewish tradition, which are quoted as evidences of his Hebrew learning and ingenuity. Three of his comments are preserved, one concerning the Red Heifer of the Bible, to explain which he cites an Indian parallel. His remarks, it has been conjectured, were transmitted by Harizi or Samuel Ibn Tibbon, and are evidently received with satisfaction by later writers. In another place he identifies material substance as snow, and his third interpretation sets forth the reason why only domestic and no wild animals are acceptable as sacrifice. These data are chronicled by Jacob ben Abbamari ben Simon ben Anatoli, of Provence, who flourished in the third decade of the thirteenth century, and who was commissioned by the king to translate Arabic philosophical works. Dr. J. Perles has already made it highly probable, in a monograph on the subject, that the Emperor was instrumental in the translation of Maimonides' "More Nebukim" into Latin.

However fragmentary these references may be, they at least prove beyond peradventure that the illustrious monarch was not only a Maecenas of Hebrew learning, but a no mean Hebraist himself. It is, furthermore, gratifying to have the names of Jewish scholars coupled with those of such celebrities as Michael Scotus, the Astrologer Theodorus and other *Hofgelehrten*, who loom large in the history of science and philosophy. Alexander von Humboldt has called attention to the Emperor's learned entourage, and mentions the fact that "the sons of Averroës lived at the Court of the great Hohenstaufen, Frederick II, who owed a portion of his knowledge of the national history of Indian animals and plants to his intercourse with Arabian literati and Spanish Jews, versed in many languages."[5]

Two other royal personages, Robert I and Carl I, of Anjou, are said to have been not only promoters of Hebrew learning and friends of Jewish literati, but to have actually studied Hebrew. Moses Rieti, in his poetical work, entitled "Mikdash Meat" (ed. Goldenthal, Vienna, 1851, pp. 105–106), mentions Judah ben Moses ben Daniel, commonly called Judah Romano, as King Robert's instructor in Hebrew. Judah reported to Moses Rieti verbally that he was in the habit of reading the Prophets with the King in the holy tongue. There is still preserved in the Municipal Library of Hamburg a curious document, which purports to be a Circular, addressed to the Jewish

congregation of Aix, in the Provence, in 1328, by this enlightened monarch, the style of which would seem to point to a Hebrew translator from the Latin original. Both versions have been published by STEINSCHNEIDER and others, but, in spite of the doubt cast upon the authenticity of the Hebrew text, by the last named scholar, as well as by GÜDEMANN and NEUBAUER, it is still an open question whether King Robert composed the Hebrew document or not. In any event, the relations of this monarch to contemporary Hebrew scholars, among them Kalonymos ben Kalonymos, are too well-known to require special comment. They are admirably set forth in the works of GRAETZ, BERLINER, GÜDEMANN and other writers.[6]

The next important personage of whom we must treat is Pico de la Mirandola, Prince of Concordia, otherwise called Count Giovanni Frederico, the famous Florentine philosopher and theologian, who flourished from 1463–1494. In the history of Hebrew lore, and especially in the realm of Cabalistic studies, he deserves a foremost place. He was a philo-Semite of noble sentiments and numbered among his friends several of the eminent Jews of his time, notably Johanan Allemano and Elijah del Medigo. He translated several Cabalistic works into Latin; endeavored to harmonize the philosophy of Plato and Aristotle with the Cabala and neo-Platonism; and actually claimed that the divinity of Jesus could be substantiated in the Cabalistic writings. His ascetic mysticism embroiled him with the Church, which tried and acquitted him for heresy. Like many of his contemporaries, he was a great bibliophile and collected a considerable number of Hebrew manuscripts, which were afterwards purchased by Cardinal Grimani. It is recorded as a tradition, accepted by STEINSCHNEIDER, that the devotion of Elijah del Medigo to this prince of Hebraists exposed the former to an ailment with which Pico was afflicted. It forms an interesting chapter in the history of literary friendships between distinguished Jews and Christians, which is yet to be written.[7]

Among those who are said to have attained some proficiency in the Hebrew tongue is mentioned Cibo (?), daughter of Fr. Cibo, the Count of Anguillara, and wife of John Verano, Duke of Camerino, who flourished about 1550.[8]

Next in order on our list is Lady Jane Grey (born 1537; died February 10, 1554, aged 17), Queen of England, great-granddaughter of Henry VII, grand-niece of Henry VIII, and wife of Lord Dudley.

She understood all Oriental tongues, and is stated to have spoken and written Hebrew fluently. "Was wohl zu bezweifeln ist," says Steinschneider. Yet she wrote, in 1554, a Hebrew letter to Konrad Pellikan, professor of theology in Zurich (died 1566), requesting him to dedicate to her his translations from the Talmud. Her Latin correspondence with him is preserved at the Municipal Library of Zurich. D. M. Welton, in his dissertation on *Lightfoot, the Christian Hebraist* (p. 6), says: "Sir Thomas Chalmer's elegy on Lady Jane proves that she added a knowledge of Hebrew, Chaldee, and Arabic to her other accomplishments." This seems to be borne out by the fact that Anna Maria von Schurman, in one of her Hebrew letters, deplores the passing of the unfortunate Lady Jane in the following words: "Wisdom has perished from among the women of England by the death of Lady Jane Grey and Queen Elizabeth."[9] It has been cleverly said, by Prof. Milledge L. Bonham, Jr., that "Lady Jane with all her learning could not manage to keep her head on her shoulders."

Among the famous blue-stockings is numbered Amoena Amalia, daughter of Count Arnold von Bentheim, wife of Ludwig of Anhalt (died 1625), who is said to have been "trefflich geübt" in Hebrew, Italian and French. Louisa Amoena, Princess of Anhalt, of the same family, was likewise well-versed in Hebrew, Latin and French.[10]

Anna, Princess de Rohan (Roan), daughter of Prince Renari de Rohan (died 1646), is reported to have read the Old Testament always in the vernacular, as attested by the personal observation of Colomesius and Philip Aquinas. She also is said to have sung the psalms in Hebrew, and was a close friend of Schurman, that prodigy of learning.[11]

Anna Sophia, daughter of George of Hessen, Abbotess of Quedlinburg (died 1658), is recorded to have mastered all the Oriental languages, including Hebrew.[12]

Christina Augusta, Queen of Sweden, daughter of Gustavus Adolphus (born 1626; died 1689), likewise cultivated the study of Hebrew and engaged Mannasseh ben Israel to catalogue her library. Both he and David Cohen de Lara, the Hebrew lexicographer, dedicated one of their books to her. Her relations to Teixeira, the noted Jewish ambassador from Vienna, are set forth at length in historic sources.[13]

Maria Eleonore, daughter of Joachim of Brandenburg, wife of Louis Philip of Pfalz, for whom John Coccejus composed a Hebrew dictionary (1669), is cited as a Hebraist.[14]

A mere mention is all that can be made of Lady Dorothea More, to whom one of Schurman's Hebrew letters is addressed (about 1678).[15]

Her namesake, Dorothea Maria, wife of Duke John, of Sachsen-Weimar, who lived about the middle of the seventeenth century, is said to have progressed sufficiently in Hebrew to be able to read and translate the Old Testament. ("Nicht allein aufschlagen, sondern auch lesen und verteutschen können.")[16]

Henrietta Catherina Friesen, daughter of Charles, Freiherr von Friesen, wife of Nicholas von Gersdorff, Minister of Chursachsen, is lauded for her Hebrew learning by John Adam Scherzer, about this time. She is designated a "reines, untadeliges monstrum."[17]

Elizabeth, daughter of Frederick V of Pfalz, Abbotess of Herfort (died 1680), understood all Oriental languages including Hebrew. She, too, is described a "Miracul gelehrter Weiber."[18]

Perhaps the greatest prodigy of the seventeenth century was Anna Maria von Schurman (died 1678), who may truly be described as a royal Hebraist, although she was not as highly connected as the aforementioned ladies. She is credited with a knowledge of fourteen languages, several of which she spoke and wrote with ease. She composed music, poetry, painted, engraved on copper and etched an admirable portrait of herself, which is prefixed to her collected writings. She is too much of a "Weltberühmtheit" to require extensive treatment, and for our purpose we need only chronicle the fact that she composed Hebrew poetry and corresponded with Lady Dorothea More and others, in Hebrew, and that she wrote Hebrew with a fluency and elegance which are indeed exceptional. She is said to have been a friend of Buxtorf, and Menasseh ben Israel.[19]

One of the notable Hebraists of the seventeenth century was the Princess Antonia, daughter of the Duke Eberhard, of Württemberg, who, it is asserted, read the most difficult books of rabbinical literature and understood the Cabala so well that she surpassed learned Jews, and indeed put a number of them to shame, as one writer observes. However exaggerated this account may be, we know that she acquired a good working knowledge of the Hebrew language and its grammar. She appears to have had no Jewish teacher, but studied Cabala with Philipp Jacob Spencer, a pupil of Buxtorf's during a temporary stay at Heidelberg. To this he himself bears testimony, in a letter addressed to his master in 1662, wherein he praises her highly. She

had deep veneration for the great Hebrew scholar of Basel and received from him some of his books through Prof. Esenwein, of Tübingen, who, in one of his letters to Buxtorf, dated February 21, 1661, writes that Antonia was anxious to compare his copy of the *Cusari* with another manuscript, which she afterward presented to her brother Henry. As early as July, 1649, Prof. Esenwein wrote to Buxtorf that Antonia, "who had already been well grounded in the Hebrew language and the reading of the Bible, was burning with desire to learn also the art of reading Hebrew books without the use of vowels," and three years later he writes to Buxtorf that "the Princess was aglow with incredible love of the holy tongue and had already made such progress with it that she had, with her own hands, put vowels to a Hebrew Bible, written in rather large letters by some copyist, and had, besides, acquired a considerable knowledge of Hebrew grammar."

The praises of this learned Princess were sung in Hebrew poems by the clergy of Suavia and by noted Hebraists. One of these poems, comprising 23 stanzas, sent to John Buxtorf as a curiosity, is preserved in manuscript, in Basel. It was translated from the Hebrew into Latin by Johann Martin Rebstock, Pastor in Laufen, and bears her name אנטוניה דוכסום מוערטעמברג in acrostic. The author is Charles Filibert, Count of Candel, an Italian nobleman, who resided in Württemberg for a number of years. Beyond the fact that his mother had been born a Jewess, little or nothing is known of him. Antonia studied Cabala up to the time of her death, and there is extant a work of hers containing Cabalistic diagrams, some of which are interpreted in Hebrew and German. These diagrams were drawn by the Princess and are preserved in the royal library at Stuttgart. Schnurrer, in his valuable biographical record of Hebrew scholars in Tübingen, in 1792, condemns Princess Antonia for her failure to erect a monument to Reuchlin, the father of Hebrew studies, which was once her pious wish, but which she abandoned upon learning that the great leader of the Reformation did not treat her great-grandfather's brother, Duke Ulrich, with the consideration he merited.[20]

It is a fact which we might chronicle in passing that many women of Reuchlin's time were attracted to the study of the sacred tongue, which, as in the Colonial period in New England, was considered

an indispensable factor in the education of ladies of quality. This is especially emphasized in the curious but valuable little work by the Right Reverend Thomas Burgess, the Lord Bishop of St. David's, who in his "Motives to the Study of Hebrew," Part II (second edition, London 1814), enumerates several learned women of note, who were known as Hebraists, and furnishes a lengthy list of other cultured ladies who were versed in languages, theology, law and the sciences.

The following is the list drawn up by him (pp. 90–91):

Female Hebraists of the Fourth Century

Marcella	Blesilla
Paula	Eustochium

Twelfth Century

Heloissa

Sixteenth Century

Lady Jane Grey	Aloysia Sigea
Lady Arabella Stuart	Susan de Habert
Lady Killigrew	Setti Maani Gioerida
Torquinia Molsa	Pietro della Valle

Seventeenth Century

Viscountess Ranalaugh	Maria Cunitz
Elizabeth Bland	Anna Maria Schurman
Helena Lucretia Cornaro, Doctor in the University of Padua	Marchioness de Vielbourg

Eighteenth Century

Elizabeth Bury	Elizabeth Carter
Constantia Grierson	Elizabeth Smith

Most interesting is his supplementary statement (pp. 93–94), which, incidentally, confirms the claim, doubted by Steinschneider, that Lady Jane Grey is to be included in the category of Hebrew scholars.

He writes as follows:

"In the preceding list of learned ladies, many, probably, were Hebraists who are not so recorded, especially among those of the

sixteenth century, when Hebrew made a usual part of female education, and at a time when the Reformation, among its many blessed and providential influences, excited such a general zeal for studying the Scriptures in their original languages. In the family of Sir Anthony Cooke there can be little doubt that Lady Burleigh, Lady Elizabeth Russel and Lady Bacon (who were eminent for their knowledge of Greek and Latin and for their compositions in both those languages), were educated in the same course of studies as their youngest sister, Lady Killigrew, who was learned in Hebrew as well as in Greek and Latin. The Countess of Pembroke, Sir Philip Sidney's sister, should also, perhaps, be added to the class of Female Hebraists, for in her translation of the Psalms, which is still preserved in the library at Wilton, she is said to have expressed the sense of the Hebrew better than the Latin or the common English version. This superiority Sir John Harington imputed to the assistance of a learned friend, for no other reason than because he thought it was 'more than a woman's skill to express the sense of the Hebrew so right.' This supposed incapacity for Hebrew is triumphantly disproved by the list of eminent female Hebraists before given, and especially by the learning and talents of three very young ladies in that list, Blesilla, Lady Jane Grey and Miss Smith."

Returning to our chronological scheme, we remember John George II, Kurfürst of Saxony, great-grandson of Christianus Augustus of Pfalz-Sulzbach (died 1680), who learned Chaldaic and Syriac, and habitually read the Old Testament in the original. Landgrave George, founder of the Hessen-Darmstadt dynasty, is said to have studied Hebrew, so as to be able to understand his Bible more intelligently. Landgrave Philip, of the same house, attained a wonderful proficiency, not only in his Hebrew studies, but mastered the Rabbinic literature so well as to be able to read difficult passages at sight. He corresponded with the learned Jews of his time, and his Hebrew letters, comprising a huge volume in folio, are preserved at the *Hochfürstliche Bibliothek* at Darmstadt. According to SCHUDT, he translated the Bible from Hebrew into German. The same authority reports that Augustus, Kurfürst of Saxony, began the study of Hebrew in his sixtieth year "in order to get the full sense of the Old Testament."

Landgrave Ludovicus VI is likewise credited with proficiency in Hebrew, as chronicled by SCHUDT; also the Princess Gunther and

Henricus of Sondershausen, who studied Hebrew under the eye of the apostate, Christian Lebrecht Fels, the author of a curious tract on the *Had Gadya*. He dedicated his Hebrew grammar, published in 1697, to these princes.[21]

Here is the place to mention the name of Maria Elizabeth, daughter of Christian Albrecht, Duke of Schleswig-Holstein (1706), who, at a very early age, studied Latin and Hebrew under the tutelage of the Chief Court Chaplain Friccius.[22]

One of the most interesting figures of the eighteenth century is Anna Constanze von Cosel, the ill-fated Countess, favorite of Augustus II, whose romantic career would afford fascinating material to the novelist. From her earliest youth she was interested in Hebrew studies, and is said to have understood Rabbinical literature and the Cabala. For a long time she corresponded with Bodenschatz, the famous theologian (1717–1797), whose work on the "Constitution of the Jewish Church," published in 1748, is still consulted for information. Her dramatic meeting with him is described by a contemporary, and furnishes additional proof of her ingenuity and learning, which she knew to demonstrate, on occasion, with all the caprice and artistry in her power. We are told he was not aware that his correspondent was a woman, and that when he called by appointment to meet his unknown friend face to face, she appeared dressed in the garb of a Jewish high priest, every detail of which costume had been carefully elaborated by her according to the description in the Old Testament. Her teacher, Bodenschatz, translated for her the *Pirke Abot* and other Hebrew selections. Alfred Meissner, in his "Charaktermasken," vol. ii, p. 176, reports that the great poet, Heine, cherished the idea, even in the last years of his life, of writing a historic romance, dealing with her life and times. Not only the scenes of the brilliant and degenerate Court appealed to his rich fancy but the fate of the Countess particularly (who, as is well known, ended her life in captivity at the Castle Stolp) impressed him vividly enough to impel him to perpetuate her history. No doubt the fact that she developed, in her exile, a strong liking for Judaism, as did Lady Esther Stanhope in the wilds of Lebanon, and that she spent much of her time in Talmudic studies, attracted his attention. Meissner, indeed, adds that Heine's faithful friend, la Mouche, read, at the poet's repeated request, while he lay on his

mattress grave, the curious memoirs of the Countess' life, written by Vehse, who records all the particulars regarding her career.[23]

The Marchesa de Croya (Croix?), with whom Hayyim Joseph David Azulai was personally acquainted, and whom he mentions in his small book of travels, under date of Paris, 1778, declared that Dr. Falk, the celebrated Baal-Shem of London, had taught her practical Cabala, and that she was learned in the holy tongue. Both she and her husband were well versed in the Bible, and she told the Rabbi of Cabalistic books presented to her by Jews. She gave Azulai some money for Palestine and asked him to pray for her. Azulai also records the fact that the Marchioness had saved many Jews from falling into the clutches of the Inquisition. We might add, in passing, that Dr. Falk appears to have been on intimate terms with Baron Theodore de Neuhoff, that strange adventurer, who was crowned king of Corsica, and upon his banishment settled in London in 1749. In the belief that with the aid of the Baal-Shem's magical tricks he could retrieve his fallen fortunes and re-establish himself, he consulted Dr. Falk, who, we know, visited him while in prison. Dr. Falk also stood on terms of friendship with Prince Czartorysky and other personages of rank, and is said to have presented a talisman to the Duke of Orleans, to ensure his ascending the throne. The history of this talisman is in itself a story worth recording, as it has passed through various hands before it became safely lodged at Stowhouse, Twickenham.[24]

No less romantic than the history of the Countess Cosel is that of Lord George Gordon, of London, whose career is described, at some length, in Charles Dickens' "Barnaby Rudge." This quixotic leader of the "No Popery Riots" became a proselyte to Judaism, having acquired considerable knowledge of Hebrew and the Jewish ceremonies, of which he was a rigid adherent. Until December 1787, he lived as a Jew, and was, in that year, condemned to two years' imprisonment and a heavy fine for various petty political offenses. This did not discourage him, however, and in his religious fervor he did not suffer himself to relax one jot, even while in a prison cell. He laid *Tefilin* on his arm and head every morning, and held service on the Sabbath, having secured the required religious quorum, in the persons of ten Polish Jews, who were to have bailed him out. He had, previous to his being admitted to the Jewish fold, attended divine services at the synagogue, and we are told that upon being

called up to the Law he offered one hundred pounds as a gift to the house of worship. The walls of his prison were inscribed with the Ten Commandments and decorated with the *Talith* and *Tefilin*, and in his diet he was particularly strict about eating *kosher*. On January 18, 1793, he was cited to appear at court to give verbal guarantees for his future good behavior. On that occasion he wore a large slouched hat, which he would not remove, because of religious scruples. It being forcibly taken from him, he deliberately put on a white cap, which he had in reserve. Dickens makes much of his alleged love for a Jewish girl, for which actual evidence is wanting. He died in November, 1793, at the age of forty-three, having been in prison for several years, in spite of the pledge given by his Polish friends to have him released. A very good biography of him has been furnished by Robert Watson (1795), and other data are given in the subjoined notes to this paper. Some interesting caricatures of Lord Gordon are reproduced in the London *Jewish Chronicle* of December 7, 1906, and there are others, not generally known, in my possession.[25]

Another nobleman, who was closely interested in the Cabala, and whose relation to Jewish scholars deserves to be noted, is the Count Waldstein-Wartenburg, who is lauded by Moses ben Menahem Kunitz, commonly called Moses Kunitzer (1774–1837), as a fine Hebraist, and a genial patron of Jewish learning. No doubt, in recognition of his friendship, he inscribed to him his commentary on the "Behinat Olam" (Vienna, 1796). This dedicatory epistle (in Hebrew and German) is in itself an interesting contribution to the history of literary friendships. We record, in passing, that Kunitzer publishes in his "Mezaref," Part i, pp. 33a–38b, a highly interesting letter, in Hebrew, by a Christian professor of rhetoric, named Bonyhád (or Bonyády) on the metaphors and parables of the Talmud.[26]

The Court of England, too, has contributed its quota to the literature concerning royal Hebraists. Augustus Frederick, Duke of Sussex, corresponded in Hebrew with Abraham Belais, who, in 1850, was Rabbi in London. Belais was formerly Treasurer to the Bey of Tunis and Secretary of the Chief Rabbi of Nice. His commentary on Ecclesiastes, intitled "The Dust of the World," published in London, 1850, contains the Duke's approbation in Hebrew,[27] as well as recommendations from other royal personages. The English and Hebrew Lexicon of Michael Joseph (London, 1834) entitled מדריש מלים,

contains a dedicatory epistle, in English, and a Hebrew poem of twelve lines, inscribed to the Duke of Sussex. The Duke was well known as a patron of Jewish learning and a zealous bibliophile, and his collection of Hebrew books and manuscripts has often been highly praised. He is said to have been a great friend of the Jews, and to have assisted the cause of Jewish emancipation. He studied the sacred tongue with the Reverend Solomon Lyon, of Cambridge, and with a Mr. Levy, of London, and is said to have read one chapter daily in the Hebrew Old Testament.[28]

The Duke of Manchester is quoted in KIRCHHEIM's "Carme Shomron" (Frankfurt a. M., 1851), as the author of a learned work on the Seven Weeks of Daniel and the Kings of Persia.[29] This, no doubt, refers to an English monograph, the exact title of which I have not been able to secure.

In more recent times, possibly the most dramatic figure in the world's history, by reason of his great nobility of character, scholarly attainments and adverse destiny, is Dom Pedro II, Emperor of Brazil. He was born on December 2, 1825; died in Paris, December 5, 1891, shortly after his deposition. He became emperor in July, 1840, and appears to have studied the history and literature of Israel, especially the poetic books and the prophets and the origin of Christianity, since the war with Paraguay, in 1865. Prof. MAX MÜLLER, in his charming reminiscences, entitled "Auld Lang Syne," First Series, in the chapter on "Royalties," devotes a few sympathetic paragraphs to this illustrious prince, who not only was interested in Hebrew literature, but had a strong penchant for Oriental research in its broadest aspect. Dom Pedro's instructor in Hebrew, as we know from his own account (see Appendix), was a Swiss Jew, named A. Akerblom, and MAX MÜLLER, describing the Emperor's visit to Oxford, says: "To the very end of his reign, and even when in exile, he kept his tutor, and carried on his studies in Sanskrit and Hebrew." This tutor, who is described as a young German, by the great English Orientalist, accompanied him on his Continental travels. Dom Pedro's other masters were the German Protestant Minister, Koch, who was tutor of the royal household; Dr. Henning (died 1888), and Prof. Seybold, the noted scholar, who, since 1886, taught him Hebrew and Arabic. The latter language he had commenced learning in Brazil, with the aid of Baron Schreiner, the Austrian Minister, and we are given to understand by his biographer, that he desired to become proficient in Arabic that he might the better appreciate the beauty

of the Hebrew language and its rich and varied literature. He began to translate into Portuguese, for the first time, "The Thousand and One Nights," from the Arabic original.[30]

During his last visit to Cannes, the Chief Rabbi of Avignon, B. Mossé, called his attention to the ritual used by the local Jewish congregation, and the Emperor was so interested in the liturgy that he prepared a scholarly edition of three poetic pieces, included in the synagogue service. These were published in a dainty and artistic little volume,[31] in commemoration of the one hundredth anniversary of the union of the County Venaissin with the French Republic, in 1891, and competent authorities declare that his French rendering and interpretation of these Hebrew and Provencal verses merit much praise. This little volume has now become very rare, and copies are only to be found in large libraries. It is interesting to note that the Grand Rabbin of Avignon wrote a life of Dom Pedro, and that the sympathetic hand of David Kaufmann drew up an adequate appreciation of this great, generous prince. I have read somewhere that Dom Pedro prepared an edition of the Hebrew Bible for the press, but I can find no reference to its publication, nor to the whereabouts of the manuscript.

Another modern monarch, King Oscar II of Sweden and Norway, deserves a place in this sketch as an Orientalist and a patron of Hebrew learning, although all that is known of his interest in our subject is from press reports, which are not often reliable. He is said to have conducted a conversation in Hebrew with Prof. David Simonsen, of Copenhagen, on the occasion of the latter's audience with him several years ago, and to have acted as host to the Congress of Orientalists, which met at Stockholm quite recently.

This concludes our résumé of a subject which presents so many interesting facts to the scholar, layman and especially to the *Kulturhistoriker*. However inadequate and fragmentary the above account may be, it is hoped that the recital of this somewhat bare and monotonous story may furnish to the special student material for a more extended investigation of a theme, which offers many fascinating glimpses into the inner lives of men and women of title and distinction, whose friendship and good-will toward the People of the Book will be recorded as a bright chapter in the history of human tolerance. Though they have no place in Jewish history, they may still be called, by those of us who know how to be grateful, Princes and Princesses in Israel.

NOTES

[1] Cf. his article *Hebraistinnen*, in *Hebräische Bibliographie*, xx, pp. 65–69, and the references there given; R. GOTTHEIL's "*Female Christian Hebraists*," in *Jewish Encyclopaedia*, vi, p. 304[2]; A. MARMORSTEIN, *Christliche Hebraisten in Ungarn*, *Zeitschrift für Hebräische Bibliographie*, viii (1904), pp. 49, No. 5; 80, No. 26; *Some Female Hebraists*, in G. A. KOHUT's *Ezra Stiles and the Jews* (New York 1902), pp. 67–72.

[2] See *Christliche Hebraisten*, in *Zeitschrift für Hebräische Bibliographie*, i, seq. It is a long series of articles, published in several volumes of that periodical.

[3] See *Jewish Quarterly Review*, July, 1893, and the same author's article, *Julian the Apostate*, in *Jewish Encyclopaedia*, vii, pp. 390–391. See also P. ALLARD, *Un Précurseur du Sionisme, Julien l'Apostat et les Juifs*, in *Le Correspondant*, 1901, pp. 530 seq.

[4] See the authorities quoted in *Hebräische Bibliographie*, xx, pp. 67–69, and PAUL RIEGER, *Geschichte der Juden in Rom*, i (Berlin 1896), p. 173, n. 7.

Another Roman maiden, Caecilia Sebutia, who, according to BARTOLOCCI, *Bibliot. Rabb.*, iii, p. 756, was eighteen years old, in 1683, is credited with an extraordinary knowledge of Hebrew. She could cite Biblical quotations in support of her arguments against the Jews, and was able to controvert learned Rabbis and to carry on philosophical-theological disputations in public. See the sources mentioned by STEINSCHNEIDER, *Hebräische Bibliographie*, xx, p. 69, and PAUL RIEGER, *loc. cit.*, ii, p. 289. Concerning Elena, see WAGENSEIL, *Sota*, p. 1190.

[5] See the references and extracts in STEINSCHNEIDER, *Hebräische Bibliographie*, vii, pp. 62–66, 136; xv, 86; xix, 118; xx, 24. See also his *Catalog* of Hebrew Manuscripts in Hamburg (1878), p. 103; idem, in *Ozar Nehmad*, ii, p. 234; idem, *Die hebräischen Übersetzungen des Mittelalters* (1893), pp. 1, 3, 58, 61, 461, 477, 793, 807; idem, *Verzeichnis der hebräischen Handschriften zu Berlin*, ii (1897), pp. 121–126; idem, *Die arabische Literatur der Juden* (1902), No. 117, pp. 162–163; RENAN-NEUBAUER, *Les Rabbins Français*, pp. 582–586, 744; idem, *Les Écrivains Juifs Français* (1893), p. 241; HUMBOLDT, *Cosmos*, English translation, Bohn Library (London 1864), ii, p. 588; MUNK, *Mélanges*, p. 335; J. PERLES, *Salomo ben Aderet*, p. 13; GROSS, *Gallia Judaica*, p. 374; GRAETZ, *Geschichte der Juden*, vii[2] (1873), pp. 93–99; M. GÜDEMANN, *Geschichte des Erziehungswesens und der Kultur der Juden in Italien während des Mittelalters* (Wien 1884), pp. 101–107, 150, 286; ADOLPH KOHUT, *Geschichte der deutschen Juden*, pp. 153–163, 166, et passim; J. PERLES, *Die in einer Münchener Handschrift aufgefundene erste lateinische Übersetzung des Maimonidischen „Führers"* (Breslau 1875), cp. *Hebräische Bibliographie*, xv, p. 86 seq. The recently issued sumptuous volume, entitled *Jewish Influence on Christian Reform Movements* by LOUIS I. NEWMAN (New York 1925), devotes many pages to Frederick II and other noted Hebraists.

[6] Cf. Immanuel ben Solomon, *Mahberet*, No. 23; ליקוטי ר' יוחנן אלימנו (MS. Oxford, 2,234; vide NEUBAUER's *Catalog*, p. 771); *He Haluz*, ii, p. 159, note; E. CARMOLY, *Israelitische Annalen*, i, p. 63; idem, *Histoire des Médecins Juifs*, p. 94; idem, in *Israelit* (1866), p. 620; *Ozar Nehmad*, iii, p. 110; STEINSCHNEIDER, *Hebräische Bibliographie*, vi, p. 112. (Incidentally it may be remarked, as a vindication of CARMOLY's veracity, that his reference to Mose Rieti is correct. In his מקדש מעט, ed. Goldenthal, Wien 1851, speaking of Judah Romano, Rieti says: זה חכם גדול מאד בפילוסופיה באר והעתיק וחבר וקבל מאלבירטו מאגניו כי בקי היה בלשון נצרי והוא היה רבו של מלך לוביירטו [sic] וספרו לי שקרא עמו ארבעה ועשרים כלו בלשון הקודש.)

At the end of his Hebrew translation of the *Liber de Causis* (MS. Munich, No. 120; vide STEINSCHNEIDER, *Übersetzungen*, p. 263; text in *Hebräische Bibliographie*, viii, p. 66, n. 8), Judah distinctly says: [according to the Parma MS.: תמו דברי העתקת] תמו דברי העתקת גור אריה בהוכחה קצת מההגיון והעתיקו לאדון מלך רובירטו בלשון נצרי והמלך הפילוסוף הנזכר שבחו מואת ההעתקה ושמו עטרת ראשו; STEINSCHNEIDER doubts the authenticity of this statement, without otherwise arguing the point. See also the following authorities: STEINSCHNEIDER, in GEIGER's *Jüdische Zeitschrift*, viii, p. 122; *Hebräische Bibliographie*, xi, p. 54; xix, 118; KOBAK's *Jeschurun*, vi, p. 56; the same scholar's monograph, *Giuda Romano* (Roma 1870); idem, *Catalog Hamburg*, pp. xv—xvi, 103, 180, 181; GÜDEMANN, *Geschichte des Erziehungswesens und der Kultur der Juden in Italien*, pp. 150, 151, 229, note 4; J. PERLES, *Kalonymos ben Kalonymos.* תשובה, Sendschreiben an Joseph Kaspi (München 1879), p. ix; RENAN-NEUBAUER, *Les Écrivains Juifs Français*, pp. 74 seq.; 100, 113, 114, 232, 241, 306; GRAETZ, *Geschichte der Juden*, vii[2], pp. 283, 286, 288; VOGELSTEIN-RIEGER, *Geschichte der Juden in Rom*, i, pp. 303, 306 seq.; 442 seq., 447. It is interesting to note that a Hebrew translation of Arnaldus de Villa Nova's Latin treatise, "De Vino" (MS. Hamburg, No. 308) is dedicated to King Robert. חברו אל יקר תסארת מלכות השלשון הגדול האדון מלך רובירטו מלך ירושלים ושצילייא. Cp. RENAN-NEUBAUER, *Écrivains*, p. 232; STEINSCHNEIDER, *Catalog der hebräischen Handschriften zu Hamburg*, p. 131.

See, in general, on the relations between learned Jews and Christians, GÜDEMANN, *op. cit.*, chapter viii; A. BERLINER, *Persönliche Beziehungen zwischen Christen und Juden im Mittelalter* (Halberstadt 1881); I. ABRAHAMS' chapter on *Literary Friendships* in his *Jewish Life in the Middle Ages*, pp. 413—429; CECIL ROTH, *Leona da Modena and the Christian Hebraists of his Age*, in this *Memorial Volume*.

[7] It will suffice to refer to J. DUKAS' *Recherches sur l'Histoire littéraire du Quinzième Siècle* (*Bulletin du Bibliophile* [1875], reprinted, Paris 1876); BRÜLL, *Jahrbücher*, iii, p. 193; STEINSCHNEIDER, *Hebräische Bibliographie*, xxi, pp. vii—viii, 60—71; *Bodleian Catalogue*, p. 945; *Hebräische Übersetzungen*, s. v., "Pico," in Index, p. 1063, and the pages to which it refers; J. PERLES, *Beiträge zur Geschichte der hebräischen und aramäischen Studien*, pp. 178, 179, 181, 183, 188, 197, 198, 226; GRAETZ, viii[2], pp. 240—245; MUNK, *Mélanges*, p. 510; *Jewish Encyclopaedia*, x, p. 32. See I. ABRAHAMS, *Pico della Mirandola*, in *Hebrew Union College Jubilee Volume* (Cincinnati 1925), pp. 317—331.

Elijah del Medigo, writing in 1482, says in one place (cp. *Hebräische Bibliographie*, xxi, p. 62): גם כי סבבוני צרות הזטניות הכוללות לרוב האנשים והטיוחדות לאוטתינו ט"ט לבקשת השר החשוב טאדוני אוטלייא סיניור יואני דסיצי טטירנדולא איש טצליח טאד בחכטה. Elsewhere (cp. *loc. cit.*, p. 69), the Prince is lauded in the following terms: . . . איש טשכיל טאד אטת בלבבו לא ראיתי באטת בזטננו דוטה לו.

[8] *Hebräische Bibliographie*, xx, p. 67, and sources there cited.

[9] Cf. RIGGENBACH, *Chronicon* (Basel 1877), p. 182 (not mentioned in the German edition of the autobiography, ed. by Th. Vulpinus, Straßburg 1892, p. 166, n. 6); STEINSCHNEIDER, in *Zeitschrift für Hebräische Bibliographie*, vi, p. 52, n. 3. Several of her Latin letters to Bullinger are in the Zurich library. The passage referring to her in one of Schurman's letters to Lady More, quoted in the text, is as follows: גלתה החכטה טקרב הנשים שבאינגלאנד אחרי טות הנברת יוחנה גריה וטלכה אלישבע ז"ל.

[10] *Hebräische Bibliographie*, *loc. cit.*, p. 67.

[11] Vide J. J. SCHUDT, *Jüdische Merkwürdigkeiten*, Appendix to vol. ii, book vi, ch. 16, § 18, p. 27, and the references there given. See also *Hebräische Bibliographie*, *loc. cit.*, p. 69.

[12] *Hebräische Bibliographie*, p. 66.

[13] Cf. KAYSERLING in WERTHEIMER's *Jahrbücher der Israeliten* (1860), pp. 1—13; idem, *Menasseh ben Israel* (Engl. trans.), p. 18; GRAETZ, x[2], pp. 88, 228, 264, 457, 459;

D. KAUFMANN, *Die letzte Vertreibung der Juden aus Wien und Niederösterreich*, p. 120 seq., and the sources cited in *Jewish Encyclopaedia*, iv, p. 59. See also E. N. ADLER, *About Hebrew Manuscripts* (1905), p. 70.

[14] *Hebräische Bibliographie*, xx, p. 68.

[15] See above, note 9.

[16] *Hebräische Bibliographie*, xx, p. 67.

[17] *Ibid.*, p. 68.

[18] See the dedication of HOTTINGER'S *Kirchengeschichte*, v, mentioned in *Hebräische Bibliographie*, xx, p. 67.

[19] *Hebräische Bibliographie*, xx, p. 69, and the sources cited in G. A. KOHUT'S *Ezra Stiles and the Jews* (1902), pp. 69—70. Her three Hebrew letters were published in her *Opuscula* (of which the present writer possesses three editions, all very scarce), and reprinted in the *Bikkure ha-Ittim* (1825), p. 31 seq., and (one) in MARTINET'S Hebrew *Chrestomathie*, ii, p. 50. An English translation of the letter to Lady More is to be found in MARGOLIOUTH'S *Pilgrimage to the Land of my Fathers*, ii, p. 426; see also vol. i, p. 69; ii, pp. 417—418 (in which volume other interesting matter pertinent to our theme is recorded). The noted scholar and theologian John Leusden inscribed a laudatory poem in Hebrew to Anna Maria von Schurman, *printed in only one of the three editions of her Opuscula.*

[20] See C. F. SCHNURRER, *Biogr. und literar. Nachr. von ehemaligen Lehrern der hebr. Literatur in Tübingen* (Ulm 1792), pp. 47—48; *Hebräische Bibliographie*, xx, p. 67; KAYSERLING, *Eine Prinzessin als Hebraistin*, in *Allgemeine Zeitung des Judentums*, lxi (1897), p. 305; idem, in *Jewish Quarterly Review*, ix (1897), pp. 509—514; *Jewish Encyclopaedia*, p. 656.

[21] On John George II, of Saxony, the Landgraves George, Philip and Ludovicus VI, as well as the Princes of Sondershausen, see the notes in SCHUDT, *loc. cit.*, ii, pp. 293—294 (book vi, ch. 16, § 18). He mentions other royal personages as Hebraists, not included in our text.

[22] *Hebräische Bibliographie*, xx, p. 68.

[23] See the extracts from VEHSE'S Memoirs in FRANKEL'S *Monatsschrift* (1861), pp. 438—440; in Hebrew in *Ha-Karmel*, i (1862); GRAETZ, xi (1870), pp. 389—390; G. KARPELES, *Heinrich Heine und der Rabbi von Bacharach* (Wien 1895), p. 61, n. 76.

The *German Countess who Understood Hebrew*, mentioned in the diary of *Ezra Stiles* (vol. i, p. 220; cp. G. A. KOHUT, *Ezra Stiles and the Jews*, p. 68), as having presented a Hebrew and Greek Bible to the Rev. Mr. Russmeyer, in 1727, when he was a boy, is, according to a suggestion of my friend, Dr. PAUL RIEGER, of Stuttgart, the Countess Cosel.

[24] Vide Azulai, שעגל שוב (Leghorn 1879), p. 13b, who tells of his meeting the Marchioness and the Marquis de Toma, in Paris, in 1778. See also HERMANN ADLER'S articles on the *Baal-Shem of London*, in the *Festschrift zum siebzigsten Geburtstage A. Berliners* (Frankfurt a. M. 1903), pp. 6—7; *Jewish Encyclopaedia*, v, p. 331, and in the *Jewish Tribune* (Portland, Ore.), May, 1905.

[25] See the contemporary polemical pamphlets relating to Lord Gordon, listed in JACOBS-WOLF, *Bibliotheca Anglo-Judaica* (1888), p. 70, Nos. 396, 398; J. PICCIOTTO, *Sketches of Anglo-Jewish History* (1875), pp. 183—189; *Jewish Chronicle* (London), March, 19, 1899; Dec. 7, 1906, pp. 19 -20; G. A. KOHUT, *Ezra Stiles and the Jews*, pp. 74—76; *Jewish Encyclopaedia*, iv, p. 47 (with portrait).

[26] On Kunitzer, see I. REICH'S *Beth-El*, i[2], pp. 169—176 (especially p. 174); *Jewish Encyclopaedia*, vii, p. 583. In his מצרף, i, p. 24b, he mentions Christian friends, and publishes two interesting responsa, one on the propriety of teaching the Torah to a Gentile (*ibid.*, pp. 64b—71a), and the other about supplying a garrison with fruit (*ibid.*, pp. 32b—33a). The dedicatory epistle is printed in his כסא העין, Vienna, 1796.

[27] See ספר עפרות תבל. Introduction, where the Duke writes (in part?): קראתי אגרת מלמדי רבי יצחק ואני נותן לו חן חן על הרטונים ששלח לי ואצמה לראות פניו אוהבו הדודש שלומו.

[28] See J. PICCIOTTO, *op. cit.*, pp. 267, 268, 285, 286, 387, 388.

[29] Vide כרמי שומרון, p. 3, n. 2: חבור עמוק מאוד על Duke of Manchester ובזמנינו כתב השר חקירת זמן דניאל ומלכי הפרסים...

[30] Vide F. MAX MÜLLER, *Auld Lang Syne*, i (1898), pp. 280—285; B. MOSSÉ, *Vie de S. M. Dom Pedro Empereur du Brésil*; DAVID KAUFMANN, *Kaiser Dom Pedro II. d'Alcantara von Brasilien*, in *Österreichische Wochenschrift*, viii (1891), No. 40; reprinted in *Die Deborah* (Cincinnati, O.), 1891; cf. also *Die Neuzeit*, xxxi, p. 396 seq., 481; *Revue des Études Juives*, xxii, p. 154; *Jewish Encyclopaedia*, ix, p. 580; *Ha-Meliz*, July 24, 1887, No. 164, p. 1744; *ibid.*, 1888, April 29, No. 93, p. 980; A. S. FREIDUS, idem, June 29, 1888, p. 1494; idem, Nov. 2, 1888, p. 2400; *Hamagid*, Dec. 5, 1889, No. 47, p. 372; especially GURLAND in *Hazefirah*, iii (1876), No. 38, p. 303.

In M. L. RODKINSON'S אספת חכמים, i, No. 5, p. 86 (see N. S. LIBOWITZ, אספרים דיינארד), is a curious account of an alleged interview between Dom Pedro and the noted bibliographer, bookseller and traveller, Ephraim Deinard.

[31] The full title of the little book is *Poésies Hébraïco-Provençales du Rituel Israélite Comtadin, traduites et transcriptes par S. M. Dom Pedro II d'Alcantara Empereur du Brésil* (Avignon 1891; 12°; xiii + 59 pages).

The august editor's "Introduction" is reproduced in the "Appendix" to this paper, not merely as a proof of his scholarly and sympathetic treatment of the Jewish ritual, but as an evidence of his Catholicity of mind and broad tolerance toward the Jews. Although he adds but few explanatory notes to the text of these Hebrew-Provençal verses, his French version indicates his entire familiarity with the original. It is especially interesting to find the חד גדיא included in his collection, as it has generally been taken for granted by scholars that it formed no part of the Sephardic liturgy, though ZUNZ did come across it in a Mahzor of Avignon (see *Allgemeine Zeitung des Judentums*, iii, p. 469), and it has likewise been included in SABATIER'S anthology of Hebrew-Provençal songs, mentioned in a note of Professor SEYBOLD'S, in the Emperor's 'Introduction." On this Passover rhyme, its sources and analogues, see G. A. KOHUT, in the *Revue des Études Juives*, xxxi, p. 240 seq.; idem, in *Helpful Thoughts* (New York), Sept., 1901, pp. 12—17; April, 1902, pp. 274—276; idem, *Some Passover Rhymes and Their Parallels* (reprinted from the *Jewish Exponent*, April-June, 1903), Philadelphia 1903, and especially the same writer's analysis and bibliography in the *Jewish Encyclopaedia*, vi, pp. 127—128. See also I. ABRAHAMS, *Festival Studies* (1905).

SUPPLEMENTARY NOTE

The writer of this paper is aware of the fact that there are some significant omissions, which a maturer study of the subject will rectify.

Thus, for example, reference might have been made to the important contributions to Hebrew and Oriental learning by the Baron Knorr von Rosenroth, translator and expounder of the *Zohar*; by Anton Edler von Schmid, printer and publisher of Hebrew books in Vienna; by the Archduke Rainer, likewise of that city, who collaborated with Professors DAVID HEINRICH MÜLLER and DAVID KAUFMANN in the publication of ancient Jewish texts; by the Baron Melchior de Vogué, archaeologist and Semitist; by Count Wolff Baudissin, noted philologist and Hebraist; and by the Hungarian Orientalist Count Géza Kuun, to whose memory IGNAZ GOLDZIHER devoted one of his characteristically noble tributes—an appreciation in the Hungarian language, which deserves to be better known.

APPENDIX

Dom Pedro's Introduction to his Poésies Hébraïco-Provençales

Voici un recueil de poésies hébraïco-provençales qui excitera, assurément, la curiosité des esprits qui s'intéressent à la langue des félibres. On verra que cette langue pittoresque si aimée, si étudiée de nos jours, et que le grand Mistral avec ses dignes collaborateurs — Aubanel, Roumanille, Gras, Gelu, Anselme Mathieu, Roumieux, Mouzin, Maurice Faure, Bonaparte-Wyse, Bigot, J. Huot, Monné, Mariéton, Crouzillat, Marius, Girard, Astruc, le père Xavier de Fourvières, Arnavielle, de Berluc-Pérussis, Folco de Baroncelli, Langlade, Fourès, Paul Arène, Tavan, Achille Mir, Joseph Roux, le grand épique de Limousin et nombre d'autres ont remise en honneur, n'était pas étrangères aux modestes rabbins contemporains de Saboly et de Bellaud de La Bellaudière, ce charmant félibre, ce Marot provençal du XVI^e^ siècle.

Ces chants naïfs, composés pour des fêtes de famille, rappellent les Noëls de l'Église catholique et sont encore répandus, de nos jours, dans les quatre communautés de l'ancien Comtat-Venaissin : Avignon, Carpentras, L'Isle, Cavaillon, et dans toutes les communautés qui en dérivent, soit de la Provence, soit du Languedoc.

Tous ces divers chants hébraïco-provençaux remontent à peine au XVI^e^ ou XVII^e^ siècle ; avant cette époque, on n'en trouve nulle trace. En outre, la composition de ces piouts est attribuée à un certain Mardochée. Est-ce à Mardochée Venture, qui vivait à Avignon, au dernier siècle ? Dans cette hypothèse, ces poésies ne remonteraient plus au XVI^e^ ou XVII^e^ siècle !

Dans tous les cas, l'attribution de ces piouts à un auteur du nom de Mardochée, ne saurait être mise en doute. Car le relevé des lettres initiales de chaque couplet donne les consonnes du mot : Mordechaï (Mardochée).[1]

Les Obros-veillées sont chantées à la maison, la veille de la circoncision, dans la chambre de l'accouchée, auprès de son lit, orné de rubans et de fleurs et où brillent les riches présents faits au nouveau-né.

Ces chants, où respire la piété antique, réjouissent la nombreuse assistance de parents et d'amis, et sont comme des souhaits de bienvenue au fils qui vient de naître et sur lequel la race israélite fonde un espoir de consolation et de bonheur.

Les Obros spéciales à la fête de *Pourim* ou d'Esther, se chantent, de préférence dans la période qui lie cette fête de la délivrance de la persécution de Hamam, à celle de la délivrance de la persécution de Pharaon en Égypte.

Triomphe de Mardochée, triomphe de Moïse : deux souvenirs inoubliables en Israël !

Le chant « un agneau ou un chevreau : Had gadiâ » (en hébr. chald. חד גדיא) s'entonne à la table de famille, lors des deux soirées de Pâques, et exprime le rôle de la puissance providentielle dans les événements de la vie des individus, comme de celle des peuples.[2]

Au sommet de toutes les actions humaines se trouve la justice infinie, qui donne à chacun selon ses œuvres. Idée consolante pour les victimes de la violence et de l'iniquité ! source de force et de courage pour la race, toujours opprimée, qui ne doit, enfin, son indépendance qu'aux bienfaits de la civilisation moderne.

La versification de ces poésies est assez irrégulière et difficile à définir.

Le premier Piout des Obros se compose de sept couplets de six vers. Les vers ont en général huit syllabes, sauf quelques-uns qui n'en ont que sept et qui riment ensemble.

La première strophe est irrégulière. Dans la quatrième et la cinquième, le premier vers rime avec le deuxième ; les quatre derniers sont alternés.

Dans toutes les autres, au contraire, les quatre premières rimes alternent, les deux dernières sont accouplées.

Le deuxième Piout se compose de six couplets de sept vers. Les vers sont de six syllabes, excepté le troisième.

Les derniers de chaque couplet, qui n'ont que trois syllabes et qui riment ensemble, riment aussi avec le quatrième.

Quant au Piout pour la période de *Pourim* à Pâques, il se compose de quinze couplets de neuf vers de longueur différente. Les trois premiers riment entre eux, ainsi que le sixième et le septième. Le quatrième et le cinquième riment avec le huitième, qui se répète et qui n'a que cinq syllabes.

Le Had gadiâ, chant d'« un chevreau », est plus régulier. Écrit en chaldéen, c'est un simple exposé des conséquences rémunératrices qui s'enchaînent dans l'humanité, et n'offre rien de particulier au point de vue de la versification. Il n'est placé dans ce recueil que parce qu'à la table de famille on le traduit en langue provençale, laquelle était assurément, au moyen âge, la langue habituelle des Israélites du

Comtat et est demeurée en usage dans la cérémonie des soirées pascales chez les Hébreux de l'ancien Comtat-Venaissin.

Ce petit recueil de poésies hébraïco-provençales, que nous donnons au public, sera, croyons-nous, bien accueilli, en ce moment opportun où l'on célèbre solennellement le centenaire de l'annexion du Comtat à la France, et où on ne lira pas sans quelque intérêt un des produits les plus curieux et les plus originaux de la langue des habitants de l'ancien Comtat-Venaissin.

Notre œuvre bien modeste ne gagnera-t-elle pas, à ce seul titre, les sympathies des descendants des anciens Comtadins, devenus aujourd'hui les meilleurs patriotes français?

Quant à l'historique de mes études de l'hébreu, entreprises dans le but de connaître mieux l'histoire et la littérature des Hébreux, principalement la poésie et les prophètes, comme aussi les origines du christianisme, elles remontent aux années de paix avant la guerre du Paraguay en 1865. J'ai abordé ces études, pendant un de mes séjours à Pétropolis, avec M. Akerblom, Juif suédois; plus tard, je les ai reprises avec M. Koch, ministre protestant allemand, précepteur du fils de M^me^ la Comtesse de Barral, gouvernante de mes filles; après la mort soudaine de celui-ci, je les ai continuées avec le docteur Henning (mort à Darmstadt en 1888), et, depuis 1886 avec mon savant collaborateur et professeur de langues orientales, le docteur C. F. Seybold, avec lequel j'ai aussi continué l'étude sérieuse de l'arabe — (commencée jadis avec le Baron de Schreiner, ministre d'Autriche au Brésil, que je connaissais de l'Égypte) — d'abord, comme indispensable pour une connaissance approfondie, de l'hébreu, mais aussi, à cause de sa très riche et fort intéressante littérature. J'ai entrepris aussi la première traduction portugaise — d'après l'original — des Mille et une Nuits, laquelle, cependant, n'est pas encore trop avancée.

Pendant mon dernier séjour à Cannes, le Grand Rabbin B. Mossé,[3] d'Avignon, m'a fourni l'intéressant Rituel Comtadin, qui contient ces textes mixtes fort curieux, et il a bien voulu prendre part à l'impression.

C'est comme amateur, déjà de longue date, du félibrige, que je me suis attaché à la publication de ces morceaux hébraïco-provençaux, que j'offre à la Société félibriste à l'occasion des grandes fêtes du Centenaire de cet automne.[4]

Vichy, 1^er^ août, 1891.

DOM PEDRO D'ALCANTARA

NOTES

[1] MARDOCHÉE VENTURE est, avec un certain ISAÏE VIDAL, l'éditeur de Recueil des Chants liturgiques Comtadins : *Séder Hakkontérès*, imprimé à Avignon en 5525-1765. A la même date, en 5527-1767, fut édité à Avignon, par un nommé MARDOCHÉE CRÉMIEUX, le Rituel des prières journalières : les *Séder Hatthamid*, où se trouve spécialement le *Chant des Obros de Pourim*, ainsi que notre premier Piout, dont nous indiquerons quelques variantes. (Var. sous le texte.)

[2] Ce chant traditionnel se trouve dans le Rituel des soirées de Pâques, connu sous le nom de הגדה = haggadâ : du nom de la partie homilétique de Talmud, d'où il a été tiré. (*Séder Hakkontérès* ר"ח.)

[3] Officier de l'Instruction publique. Fondateur et Rédacteur en chef de *La Famille de Jacob*, Membre des académies de Marseille et de Madrid, auteur d'un grand nombre d'ouvrages d'exégèse, de littérature, d'éducation et d'histoire, en d'autres de la *Traduction littérale et littéraire des Psaumes, de l'histoire des Femmes de l'antiquité judaïque*, et, tout récemment, de la vie de S.M. Dom Pedro II Empereur du Brésil. (Note de l'éditeur.)

[4] Au dernier moment nous apprenons de M. KAHN, grand rabbin à Nîmes, séjournant pour quelques semaines à Vichy, qu'un hébraïsant, à Nîmes, M. SABATIER, a déjà tenté — sous ce titre : *Chansons hébraïco-provençales des Juifs Comtadins*, réunies et transcrites par E. SABATIER, Nîmes, A. CATÉLAN, libraire, 1876 (épuisé et rare, sans l'hébreu en regard) — l'œuvre que nous donnons au public et qui est le produit personnel de S. M. Dom Pedro II, car nous affirmons que jamais S. M. ni nous-même n'avons eu connaissance du travail de M. SABATIER. (Note du Dr C. F. SEYBOLD du 3 août, 1891.)

THE COUNCIL OF JERUSALEM DESCRIBED IN ACTS xv[1]

KIRSOPP LAKE (CAMBRIDGE, MASS.)

The general problem of Acts xv is so complicated that it can only be stated,—it cannot be solved—by a process of analysis into smaller ones.

The reason for this is that here, almost for the only time in Acts, we really have a parallel narrative in a contemporary source, which may fairly be taken as playing a part analogous to that of Mark as compared with the gospel of Luke. It is analogous, however, not identical. For whereas Mark and Luke, being gospels, both belong to the same class of literature, Acts which is history, and Galatians which is a controversial letter, belong to two entirely different types of composition. Moreover Mark is one of the sources of Luke, but there is no reason to suppose that Galatians was used by the writer of Acts. (See Jackson and Lake, *Beginnings of Christianity*, vol. II, p. 308.)

In Galatians i. 11–ii. 14 Paul gives a short account of his life from his conversion down either to the time when he went to Galatia or to the time when he was writing. The first part of this account, i. 11–24, covers the period described in Acts ix. 1–30. The second part, ii. 1–14, covers either the visit described in Acts xi. 27–30 and xii. 25 or that described in Acts xv. 1–35, and it is therefore with this second part that a discussion of the Council of Jerusalem must necessarily deal.

A comparison between the epistle and Acts presents the following problems:—

(i) What is the meaning of Galatians ii?

(ii) To which visit of the two which are possible does Galatians ii really correspond?

(iii) What is the meaning of the Apostolic decrees?

(iv) The results of a comparison of Galatians ii and Acts xv.

[1] This article was prepared for Volume iv of *The Beginnings of Christianity* in which it will appear in a slightly modified form.

I. What is the Meaning of Galatians ii?

As so often happens in passages which present exegetical difficulties, the text is uncertain. The ordinary text found in all critical editions and in all translations of modern times is: ἀλλ' οὐδὲ Τίτος ὁ σὺν ἐμοὶ Ἕλλην ὢν ἠναγκάσθη περιτμηθῆναι· διὰ δὲ τοὺς παρεισάκτους ψευδαδέλφους, οἵτινες παρεισῆλθον κατασκοπῆσαι τὴν ἐλευθερίαν ἡμῶν ἣν ἔχομεν ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ, ἵνα ἡμᾶς καταδουλώσουσιν, οἷς οὐδὲ πρὸς ὥραν εἴξαμεν τῇ ὑποταγῇ, ἵνα ἡ ἀλήθεια τοῦ εὐαγγελίου διαμείνῃ πρὸς ὑμᾶς. "But not even Titus who was with me, being a Greek, was compelled to be circumcised, but because of the false brethren privily brought in, who came in privily to spy out our liberty which we have in Christ Jesus, that they might bring us into bondage, to whom we yielded in subjection, no! not for an hour, that the truth of the gospel might continue with you."

This text is found in all Greek MSS. (including ℵ B) except D, but not in the Old Latin version, or in the Peshitto Syriac. It has in so far a claim to recognition that it has not merely much manuscript support, but provides a sentence so impossible to construe and difficult to explain that it invites alteration.

The serious rival to this text is found in D, Irenaeus, Victorinus, Tertullian, Ambrosiaster, Primasius and the Old Latin version: ἀλλ' οὐδὲ Τίτος... ἠναγκάσθη περιτμηθῆναι, διὰ δὲ τοὺς παρεισάκτους ψευδαδέλφους ... πρὸς ὥραν εἴξαμεν τῇ ὑποταγῇ ἵνα ἡ ἀλήθεια, κ.τ.λ., omitting the words οἷς οὐδὲ before πρὸς ὥραν.

Intermediate stages between these two readings are found in Marcion, some Greek MSS. known to Victorinus, and the Peshitto Syriac, who read, οὐδὲ πρὸς ὥραν εἴξαμεν, κ.τ.λ., but without οἷς, and in Jerome's Commentary on Galatians, which reads οἷς πρὸς ὥραν εἴξαμεν without οὐδέ. The question is whether these stages represent emendations of the ordinary text or of that found in D, &c. Undoubtedly, Tertullian and Irenaeus represent an older type of text than anything found, as a whole, in our extant MSS., but in any given instance there is always the chance that they have a purely Western corruption, and that the great MSS. are right. The crucial point of the textual argument is to be found in the reading of the Peshitto and Marcion. This seems to be certainly an emendation of the one text as of the other.

If we assume the text of the MSS. to have been the original, it is possible that Marcion and Rabbula (the maker of the Peshitto) struck out οἷς to improve the grammar; if we assume the text of Tertullian and Irenaeus, they may have inserted a negative in order to exclude the exegesis that St. Paul really did "yield in subjection."

It will be seen, therefore, that the real difficulty is not that the textual authorities are equally balanced, but that it is so difficult to see which of the variants is really the *lectio ardua* which explains the others. The question is, Which is more likely to have seemed *ardua* to early scribes, and so to have first invited alteration? Would they have been more shocked by the suggestion that St. Paul had circumcised Titus, or by an anacoluthon in his statement that he did not do so?

It is, however, a curious fact that the chief importance of this textual puzzle is to show that from the beginning no one was quite sure what certain details in the passage meant. Nor is it appreciably easier with one text rather than another. Whether it means "Titus was not compelled, and remained uncircumcised" or "Titus was not compelled, but was circumcised as an act of grace" depends entirely on the emphasis read into the words. So also with the ordinary text, the choice between thinking that Paul meant that he yielded, but not in subjection, or thinking that he meant that he did not yield at all, is entirely doubtful apart from the emphasis on certain words.

I am inclined to think that probability favours the text which omits the οἷς and the οὐδέ, and that Titus probably was circumcised. Paul is here defending himself against attack: there is, therefore, a probability that the incidents with which he deals are those which his opponents had used to prove that he was subordinate to the Apostles at Jerusalem. Certainly this is the case with the first visit to Jerusalem, and with the interview with the Apostles on the second visit; clearly these were facts out of which Paul's opponents had tried to make capital, and had thus forced him to give his own account of what had happened. If we might assume that this is also the case with the episode of Titus, it would follow that he had been circumcised, that Paul's opponents had used this as an argument, and that Paul, therefore, found it necessary to explain that, though Titus had been circumcised, it was not under compulsion, but as an

act of grace, perhaps of misplaced concession to false brethren, whose true character he did not at the time perceive. At first sight this seems convincing, but it may be argued, on the other hand, with equal plausibility, that the incident of Titus is only mentioned in order to prove that the interview at Jerusalem was not really a permanent submission, as could be seen from the fact that Titus (who was a Gentile) was not circumcised, in spite of the pressure exercised by the "false brethren," to whom he yielded only on matters of temporary importance, not on those of principle. Nor is it possible to base a decision between these two lines of argument on our knowledge of what Paul is likely to have done. There is no line of argument which is not equally balanced by another. Paul argues in his Epistles against the necessity of circumcision, yet on the other hand, if Acts be correct he circumcised Timothy, who was, after all, a Greek, even though his mother was a Jewess. But is Acts correct? We may safely say that no one after reading Gal. v would ever have expected such a concession to Jewish feeling as the circumcision of Timothy. Nevertheless v. 11 ("If I preach circumcision, why am I persecuted?") might be taken as implying that in some way he had given rise to the statement that he did recommend circumcision. Thus the only possible summing up of the whole point seems to be that a verdict of "not proven" ought to be returned. It is possible to make attractive statements in the spirit of an advocate for either side, but if a judicial attitude is to be observed, no other verdict is conceivable. If, however, I were obliged to take sides, I should say that there is a balance of argument in favour of the view that Titus was circumcised.

However this may be, the most important facts are also the clearest. The trouble began in Jerusalem and it was concerned with the question of circumcision. Paul did not go up because of it, but it came upon him owing to "false brethren" who had been brought in unawares when he was already there because of revelation, for another purpose, which he scarcely defines but suggests to have been the care of the poor.[2] Moreover the leaders were ultimately convinced

[2] Paul is not very explicit on the subject. That the object of his visit was the care of the poor is implied by Gal. ii. 10, but all that Paul emphasizes is that he went up by revelation, not as a matter of obedience to the apostles in Jerusalem. It is from Acts xi not from Galatians that the "relief" nature of his visit is to be gathered. The

that he was justified in the gospel which he was preaching among the Gentiles. Peter and the other "pillars" recognised that he was the leader of the mission to the heathen, as Peter was of the mission to the Jews. No "terms" are mentioned. It was, according to Galatians, an unconditional surrender to the Antiochian position. But not every one was convinced, and further trouble remained. Peter came down to Antioch, and so also did emissaries from James. These latter raised a new difficulty—not the question of circumcision but the terms on which Jewish Christians might associate with Gentile converts. The position of James was one of opposition to unrestrained intercourse with Gentiles, and Peter and Barnabas who had been freely mixing, as Paul did, with the Gentiles, were persuaded that James was right. Then the trouble went further, and obviously—to judge from Galatians—some of the party of Jerusalem revived their original position. Paul does not suggest that James or Peter did so, but clearly some Jewish Christians carried on propaganda as far as Galatia in favour of circumcision and the fullness of the Jewish Law.

II. To which Visit of Paul to Jerusalem, as described in Acts, does Galatians ii really correspond?

To this question three answers have been given.

(a) By most of the older commentators it was held that Gal. ii clearly corresponded to Acts xv. The best statement of this theory is certainly that given by Lightfoot in his Commentary on the Epistle to the Galatians. He writes as follows:—"The *geography* is the same. In both narratives the communications take place between Jerusalem and Antioch: in both the head-quarters of the false brethren are at the former place, their machinations are carried on in the latter: in both, the Gentile Apostles go up to Jerusalem apparently from Antioch, and return thence to Antioch again. The *time* is the same, or at least not inconsistent. St. Paul places the event fifteen or

reverse is true of his final visit to Jerusalem. Here Acts says nothing about the "relief" which Paul brought from Europe, but I and II Corinthians show that to take this to Jerusalem was one of his chief objects, and that he had been working for it for years. It is possible that the "relief" element was really present on both occasions, and possibly its long continued nature indicates that it was not due—as Acts would suggest—merely to famine, but also to the ill-judged "communism" which must have permanently impoverished the church in Jerusalem.

sixteen years after his conversion: St. Luke's narrative implies that they took place about the year 51.[3] The *persons* are the same: Paul and Barnabas appear as the representatives of the Gentile Churches, Cephas and James as the leaders of the circumcision. The agitators are similarly described in the two accounts: in the Acts, as converted Pharisees, who had imported their dogmas into the Christian Church; in the Epistle, as false brethren who attempt to impose the bondage of the Law on the Gentile converts. The two Apostles of the Gentiles are represented in both accounts as attended: 'certain other Gentiles' (ἐξ αὐτῶν) are mentioned by St. Luke; Titus, a Gentile, is named by St. Paul. The *subject of dispute* is the same; the circumcision of the Gentile converts. The *character of the conference* is in general the same; a prolonged and hard-fought context. The *result* is the same; the exemption of the Gentiles from the enactments of the Law, and the recognition of the apostolic commission of Paul and Barnabas by the leaders of the Jewish Church."

The strength of this position is in its affirmations. It certainly shows that there is so strong a resemblance between the circumstances of these two visits to Jerusalem that it is incredible that they were repeated so exactly on another occasion. The suggestion of repetition is made worse if Gal. ii refers to another visit actually mentioned in Acts, for that would mean that the same controversy arose twice, that Luke described it on one occasion and Paul on the other. Therefore since LIGHTFOOT wrote the majority of critics have always agreed that Acts xv and Gal. ii refer to the same visit.

The difficulty is not in this affirmation, but its application to the details of the story, for it entails conclusions which are very disturbing. If Galatians ii = Acts xv, it was, according to the sequence of events given in Acts, Paul's third visit to Jerusalem. He went there first soon after his conversion, a second time with the Antiochian mission to relieve the famine in Judaea, and the third visit as described in Acts xv. But Paul's own statement in Galatians is that the visit described in chapter ii was only his second; and he is emphatic on the point, because he is arguing that he was not and never had been

[3] LIGHTFOOT explains in a footnote that "this is calculated by a back reckoning of the time spent from the Apostolic Council to the appointment of Festus, the date of which is fixed independently at A.D. 60." A modern writer would probably speak less certainly; see TURNER's article on *Chronology* in HASTINGS' *Dictionary of the Bible*.

subordinate to Jerusalem and that the facts of his life show that he never had had an opportunity for being in such a position. He calls God to witness that he is not lying. Why should he have voluntarily weakened his position by omitting a visit to Jerusalem? The suggestion is incredible.

This point had of course been seen by the Tübingen school, but they had used it merely to discredit Luke. In England the belief was wide spread that they had been fully answered, and no further serious attention was paid to them, except by a very few scholars who knew that the last word had not been said on the subject, but had not formulated any clear theory of their own. In Germany there were three parties, those who inherited the Tübingen tradition, and thought that Acts was quite untrustworthy, those who had inherited the opposite view and believed that somehow the discrepancy between Acts and Galatians could be reconciled, and a younger generation which had for the moment given up historical criticism in favour of *Quellenkritik* and produced an endless series of theories as to the source of Acts.

Lightfoot was, of course, fully aware of all that was going on in Germany. He was convinced that the Tübingen school was wrong in its general presentation of history, and he held that Acts was more trustworthy than most of his German contemporaries admitted.

His own answer to the difficulty was, "The answer is to be sought in the circumstances under which that visit was paid. The storm of persecution had broken over the Church of Jerusalem. One leading Apostle had been put to death; another rescued by a miracle had fled for his life. At this season of terror and confusion Paul and Barnabas arrived. It is probable that every Christian of rank had retired from the city. No mention is made of the Twelve; the salutations of the Gentile Apostles are received by 'The Elders.' They arrived charged with alms for the relief of the poor brethren of Judaea. Having deposited these in trustworthy hands, they would depart with all convenient speed. Any lengthened stay might endanger their lives. Nor indeed was there any motive for remaining. Even had St. Paul purposed holding conferences with the Apostles or the Church of the Circumcision, at this moment of dire distress it would have been impossible. Of this visit then, so brief and so hurried, he makes no mention here. His object is not to enumerate his

journeys to Jerusalem, but to define his relations with the Twelve; and on these relations it had no bearing." But this explanation overlooks the fact that in Galatians Paul is clearing himself of the accusation that he is a disobedient subordinate of the apostles in Jerusalem by showing that on his visits to Jerusalem he never was subordinate to them at all. Surely it is inconceivable that he omitted a visit which can scarcely have been unknown, especially if he could have said that the apostles were then absent. Nor is the picture of the apostles retiring to safety, and leaving the church to presbyters a very convincing suggestion, or consistent with Acts viii. 1.

(b) A new suggestion was made in 1895 by Sir William Ramsay who recognised that Lightfoot's argument was weak when it minimised the "famine-relief" visit. He therefore took the obvious step of identifying the second visit in Acts with the second visit in Galatians. He thought that Acts said nothing about the details of the visit because it had been held in private.

At the time when I first read his book Ramsay's view, though not widely accepted, seemed to me the best way out of the difficulty. I followed it up in my *Earlier Epistles of St. Paul* and so did Mr. C. W. Emmet in his *Commentary on Galatians* and in *Beginnings of Christianity*, vol. II, pp. 265 ff. But the theory never won general approval; and rightly so. The obvious difficulty is that if the whole question had really been settled beforehand by the Apostles at the second visit to Jerusalem, why did they pretend to argue it all *de novo* at the meeting described in Acts xv, as though they had never discussed, much less settled the problem?

Nevertheless, just as there is convincing power in Lightfoot's view, that Gal. ii must mean the same visit as Acts xv, so also is there in Ramsay's contention that Gal. ii must refer to Paul's second visit. The problem is thus an *impasse* if we take Acts as it stands.

(c) The succession of critics whose work has pointed to the only possible solution, is Weizsäcker, McGiffert, and Ed. Schwartz. In varying ways they all used the same key to solve the riddle,— Acts xi (the famine relief visit) and Acts xv are both descriptions of the visit referred to in Gal. ii, derived from different sources.

The clear advantages of this theory are:—

(i) It is based on the known fact that Luke used "sources," and that in his gospel he repeats, on occasion, the same saying from

Mark and from another source which is also found to have been used by Matthew. Thus the saying "There is nothing hid that shall not be revealed" comes in Luke viii. 17 and in Luke xii. 2. The first passage is from Mark, the second from Q (?) (cf. Matt. x. 26). A glance at the third appendix to HUCK's *Synopse* shows at least seven other instances of this tendency to double a saying because it was found in more than one source. Nor is there anything strange in this. The characteristic is found in Matthew, and in general in almost all writers of this period who made use of "sources."

(ii) It is the only theory which can do justice to the arguments set out by LIGHTFOOT in favour of identifying Acts xv and Gal. ii without doing violence to the fact that Paul says that Gal. ii was his second visit to Jerusalem. The difficulty of reconciling these points disappears when it is seen that the two stories refer to the same visit, described from different points of view.

It has not, I think, found so much favour as it might have done, because it is bound up with SCHWARTZ's theory of chronology and with his belief that John the son of Zebedee was put to death together with his brother James.

It is, however, by no means necessary to accept these theories merely because we hold that Acts xv is a different version of the visit to Jerusalem mentioned in Acts xi. 25, so that both these accounts are parallel to Gal. ii and both are really Paul's second visit.

The most exacting test which can be applied to any reconstruction of an historical narrative is whether it produce a result in accordance with the oldest tradition, especially as to the order of events. Two narratives may reasonably differ as to the importance or even the character of various episodes, but if they are of first rate value they will not often differ as to the order in which the events happened. Now, it is on this question of order that Acts xv and Galatians differ most in the present arrangement of the narrative, but in the interest of the central difficulty of whether the visit was Paul's second or third, this point has sometimes been overlooked.

According to Galatians Paul went to Jerusalem by revelation, not because of any controversy in the church, and he hints that it was concerned with the care of the poor. While in Jerusalem he was attacked by "false brethren"; there was a discussion, but he won the day; then, on his return to Antioch the difficulties again arose,

because emissaries from Jerusalem reopened the question, and persuaded Peter and Barnabas to desert the Hellenistic side which they had hitherto adopted.

It would, however, seem that the problem was not quite the same as it had been. In Jerusalem the question seems to have been that of circumcision. It is true that this is scarcely stated in so many words, but it certainly seems to be implied by the story of Titus. In Antioch, on the other hand, the question was the further one of the conditions of intercourse between Jewish and Gentile Christians. Paul, Barnabas, and Peter had mingled freely with Gentiles, and joined in their meals. But the emissaries of James held that this was improper. There is no suggestion that they were claiming that the Gentiles should be circumcised, but they did insist on a social barrier between circumcised and uncircumcised. Paul did not yield on this point, but Barnabas and Peter gave way.

Acts, as it stands, gives a different sequence of events. According to it the trouble arose in Antioch, was carried to Jerusalem by Paul and Barnabas, who went there for that express purpose, and partly by them but still more by Peter the church was persuaded of the essential rightness of the Antiochian position. But this settlement was accompanied by the imposition of three (or four) requirements,[4] which from their nature seem to be intended to fix the conditions of intercourse between Jewish and Gentile Christians. They would be in place as the solution of the controversy, which according to Galatians, arose in Antioch between Peter and Paul, but they scarcely fit into the struggle about circumcision, which according both to Galatians and Acts was the subject of the meeting in Jerusalem. Nevertheless, taking Acts as it stands, these conditions seem to be intended as the solution of the controversy about circumcision. There is nothing in Acts about a new dispute either on circumcision or on the social intercourse of Jew and Gentile, for though on their return Paul and Barnabas quarrelled, it was on a personal matter.

Thus, taking Acts as it stands, there is a serious difference between it and Galatians as to the order of events. This difficulty used to be solved most often by the rather violent method of supposing that

[4] The "three-clause" Western text of the Decrees seems to be right. See the note by J. H. Ropes in *Beginnings*, vol. iii, pp. 265 ff.

Paul in Gal. ii deserted the chronological order of events and that Peter's visit to Antioch was earlier, not later, than the conference in Jerusalem. This is ZAHN's and TURNER's view.[5] It is in itself improbable, and would never have been suggested but for the apparent evidence of Acts that the trouble began in Antioch and was settled in Jerusalem.

A far more plausible solution is provided by the distinction of sources suggested above. According to this the Antiochian tradition in Acts is represented by Acts xi. 27–30; xii. 25=Gal. ii. 1ff.; Acts xiii. 1–xv. 2; and perhaps xv. 36ff.=Gal. ii. 11ff. The possibility exists that the missionary journey in xiii and xiv comes from another source; Galatians, however, does not mention this journey, so prominent in Acts, partly because it was not germane to the argument, partly because the Galatians knew all about it, but it is hinted at as the natural result of the agreement reached in Jerusalem. Luke on the other hand omits the temporary defection of Peter, and ascribes the estrangement of Paul from Barnabas to a personal quarrel about Mark. But the order of events as distinct from their interpretation is the same as in Galatians—a visit to Jerusalem, a meeting with the apostles, a mission to the heathen, a quarrel in Antioch, instigated by emissaries from Jerusalem who influenced (Peter and) Barnabas. The order of events is thus exactly the same in both documents. The only difference is that the dispute in Antioch is represented in Acts as being about circumcision and the Law, instead of about social intercourse.

But into the middle of this tradition Luke has inserted the narrative of events as he had heard them from the side of Jerusalem, so that the defection of Barnabas is disconnected from the trouble in Antioch. This covers xv. 3–35 and gives the Jerusalem story of what had happened when Paul and Barnabas went up from Antioch. It is impossible to say whether this tradition reached Luke in a written form or not, but the narrative clearly reflects the views of Jerusalem rather than of Antioch. It also really agrees with the other evidence in that it too, when read by itself, makes the controversy begin in Jerusalem.

To fit this story into the Antiochian frame Luke added some editorial sentences, made the Jerusalem narrative appear to be the

[5] Article on *Chronology* in HASTINGS' *Dictionary of the Bible.*

story of another incident, and forced xv. 2—the coming of emissaries from Jerusalem—into connection with what follows instead of with what had gone before. He was thus obliged to produce the very unconvincing story of a controversy which began in Antioch, and was then removed to Jerusalem by representatives of the Antiochian mission, who however said nothing about the controversy which took them to Jerusalem, until it was actually forced on their attention.

He also introduced into the narrative of the discussion in Jerusalem decrees which have *prima facie* more to do with the subject of social intercourse.

III. The Meaning of Acts xv in General and of the Apostolic Decrees in Particular

Reading Acts xv as a connected narrative, and merely looking for the general meaning of the decrees, it is clear that the intention of Luke was to represent them as the minimum of the Law which was to be required from Gentile Christians in lieu of circumcision. The difficulty of accepting this view is that it seems so inconsistent with Paul's position, as stated in Galatians and Romans, that it is almost incredible that he would have accepted such a compromise. Moreover closer investigation into the wording of the decrees confirms this doubt, and suggests that the decrees were concerned with the problem of social intercourse between Jews and Gentiles in the Christian Church, not with the problem of circumcision.

The Apostolic decrees forbid three things, εἰδωλόθυτα, αἷμα, and πορνεία.

(a) Εἰδωλόθυτα is the Jewish equivalent of the ordinary Greek θεόθυτα or ἱερόθυτα. From Phrynichus *Ecloga*, p. 159 (Lobeck's edition), it would appear that θεόθυτον was the older name. There is a good note on these words in J. Weiss's *Commentary on I Corinthians* (p. 214). From I Corinthians viii it seems that εἰδωλόθυτα might be used in a wider or in a narrower sense. In the narrow sense it would imply actual participation in a sacrificial meal. As to these meals we are inclined to look on them as solemn religious services. Some of them no doubt were: but others probably resembled a dinner-party more closely than a church-service. It was the custom to issue invitations to dinner in the temple and the fiction was that the god was himself the host. For instance Pap.

Oxy., i. 110 says ἐρωτᾷ σε Χαιρήμων δειπνῆσαι εἰς κλείνην τοῦ κυρίου Σαράπιδος ἐν τῷ Σαραπείῳ αὔριον ἥτις ἐστὶν ιε, ὥρας θ'.[6] In the wider sense the greater part of the meat sold in the shops was "offered to idols," as the animal from which it was taken had usually been consecrated to some god, even if it were only by the ceremonial burning of a few hairs. Thus, in this strict sense, to avoid eating things offered to idols was difficult, if not impossible. It would, however, appear that it was not quite impossible, for Paul implies that by making inquiry the Corinthians might be able to avoid such meat.

Its meaning in Acts is defined by vs. 20 as τὰ ἀλισγήματα τῶν εἰδώλων which cannot be narrowed down to the actual participation in a sacrifice, or even to the eating of sacrificed meat,—it means idolatry, described by that part of it which was most prominent and least easy to avoid.

(b) Αἷμα might mean murder, and it has often been so interpreted. But murder, unlike idolatry, was not a common practice difficult to avoid, and it is very unlikely to be intended here. Αἷμα surely refers to the Jewish objection to blood as a form of food, and πνικτόν is a correct gloss on its meaning. This was based on Leviticus vii. 26 which was specially extended in Leviticus xvii. 10 to cover the "stranger living in Israel," "Whatsoever man there be of the house of Israel, or of the strangers that sojourn among you, that eateth any manner of blood I will even set my face against that soul that eateth blood, and will cut him off from among his people. For the life of the flesh is in the blood."

The later Judaism devised all manner of rules to safeguard the possibility of eating blood, especially by ordering that animals must be killed by effusion of blood only, and there must be no possibility of their death being hastened by any other means, such as strangulation. Thus "things strangled" was only another way of expressing the command to keep from blood. (See STRACK, ii, pp. 730–739.)

(c) Πορνεία might mean fornication in a general sense: but it is more likely to mean "marriage within the forbidden degrees," which the rabbis described as אסור ערוה "forbidden for πορνεία." So also in Numbers xxv. 1 f. the context makes it plain that the πορνεία of the

[6] Further examples see LIETZMANN's *Commentary on I Corinthians*, p. 124.

Israelites was marriage with the women of Midian (cf. Apoc. ii, 20). (See STRACK, ii, pp. 729f.)

Each of the three words is thus capable of a wider or a narrower meaning and the purport of the Apostolic decrees was therefore in doubt even in the second century. In the West they were interpreted as a "moral code" forbidding idolatry, murder and fornication, but in Alexandria, and probably elsewhere in the East, they were taken to be a food-law. The influence of these two lines of interpretation can be seen in the history of the text, which in some places added the "golden rule" to the "minimum moral code" and in others expanded or explained "blood" as "things strangled."

It is however obvious that taken in a narrow sense neither interpretation is wholly satisfactory. Πορνεία, whether it mean "fornication" or "marriage within prohibited degrees," has no place in a food-law, and αἷμα though it might have meant murder is not likely to have done so, for it was not necessary to come to agreement with God-fearers as to murder. Therefore the theory of a "food-law" seems blocked by one word, and that of a "moral-law" by the other.

But the question whether these regulations were a "food-law" or a "moral-law" presents a somewhat wrong antithesis. Assuming that εἰδωλόθυτα means principally food offered to idols, and αἷμα means food containing blood, it would still not be fair to call this a food-law in the sense in which the ordinary man would now understand the phrase. An exact parallel is to be found in American law, which forbids the drinking of alcohol; that is a food-law, but in the minds of those who assent to it, its justification is that it is wrong to touch alcohol. It is the "wrongness" not the "food" which is forbidden; and that was exactly the attitude of the Jews towards the use of blood as food. There was therefore nothing inappropriate to their mind in putting "blood" into the same category with idolatry and forbidden marriages, and making abstinence from it one of the conditions of intercourse between Jews and God-fearers. The most hopeful line of approach to the subject is to remember always that the question which necessitated such rules can only have been that of the terms on which Gentiles who were Christian God-fearers could meet with Christian Jews, and these again with Jews who were not Christian. There is at least a probability that the terms were the same as those on which God-fearers and Jews met when neither were Christian. The problem

was for Christians only a passing one, for it was soon solved by the Synagogue, which turned out the Christians, and made it a matter of no practical importance whether a Christian was a Jew or a God-fearer, as the community of Jews would not associate with him in any case. But for the moment Jewish Christians still hoped to preserve the continuity of the institution and " terms " were a practical necessity.

There is unfortunately very little known about the Jewish rules as to intercourse with God-fearers. Probably however the rules which obtained with regard to " sojourners "—heathen living among Jews—may give some clues as to Jewish policy. This can be gleaned from Leviticus, which specifically prescribes certain rules for the " stranger within your gates." These resident heathen were obliged (i) to abstain from offering sacrifice to strange gods (Lev. xvii. 7 9), (ii) from blood (Lev. xvii. 10ff.), (iii) from marriage within the forbidden degrees (Lev. xviii. 6–26), (iv) from work on the Sabbath (Exod. xx. 10f.), and (v) from eating leavened bread during the Passover week (Exod. xii. 18f.). These regulations were expanded and ultimately codified by the Rabbis as the Seven Commands given to the sons of Noah, and therefore binding on all mankind. They are set out in *Sanhedrin* 56b (i) the establishment of courts of justice, (ii) Abstinence from blasphemy, (iii) Abstinence from idolatry, (iv) Abstinence from marriage within the forbidden degrees, (v) Abstinence from murder, (vi) Abstinence from robbery, (vii) Abstinence from meat cut from a living animal. Some Tannaim add the prohibition of blood from a living animal.

The formulation of these rules is doubtless later than Acts, and their application to " sojourners " is an historic fiction. At the time when they were drawn up the Jews had no land of their own. They were themselves the " sojourners," and the rules in *Sanhedrin* for the treatment of strangers living in Jewish territory were devised with a view to a restored Israel, rather than based strictly on the memory of the past, just as the tractate *Middoth* gives the measurements of a future temple rather than merely the tradition of the old temple. Nevertheless the picture of the future was based on the memory of the past. In the case of the temple the memory was real, but the rules as to sojourners, so far as they represent memory, must have been based on the treatment of God-fearers. At the time of Acts the formulation of this treatment was probably not so clearly defined as

is that of the "sojourners" in the *Sanhedrin*, but there is sufficient resemblance between the Apostolic decrees and the Noachian rules to make it probable that both represent the regulations which controlled the intercourse of Jews and God-fearers in the middle of the first century.

IV. The Result of a Comparison between Galatians ii and Acts xv

The preceding discussion has rendered probable two conclusions. (i) The conference in Jerusalem described in Gal. ii was concerned with the question of circumcision, and the applicability of the Law to Gentile Christians. Luke regarded the decrees as the settlement of this issue. But there is nothing in the Pauline epistles to support this view. (ii) The actual intention of the decrees, as established by the meaning of the words, and a consideration of contemporary Jewish thought, was to facilitate the social intercourse of Jewish and Gentile Christians by establishing rules of conduct for Gentiles which would remove the possibility of offence in Jewish circles.

That is to say the internal evidence of the decrees indicates that they, or the policy which they embody, belong to a different problem from that with which Luke has connected them. Moreover Galatians clearly indicates that the controversy as to the conditions of social intercourse to which they really belong began in Antioch between Paul on the one side and Peter, Barnabas and the representatives of James on the other side, after Paul, Peter and James had come to an agreement in Paul's favour as to the original controversy with regard to circumcision and the keeping of the Law.

Assuming that the policy represented by the decrees is not a fiction, the critical problem is to form a reasonable hypothesis to explain why Luke represents as a "minimum-law" requirement what was really the regulation of social intercourse.

Three points are provided by the Epistles and Acts, and by the known course of the history of Christianity.

(i) Owing to the speedy rejection of Christians from the Jewish society the question of social intercourse between Jewish and Gentile Christians soon ceased to be a real issue. Except in Palestine Jewish Christianity had either ceased to exist or was quite unimportant before 100 A.D. It is therefore not impossible that Luke may really

never have come into personal contact with the situation to which the decrees belong, just as he probably never had come into personal contact with glossolalia, and so misunderstood and misrepresented the account of it which is behind Acts ii.

(ii) Galatians ii is clear evidence of Paul's opinion that the controversy as to circumcision had been settled and that Peter and James agreed with him, but that the controversy as to social intercourse had not been settled, that James was always on the other side to himself, and that Peter and Barnabas after some hesitation had gone over to James.

(iii) It is possible that attention should be paid to the fact that in Acts xxi James mentions the decrees as a new thing, of which Paul was unaware. This might suggest that the controversy had been settled while Paul had been in Asia and Achaia. But though this is possible it would be unwise to press the point, for the speech of James is quite likely to be Lucan, and the passage can be explained as reminding Paul of what he knows, rather than as telling him what he does not. Moreover, though the meaning is not quite clear, James seems to imply—as Luke would doubtless have intended—that the decrees were the minimum requirement from the Gentiles as a substitute for circumcision.

Putting these three points together—and the third can really be omitted—the most probable hypothesis seems to be that Luke either knew of the decrees as an actual document, or at least of the policy which they represent, as the settlement of a controversy between Jewish and Gentile Christians. But he did not quite know what the exact controversy was. Finding, however, in his sources an account of a rather stormy meeting at Jerusalem, which ended in the abolition of circumcision for Gentile Christians, he assumed that the decrees were part of the decision of this meeting, and were a "minimum-law" requirement, and he told the story accordingly. In reality the decrees belong to the second controversy, and Paul had not been a party to them, though he had played a leading rôle in the previous and more important discussion as to circumcision.

It is relatively unimportant to decide,—and it is impossible to do so—whether Luke actually knew a definite letter of the Apostles embodying the decrees. It is, of course, possible that such a decree was sent out in a circular letter. But there is no corroborative evidence,

and next to the insertion of speeches, the summarising of a situation in a letter, supposed to have been addressed by one party to the other, was the favourite method of the writers of the period. Like many of the speeches in Acts this letter recapitulates what has been told in the narrative. This fact, and also that other writers of the time appear to invent letters much as they do speeches for their heroes, suggests that this passage is Luke's own composition. The style seems to justify such an origin. On this point HARNACK and WEISS seem to have the better of the argument rather than ZAHN who thinks the language points to a source rather than to Luke. That the letters in ancient histories are perhaps more often genuine than the speeches is of course due to the fact that genuine letters are more easily preserved than merely spoken words. That letters are less often used than speeches is due to the fact that the situations more often called for spoken communications rather than written. Letters are necessitated in reality and in fiction by geographical distance. If the author had some written source for the decrees then we must admit that least their wording is his own, and that the speech of James that anticipates them, as well as the reference in xxi. 25, is his further use of the same material.

Therefore, though the point does not admit of certainty, I am not convinced of the existence of an actual document, and still less whether, if such a document existed, it was worded exactly as stands in Acts.

More important is the question whether, apart from the epistolary form, the "decrees" really represent a rule which in the first century claimed Apostolic authority and was issued from Jerusalem.

Is there sufficient ground for believing in the existence of Apostolic authority at this period? LOISY is the most incisive critic of this belief, and his researches into Acts have led him to think, and in turn are coloured by the opinion, that "Apostolic" authority is a fiction of the editor of Acts, unsupported by the source which he was using, and without foundation in history. I think that LOISY is wrong on this point, and that his and similar opinions are due to an erroneous interpretation of the Pauline epistles.

In Galatians and in Corinthians Paul refers by implication to the question of Apostolic authority. He rejects with great vigour all claims which involved his recognition of the superiority of the Apostles in

Jerusalem. But the same epistles prove that he believed in Apostolic authority as such. His claim was not that the other Apostles had no power, but that he had as much as they did, and that his was not derived from theirs. He also was in the habit of settling questions by letters. Moreover Galatians certainly shows that there was a party which denied Paul's Apostolic authority, except as derived from Jerusalem. Thus the epistles themselves prove that Apostolic authority was really claimed by some persons in the early church and that these persons were in Jerusalem is equally clear. Whether "the Twelve" or "James" was their head is another question.

The extension in tradition of the "James" theory is found in the Clementines, and of the "Twelve" theory in the *Epistola Apostolorum* and in the *Apostolic Constitutions* and its sources, such as the *Didache* and the *Didascalia*.

Thus the important points are that the fact of Apostolic authority was claimed by Paul, and was recognised by him in others, but not over himself. Others, however, clearly disagreed with him, and regarded him as subordinate to Jerusalem.

If so, apart from the actual form of the document, which may be Lucan rather than historical, it is not improbable that a letter was sent by the Church of Jerusalem to regulate the relations between Jewish and "God-fearing" Christians. Whether it was sent at the time of the conference at Jerusalem is of course a further point.

The same considerations which render it probable that a letter was sent claiming "Apostolic authority," renders it improbable that Paul accepted it as such. To have done so would have been the abnegation of his own claims. The complete absence of any reference to the decrees in Galatians and I Corinthians confirms this view, and it is clear that nothing which he says in Galatians about the trouble in Antioch implies the existence of the "decrees" which probably marked the close of the controversy about social intercourse. Paul was in Antioch at the beginning of this trouble, but not at its end.

It will perhaps make easier the discussion of this intricate problem if a general statement be made of the situation in the Church which seems to be revealed by the critical study of Acts xv and the Pauline epistles.

A clear distinction can be made between the position of Paul and of other parties which may with less certainty be associated with the names of Peter and James.

Paul did not believe that the Law was in any way whatever binding on Gentile Christians. This conclusion is not modified in the least because he strongly urged in practice the same conduct as that produced by obedience to the Law. It was the fruit of the Spirit, not the work of the Law, and his central message in Galatians and Romans is that righteousness is obtained by a remodelling of man's nature, brought about by faith on the part of man, and by the Spirit given by the favour (χάρις) of God. There are many details which are doubtful, especially the relation of this change of nature to Baptism. Did Paul think that the Spirit was conveyed in Baptism, or, in other words, that Baptism was the form chosen by God to embody his favour? I believe that he did, though the matter is doubtful, and probably incapable of proof, and I am sure that many of Paul's converts thought so. But the really important point has often been overlooked in the heat of controversy about the relation between Baptism and Faith. Whether Baptism was held to be the necessary form of the divine act of favour bestowing the Spirit may be left an open question, nor is it necessary to have a final definition of "righteousness" or of "faith." The central point is that Paul clearly thought that a real supernatural change was needed and was effected. That surely is Greek, not Jewish. The Jewish position is that when the sinner repents and changes his ways he is acceptable to God. He is not changed, but his choice and his conduct are. The converted Christian in Pauline theology is a "new creature." Like the Fourth Gospel Paul holds that we "become" children of God. The contrast is between this "becoming a child of God"—whether by faith alone or by faith and baptism is immaterial—and Jewish teaching typified in Christian literature by the parable of the Prodigal Son, in which the Prodigal is always a Son, even though a foolish one. In this respect the doctrine of Sonship in early Christianity moves, as it were, on opposite lines with regard to Christ and with regard to Christians. Its tendency is to become less "adoptionist" with regard to Christ, but to become more so with regard to Christians. The Prodigal was not an "adopted" son but Paul's converts were.

In the Pauline scheme of thought there is no room for any "Law," especially not if it be presented as a minimum requirement of conduct. Thus it is unthinkable that Paul ever accepted the "Apostolic

decrees" as a compromise on this question. He may have come to much the same conclusion in practice as to εἰδωλόθυτα and πορνεία; I Corinthians shows that he did; but he manifests no knowledge of any "decree" on the subject, and does not mention αἷμα.

The position of James is nowhere fully stated, and seems clear only up to a point. His representatives in Antioch undoubtedly insisted on the Jewish manner of life, which must at least mean observance by Gentile converts of whatever rules were in force at that time for the regulation of social relationship between Jews and God-fearers. All the evidence seems to suggest that these rules are embodied in the Apostolic decrees. There is, as has been said, no evidence at all that Paul ever accepted them as part of the Christian way of life, but there is every reason to suppose that they were current in circles where Jewish Christians were found. In other words there is no reason to suppose that Acts is wholly fiction.

Did James go further, and insist on circumcision for converts? Possibly he did. Certainly there were Christian missionaries who preached this doctrine, as Galatians and Romans prove. Later on the Jews seem to have had a time limit. If a man did not become a proselyte in a year he was a "Goi." But it is quite possible that James and others believed that the Life of the World to come—though perhaps not the Days of the Messiah—would be open to pious God-fearers. That this view was held in some circles seems clear from the Sibylline Oracles, but before opinion can be clarified on this point we need more knowledge on two points:—(a) How far did Jews in the first century admit that pious God-fearers had a share in the world to come, and (b) How far did the first Christian eschatology contemplate the "Days of the Messiah" as well as the "World to Come"? On the second point I think that Jesus contemplated only the speedy coming of the "world to come," and that Paul and others (notably the Johannine Apocalypse) introduced a Christian version of the "Days of the Messiah," which was not part of the teaching of Jesus. (See *Beginnings*, vol. i, pp. 281 ff.)

If this be so it is possible that the position of James was that the way of Life was open to the heathen, but that they must obey the rules laid down for God-fearers. Whether this be so or not, it would certainly seem possible that this was the position adopted by Peter and Barnabas under pressure from James, but refused by Paul.

It is important in this matter to keep two questions distinct,—the existence of parties and the relation of certain leaders to them. There is much less doubt as to the parties. There were at least three in the Christianity of which Antioch and Jerusalem were the foci. (i) The Pauline party, which taught that the Christian was a "new creature"; its Christianity either was already a Greek-spirited sacramental cult of Jesus, or—which is more probable—was the bridge which led to such a cult. (ii) The strictly Jewish Christians who held that Christianity was the legitimate development of Judaism and insisted on circumcision and the Law. Was this the party of James? Perhaps, but not certainly. (iii) An intermediate party which was willing to recognise the Christianity of the converted God-fearer, without making further claims on him than on other God-fearers. Was this the party of Peter? Perhaps, and perhaps even of James also, but certainly the party to which belonged the source used in chapter xv by the writer of Acts.

The course of history suggested by a critical comparison of Acts and the Epistles is that there was, to begin with, a struggle between the first, or strictly Pauline party, and the second, or strictly Jewish. The Pauline party won, and gained the support of Peter and James. Then there arose a second struggle in Antioch as to the conditions of social intercourse, and on this Peter and Paul took opposite sides. Probably the Apostolic decrees represent the compromise which settled this controversy, but it is doubtful whether Paul was a party to it, and his energies were taken up in combating the recrudescence of the strictly Jewish party which tried to hamper his efforts in Galatia and elsewhere.

A COLLECTION OF YEMENITE PIYYUṬIM[1]

REUBEN LEVY (CAMBRIDGE, ENGLAND)

Among the manuscripts in the possession of the Jewish Institute of Religion is a Yemenite *diwan* purchased some years ago from a Paris bookseller. This volume adds a number of new poems to the lists compiled by BACHER and others who have interested themselves in the field of Yemenite poetry, and as it increases the scope of Jewish Literature, to which ISRAEL ABRAHAMS devoted his life, it may not be out of place to describe the MS. here.

The volume is a small but stout one, measuring about six and a quarter inches by four, and containing 187 folios of paper. Apart from two small gaps the MS. is in a good state of preservation, and with the exception of the first five folios it is all written in the same hand. The colophon, gives the name of the scribe as Yosef ben Shlomo ben Sa'adya al-Manzili, who writes that he finished the *diwan* on the second day of Ellul of the year 90 (of the Seleucid era), i.e. in 1678. The date is interesting because, according to BACHER,[2]

[1] Bibliography and List of Abbreviations: (1) W. BACHER, *Die hebräische und arabische Poesie der Juden Jemens.* Budapest 1910 = B.—(2) W. BACHER, *More about the Poetry of the Jews of Yemen,* in "The Jewish Quarterly Review," new series, January 1912 = B. (J.Q.R.).—(3) W. BACHER, *Zur Rangstreit-Literatur aus der arabischen Poesie der Juden Jemens,* in "Melanges Hartwig Derenbourg." Paris 1909.—(4) W. BACHER, *Ein hebräisch-arabisches Liederbuch aus Jemen,* in the "Festschrift zum siebzigsten Geburtstage A. Beliners." Frankfurt a. M. 1903.—(5) IBEN SAFIR אבן ספיר. (Edition of the מקיצי נרדמים.) Lyck 1866.—(6) D. VON GUENZBURG, מספרי תימן (From Yemenite Books) in the "Steinschneider-Festschrift." Leipzig 1896.—(7) M. STEINSCHNEIDER, *Die Handschriften-Verzeichnisse der Kgl. Bibliothek zu Berlin,* Vol. II, Part I, pp. 25—27 and 117—130 = St.—(8) A. NEUBAUER, Catalogue of the Hebrew Manuscripts in the Bodleian Library (nos. 2377 and 2498). Oxford 1886 = N.—(9) G. MARGOLIOUTH, Catalogue of the Hebrew and Samaritan Manuscripts in the British Museum, Part II, pp. 397–450. London 1915 = BM.—(10) E. DEINARD, or MAYER, Catalogue of the old Hebrew Manuscripts and printed books of the Library of Hon. M. Sulzberger. New York 1896 = Dein.—(11) D. YELLIN, "Ginze Teman," in השלח, Vol. II, pp. 147—161. Berlin 1897.—(12) M. STEINSCHNEIDER, *Die arabische Literatur der Juden,* pp. 259—267. Frankfurt a. M. 1902.—(13) P. HEINRICH, *Fragment eines Gebetbuches aus Yemen.* Wien 1902.

[2] *Die hebräische und arabische Poesie der Juden Jemens,* p. 34.

it was in that year that the edict was framed expelling the Jews from Sanaʿa. Our MS. was completed immediately before or after the edict was put into force, because it contains none of the elegies which BACHER quotes as having been composed by the poet Shibzi to commemorate the expulsion, though it has a number of Shibzi's compositions new to BACHER. It is possible that the scribe himself was a refugee from Sanaʿa, for he says that he completed his work at Damar, which was for most of the exiles a stage on the way to Muza, where they took refuge. He prays in his colophon that Damar may be destroyed and Jerusalem built up, and continues: "If anyone finds an error in the book let him correct it, because I wrote when there were young children with me, under the burden of the season, heavy imposts and the king's wrath against Israel."

The first three folios of the book do not belong to the collection proper. They contain entries of various content written in different hands. At the head of the first folio is a pious verse in Arabic, followed by an entry reading: "I found written in the *Siddur* of Master Isaac Moḳaṭa the grace after meals in an abbreviated version, and this is it." The grace itself follows with variants that may be of interest to the liturgiologist. Following that again comes a will, which has had a pen run through it and is illegible.

On the outside of the second folio are a number of notes of small interest except for one which reads: "On the night of the twenty first of Ellul, Master Mordecai said that he was about to send to the men of Cochin, who are the black Jews, 6 or 7 scrolls of the Law, Tefillin, Mezuzoth and other books of the Law. May the Almighty, blessed be He, guard him and preserve him alive."

The second page of the second folio and the two sides of the third folio are covered by an Arabic version of the Eighteen Blessings, attributed to Saʿadya. A superscription reads:

תפסיר שמונה עשרה בלשון ערבי מכמהר"ר סעדיה גאון ז"ל

The version itself differs scarcely at all from that published by KÜNSTLINGER in 1910.[3] A later hand has pointed the text with the sublinear punctuation, not always accurately however.

[3] *Das Achtzehngebet mit arabischer Übersetzung*, nach einer jemenitischen Handschrift, herausgegeben von Dr. DAVID KÜNSTLINGER. Krakau 1910.

With the fourth folio the collection of piyyuṭim begins, with the heading:

אתחיל לכתוב שירות ותושבחות לאל אלהי הרוחות
אוול שי לרבי יהודה הלוי זצ״ל ענין שבת ס״י יהודה

The poems are numbered, though not accurately, and are pointed in the Babylonian (superlinear) style, except for a few initial words which have the ordinary Tiberian pointing. There appears to be very little order or arrangement of the poems, in spite of the fact that they are collected in series under headings; for under any of these may be found poems belonging to other sections. The first and longest of the series contains 280 poems, with a section missing from about the middle of no. 41 to the middle of no. 47. Inserted among the poems of the usual liturgical character are a number of חידות, which seem to have been employed in the service of the synagogue like the rest, being provided with the rubric פזמון after each verse. Some of these riddles are the work of Judah Halevi, the rest being by the Yemenite poet Yaḥya al Ẓahari or by anonymous composers. One of these by Yaḥya is worth quoting as a specimen of his style and his humour (no. 49):

ומה היא המשמחת אחרים בעת תבכה ותזיל הדמעות
לדמעתה על לחיה ישושון בקול עֵרֶב ונישא מגבעות
ותבוא על בעליה ותגמור והיא תעל וירדו לבקעות
תגלה סוד לבכה לאחרים בעת תנוד ולה כמה תנועות:

The answer is "a taper."

A subsection of the first part is headed שירות לענין מילה and runs from 192 to 196, being followed by another subsection לענין אכילה consisting of two poems. Then comes a section לענין מועדים which has poems לענין פסח, לענין שמיני עצרת, לענין סכה, לחג השבועות and לענין ר״ה though there are a number of other poems scattered about the books to be used לענין מילה and לענין שבת. With no. 281 there begins a section labelled והולאי זפאת לאלחתנים, which contains 32 poems. Following it are 92 pieces headed ואלו נשוד אוול דאלך נשיד ושירה ותושיח, then 22 under the title והולאי חדויות לאלחתנים, 32 under והולאי הלילות, and a single poem labelled שירה, which is the 458th and last in the

book. An index completes the work, except for a note on the last page written in a later hand and reading:

זה הספר של שירות שבזיאת מן ספר מורי ורבי הרב הגאון הנשר הגדול בעל הכנפים שחיבר אותו בחכמתו ובשכלו ולא נודע לשום אדם מה הוא מחבר אשריו ואשרי חלקו ועל החשק שהם חושקים בו בארץ תימן גם כן אני חשקתי בו ונתתי לרי יחיאל ב״ח״ר״מ״ו יהודה מטאלון ז״י״צ״ו״ל׳ נתתי לו תפוחי זהב והוא נתן לי זה הספר בחצי חודש טבת שנת התעט [1719].

To facilitate reference, the plan of B. will be followed in the description of the contents of our MS. Where a poem is known to B. its number in our MS. is given, otherwise its first line is quoted. (The writer is indebted for references to Dr. G. A. Kohut and Mr. H. S. Lewis.)

A. Poems of Salim ben Yosef Shibzi (Mashta)

B.	MS.	B.	MS.	B.	MS.
1	379	46	254	80	151
2	373	47	364	83	382
3	388	51	201	84	149
4	398	52	196	86	145
5	301	53	234	92	302
12	380	56	169	93	200
15	387	57	378	94	280
16	389	58	374	95	233
17	385	59	180	96	237
21	383	61	174	98	188
22	308	62	31	99	266
24	384	63	30	103	135
31	322	65	29	105	161
32	321	66	147	109	297
37	219	70	140	110	205
38	325	72	249	111 (a)	185
39	386	73	170	112	276
40	144	74	171	113	162
41	300	75	209	114	166
42	165	76	207	115	279
43	381	78	156	116	33
45	375	79	150	117	172

B.	MS.	B.	MS.	B.	MS.
118	255	137	244	156	232
119	32	138	167	165	187
120	190	139	34	166	227
121	173	140	206	167	216
122	248	144	211	170	215
123	35	146	154	172	143
124	127	147	152	173	181
125	182	150	177	175	377
128	168	150 (a)	179	178	402
132	164	151 (a)	121	180	222
133	294	152	147	181	218
134	138	153	231	186	217
135	269	154	214	187	403 [4]
		155	213		

There are in the volume sixteen poems of Shibzi not noted by B. Of these, four are in Hebrew, three in Arabic, eight in Arabic and Hebrew intermingled, and one in Aramaic. Of the Hebrew poems the first (no. 176) is a mystical composition of nine verses beginning

דברי שיר וחידה דברי. שבחי את אלהים יוצרי
מתשוקת זמן התנערי. מהבליו בטוב התיישרי פז׳

and having the acrostic א יוסף שלם ד.

The next (no. 204) is a hymn for the feast of סכות. It occurs elsewhere in the MS. described by NEUBAUER in his Catalogue of Bodleian MSS. (no. 2377, B. 11), and is the only one of the sixteen that seems to be mentioned outside of our MS. There are ten verses in the poem and its acrostic is שבזי יוסן בן.

The first verse runs:—

בחג הסכות שמחו בנים. יום הקיפכם שבעה ענגים
נסים ומופת ראו קהלי. סיכך במדבר ארבע דגלי:

No. 397 seems to be a song of welcome of a friend, beginning

סגולת סופרים בא המדינה. בעת צער ולוותהו שכינה

The acrostic reads סלם יושף ש.

[4] The Arabic poem opening נא ללכואכב פי מנאזלהא is put by B. amongst the anonymous pieces (no. 192). Its acrostic is מסאם אבא יוסף which might well be an attempt at מסאלם אבן יוסף. It is no. 223 in our MS.

The last of the Hebrew poems (no. 399) is a prayer, nine verses long, with the beginning

שפע אור אודך צורי בעתמה ׳ מקום רועי בני תורה וחכמה

and׳ having the acrostic שלם אלשבזי.

The first of the Arabic poems (no. 155) is of mystical content. Its opening words are familiar from other works of Shibzi's composition:—

אלכם אלנור עקלי דעאני לאלאפנאן ׳ ותדכרת לגז אלמעאני ואלאלחאן

(acrostic סאלם יוסף ת).

Next is a song of praise (no. 400) with the beginning

סבחאן מן מלכה הוא ארבעת אקטארו ׳ ואנאר כלקה בנורן חאט אלאנוארו

(acrostic סאלם שבזי דוו), and then (no. 401) another, of which the first verse is

תווכלת באסם אללהי באעת לחיותי ׳ ואליה מרגועי כרזקי וגאיתו

(acrostic ת סאלם יוסף ית).

The Aramaic poem no. 238 is a Hallel, and is distinct from the other poems in the volume in not having its verses separated by the *pizmon* indication. The first verse is

הללויה והלל יה אֲלהא דדיליה שלמא דבסים ליליא בימא וכ׳

and the others would seem to begin respectively with

לַעלמא דין .. שַׁכליל שמיא .. בַּחר ליה ביעקוב .. זַכון באורחתהון ...
יַתרעי בצלותנא ...

forming the acrostic אלשבזי.

In the new Hebrew-Arabic poems of Shibzi, the ease with which he passed from one language to the other receives fresh illustration. Three of the eight pieces are of the kind that Bacher made familiar as "girdle-poems," which derive their name from a "belt" or "girdle" of verse inserted in a poem in a rhyme differing from that of the rest. The first of them (128) is eight verses long and contains religious communings of a type familiar from the liturgy. It has Hebrew and Arabic in alternate verses, of which the opening one is:

לבי בחכמה ישאף ׳ תמיד צף ׳ כים יתחמה
מעול זמנו נתרף ויתקף נפשי ינחמה

(acrostic לשלם יושף). Of the other two, one (146) is a hymeneal hymn of eleven verses which begins:

יפה צביה ראת עיני למולי הלכה הדר זיוה בהלני ודעתי משכה

(acrostic יסאלם בן יוסף); the other (158) a prayer for aid in trouble. Its last verse reads:

מבני ישמעל דע שהוא מתגעל קם והכביד העול...

but it is doubtful if any specific happening is indicated by it. The first verse is

רב..מוסי אלכלים יא מדבר" לאל עאלם" אעטנא אלכיר ואלגאה
ואלבר" נתעלם:

and the acrostic,—with some kind of which Shibzi invariably marks his work,—is רישאלמה.

Of the remaining five pieces, no. 226 is a song of praise, in which the Arabic refrain סבחאן רבי אלגבארי אלבארי is repeated before the *pizmon* at the end of each verse. The first verse reads

אפתח ואנעים את שירי "לך צורי"
הקשב לשועי ודברי ומאמרי"

(acrostic אני שלם בן יושף). No. 228 is a prayer for release from exile. It begins

שוכן שחקים הקימה" נרדמה גולה בבבל ובתימא" ובימא

and its acrostic is שלם יוסף משתא. In the next poem (no. 247), which is a confession of faith, beginning

מפאתי חשמל׳ קול רעיה המל בסנלגלי.
צלח ידיד נפשי" עמד בהר קדשי עוז מגדלי

(acrostic משתא שבזי), there are eight verses of which only two are in Arabic. A song of praise and penitence forms the next piece (270), of which the first verse reads

לבי ועיני מודים בשירה לקוני
ערב ובקר מיחדים׳ שוכן מעוני

(acrostic לישבזי מ). A similar song of praise to God, with a partly mystical content, forms the last of the Hebrew-Arabic poems of Shibzi (392). It is eleven verses long (acrostic אלשבזי משתא כ) and the first is

אל המיוחד" שם כבודו שומרי"
ברוך שמו לעד" אלוה קוני:

B. Other Yemenite Poets and their Work
(In the order of the Hebrew alphabet)

Abishai: 258.

Abraham:	B.	MS.
	7	283
	8	299
	9	136

Our MS. adds a poem (no. 275) by Abraham to those already known. It is a girdle-poem in Hebrew beginning

ידיד קומה קנה חכמה ואם לבך יכול
לחבר שיר ובנעימה לאל ישוכן זבול

and the acrostic is י אברהם ש"ץ.

Ashya: 360.

David:	B.	MS.
	12	354
	13	10
	17	126

88. A girdle-poem in Hebrew beginning

לבי לעלמה צפונה" יעוף כמו יונה

(acrostic לדויד).

David ben Gad:	290 (B. 1).
David ben Yosef:	7 (B. 2).
David ben Yesha'ya:	305 (B. 2).
David Hallevi:	109
Zekharya:	394 (B. 1).

Yosef:	B.	MS.	B.	MS.
	1	367	19	163
	8	236	20	148
	11	363	21	139
	17	87	25	157

Yosef ben Yisra'el Mashta:

B.	MS.	B.	MS.
3	352	13	230
5	89	14	295
6	318	15	153
7	319	16	191
8	317	18	142
9	328	21	184
10	327		

[? Yosef] al-Mu'allim:

The poet is represented by an Arabic love-song (no. 225) which opens:

קאל אלמעלם תפכר" יא באהי אלנצר" ואסמע לקולי אלמעשר"

Each stanza has the refrain סאלת ען טאיר אכצר מן זין אלדרר "I asked a green bird about the beauty of the pearls," and at the head of the poem stands the direction

גזלי (sic) וקת אלחנא לאלרקצה לחן מעשר

"A love-poem for the time of (?) bending for the dance; tune of the ten." It is one of the very few pieces in which a musical direction is provided.

Yosef ben Mosheh: 315 (B. 1).
Yaḥya: 102 (B. 2).
Yaḥya al-Ẓahari: 12 (B. 9), 13 (B. 10), 37 (B. 2), 78 (B. 3), 326 (B. 11).

Number 74 in our MS., a poem that opens

אֶל אֵל קדוש חי נבדל" אריד על שיחי ונרי ישיב

and has the heading

גואב למו' יחיא אלצאהרי סימן אבנר זלה"ה

is put by B. amongst the anonymous works (no. 8), although its acrostic is אבנר, another name for יחיא. A collection of eight Hebrew riddles, which are ascribed to this author and appear to be new, is inserted in the volume after no. 48. They begin in order as follows:—

[49. [למרי יחיא אלצאהרי נע׳ג פי אלשמעה
ומה היא המשמחת אחרים״ בעת תבכה ותזיל הדמעות וגו׳
[50. [ולה איצא ז״ל פי אלמטחן
ומה אוכל לכל מיני תבואות לך אניד במעשהו פלאות
[51. [ולה איצא פי חאשא אלמנאם
ומה מרכב והרוכב נִשָּׂאוּ״ ובלתו כל אנוש נגע קראו
[52. [ולה איצא פי אל מיל ואלמכחלה
ומה בועל שתי אחות לעין כל״ ואין עליו במעשהו תלונה
[53. [ולה איצא ז״ל פי אלמיזאן
ומה נתלה והוא שוטה ולא דובר ולא בוטא
[54. [ולה איצא ז״ל עלי אלנאר
ומה בת על פני ארץ תהלך׳ ולה כל עין וכל פריו לאכלה
[55. [ולה איצא ז״ל פי מצרעי אלבאב
שנים נמנעו מכל אכילה׳ וילינו בכל לילה דבוקים
[56. [ולה איצא פי אלדהב ואלזיבק
ומה שבעה אשר קמו בכוחם״ עלי אחד ומת תחת ידיהם

Yaḥya ben Ṭubiyah:	298
Ya'qob:	208 (B. 2).
Yeshu'ah:	409 (B. 1), 250 (B. 2).
Yisra'el ben Yosef:	320
Mosheh:	313 (B. 1).

(Sulaiman) Abu Yusuf: Two poems which would seem to be by this author are given in our MS. Except for a few words in each, both are written in Arabic and both contain religious exhortations addressed to the author's son Yusuf, the first begins יוסף בני יוסף בני אבו יוסף תהגם פי אלנצאמא and the second (no. 105) עת אראך יסור יגוני פתסביח אלאלאה.

Sa'adyah:	B.	MS.
	2	14
	4	195
	5	369
	7	253
	10	160
	12	134

Three new poems are added from our MS. All three are girdle-poems of religious import, and are written in mingled Hebrew and Arabic. The pieces are nos. 132, 137 and 221.

They begin respectively as follows:—

(132) לבי בחכמה נכסף לתורה תמימה כי היא תרפא למחלי

(acrostic לשששעדיה),

(137) שישי יחידה על מחול וכנור צלצל ועשור

(acrostic שעדיהא),

(221) שמחי יחידתי לצור הללי בנעים זמירותיו שמו גדלי

(acrostic ישעדיה).

Sa'adyah ben Yosef:	B.	MS.
	1	251
	2	272
	3	260
	4	210
	5	296
	6	189
	7	186

Sa'adyah ben 'Amram: 264 (B. 1), 265 (B. 2).
Sa'id: 20 (B. 6), 98 (B. 5), 133 (B. 11).

No. 246 is a new poem by this author. It is in Hebrew and contains mystical reflections, opening:—

מפאתי היכל חלק לבל יוכל

(acrostic מחזמק).

Sa'id ben Ḥayyim: 329
Sa'id ben Ya'qob: 220
Shelomoh: 116 (B. 3), 245 (B. 4).

A new religious poem by him in Arabic and Hebrew (no. 268) begins as follows

שמעה לקולי כי אני עבדך תרחיב ללבי עדי אטריחך

(acrostic שלמה); and another in Hebrew (no. 4) has as its opening line "אשמר שבת אלהי אשמר (acrostic אשלמה).

Shelomoh ben Sa'id: 365
Shelomoh ben Shalom: 303 (B. 1).
Shemuel: 3 (B. 1).
Shemaryah: 271

A new author, Yaʿqob ben ʿAmram, is to be added from our MS. to the list known to B. Yaʿqob is represented by a girdle-poem (no. 159) of six stanzas written in Arabic except for a few words of Hebrew in the fifth. The poem is on the life of Abraham and begins רב מוסי אלכלים די תגלא" אלמולא" פוק שכצן לבינן כלילא" פי קולא" כאן אברם יסמא כלילאלא" מן אולא. The author spells out his name in the last stanza as follows:—

אסם אדכר ליאן ועינן" קאף ואו בא
עין מים רא ואלף ומימן" הו אלאבא

C. Anonymous Yemenite Poems

a) Hebrew

B.	MS.	B.	MS.	B.	MS.
5	114	38	243	79	359
6	83	39	404	81	106
8	74 (v. Yaḥya al-Ẓahari supra)	50	345	82	103
10	395	51	72	83	366
14	71	52	370	84	5
15	314	53	86	85	197
19	111	58	252	86	335
22	356	61	344	90	310
24	347	63	330	91	362
25	350	66	407	95	324
26	287	67	333	97	40
29	6	70	331	99	8
31	304	72	396	100	241
36	306	73	371	107	23
		75	351		

b) Hebrew and Arabic

B.	MS.	B.	MS.	B.	MS.
110	266	128	115	144	337
111	131	129	307	145	117
121	407	137	85	147	129
122	411	139	273	148	175
126	309	140	274	154	358
127	312			156	239

c) Arabic

B.	MS.	B.	MS.	B.	MS.
166	178	178	183	191	278
167	120	186	224	192	223
168	122	188	123	193	410
177	141			194	229

No. 192 in our collection, beginning ישלום לנימול ולכל יישראל is described in B. (J.Q.R.), N[1] no. 121[a].

d) Wedding-songs that begin with the word אהוב

B. (p. 41).	MS.
2	416
5	418
6	413
7	415
13	418
14	414

The wedding-song in Hebrew and Aramaic (no. 417 in our MS.) beginning

אהוב נם אלי וגואלי" ברוך' גבור"

is not found in B.

e) Wedding-songs that begin with the words אשירה לאהוב

B.	MS.
1	422
6	423
7	421
8	420
9	412
13	425

A new poem of this class is no. 424, of which the opening verse is:

אשירה לאהוב הבוחר בישראל

Of the הלילות, contained on pp. 42 and 43 of B., our MS. contains all those form א to יז, with the addition of כ, כד, כו, ל, לד and לח. Also it has the three short examples quoted here in full:—

(446) דם פסח ומלה צוני ומצות ומרורים הלעיטני
דרשתי את י״י ועננני והללויה
(447) נצטוה אברהם אבינו לימול כל זכר באנשי ביתו
נתקיימה המצוה ביצחק ובזרעו אתו
ואברהם בן תשעים ותשע שנה בהמלו בשר ערלתו והללויה
(449) קראו ידידים ועלזו בחתונה
כי כן ישמיעכם האל חמשה קולות בעלותכם ציונה
וראיתם ושש לבכם ועצמותיכם כדשא תפרחנה והללויה

To the collection of anonymous poems in B. are to be added the following, all written in Hebrew.

(262) A prayer for deliverance from exile. It opens

אל אל קדוש ומיוחד אקרא מגלות ומדלות

(4 verses).

(84) A liturgical composition beginning:—

חום אלהי ממעונך על הבעלת שרונך
יעבר עלי רצונך כאשר עבר חרונך

(6 verses of which the last three begin respectively א׳, ב׳, ג׳).

(242) A love-song of five verses. It occurs also in Neubauer (N.) MS. 2377, no. A 37. The opening verse is

יעלה הביאתנו לבית אהבה״ ברה ותמה באביגיל

(334) A song of praise, beginning:—

לאור עולם אשר החפיר מאורות וסביב עומדים לו כמנורות

(349) A poem of religious content, opening:—

נפשי לאל אחד לבד תוחילי למה למקרה הזמן תחילי:

(5 verses).

(101) A prayer for redemption, in six stanzas, of which the first —a shorter one than the rest—is as follows:—

עד מתי תישן מלכי מדישן אבד כעשן כושן עם יקשן

(368) A short poem in 5 verses, of which the first

ישדי שמע קול צועקים אליך משתחוים לפני הדום רגליך

gives the tenour of the whole.

(110) A song of the joy of life. It begins:—

שחק מקודר עבים״ ורביבים יבכו ויזלו שמחת הדסים טובים

(7 stanzas).

D. Non-Yemenite Poems in the Collection

Abraham ibn Ezra:

B.	MS.	B.	MS.	B.	MS.
3	113	10	15	21	21
5	36	12	261	24	75
7	73	13	99	25	9
8	91	14	240	26	199
9	203	16	257	27	16
		19	112		

The following by Ibn Ezra are not given in B.:—

	איה גבורתך ימין אל
	לשמע אזן שמעתיך
(79)	בא במקרת בריתך ...
(77)	איה גבורתך .... נאושה נפשי
(93 and 263)	אל אחד ואין זר אתו
(94)	אם כח אבנים כחי
(76)	יחיד מרומם
(119)	מי יתנני כימי אלוה
(92)	שם אלי מנת גורלי
(81)	שמים וחילם
(11)	תשבי שלח לי אלי

Judah Halevi:

B.	MS.	B.	MS.	B.	MS.
3	113	10	15	21	21
5	36	12	261	24	75
7	73	13	99	25	9
8	91	14	240	26	199
9	203	16	257	27	16
		19	112		

[B. 93 on p. 51 of B. is the poem numbered 38 in our MS.]

The following by Halevi are not given in B.:—

(66)	אמור לי מה דמות בתים לבנים
(64)	אמור מה הוא אשר יען דברים
(58)	אשרי ידידים למדו דתינו
(68)	בליעל וירח מדנים
(69)	בשבעים אב משרת
(63)	ומה בוכה בלי עין
(65)	ומה דקה ורקה וחלקה

(60) ומה מלך במגבעת אדומה
(67) ומה מדור מחוגר מסביביו
(61) ומה מת על פני ארץ משולח
(59) ומה עור אשר עינו בראשו
(70) ידידי נהליני על גפנים
(39) ישעי צמח ישעי צמח
(62) כלי מכיל לאין תכלית
(124) מי יתנני עבד אלה
(194) שיר חדש בפי כלנו
(57) שלשה הם אמונה מעשיהם

No. 406, one of the poems labelled חדויות לאל חתנים "bridegrooms' chants," is an extract from the Taḥkemoni of al Ḥarizi. It is the poem in Hebrew, Arabic and Aramaic which begins דבר אל יאמן ומאעת אלרחמאן שפר עובדיה and is found on p. 57 of Lagarde's edition. The version in our MS. is shorter than that in Lagarde, but has some better readings.

Judah al-Ḥarizi: 22 (B. 1), 336 (B. 5).
Judah: 2 (B. 3).
Yisra'el ben Mosheh: 355 (B. 9), 292 (B. 14).
Levi: 343
Mosheh ben Maimun: 348 (B. 1).
Shelomoh ibn Gabirol: 28 (B. 1), 18 (B. 2), 27 (B. 7), 17 (B. 9).

The linguistic side of the Yemenite poetry has been adequately dealt with by Bacher and will not be touched upon here.

In conclusion, two of the poems peculiar to our MS. are here quoted in full, the first (no. 392) is by Shibzi and runs as follows:—

אל המיוחד שם כבודו שומרי" ברוך שמו לעד אלהי קוני:
לאלכלך הבר לא סואהו אכרי" מן פצל גודה דאים אלאחסאני:
שובי יחידתי לטובו נהרי יחיש ישועתו ויושיעני:
בה אתכל יוסף יום כאן חאירי" פי כיר קפרא חאלהו מהתאני:
זכה והעלהו אלהי יוצרי" מלך במצרים בראש ארמוני:
יונם דעאה מן בטן חותן האירי" פי גב בחרן כלצה רבאני:
משכי גברת דל ואויביו פזרי" חלי פני דודך ויצליני:
שוגים ביין סבאם חמתם קוררי" את היא תשוקתי ובבת עיני:
תגלא עצים אלשאן במלכה קאהרי" אחסאנהו מסבל לכל אנסאני:
אודה שמו לעד בלב מתעורר: ובמעגלי צדק בחן ינחיני:
כאפי אלגודאת אלעזיז ואלאחקרי" ואלכל צנעה ואחדן וחדאני:

This may be roughly readered in prose as follows:—

"God called 'One,' whose glorious name does guard me;
His name be blessed for aye, He is my god that owns me.
His planning was Creation; none there was beside Him;
Of His bounteous plenty constant are the blessings.
Turn, mine only one; stream towards His goodness;
Quickly may He succour and deliver me.
On Him did Joseph trust in the day when he was troubled;
In the desert land was his plight relieved.
God showed him pure and raised him high;
In Egypt he reigned as the palace chief.
Jonah called Him, turning in the belly of a whale;
In the depths of the sea did my Lord deliver him.
O queen, redeem the weak, disperse his foes;
With thy Beloved intercede that me He may deliver.
As for them that reel, whose drunkenness is through wine,
Cool their wrath; thou, my desire, the apple of my eye.
Mighty he revealed himself, in his kingdom Conqueror,
Upon all human kind his blessings he does shower.
I will praise His name for aye, with heart aroused,
That in the paths of good with favour he may lead me.
Satisfying with his favours both the honoured and the humble,
And the Whole He made, One and Alone."

The second poem (no. 334) is an anonymous panegyrical composition in Hebrew:—

לאור עולם אשר החפיר מאורות" וסביב עומדים לו כמנורות
ועידיו שומעי שמעו יבואון" ונפשותם ירימון לו תשורות
ואיך יוכלו לכחש נפלאותיו" ובו העוברים יראו גבורות
כבוד עליון סביב קברו ינוצץ" ויפיץ אור לעינים סגורות
כבוד עֶזְרָא קדוש אֵל המכובד אשר הוא ליקום עֶזְרא בצורות

"To the light of the world, that put the stars to shame;
About whom they stand as lamps;
Whose witnesses, having heard his fame, come,
Bringing their souls as gifts to him.
How can they deny his wond'rous powers
That pass him by and see heroic deeds?
Around his tomb shines the glory of the Most High,
Spreading light afar for eyes imprisoned.
The glory of Ezra, the holy one of God, the Glorified,
He that is help to human kind in straits."

THE "GOLDEN MEAN" IN JUDAISM

HARRY S. LEWIS (NEW YORK)

The subject of these notes suggested itself to me, when I turned the other day to a passage in one of ISRAEL ABRAHAMS' most delightful works,—his life of Maimonides. He is dealing with the famous attempt of Maimonides to equate Jewish ethics with the Aristotelian doctrine of the mean. "... To the Greek the moral sense, like the musical ear, is satisfied by harmony. If virtue be harmony, beauty in action, then Aristotle's Μεσότης (Mean) perfectly expresses the principle of virtue. Excess and deficiency lie at the two extremes, and each is evil; between them runs the Mean, which is the Good." This principle, ISRAEL ABRAHAMS proceeds to explain in a few illuminating pages. He shows that the Law of the Mean does not furnish us with a full theory of Jewish ethics, but is at least a useful instrument for the analysis of many moral concepts.

Maimonides derived his doctrine of the Mean from Greek sources, but it was quite congenial to the native Hebraic spirit. Glancing through the records of our history and literature, we find many indications that our religious teachers were, as a rule, fully alive to the dangers of exaggeration in the various activities of life and thought. We should be proud of our mystics, devotees, fulfillers of every jot and tittle of the Torah, without whose enthusiastic zeal Judaism would not have endured; but we also owe much to those, who tempered zeal with moderation and cautious reflection.

The Bible contains two familiar passages in praise of moderation. Both of them are to be found in the "Wisdom" books. There is Agur's prayer:—

> Give me neither poverty nor riches;
> Feed me with the food that is needful for me:
> Lest I be full and deny Thee,
> And say, Who is the Lord?
> Or lest I be poor and steal
> And profane the name of my God.

In other words, the extremes of poverty and riches expose men to greater temptations than the safe middle lot in life. "Poverty," wrote Addison, in his exposition of these verses, "is apt to betray a man into Envy, Riches into Arrogance. Poverty is too often attended with Fraud, vicious Compliance, Repining, Murmurs and Discontent; Riches expose a man to Pride and Luxury, a foolish Elation of Heart, and too great a fondness for the present World. In short, the middle Condition is most eligible to the Man, who would improve himself in Virtue." (The Spectator, no. 464.) Agur's desires are moderate in every sense. He prays God not to give him riches (which, as Bunyan remarks, is "scarce the prayer of one of ten thousand"). On the other hand, Agur would not have agreed with those, who considered the "way of the Torah" to be followed by living in extreme poverty, "eating bread and salt, drinking water by measure and sleeping on the ground." It is better, he thinks to have enough but not too much. In the Tragedy of Euripides, the nurse of Medea's children expresses a similar sentiment, but with a very different motive. She is glad not to have been born to greatness, for "better life's level way"—

> "Sweeter name than 'The Mean' shall ye say not,
> And to taste it is sweetness untold,
> But to men never weal above measure
> Availed on its perilous height.
> The Gods in their hour of displeasure
> The heavier smite"
>
> ("Medea" in "Loeb Classical Library.")

The Greek dramatist deprecated excessive prosperity, because it was likely to provoke the envy of the gods; the dangers, which the Hebrew moralist wished to avoid, are rooted in man's heart within.

Agur's prayer for moderate possessions is strictly ethical, but commentators have been greatly puzzled by a passage in Koheleth, where we are apparently advised to be good but not too good. "Be not righteous overmuch; neither make thyself over wise; why shouldest thou destroy thyself? Be not overmuch wicked, neither be thou foolish; why shouldest thou die before thy time?" This may sound rather shocking, but the advice given is quite good, although it is cynically expressed. Koheleth is writing sarcastically. Put the words,

righteous and wicked, into inverted commas and the meaning will become clearer. Pay no attention, he would say, to the formulas of self-righteous formalists: their ideas of righteousness and wickedness need not count with you. We are reminded somewhat of the passage where the Talmud denounces as world destroyers the pious fools, who would leave a child to drown in a river, whilst they were taking off their phylacteries (T. J. Sotah ch. 3).

In Talmudic literature, there are many passages in which the praise of moderation is expressed or implied. There is, for example, the following saying, couched in general terms but seeming to have special reference to the proper method of religious study:

"The Torah is likened to fire; warm thyself before it, but approach not so closely as to be scorched neither remove thyself so far as to be frozen." (Mechilta on Exodus, XIX, 18.) I. H. Weiss, in his commentary on the passage, explains it to mean that we are to avoid alike the chilly legalism of the Sadducee and the burning mysticism of the Essene.[1]—Another version of this saying occurs in T. J. Hagigah II, 1:

"The Torah is, as it were, between a path of fire and a path of snow. Incline this way or that way and thou wilt perish. Take therefore a middle course."

Here the context shows that this middle course has reference to the mysteries of religion, which are only to be divulged to disciples of ripe intelligence. It was felt that, even for them, the pursuit of esoteric knowledge is dangerous. It may lead to madness, to untimely death or to mortal heresy. Few indeed are the Akibas, who can enter in peace and leave in peace the "Paradise" of celestial lore. The Mishna forbids us, therefore, to inquire "what is above, what is below, what was before (the creation), and what is at last to be." But, of course, this was a prohibition, which it was impossible to enforce. These problems about the unknown and the unknowable are of persistent interest; the human spirit is "weary yet pursuing": we imagine solutions where proof is impossible. So it has ever been in the history of Judaism. Many have been content to accept the doctrines of their religion in simple faith, but there have always

[1] Is there something of the same idea in the phrase used by the Talmud, to characterise Jesus of Nazareth—"the disciple who overcooked his food in public"? (Sanhedrin, 103 a.)

been unquiet spirits, unable to rest until they had tried to solve the riddle of the universe. And so old questions have been asked and answers attempted again and again, from the times of Jeremiah and Job to the present day. Hence the apocalyptic books, the mystical passages in Talmudic and Geonic literature, Maimonides with his philosophy and Nachmanides with his hidden "way of truth," the Zohar and its off-shoots, the Baal-Shem and Moses Mendelssohn, S. R. Hirsch of Frankfurt and E. G. Hirsch of Chicago. Note also, as pertinent to my subject, that Judaism, throughout the middle ages, was more successful than Christianity and Mohammedanism in giving opportunities to its adherents to indulge in speculative adventure. In the Moslem empire, philosophy was soon suppressed and in Christendom it became the handmaid of theology. In our own case, opposition to the various statements of rationalism and of mysticism was more or less ineffective. The reason may have been that we lacked a central authority, such as that of the Pope, able to enforce its decisions throughout the Jewish world. If so, it was either a very lucky accident, or (as I would prefer to think) a providential circumstance. The heresies of one age often received, at last, something like official recognition; the philosophical work of Maimonides is actually the first book, cited by Isserles in his contribution to the codification of Jewish law. Moderation won a victory in this way and also in another. Although Kabbala was accepted for several centuries as a true doctrine, its influence continued subsidiary to that of the Talmud. Legalism acted as a check against the excess of mysticism.

The comparison of right conduct to a road, midway between fire and frost, occurs again in the Aboth d'Rabbi Nathan (ch. 28, text A). By means of this metaphor, R. Judah b. Ilai illustrates his statement that "those, who, in this world, attach primary importance to the study of the Torah and secondary importance to the pursuit of a trade, will receive precedence in the world to come." This is certainly in accordance with the best Rabbinical teaching. It is most appropriate in the mouth of Judah b. Ilai,—the enthusiastic student, who yet enjoined every father to teach his son a trade and who sang the praises of hard work. There have always been Jewish students whose sole occupation was Religion (תורתם אומנותם), and Sirach, we know, was of opinion that a scholar ought to be a gentleman of leisure.

But thank God for our noble amateurs, whether they were wood-choppers, sandal-makers or physicians, marriage-brokers like Maharil or bankers like Solomon Buber. One cannot help being sorry that it became necessary (after the fourteenth century) for congregations to pay scholars to be Rabbis and nothing else. Still, after all, (so long as Jews *were* Jews) the Rabbi by no means monopolised religious knowledge in his community. He was surrounded by a laity, learned or at least appreciative of learning, who continued to exemplify "that excellent thing"—the study of the Torah combined with some worldly occupation. Nowadays knowledge of things Jewish has been left to the specialist and the future of our religion is therefore endangered, for the most characteristic feature of Judaism, which distinguishes it from all other religions, is the stress which it lays upon Talmud Torah. Without this element, you can doubtless be ethical and even religious, but Judaism will hardly persist in your family for many generations. No doubt, Jewish studies must be brought up to date; no doubt, they must be recognised as being but a means to an end, for religious knowledge is valueless unless it helps us to lead a religious life and to labour in the cause of Israel's mission to Israel itself and to humanity. But in the words of the Rabbis, study takes precedence over action, for study leads to action. We need a synthesis of both; we must strive to attain the mean, which is really golden, because it combines the good points of each extreme.

The Rabbis, besides being students and teachers, interpreted and enforced Jewish law. In this capacity also they acted, as a rule, with moderation. They made fences to the Law, but generally contrived that these fences should not be too high. They laboured in many ways to reconcile religion with life. Serious difficulties stood in the way,—difficulties, which could not always be surmounted. Theoretically the precepts of the Torah, as explained by tradition, were fixed quantities: "God will to all eternity never alter nor change His Law." But changes did come often enough. Much could be done by interpretation, by means of which an unpalatable law, could not only be explained but explained away. Thus an "eye for an eye" was understood by the Pharisees to be an order to pay damages,—an eye's worth for the loss of an eye. According to the theory of the Mishna, capital punishment was so hedged about by restrictions,

that its operation was rendered almost impossible. The Rabbis assumed that they were empowered to annul religious vows, which had been unthinkingly undertaken: "when a man vows a vow to the Lord... he shall not profane his word" was taken to mean that others might profane it for him. Again, it was a recognised principle that the Torah has pity on the property of Israel. In considering questions of *Kashruth*, the Rabbis have always tried to strain the law a little, rather than to subject an individual to great loss.

"By far the most important development that has ever taken place in post-Biblical Judaism is the setting aside practically of the whole of the Levitical law, including the sacrificial system... Many of the Levitical institutions were of course intimately bound up with the national life in Palestine and disappeared *ipso facto* with the destruction of the Temple and of the Jewish State. Academically, therefore, it may perhaps be true to say that orthodox Judaism regards these laws, as merely being in a state of abeyance." But practically they have gone for ever. Other Levitical enactments, such as the ordeal to test a woman suspected of adultery, had been repealed by the Pharisees at a still earlier date. The priestly dues (מתנות כהונה), enjoined in Deuteronomy, 18^{3-5} are theoretically binding at the present day, but their observance has for ages entirely lapsed, and no Rabbi has attempted to enforce them.[2]

Circumstances alter cases and superannuated laws, like superannuated officials, become ripe for retirement. A certain recognition to this principle has always been given by the Rabbis, although they continued to enforce some ancestral customs such as the observance of the second day of the Festivals, which had ceased to rest upon a rational basis. On the other hand, numerous anniversary celebrations, regarded in the *Megillath Taanith*, were already abolished in Talmudic times. We even find cases where the requirements of the Biblical law were relaxed, notably in relief of a woman, whose husband had absconded or disappeared. Testimony, which would have been incompetent in other cases, was admitted by the Jewish courts, in order to prove that her husband was dead or had divorced her, so that she might be able to remarry. It was recognised that necessity creates a law of its own. Did not the Maccabean warriors stand to their

[2] This paragraph is quoted, in shortened form, from a paper by my late friend, F. S. SPIERS, which was printed in the *Jewish Chronicle* of February 7 and 14, 1908.

arms on the Sabbath? When human life is in peril, all commandments may, nay must, be set aside, except only the fundamental prohibitions against idolatry, murder and incest. In a very few instances, ancient enactments, assumed to rest on divine authority, were entirely abrogated in zeal for God's service. Thus it was that the Traditional Law, which was given to be transmitted by word of mouth, was yet eventually committed to writing, lest it should be forgotten in the stress of Israel's persecution and dispersion. Above all, as it has often been shown, the changed attitude of Jews towards gentiles in post-Talmudic times is reflected in the Rabbinical codes and responsa. In addition to EISENSTEIN's numerous illustrations of this,[3] I may mention that a German Rabbi of the seventeenth century, condoned the common practice of contemporary Jewesses, who visited gentile houses without escort in order to trade with the inmates. The secular authorities, he said, could be trusted to safeguard them from outrage.[4]

It was a principle of the Talmud that a custom of Israel is law, unless the custom be actually sinful or foolish. As a matter of fact, custom was sometimes stronger than law as in the case of *Kol Nidre*, which has retained its place in the prayer-book, although the Rabbinical authorities tried long to abolish it. The force of custom was exercised as a rule in the direction of increased stringency of ritual observance. But not always so. When certain ritual laws had fallen into desuetude, the Talmud advised that no action should be taken to maintain them. "Let Israel alone," it was said. "It is better for them to sin in ignorance rather than to sin wilfully." This is a further illustration of the fact that the Rabbis were willing to act with moderation when no serious principle was at stake.[5]

And then there were legal fictions, introduced as a desperate remedy for hard cases. These go back far in Jewish history. I suppose the most ancient was the *Erub*, by means of which (to adopt ISRAEL ABRAHAMS' lucid definition) "groups of houses were combined and considered as one private enclosure with regard to certain aspects of the Sabbath law." The Mishna gives regulations concerning various

[3] *Jewish Encyclopaedia*, s. v. Gentile.

[4] *Chavvoth Yair* § 66.

[5] The Talmudic passage referred to is in Betsah 30 a. Its operation is explained by ISSERLES (*Orach Hayyim*, § 428

kinds of *Erub*, but assumes the principle of the institution to be well known. It was thought to have been founded by King Solomon, that is to say it was of unknown antiquity. Then again we have Hillel's *prosbul*, a system of contracting out of the obligation to remit debts every seventh year. He found that the Pentateuchal precept, intended for the benefit of the poor, actually prevented them from borrowing money in the time of need. Other legal fictions in Jewish life are later. I will only mention a few. In the course of time, Jews settled in cold countries; how then could they enjoy the Sabbath without a fire? Hence various evasions to justify the employment of a *Shabbath Goy* or *Goya*. Again, a Jew may not exact interest on a loan from his fellow-Jew; but it became usual for the creditor to be made a sleeping partner by the debtor and thus to become entitled to a share in the profits. The Mishna provides that one who brings a bill of divorce (*Get*) from the maritime provinces must say "This was written and signed in my presence." Notwithstanding this, it has now become the general practice to send the *Get* through the mails. The person, who receives the *Get* and other documents empowering him to deliver it to the prospective divorcee, is nominally constituted an officer of the Beth Din, in order that he may be freed from restrictions imposed upon the husband's representative. I doubt if this practice goes back further than the eighteenth century,[6] although Rabbenu Tam already recorded isolated instances where a *Get* was conveyed from place to place by a gentile messenger. With regard to the legal fictions, which I have mentioned, and others also, it is probably true to say that they were at first employed in cases of exceptional hardship and afterwards became general.[7]

It has often been suggested that the practice of legal fictions and the hair-splitting methods of Talmudic discussion (*pilpul*) had a bad effect on Jewish character. But there is, I think, a simpler explanation of moral defects, caused by ghetto life and influences. Subterfuge and prevarication are the weapons of the under-dog and such they

[6] It is not mentioned in the *Ture Zahab* (c. 1640), but fully discussed in the *Pithe Teshubah* (1862) with citations from various responsa. Certain German Rabbis (c. 1855) adjudged a *Get*, sent by mail, to be invalid (*He-Halutz*, part 5, p. 9).

[7] The legal fictions of the Rabbis were denounced by an anonymous writer in *He-Halutz*, part 2, pp. 32—37. It is no wonder that he wrote with warmth. Various objectionable practices, which are now of historical interest only, were still maintained in his day.

were to some extent to persecuted Israel. The Rabbis always enjoined upon their people the duty of strict honesty to all, but there were cases for moral compromise with a certain sacrifice of principle. It could not always be helped. Suppose an unauthorised tax-collector, a strong man armed, who levied for the benefit of his private purse, called upon you for a sworn statement of your assets. You dared not sin against God by swearing falsely, and if you told the truth, you would lose most of your property. In such a case the Mishna permits you to swear with your lips to a falsehood and to add a mental reservation which converts the falsehood into truth (Nedarim III, 4). Again, a non-Jew might request or command you to do something, which was undesirable or unlawful. The best device was evasion—לאשתמוטי מיניה, to put him off with an excuse. This was often recommended. Again, it was considered permissible to depart from the truth, in order to promote peace (Yebamoth, 65b). It cannot be doubted that teaching of this character had a bad effect. When the Rabbis conceded an inch, their people would often take an ell. Thus in the Palatinate, we find that it was a common practice, in the seventeenth century, to travel with a false passport and to bribe judges of civil courts. There were some, who boasted of their success in winning cases by such means.[8] No doubt the chief responsibility for such practices rested not upon the Jews, but upon their persecutors. At times our fathers could hardly live without condescending to bribery and corruption. This resulted in certain symptoms of degeneration, which did not disappear immediately after emergence to freedom.

That Judaism puts into practice the maxim of the golden mean is illustrated by the attitude towards asceticism, adopted by our chief authorities. The main stream of Jewish life and thought is opposed to asceticism, although some of our saints and mystics practised various austerities, not because they regarded enjoyment as an evil

[8] *Chavvoth Yair* §§ 182, 136. In the first mentioned of these responsa, Bachrach treats the false passport as a matter of course, whilst discussing at length whether a man might kiss a woman, in order to support the pretence that she was his wife. In the second, he quotes another Rabbi, his brother-in-law, who condemned the notorious practice of feeing judges but added that it might be difficult for a Jew to obtain justice by any other means. This responsum includes a very interesting conversation, creditable to both parties, between the Rabbi and Duke Karl Ludwig, the Elector Palatine.

in itself, but because they aimed to strengthen their spiritual forces by subduing bodily desires. Maimonides argued against asceticism even in this modified form, because the Torah has already imposed sufficient restrictions without our inventing others.

By the way, Maimonides was a strange advocate of moderation, for in practice he was decidedly an extremist, who enjoyed nothing except the cultivation of the intellect.[9] As ISRAEL ABRAHAMS expressed it, "he was out of sympathy with the 'play' side of human nature." Poetry and music seemed to him a waste of time; love songs were especially objectionable. Dancing was only tolerable as an aid to digestion. He held that the soul of man can only achieve immortality through the exercise of the intellectual faculty. All emotionalism is to be suppressed; "the successes and mishaps of this life should be regarded with indifference by a true philosopher." (Letter to Saladin.)

This last sentence of Maimonides is certainly not characteristic of Jewish thought. It was no part of Rabbinical teaching to encourage men to suppress their natural feelings of joy and sorrow. Nachmanides, in his preface to the תורת האדם, condemns the following stoical aphorisms attributed to Socrates: "They asked me why they had never seen me grieved. I replied that I possessed nothing which I should be grieved to lose." "How deceived is he who knows that he is journeying from the world and yet busies himself in its concerns."[10] The attitude, genuinely Jewish, is quite different. "'There is a time to lament'—in the days of mourning. 'There is a time to dance'—in the company of brides and bridegrooms.'" This is Rashi's commentary on Eccles. III, 5, and we may be sure that he practised what he preached.

It is interesting to notice the attitude of the Rabbis of the Talmud towards fasting, that is to say towards voluntary fasts imposed by an individual on himself, in addition to the congregational fasts, which were of universal obligation. Some considered such a faster to be a saint; others, a sinner (Taanith 11 a). R. Jose warned his brethren not to afflict themselves with self-imposed fasts, lest they become dependent upon others for support (Taanith 22 b). It was,

[9] But he was not without some human ties. He loved his father, his brother, Abraham the son of his old age, and his disciple, Joseph Ibn Aknin. He writes also to his friend Japhet in affectionate terms.

[10] These aphorisms were quoted by Nachmanides from מוסרי הפילוסופים.

however, obvious to all that a labourer must not fast or practise other austerities, lest he diminish the work to be performed for his master. R. Johanan once visited a town where he found a teacher of the Bible, who was languid. "Why so?" he asked, "The servant of a human master may not fast; still less one who labours in God's service." (T. J. Demai VII, 4.)

Excess of ascetism may be unhealthy, but something more than moderation in all things is needed to make a religious man. "Ye shall be holy." What is holiness? According to the Sifra, holiness is abstinence. Nachmanides further explains that holiness requires a sparing use of things permitted. It takes at least a touch of asceticism to make a saint. As an extension of this idea, Bachya teaches that "it is proper that there shall be a few select individuals, ascetic in their habits of life, and completely separated from the world, to serve as an example for the generality of mankind, in order that temperance of the more general kind shall be the habit of the many."[11] On the other hand, he holds that such men as the Patriarchs, who lived in the childhood of the world, did not need to be ascetics, for their mind was so clear and their faith so great, that they were almost immune from the lusts of the flesh. This is in curious contrast with the view of Judah Halevi, who considers asceticism to be only suitable for those who reach the eminence of Enoch "who walked with God" and could commune with angels, without thought of the fetters of the body. God's presence descended of old upon the prophets, so that they might lead a purely spiritual existence, whilst yet on earth. Since we cannot now rise to such heights, we should use all our faculties, whether of the body or of the spirit, in the service of God.[12]

This is about enough of these rather disjointed notes, for I will not attempt to say anything about the various movements in Judaism, which aimed at extreme asceticism. I may just note that none of our Jewish ascetics, except the ancient Essenes and Therapeutae, preached celibacy. They married and, if they became widowers, soon married again. (Amongst Jewish teachers, I know of no celibates except Ben Azzai, the prophet Jeremiah, Judah Brieli, and Moses

[11] Husik, *Mediaeval Jewish Philosophy*, p. 104.
[12] Kusari III, 1 and ii, 50.

Hayyim Luzzatto.)[13] Most of these ascetics were magnificent. We are certainly not going to imitate them, but they have much to teach us. There is no doubt that the case against asceticism has been overstated by most modern Jews (e.g. by LAZARUS in his *Ethics of Judaism*). The old Rabbis did well to restrain their people from excessive austerities, but *we* need rather to be warned against overindulgence. As a corrective, one should read SCHECHTER's *Saints and Saintliness*—one of his finest *Studies in Judaism*—and two noble sermons on *Asceticism* by C. G. MONTEFIORE in the volume entitled *Truth in Religion*. These teachers, who differ in much else, both agree (אמרי תרוייהו) in deprecating the cult of ease and convenience and in urging us to a life of struggle and self-denial.

Shortly after finishing these notes on the "Golden Mean," I read in the *Jewish Guardian* of July 23rd, 1926 a remarkable sermon by the Rev. VIVIAN SIMMONS, Minister of the West London Synagogue for British Jews. The preacher urged his congregation, which has hitherto stood midway between Orthodox and Liberal Judaism, definitely to associate themselves with the Progressive movement. An excellent conclusion from my own standpoint, but I must not discuss it here. One of his passing remarks is, however, directly germane to my subject. He said:

> "In Judaism, in *Religion*, if we are quite honest about it, there is no Middle Way. There is no Middle Way that has any real meaning. At least it has a purely negative meaning. It is the fence between the two fields. It is nothing and has proved to be nothing in itself. Those who cross from one field to the other sit and rest awhile on this fence. Some of them are so weary that they never get up again at all. Others leap over or break through the fence in a single night."

There seems to be some confusion of thought here. When we have to decide what to do, there is often room for compromise and this is just as true of religious ceremonial as of anything else. When the question arises what ceremonial to retain and what to discard, the middle way is often the right way, best suited to keep together a congregation, which is united in essentials although its members differ on points of detail. Even though a ceremony may have originally

[13] See SCHECHTER, *Studies in Judaism* (third series), p. 274.

implied a doctrine in which we no longer believe, it is often capable of reinterpretation in the light of our own thought. Certainly we may adopt the metaphor of Mr. SIMMONS' and admit that this middle way is often like a fence to sit upon rather than a path to walk in. In plain English the Jewish Reformer who was orthodox in his youth may long cling to certain ceremonies through force of association, whereas he himself later in life and certainly his children after him will care for them no longer. What does it matter, provided the essentials of religion remain?

But undoubtedly there is a Middle Way, which is the wrong way. It is the way of the man, who is too timid to think, who is so indifferent, that he does not care to consider the vital problems of the hour. He leaves well alone, or more often not-so-well alone. The original members of Mr. SIMMONS' congregation held to a middle way in Judaism, which they had thought out to the best of their ability. The written Torah was for them divine, but, like Hillel's would-be proselyte, they rejected the traditions. On this basis, they reconstructed their Judaism and then they lived up to it to the best of their ability. Now come the descendants of the original "reformers," who practise extremely little of the Judaism of their fathers. It is no use to tell them that "the Lord spoke unto Moses, saying" this or that, for they do not believe it. What is to be done for them and for the myriads like them in the Jewries of the world? Try to restore the old faith? Certainly, if you believe in it yourself. But, if not, express your convictions without regard to expediency and cowardly compromise. It may be that truth in doctrine lies in the middle way, but it must be a definite truth and not a mere halting between two opinions,—a feeble attempt to answer both "yes" and "no" to the same questions.

TEXT VARIATIONS IN SOME DUPLICATE INSCRIPTIONS OF ADAD-NIRARI, KING OF ASSYRIA, CA. 1325 B.C.

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The cuneiform inscriptions named in the title form a group, and are written on tablets of stone and clay, now preserved in the British Museum, the Harvard Semitic Museum, the Museum of Antiquities at Constantinople, and the Kaiser-Friedrich-Museum at Berlin. Each tablet has one column of writing on obverse and one on reverse, and in some instances the inscription is continued on the ends and edges. For brevity and convenience the tablets are here designated by the letters of the alphabet.

A. Limestone tablet, in the British Museum, $17\frac{5}{8} \times 8\frac{1}{4} \times 1\frac{7}{8}$ inches. Lines 80 (obv. 36, one end 2, rev. 39, one edge 3). Several lines of reverse run over the edge on the right. Two whole words of rev., line 6, thus run over, but this was probably added in revising the inscription.

The tablet was acquired by GEORGE SMITH on one of his expeditions to Assyria in 1873 or 1874. (See his *Assyrian Discoveries*, pp. 47, 243, 3rd ed., New York 1876.)

The text was published in *Cuneiform Inscriptions of Western Asia*, iv. 44, 45, London 1875; in the 2nd ed. of that volume, 1891; and in LEONARD W. KING's *Annals of the Kings of Assyria*, i., 1902 (pp. xxv, xxix, xxxiii, photographic reproductions; pp. 4–12, transcription, transliteration, translation). Several scholars have given translations, as GEORGE SMITH (*loc. cit.* 243–247), A. H. SAYCE, JULES OPPERT, F. E. PEISER, and others.

B. Alabaster tablet, in the Harvard Semitic Museum, ca. $31 \times 23 \times 4$ to 5 cm. Perfectly preserved. Lines 65 (obv. 28, lower end 3, rev. 28, upper end 4, left edge 2). Several lines run over to the right. The characters, in the archaic style, are deeply cut. With an eye to

symmetry, the scribe has so spaced the characters that every paragraph begins with a new line.

Before it came to America the tablet was examined by two Paris Assyriologists, Jules Oppert and Victor Scheil. Both of these scholars published articles on the subject, Oppert in *Comptes Rendus de l'Académie des Inscriptions et Belles Lettres* for June, 1893, and Scheil in *Recueil de Travaux Relatifs à la Philologie et à l'Archéologie*, xv. 138–140 (1893). Scheil states that he had recently seen the tablet in the hands of a Constantinople dealer in antiquities. His article consists of a transliteration of the inscription into ordinary type, with indication of differences from the London copy by means of italics.

In 1893 the tablet was on exhibition at the World's Fair, Chicago. Here several successful plaster casts were made and distributed, probably at the suggestion of Frederic W. Putnam. In February, 1894, Professor Putnam presented a copy of this cast to the Harvard Semitic Museum, another went to the University Museum at Philadelphia, and others probably to other museums.

From the cast in Philadelphia Morris Jastrow published a photographic copy of the text, with transcription, transliteration, translation, and notes, in the *American Journal of Semitic Languages and Literatures*, xii. 143–172 (No. for April–July, 1895). Another copy may have been used by Professor Robert F. Harper for his translation in *Assyrian and Babylonian Literature, Selected Translations*, Appleton, New York 1901.

The other duplicates, C–H, were found by members of the Deutsche Orientgesellschaft in their fruitful exploration, under the lead of Walter Andrae, of the ruins of Asshur (September 18, 1903, to December 31, 1913). Nos. C D E G seem to be at Constantinople, F and H at Berlin. C–F were autographed by Leopold Messerschmidt, and published in *Keilschrifttexte aus Assur Historischen Inhalts* (=*KAH*), Part 1, pp. 5–14, 61–63 (1911). Of G, a very close duplicate of A and B, Messerschmidt publishes only the readings which differ from A (*KAH*, Part 1, pp. 63, 64). The inscription on H was copied for *KAH* by Otto Schroeder (Part 2, pp. 16, 17, 1921). A translation of C, D, E into English, with transliteration, was published in the *American Journal of Semitic Languages and Literatures*, xxviii. 174–182 (April, 1912) by David D. Luckenbill.

C. Baked clay tablet, broken into two parts, and otherwise considerably damaged, 31 & ½ × 16 & ½ cm. Lines 45 + 43. Excellent writing, many of the signs in archaic Babylonian characters. *KAH*, Part 1, No. 3.

D. Alabaster fragment. Breadth 20 & ½, thickness 4 & ½ cm. Length before the break estimated at 35 cm. The lost portion of the text is supplied from the fragment of another tablet. The text thus restored has 75 lines in new Assyrian script. Right hand end of many lines damaged. *KAH*, Part 1, No. 4.

E. Alabaster tablet, 40 & ½ × 27 & ½ × 5 & ½ cm. Damaged in spots. New Assyrian script of 37 + 35 lines. *KAH*, Part 1, No. 5.

F. Baked clay tablet, broken, with loss of several lines at beginning and end. No. of lines preserved wholly or in part, 31 of obv., 29 of rev. Mixture of old Babylonian and new Assyrian scripts. *KAH*, Part 1, No. 65.

G. Alabaster tablet, 36 & ½ × 24 & ½ × 5 cm. Obv. well preserved, rev. damaged. Date illegible owing to "Auflagerungen" (mineral deposits on the surface?). Only readings differing from A given in the publication. *KAH*, Part 1, No. 66.

H. Clay tablet of 64 lines. Well preserved. New Assyrian script. *KAH*, Part 2, No. 35.

All the inscriptions on these eight tablets are divided into three parts: (1) An introduction, giving the titles and achievements of Adad-nirari and his royal predecessors for three generations back; (2) A brief account of the restoration of some building (temple, palace, wall, quay) with an appeal to his successors on the throne to make further repairs when necessary, and in particular to protect his tablets from harm; (3) Dreadful imprecations on those rulers who should dare to substitute their own name for his in the records or injure his tablets in any other way.

In form and content part 1 is the same in all the tablets, with little variation. The same is true of part 3.

In part 2 the literary form is essentially the same in all the tablets, but there is considerable variety of substance. First, there is a group of three tablets, A B G, recording the restoration of the same building, the *Mushlalu*, in the same terms. The tablets of this group are therefore duplicates in all three divisions. Secondly, the tablets F H form another group, the restoration which they record being that of the

kisirtu or wall of the quay along the Tigris just to the east of the city. A restoration of the *kisirtu*, recorded in *KAH*, Part 2, No. 33, reads like a condensed form of the account given in F and H, but the date differs from that of H. The date of F is lost. Thirdly, the three remaining tablets record each a different restoration: C, That of the eastern wall of the city, damaged by overflow of the river; D, That of a wall of the new city, extending from the "great wall within the city" to the river; E, That of a palace in the city. The three tablets C D E are thus in the architectural section not duplicates of one another or of either of the other groups. Unlike the other two groups, they mention by name several of the earlier rulers who had built or restored the same structures.

Looking at the building sections as a whole, there are not a few differences in the story, such as grow out of the origin and nature of the structure, the cause of the damage, the kind of repairs, &c.; whereas in tablets reporting the same restoration not nearly so many variations occur.

Thus, in group 1 (A B G, restoration of the *Mushlalu*), certain words are wanting in one copy or the other. We read of the *Mushlalu* in B that "in former times it was built of hewn stone and clay," *i-na pa-na it-ti pi-li u ṭi-ṭi ip-šu* (obv. 28). G has the same, except that for *pi-li* it reads *pu-li*, without difference of meaning. A has only *i-na pa-na ip-šu*, "in former times it was built." Furthermore, A and B connect the *Mushlalu* with the temple of Ashur by the words *ša bit ilu A-šur*. These words are not found in G.

A surprising difference of text in these tablets is in the appeal to future rulers. In seven copies of the eight the appeal is introduced by the words *a-na ar-kat ume*, "for future days." This expression is wanting in B (rev. 5). Much more striking is the omission by B (rev. 6) of the words *u-šal-ba-ru-ma e-na-ḫu*, "shall grow old and decay," which would seem to be an important part of the context. They are found in all the other tablets. In A (rev. 9–14) the whole passage reads as follows:

9. *a-na ar-kat ume rubu ar-ku-u*
10. *e-nu-ma aš-ru šu-u*
11. *u-šal-ba-ru-ma e-na-ḫu*
12. *an-ḫu-su lu-di-iš na-ri-ia šu-me šaṭ-ra*
13. *a-na aš-ri-šu lu-ti-ir ilu Aš-šur*
14. *ik-ri-be-šu i-še-me.*

The passage may be rendered word for word thus:

9. For future days! The future prince,
10. when this building
11. shall grow old and decay,
12. its decay let him renew, my tablet (and) my inscription
13. to its place let him restore! (Then) Ashur
14. his prayers will hear.

The omission by B of *a-na ar-kat ume* and *u-šal-ba-ru-ma e-na-ḫu* may be accidental, and would not seriously affect the understanding of the passage by an Assyrian reader. The words *e-nu-ma* and *an-ḫu-su* both suggest future decay. Moreover, the omission of *u-šal-ba-ru-ma e-na-ḫu* is not unusual. Inscriptions of Adad-nirari's grandson, Tukulti-Ninib (*KAH*, Part 1, p. 33 and p. 34; *KAH*, Part 2, No. 50, l. 30f.), after recording building operations, proceed with the words, "Let the future prince renew its (decay)," omitting "when" and the verbs meaning "it shall grow old and decay" (lines 8, 9). True, the noun for decay in the second of these passages is lost by a break in the tablet, but the reading can scarcely be questioned. Either "decay" or some other word of the same meaning must be supplied. The possessive pronoun which belonged to the lost word is preserved. These Tukulti-Ninib passages are however, not quite parallel with the reading in B, which uses "when," with the evident intention of following it by one or more verbs, but fails to do so.

The question then still recurs, why does B only of the eight duplicates omit verbs? And why did not the scribe who revised B, and who seems, from a comparison of the characters, to be a different person from the original writer, supply the deficiency?

That he did not do this, can certainly not be explained by lack of space. Indeed, the wasteful spacing between characters in the building section is one of the most noticeable features of the writing on B. At the top of the reverse of B, six lines cover about as much space as the seven which follow, and the number of characters in the six lines is 44, or an average of seven and a third. In the six lines which follow are 94 characters, an average of fifteen and two thirds. Lines five and six with a total of thirteen characters are followed by seven and eight with a total of thirty two. In the thirteen lines immediately preceding the building section, the thirteen of this section,

in which the changes occur, and the thirteen following, the numbers of the characters are respectively 183, 112, and 198.

Another very noticeable feature of B is the extensive alteration which has been made in the portion of the stone containing the building record. An earlier writing has been imperfectly removed to make room for the text now occupying the space. One entire line of writing (line 4 of the reverse) and considerable portions of other lines have been ground or cut away. Many traces of the original writing are visible, but not enough of any character to make its value recognizable. In other lines the new characters were cut over the old, in some cases without obliterating traces of the latter. Now, it is quite possible that the first writing was meant to be the same as the present and that the changes were made necessary by serious mistakes of the first scribe. But it is also possible that an entirely different text occupied the space originally. That the space was not designed for so brief a record as now occupies it is highly probable in view of the relatively small number of characters to the line, as the figures just given show. If the present writing coincided in part with that which was removed, we can understand why a portion of the space was not ground away, and why some of the characters were not written over, as seems to be the case.

Whatever be the explanation of the large amount of erasure on B, whether to correct serious mistakes of the original scribe, or to remove a different record in order to make place for the present text, there seems to be no doubt that the corrector might easily have gone further and supplied the missing verbs called for by the context.

In this connection it is interesting to note that the old Assyrian scribes seem to have been forehanded in preparing and partially inscribing in advance tablets which were to record special events in the royal activity. So I would explain the ruled but unwritten space for six lines in a tablet of Adad-nirari's father, published in *KAH*, Part 2, p. 11, col. iii. Thus may also be understood the incompleteness of the date of tablet H (month and year named, but not the day). In *KAH*, Part 2, p. 19, line 27, is a similar case. Another instance, still more interesting, is given in *KAH*, Part 1, No. 19, where we find the word month followed by a long blank for the name of the month and the number of the day, then the word *li-mu*, followed by a second long blank for the name of the man after whom the year was called.

Tablet B is dated five days later than A. It is useless to speculate as to the reason for this difference. It is not clear why we should suppose that all duplicates reporting the same event must bear the same date. But a word about the method of dating may here be opportune.

As in the last centuries of Assyrian history, dating by *limus* was current in the time of Adad-nirari and his immediate successors. How much earlier it existed we do not know. The essence of the system lay in the practice of calling each year after some man of prominence, whose name takes the place of the year as an essential part of every date. In the absence of a common era or of a system of dating by the year of the king's reign, the *limu* system was a convenience. But to make such a system serve the purposes of history a chronological list of the *limu* officials (commonly called "eponyms" today) is necessary. The library of Assurbanipal has supplied the lack for some two and a half centuries preceding his time. Until such lists for the earlier period are recovered, we may know the names of many of these officials, not the corresponding years of the king's reign. It thus happens that although our duplicates are provided with dates, these do not aid us in fixing the chronological order of *limus* or of the tablets. In the later centuries of Assyrian history both the year of the king and the *limu* system were sometimes employed as means of dating.

In connection with the subject of scribal mistakes, erasures, and corrections, attention may now be called to a few others which are found in these tablets. All things considered, the number is surprisingly small.

In A, rev. 11, the second and third syllables of *e-na-ḫu* have been cut over some other word. In H, rev. 2 and 16, two erasures are noted by the editor; in H, rev. 22, the sign *im* was erroneously repeated, and the second sign then erased.

All the tablets have near the close the imprecation, "May Adad strike his land with a destructive bolt" (*ilu Adad i-na bi-ri-iḳ li-mu-ti mat-su li-ib-ri-iḳ*). As written in H there is a double uncorrected mistake. *Na* is written before and *i-na* is left out after Adad (H, rev. 27).

Mu-ra-piš mi-iṣ-ri u ku-du-ri, "enlarger of the territory and the boundary," is a title of each of the four kings named in the first section of the tablets, and its position at the end of three of the

paragraphs indicates its importance as the highest word that could be written in praise of Adad-nirari's ancestors. In tablet E this expression is abbreviated to *mu-ra-piš mi-iṣ-ri*. It seems that the omitted words were not carried over to the next line because the scribe wished a new line to begin with the building section, as on all the other tablets. He may have had the unfulfilled purpose to carry the two words over the margin to the edge of the tablet, as he did in many other cases.

In E, rev. 13, the expression *a-šar la a-ma-ri*, "place where it cannot be seen," is written *a-šar la-ma-ri*. The scribe may have dropped the *a* by oversight, or, if he was writing the tablet to dictation, he may have heard the two words as one.

H, rev. 19, has a word *na-as-pu-uḫ*. The other copies read *na-aš-pu-uḫ*, which seems to be the correct form.

In all duplicates but one we have a word of two syllables which may be read *mi* (or *me*)-*ši* (or *lim*). Reading *mi* (or *me*)-*lim* we have the word for "flood, overflow." The sentence then reads, *a-na* (var. *i-na*) *mi* (or *me*)-*lim i-na-du-u* "into the flood shall throw" (i.e. the tablet, in order to injure it). F, rev. 11, has the form *me-še*, which can represent *mi-ši* but not *mi-lim*. The word therefore seems to require *š* instead of *l* as its middle consonant, whatever be the meaning of *mi-ši*, *mi-še*, *me-še*.

As another of the methods of damaging the tablet we have in the context *a-na me i-na-du-u*, "into the waters shall throw." The reading *me-še* of F, rev. 11, gets rid of the improbability that the writer would twice in the immediate connection mention water as a means of injury to the tablet.

Turning now to parts 1 and 3 of these tablets, we find that in these sections all eight are real duplicates. There are, indeed certain variations, both accidental and intentional. Most of the variations, however, are purely formal, arising from the ancient usage of writing a word or syllable in a variety of ways, of which more hereafter.

In part 1 the most considerable difference is in section 1, title and achievements of Adad-nirari. Here E and F insert a list of about a dozen cities captured by the king (E, obv. 8–14). Among them is Karchemish on the Euphrates, written *Kar-ga-mis* in E and *Ga-ar-ga-mi-is* in F. A second insertion is that Adad-nirari was capturer of the land "Kudmuḫi and all of its allies" (D 13, 14; E 22;

F 13, 14; H 14). "Subduer of the land of Musri" is a third insertion (D 25; E 31; F 24; H 21, 22).

What conditions led to the insertion of these items in some of the tablets and their omission in others is not clear. It is possible that the tablets omitting them are of earlier date than the events recorded.

Part 3 consists of imprecations against any ruler who should alter, conceal, injure, or destroy the tablets. Among the methods denounced are burying, burning, and throwing into the water, given in this order in B C D E F H. In A the order is burning, throwing into the water, burying, probably only an accidental variation (rev. 18–20). In all the tablets except one *riḫiṣ limuti*, "destructive flood," is among the imprecations. The exception is B, which omits the second word by oversight (rev. 26).

There is much variety in the method of designating the inscriptions on stone and clay. B and C are the only tablets which agree in the order and the spelling, as appears from the following list:

A *na-ri-ia šu-me šaṭ-ra* (rev. 12)
B C *na-ri-ia u šu-me šaṭ-ra*
H *šu-me šaṭ-ra*
F *šu-me šaṭ-ra na-ri-ia*
E *šu-mi šaṭ-ra u na-ri-ia*
D *šu-me šaṭ-ra na-ri-ia u ti-me-ni-ia*

"Enemy and evil person" is also variously expressed, as:

A *ia-a-ba lim-na* (rev. 24)
H *a-ia-ba li-im-na*
B C D *ia-a-ba li-im-na*
E *ia-a-ba u lim-na*

The largest amount of divergence of text in Part 3 is found in the closing lines. Here A, B, and C agree verbatim. No readings of G after line 2 of the imprecations are given by *KAH*. The close of F is lost.

In D, E, and H is a considerable passage not found in the other parallels. In translation the close of A, B, and C reads as follows: "May Adad ..... like a deluge storm his land, to mounds of rubbish and to ruins may he reduce it. May Adad strike his land with a destructive bolt." After this D adds: "May Ishtar the queen cause

the defeat of his land. Before his enemy may he not be able to stand. On his land [may Adad send famine]." E and H agree with D, except that after the expression "may he not be able to stand" they insert the closing words of A, B, and C ("may Adad strike his land with a destructive bolt"), and then add, as their own close, "may he send famine upon his land."

Another short inscription of Adad-nirari agrees in these points with E and H (*KAH*, Part 2, p. 15, l. 42 ff.). An inscription from his son Shalmaneser I does the same (*ibid.*, p. 20, l. 26 ff.). An imprecation of his grandson Tukulti-Ninib is expressed in language partly the same, "May Ishtar the queen, who names the years of my reign, cause the defeat of his land. Before his enemies may he not be able to stand. Into the hand of his enemies may she deliver him" (*KAH*, Part 2, p. 29, l. 120 ff.).

To give lists of such differences in the writing as do not affect the text would be, for the purposes of this paper, useless. But a general account of the subject, with a few illustrations, may not be amiss.

The Babylonian-Assyrian script was originally picture writing, each sign representing an object or an idea (ideogram), as man, animal, water, mountain. In course of time some of the characters came to be used as syllables (phonograms), and there was a tendency to simplify and conventionalize the signs. Gradually additional signs became necessary, and many signs took on additional values. In not a few cases the same ideogram could represent several objects or ideas, and the same object could be represented by more than one ideogram.

Ordinarily an inscription consists of a mixture of ideograms and syllabic signs in varying proportions. Syllables are all short. In addition to those consisting of one vowel, there are two kinds, such as have one vowel and one consonant (as, ba, ab), and such as have two consonants with a vowel between. In the syllabic writing of a word there is considerable variation. Thus the word *kiššat*, "hosts," is written *ki-iš-ša-at* by C, *ki-ša-at* by B, *ki-šat* by A.

In our duplicates some of the words are uniformly written by ideograms, but far the larger number by syllables. A few are written by either method, according to scribal preference. *Naphar*, "totality," is written as an ideogram in F, obv. 7, and syllabically in F, rev. 22 (*nap-ḫa-ri*).

As a rule personal names are written wholly or in part by ideograms. The name of Adad-nirari's father is written on seven of the tablets by the three signs PU DI IL, which was long supposed to be syllabic writing. We now know that these three signs are ideograms, and that the pronunciation of the name is Arik-den-ili. It is written syllabically on the eighth tablet, A-ri-ik-di-en-ili, and also on one of this king's own inscriptions (*KAH*, Part 2, p. 11).

There is another ideogram, the pronunciation of which was long a puzzle to students. It occurs on five of our duplicates, and is composed of the sign for house plus the signs *azag* and *an*. Instead, of the ideogram, we find in E, rev. 13, the word *a-sa-ki* and in F, rev. 13, and H, rev. 8, *a-sa-ak-ki* (genitive forms). This word *isaku* seems therefore to be a derivative from the Sumerian *azag*. It is described in the context as *ašar la amari*, "a place of not seeing," i.e. where the tablet could not be seen, as a dark, or secret, or hidden place, or a place to which access was not permitted.

In a similar connection and in more comprehensive language, Tukulti-Ninib denounces any person who should remove his tablet to another place where it could not be seen (*KAH*, Part 2, p. 28, lines 97–98). Such expressions show that the ancient kings not only imbedded some of their inscriptions in foundations and massive masonry, there to be found by their descendants when carrying on restorations, but kept others above ground where they could be read by contemporaries and successors, as in libraries, on outer and inner walls of palaces and temples, and on the surface of city walls, just where the explorer finds them today.

The examples given are sufficient to show the great variety of ways in which a word might be written. That the scribes, in spite of their complicated and cumbersome script, were able to write with such a large degree of accuracy as appears in these duplicate inscriptions, cannot fail to win our admiration.

SPECIMEN OF A NEW EDITION OF THE GREEK JOSHUA

MAX L. MARGOLIS (PHILADELPHIA)

1. The Specimen requires an introductory description of the scope and arrangement of the new Edition. As I have devisedly chosen for the Specimen page 429 of SWETE's edition, the same that the editors of the Larger Cambridge Septuagint, following the selection by Drs. HORT and SWETE of ten specimen pages in the Octateuch, had collated in all the extant MSS. known to them, a word is in place on this preliminary collation. I am indebted to Mr. McLEAN for the collation of the Joshua page, and it is pleasing to record that I was introduced to the Cambridge scholar and his colleague, Professor BROOKE, by the late Dr. ISRAEL ABRAHAMS, in whose memory this Volume is published.

2. It is only recently that I was able to study the specimen collation. The page selected does on the whole serve its purpose; perhaps the following page 430 would have been more serviceable, since in v. 13f. the textual types are sharply marked in my apparatus; perhaps also an additional page with place-names (chapt. 15 or 19) would have been welcome. The textual type sometimes varies at given points in the book in one and the same MS., as I shall have occasion to show. The specimen collation contains the evidence of two uncials, MV (that of BAF was given in SWETE), and 78 minuscules. The edition in the Larger Cambridge Septuagint by BROOKE-McLEAN (B.-M.), published in 1917, adds the evidence of the uncials Θ, G, K, Δ_8 and (in the preface) the small fragment Oxyrhynchus 1168; but of the minuscules only 28 were selected, with the addition, however, of b_2, somehow absent from the specimen collation, and the Lectionary d_2. To the apparatus thus available for page 429 SWETE, I have been able to add cod. Μετέωρα 216 (Rahlfs 461), the Haverford MS. of the Ethiopic—of both of which I have photographs—and (in transcript) the Syriac Lectionary Brit. Mus. Add. 12,133 (see FIELD, i, 334). I possess likewise photographs of F and the

minuscules 15. 18. 29. 44. 54. 55. 56. 58. 64. 68. 71. 74. 75. 76. 82. 84. 106. 108. 118. 121. 122. 127. 128. 134. 343. 407. 426. 509. 610. 730 and of the Brit. Mus. MS. of the Syrohexaplar. Naturally I had before me the facsimile editions of BAGθ and TISCHENDORF's edition of K (see my "K Text of Joshua," AJSL xxviii, 1–55), the Onomasticon in the editions of LAGARDE and KLOSTERMANN, the editions of patristic writers and of the secondary versions (Sahidic, Bohairic, Ethiopic, Latin, Syriac). My own work on the Greek Joshua was begun in 1910.

3. The preliminary notice then published on the grouping of the codices in the Greek Joshua (see JQR N. S. i, 259–263) was based practically on HOLMES-PARSONS and lacks, of course, the precision which I have now arrived at after sixteen years of labor. The sum of the witnesses yields four principal recensions, **PCSE**, and in addition a number of MSS. variously mixed which I name **M**. At the outset it must be remarked that all of our witnesses are more or less mixed; the classification has in mind the basic character of a text, which alone is the determinant.

4. **P** is the Palestinian recension spoken of by Jerome, that is the Eusebian edition of the Septuagint column in Origen's Hexapla-Tetrapla. In a (relatively) pure form this class numbers but few representatives, and these constitute two sub-groups: $\mathbf{P}_1$ = Gγ (= c B.-M.) c_1 (= *b*) c_2 (=b′) and $\mathbf{P}_2$=b (=x) 𝔖 (the Syriac version of the Greek: $\mathfrak{S}^L$—the Brit. Mus. MS. edited by LAGARDE, $\mathfrak{S}^M$ = the Syrus Masii, $\mathfrak{S}^F$ = the Syriac Lectionary referred to above) On(omasticon). On the relation of the three forms of 𝔖 to one another I have written at length in a monograph which is to appear in the Harvard Theological Series; much also pertaining to the character of the **P** recension and its two divisions will be found there. For our present purposes it will suffice to say that for the proper names 𝔖 steps out, since but with exceptions the version took them over from the Peshitta; but the loss is more than offset by On. As between Hexapla and Tetrapla, $\mathbf{P}_2$ on the whole represents the latter and $\mathbf{P}_1$ the former. But such is the eclecticism of the texts that 𝔖, contrary to the general rule, occasionally reverses its habit to place the tetraplaric reading in the text and the hexaplaric in the margin; then, again, some of the marginal readings go back to the Syrian recension (**S**); nay, **S** readings have also entered the text of 𝔖. b, the sole Greek MS. closely resembling the Greek underlying 𝔖, in a few instances stands alone in expressing the Hebrew in a manner at odds with the unanimous reading of all

the other group members. Thus 15. 25 the MS. reads και ασωρ και αδαθα in the place of και ασωρ την καινην of the others including On. On the other hand, b is invaluable because it alone, in a consistent manner, brings out adjustments to the Hebrew in the matter of word sequence or the use of the article which the Syriac translator was not able to express, or where he employed certain devices to express these matters it is only with the aid of b that we are in a position to become aware of them. As FIELD, not to say Masius, had no access to this MS., it is not be wondered at that their retroversion of the Syriac remained imperfect.

G is available only for the middle part of the book (end of chapt. 9 to 19. 23 αυτη η κληρονομια). **γ**, a close congener of G where it remains true to type, cannot take its place in the parts missing, since the cursive is a mixed text. My impression is that the underlying copy of **γ** was a text of a different type into which **P** readings were worked. c_1 and c_2 are twin codices; c_2, which LAGARDE followed largely in his so-called "Lucian," is the inferior of the two. On c_1 as the basic text of the Complutensian edition (ɾ) and on the corrector of the MS. see my monograph on Masius, § 9. The common ancestor of $c_{1.\ 2}$, c, ascends to an uncial which resembled G not only in the form of the text, but also, as may be proved from omissions which are due to the skipping of one or more lines, externally in the number of letters to a line in a column. An important observation, which has escaped LAGARDE and HAUTSCH (*Der Lukiantext des Oktateuch*, 1909), but of which the editor of ɾ had an imperfect intuition (see my monograph, *ibid.*, especially section g), is that the opening of our book, to 2. 18 middle, formed part of the MS. which c used in the Pentateuch and then took up again Ruth 4. 11 (see RAHLFS, *Studie über den griechischen Text des Buches Ruth*, 1922, 77, 94); the gap was supplied from another MS. which, so far as the major part of our book goes, had a text belonging to P_1. Nevertheless, its text is eclectic, now going with Hexapla now with Tetrapla.

5. **C** is a recension which was at home in Constantinople and Asia Minor. We are helped in localizing the recension by the aid of the Armenian, version (see CONYBEARE, SCRIVENER-MÜLLER, ii, 151). Whether the recension had any relationship to the fifty copies ordered by Constantine from Eusebius, as CONYBEARE suspects, must remain a matter of conjecture. Jerome says nothing of a fourth recension; but then he is by no means exact, or the recension was at his

time just in the process of formation. The class **C** is made up of AMV (— N B.-M.) W (=Θ), the cursives α (=y) ε (=o, see presently) g (=l) r (=71) u (see presently) v (=b_2) ν_1 (=122) ν_2 (=68), and (basically) 𝔐, also, to judge from the specimen collation, the cursives 318. 488. 527. 669. The test case, unfortunately impossible of verification for the last four MSS., is 19. 26 the omission of και αλιμελεχ (or however the name read in the archetypal copy) which goes through the entire membership (M, of course, is unavailable here) and is nowhere else to be met with. Hence all of these are shown to be the descendants of a common ancestor. A characteristic point of this recension is that, in accordance with the well-known prescription of Jerome, it passes over asterized elements in a manner to make it obvious that the editor had **P** before him. One example will suffice. 15. 9 the common text read και διεκβαλλει εις το ορος εφρων. Origen missed עדי. He took recourse to Aquila; in taking over the missing word he copied from the same source the preposition as he found it there; naturally he placed ορος in the genitive (as Aquila must have done likewise): και διεκβαλλει ※ επι κωμας: ορους εφρων. **C** mechanically passes over the complex sub asterisco and leaves και διεκβαλλει ορους εφρων with the genitive hanging in the air! However, if the recension had come to pass merely by way of subtraction, it would not deserve a place by the side of the other three principal recensions, **ESP**. In the first place, the recension shows elsewhere thought and skill. Here again we shall be content to cite one example. 15. 34–6 read in **P** και ζανω και ηνγαννιμ ($\mathbf{P}_1$ ηνγοννιμ) ※ θαφφουα: και ※ την: ηναιμ και ιερμουθ και οδολλαμ ($\mathbf{P}_1$ αδαλαμ) και σωχω και αζηκα και σαραειμ ($\mathbf{P}_1$ σαγαρειμ) και αδιθαιμ και γαδηρα κ.τ.λ. **C** reads: και ραμεν και ζανω και αδι[α]θαιμ και ηναειμ και ιεριμουθ και οδολλαμ και νεμρα και σωχω και αζηκα και σα[ρ]γαρειμ και γαδηρα. We recognize the influence of the common text in the insertion of the two items tacitly passed over by Origen; in the form σα[ρ]γαρειμ **C** is linked to $\mathbf{P}_1$, but in οδολλαμ to $\mathbf{P}_2$; naturally the asterized elements θαφφουα and την are passed over. But αδιθαιμ is transposed from 36 into verse 34, exactly where the common text has ιδουθως. Accordingly the author of the recension recognized in ιδουθως a pendant to αδιθαιμ; while giving preference to the form as he found it in **P**, he nevertheless kept to the sequence of the common text. At the same time he dispensed with ηνγαννιμ—not that he realized that this item

is covered by ραμεν (corrupted from γανεμ, γαννειμ), for in that case he would have substituted the correct reading. But in writing νεμρα for μεμβρα(ν), the author shows that he commanded still other resources beyond common text and Hexapla-Tetrapla. Herein consists the second point, and a more important one at that, which gives the recension rank beside the three principal recensions. In a number of instances the place-names appear in a form which must have been the original antecedent to the corruptions in the common text such as lay before Origen Thus e.g. 15. 40 χαββα **C** explains χαβρα **ES**, from χαββαν (so instinctively restored in the Aldina) = בַּבָּן, an Aramaizing form in the place of χαββων **P** = בַּבּוֹן; in the same verse χαθλως **C** is the original of μααχως (from καδλως) E כתלוש contrast χαθλεις (**P**$_{1}$ καθαλεις) = כִּתְלִישׁ; 50 ανωβ **C** the original of ανωχ **S** ανων **E** = עֲנֹב for αναβ **P** = עֲנָב and so on. Perhaps we may suppose that **C** made use of the common text prevalent in Palestine, which naturally remained freer from corruptions in the geographical names. This Palestinian *koine* was only slightly touched up by Theodotion—*Urtheodotion* would accordingly be nothing but this Palestinian *koine*.

In view of the mixture of types to which almost all of our MSS. have been exposed, no complete unanimity among the constituent members of the class is to be expected. I reserve for the fuller Introduction to my edition to deal with the subdivisions and the defaulting members. But here already we may note the closer affinity between A and **α**, as evidenced by some 50 singular readings. Interesting is 19. 6: A has the singular reading αλβαθ for λαβαθ **C**; **α** reads αβλαβαθ, which I explain as $\overset{\beta\alpha}{\alpha\lambda}\beta\alpha\theta$, where the superscribed letters indicated transposition, the scribe, however, mistook them for a correction.

6. Mixture may be the result either of conflation or of compositeness: "In the composite text, alternating stretches follow a given copy faithfully exactly as it presents itself; the cause being that in an ancestral codex missing portions had been filled up from another MS. with the least concern for diversity of type" (see my monograph on Masius, § 7b). One example we had in the case of c (see above). Another example is codex **ε** which, as I have shown in Masius (*ibid.*, d, Note), goes with **C** 1–10. 4 (as far as εκπολεμησωμεν) 14. 15 (beginning with του πολεμου)—20. 7 and 24. 30 to the end of the book; while in the intervening parts—10. 4–14. 15. 20. 8–24. 29—it comports

with e (see below), as it does again in the beginning of Judges. As for u, the codex belongs to **C** from 15. 5 middle to the end of the book.

7. **S** is the Syrian (Antiochian) recension. The class consists of two divisions: $\mathbf{S}_a$=Kk$_1$ (=g B.-M.) k$_2$ (=n) *k* (=127) w (=w$_1$=118, w$_2$=w B.-M., w$_3$=537, the last on the basis of the specimen collation) 𝔏, and $\mathbf{S}_b$=r, with the sub-groups: t=t$_1$ (=84) t$_2$ (=t B.-M.) and *t*=*t*$_1$ (=74) *t*$_2$ (=76), and r=f (=p B.-M.) *f*$_1$ (=610) *f*$_2$ (=d B.-M.) *f*$_3$ (=125, on the basis of the specimen collation). The sub-group r indulges in textual omissions and contractions; *f*$_2$ frequently departs from type. The whole of the division $\mathbf{S}_b$ presents a mixed text, frequently adjusted to **C**; but its basic part belongs to **S**. Relatively purer is $\mathbf{S}_a$; but even there the texts sometimes fall apart. w belongs here basically, but it conflates its texts with superadded elements from **C** (comp. 12. 19b–22a ... και ταναχ και αξφ και θαναχ και μαγεδδων και κεδες και τον βασιλεα καδης, the elements from **C** are overlined), or it is found on the side of $\mathbf{S}_b$ (thus 6. 9 in the singular reading εμπροσθεν for οπισω), or it consorts with 𝔈 (e.g. 6. 24 in the singular reading εδωκε for εδωκαν); interesting is the singular coincidence with Theodoret 23. 13 εκ for απο. The text of w, moreover, is vitiated by omissions and wilful condensations; for an extreme case note the sacrifice of the geographical notices in chapters 13–21 (see my "K Text," 28–30). It is much to be regretted that K is extant only in fragments; at least 11. 13 it is free from the incorporation in textu of parallel renderings from α´σ´ sub nomine in k$_1$ (see "K Text," p. 24); as this mannerism recurs in k$_1$, we learn to look with suspicion upon insertions of this kind, even when they are reproduced in k$_2$ (minus the ascription) or when the ascription is wanting in both. Accordingly k has undergone amplification by the inclusion in the body of the text of glosses from the common ancestor; but this process must have begun early, for in the adduced passage the plus και εστωσας επι των θυρων αυτων (from an unknown source) is common to K with all the Greek members of **S**. The supposition that Lucian indulged in doublets will, I believe, not be substantiated as a general practice. k$_2$, it must be said, has a propensity to abbreviating the text. In *k* the whole middle part from 4. 20 beginning to 21. 5 καταλελειμμενοις is wanting. 𝔈 is a mixed text, with leanings to **E** (specifically to 𝔈); it has also undergone conflation by the introduction of glosses (see my paper in

JAOS xxxiii, 254–258). Still its text is unmistakably linked to **S**. A telling example is 19. 34 εις γην (so 𝔏 with k for την; thanks to the corruption it becomes at all possible to identify the underlying Greek behind the Latin, which would have become unrecognizable had the translator found the correct την) αθθοβωρ, a stylistic correction of εν αθθαβωρ **E** (see further below). An outstanding characteristic of the **S** recension is the correction of the Greek style, as shown by the substitution of Attic grammatical forms for Hellenistic. Otherwise Jerome's description of Lucian as but a form of the common text holds good. But it is a distinct form, as the proper names show with all the desired evidence.

8. The Egyptian recension, **E**, is preserved with relative purity in B and **β** (= B.-M. r). The close filiation between these two texts reduces the weight of their conjoint evidence. Where B stands alone, the question arises whether we are dealing with original elements of the recension, considering the mixture to which the congeners, even the nearest, are exposed, or with singularities of B. Still, often B, standing alone among its own class, receives support from extraneous texts. Hexaplaric plusses have entered the Coptic version (𝔈, extant nearly complete in the edition of Thompson, $\mathfrak{E}^{T}$; larger and smaller fragments are available in the editions of Ciasca, $\mathfrak{E}^{C}$, of Maspero, $\mathfrak{E}^{M}$, and Schleifer, $\mathfrak{E}^{S}$) and also the Ethiopic 𝔈 (= $\mathfrak{E}^{D}$ in the edition of Dillmann from codex F and $\mathfrak{E}^{H}$ Haverford MS.). The Bohairic 𝔅 fragments, edited by Lagarde, show fundamentally an **E** text; the translator, however, is quite prone to textual contraction. The basic text of 𝔈 is akin to that of e (= B.-M. q, this text embodies all sorts of glosses, see my monograph on Masius, § 7), and this MS. is closely followed by **ε** (see above) in the alternate portions not derived from **C**. The fragment O (= Oxyrhynchus 1168) likewise belongs to **E**. h is (though not in the earlier part of the book) basically an **E** text, though it defaults occasionally and is contaminated with matter found in $\mathbf{S}_{b}$ and other textual types. Codex 707 (Sinai I) would seem, according to the specimen collation, to go basically with **E**; the hexaplaric additions it shares with e; note also verse 11 the reading ηυλισθη found in e (and besides in *a*). Here especially one would wish a page with proper names. The Coptic and Ethiopic versions unmistakeably point to the Egyptian provenance of their text. Hence the designation of the recension.

9. There remain a number of MSS. which may be classed together as **M**, i. e. mixed texts. Mixture is the general characteristic, the elements coming from the four principal recensions in diverse processes of contamination. Perhaps it may be said that the ground work is the **C** type, but not quite wholly so. Certain groups emerge. Thus the group A, which is largely contaminated with **P** (in both its forms). It divides into two sub-groups: a=a_1 (=B.-M. a) and a_2=64; *a*=a_1 (=18) and a_2 (=128). The former sub-group is particularly given to tetraplaric readings, while the latter is more in contact with the class **M** as a whole.

10. A large group is the catenae group, N. Some 32 MSS. go to form it, i. e. above 52 (=e B.-M.). 53 (=f). 57 (=j). 85 (=z). 130 (=s). 344 (=v). cod. 343 which I have long had in photograph before me and 730 of which I secured a photograph just a year ago, then 16. 30. 73 (=H.-P. 237). 131, 236—all previously known from Holmes-Parsons—and, on the basis of the specimen collation, 46. 313. 320. 328. 346. 414. 417. 422. 489. 528. 529. 530. 550. 551. 552. 616. 716. 739. 761.

The entire group is held together in 6. 10 by the reading και τω λαω / τω δε λαω, which is found outside the group solely in the mixed cod. d_1 (see below). By an oversight the variant is not entered for 343; but the MS. has it, as is shown on my photograph. Accordingly, in this instance B.-M.'s "efjsvz" represent the entire group. But the reading ιερουργουντες / ουραγουντες a verse above is confined, according to B.-M., to efjv^{a}z^m and u (it is also found in my r and $a_1{}^a$), hence within the group, prima manu, to efj. sv*z^t, as do also 343. 344*. 346, step out, all the others falling in line. Obviously, only a minority steps out. The principle of selection on the part of B.-M. is plain; they wished to include a small number, among which fsz are marked by divergent readings, z and still more so v by important marginal glosses. But then it may be questioned why it was necessary to duplicate e by j, since these two are so closely related, often enough standing off against the other four. Moreover, the reader does not know where any one of the six stands for itself or for a number of congeners not listed. It seems that, in order to get at adequate knowledge concerning the catenae group, we must after all possess a complete collation of the entire membership. As it is, I have been able to signalize two sub-groups; N_a="ejsz" and N_b="fv." 343. The division is quite palpable e. g. in 6. 13 f.—see my Masius, § 17, List A, textual form 5. But in order to appraise

the full process of the genesis of the sub-groups and the whole group, we must await the fuller information when all the members will have been collated. There are also outstanding questions as to the relation of the group to cognate texts in **M**. One thing has become certain to me; the group rests upon a common ancestor. I have the evidence that back of this common ancestor there was a copy in which there was a gap, due to a missing inner double leaf between 15. 7 and 17. 1. The character of the text before and after the gap is mixed, with leanings to the textual form of **S**; that form changes in the interval, becoming virtually a **C** text, hence the scribe of the ancestor must have supplied the missing part from a **C** text, thus rendering his MS. composite, whereas the underlying copy was uniform in its conflate character.

11. The other MSS. falling within the **M** class are: F and φ (= Rahlfs 461)—the minuscule made use of F, which stops at 12. 12 and has several gaps, in its present form, somewhat eclectically, but in general favoring the corrector (F^a or F^b against F*, in the gaps filled in by F^b the minuscule goes generally with F^c); naturally, in the gaps not filled out and from 12. 12 on some other MS. must have lain before the scribe. The codd. d_1 (= B.-M. k) and d_2 (= m) —these two share a number of singular readings, but often enough go apart; the latter cod. frequently condenses the text. Cod. i (the corrector often coincides with **β**). Cod. p (= 509). Lastly, u up to 15. 5 middle (see above). An example in which the codd. named share a singular reading is found 18. 22 σαμρειμ comp. σαμαρειμ P_1 and contrast σεμρειμ $\mathbf{P_2C}$ σαμειρ **S** σαρα (σαμβα ν) from σαμρα = σαμραν, σαμραιν = צְמָרַיִם (Aramaizing pronunciation).

R (= B.-M. Δ_8) likewise belongs to the mixed class; so also, it would seem on the basis of the specimen collation, 126. 246. 319. 381. 392. 619.

12. The road to the original text of 𝔊 leads across the common, unrevised text. In order to get at the latter, we must abstract from the recensional manipulations. The operation is easy enough when we deal with additions. See my monograph on Masius, § 17. Variations in obelized elements point to divergences in the common text. But a large number of Origen's modifications consist in substitutions (especially in proper names) whereby the basic form is obviously covered up. But since Hexapla and Tetrapla differed, P_1 has frequently preserved the unrevised form which reveals itself as substantially in

agreement with **E**. Then, by the very nature of Origen's purpose, which was to save of the common text all that could be saved, readings have remained in **P** even when they do not square with the Hebrew. Often enough Origen failed to realize disagreements, exactly as they have escaped the attention of modern students. Comp. e.g. 4. 18 where 𝔊 read נצקו for נתקו. The example 19. 34 cited above for **S** shows how that recension likewise operated with a text akin to **E**.

13. Ultimately we must operate with **E**, but not without taking into account the residue of the common text imbedded elsewhere. The scant representatives of **E** in a relatively pure form, virtually the ancestor of B β, will have had singularities of their own which must be brushed aside. A study of the translator's mannerism of rendition becomes imperative. The proper names are, of course, vitiated by all sorts of scribal errors, but on the whole the rectification is possible. An example out of many is 13. 27; for και εναδωμ και οθαργαει read και ἐν αεμκ βαιθαρραν, hence 𝔊 read בית הרן as the Hebrew does Nu 32. 36. Nor are all omissions, though present already in the text underlying Origen's work, to be laid at the door of the translator. One example I have signalized in JQR N. S. iii, 319–336. Another example is found 8. 25. παντας τους κατοικουντας γαι, as the accusative shows (the nominative in $\mathbf{S}_a$ and **P** is recensional correction), belongs to v. 27 end = את כל יושבי העי, hence the omission of 25 end and 26 is due to a scribe's aberration from παντες ανδρες γαι το παντας τους κατοικουντας γαι.

14. The scope of my edition is to restore critically the original form of the version. I print the critically restored text at the top of the page. Below follow the forms assumed in the four classes, **E**, **S**, **P**, **CM**. Omissions and contractions of the text, by which certain witnesses or groups of witnesses step out as silent on the textual form, receive a rubric of their own. Then follow individual variations of class members, such as leave the characteristic class reading undisturbed in its main features. Lastly marginal readings in so far as they have not been embodied above. The subjoined Specimen illustrates the arrangement.

15. Without going into a full textual commentary, a few observations on the evidence assembled in the following pages may prove helpful. h clearly steps out of **E** in this section of the text. The MS has points of contact with $\mathbf{S}_b$, but basically it belongs to **C**. e 𝔈,

while basically of the **E** class, admit hexaplaric additions. So does also 707. B β 𝔈 are apparently the constant members. When disagreements occur among these three, we must reckon with individual idiosyncrasies. Then it becomes necessary to look about for other criteria. Thus the varying position of σοι verse 2 among members of the other classes shows that B (the evidence of 𝔈 is not clear) rightly omits the pronoun. The translator apparently forbore to express the pronoun. Its omission in n_{22} is isolated in the N group; probably also in 619 the omission is secondary. While in the Tetrapla the pronoun was placed after the adjective so as to accord with the order of the Hebrew, its place in the Hexapla was in front of the adj. The corrector of c_1 started to rectify the sequence by introducing the pronoun after the adj., but forgot to delete it before the adj.—hence the duplication reproduced by r. Elsewhere I have proved that the corrector was none other than the Complutensian editor. Both Hexapla and Tetrapla follow the Hebrew order in transposing the adj. in front of the object (υποχειριον την ιεριχω = בידך את יריחו). The Hexaplaric order, that is with reference to the position of the pronoun, is followed solely by A 𝔞. 381. Accordingly 381 is akin to A. specifically to a, as is shown in examples below; but of course there are also divergences. The omission of παντας in v. 3 is peculiar of B β (for the omission in k_2 is proved as secondary against the evidence of k_1; it is probably also spontaneous in 319); Origen certainly found it; I therefore restore it in the original of 𝔊. In v. 9, though β admits πορευομειοι και, the omission in B 𝔈 is supported further by 𝔏 u. 619; apparently no part of the original Greek text. But in v. 11 την πολιν is omitted solely in B and should therefore be restored.

In **S**, the naming of 125 as f_3 is justified by the singular reading right at the beginning: ιεριχω δε / και ιεριχω—a mannerism indulged in at the beginning of chapters (3, 4, 8, 12, 13, 18, 19, 21, 23) by f_2. Naturally the new MS shares with the entire sub-group f the omission per homoioteleuton in v. 3f., but not the similar omission in v. 8 peculiar to f. Thus the nearest congeners are $f_{1.2}$. w is clearly mixed; not only does it desert the smaller sub-group ($\mathbf{S}_a$) in favor of the larger ($\mathbf{S}_b$), but even the whole of **S** in favor of **PC**. Nevertheless, basically it belongs to $\mathbf{S}_a$. As w is given to contraction, much cannot be made of omissions of hexaplaric matter. Still, where the element is introduced in k_1 sub οι ℷ or where the increment is found only

in k, we are dealing with subsequent enlargements of which the original of **S** was free. Characteristic readings of **S**: οταν σαλπισωσιν v. 5, εναντι v. 7, κατεπαυσεν v. 11.

In **P**, **γ** steps out in many instances.

In **C**, hexaplaric additions are introduced specifically by M^m 𝔉. Impure are r. 527 (the two seem to be akin), also **α** g. 318. 669. Once A stands out against all the others.

In **M**, A (specifically a). 381. 619 have a tendency to approximate **P**. Reversions to the unrevised text are found with particular frequency in u. 319. 619, likewise in N, but also in A $F\varphi d_1$. *a*ip go now with the unrevised text, now with **S**, d_2p also with C. Hexaplaric additions are found most frequently in $F\varphi d_1$. The archetype of N was on the whole free from these increments.

16. A few comments on the translator's manner of operation. He was apparently given to curtailments. He may or may not have read מפני בני ישראל in v. 1. But v. 3f. are certainly contracted. The translator certainly had before him v. 3 as far as הקף את העיר. He may be trusted to have known that סבב means "surround"; but he chose to frame the phrasing as an order to the commander to "place about" the city all the warriors. The details he omitted from the translation, since they are embodied in the execution of the order. Similarly he omitted in v. 5 בשמעכם את קול השופר. In v. 6 he seems to have read ויבא for ויקרא; he omitted the direction to the priests, and instead combined ויאמר אלהם with אמרו (comp. ויאמרו ketib), so as to introduce immediately the directions to the people; naturally he omitted in v. 8 ויהי כאמר יהושע אל העם and construed the rest as part of the order; he read עברו ותקעו for עברו ותקעו and omitted in v. 9 תקעו and בשופרות and then in v. 10 ולא יצא מפיכם דבר and v. 11 השופרות. As to the translator's additions, τη ημερα τη δευτερα v. 12 was taken by anticipation from v. 14 where he omitted it; other plusses, like τον εν αυτη v. 2, may have been found in his Hebrew text; but usually the increments are for clarifying the sense, as for example οντας in the same verse to express the concessive force (comp. Kimhi). The manner in which Origen adjusted the Greek to the Hebrew is sufficiently clear that comments may be spared. He kept as much of the received Greek, sometimes even when it did not quite square with the Hebrew, mainly bent upon incorporating all the elements omitted as well upon the sequence of the Hebrew words.

VI

Καὶ Ιερειχω συνκεκλεισμένη καὶ ὠχυρωμένη καὶ οὐθεὶς
ἐξεπορεύετο ἐξ αὐτῆς οὐδὲ εἰσεπορεύετο. [2]καὶ εἶπεν κύριος
πρὸς Ἰησοῦν Ἰδοὺ ἐγὼ παραδίδωμι τὴν Ιερειχω ὑποχειρίαν
καὶ τὸν βασιλέα αὐτῆς τὸν ἐν αὐτῇ δυνατοὺς ὄντας ἐν ἰσχύι.

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1 ωχυρωμενη] + ※ απο προσωπου υιων ιηλ: **P** ουθεις **E**] ουδεις 2 εξ αυτης εξεπορευετο **S** — εξ αυτης: **P** 3 εγω] > **P** την ιερ. υποχειριαν **E**] prm σοι **S**: υποχειριον σοι την ιερ. $\mathbf{P}_2$ (σοι sub ※) **C** 4 — τον εν αυτη: **P** οντας **ES** (=Just)] > **PC** εν] > **P**

E 1 ωχυρωμενη] + απο — ιηλ e 3 την ιερ. υποχειριαν B. 707. 𝔊 (uid) 𝔏 (uid)] σοι την ιερ. υπο χειρα β: την ιερ. υπο χειρα σην e 4 εν] > β

S 1 ωχυρωμενη] + απο—ιηλ k_1 (sub οι λ_o) k_2𝔏$\mathbf{S}_b$ 2 εξ αυτης εξεπορευετο $\mathbf{S}_a$ Just 3 εγω] > w Just σοι την ιερ. υποχειριαν (-ιαν k_1] -ιον) k𝔅Just: w $\mathbf{S}_b$ = $\mathbf{P}_2$**C** 4 εν] > Just

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P 3 εγω γι σοι την ιερ. υποχειριαν γ': σοι υποχειριόν (+ σοι $c_1^{a?}$τ) την ιερ. c 4 οντας γ εν] > $b^{a?}$c

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CM 1 ωχυρωμενη] + απο—ιηλ M^m (sub οι λ_o) 𝔄 Fφ d_1 n_8^m n_{16}^m (sub οι λ_o) n_5 ουθεις N (n_{16}^t)-$n_{15.21.22}$u 3 εγω] > 318 aa_2 F*i n_{21}p. 392. 619 την ιερ. υποχειριαν 619] την ιερ. υπο χειρα n_{22}: prm σοι u: σοι την ιερ. υποχειριον N^{rell}: σοι υποχειριον την ιερ. Αa. 381 υποχειριαν n_{17}^m: υποχειρον 319 7 σοι suprascr φ 4 οντας M^m (sub θ′) r. 527 Fφ d_1 i $n^{\cdot n_{2.13}}$ pu. 246. 319. 392 (θ′ ο′ χω n_{16}^m: ου χω n_{17}^m) εν] > vh

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1 και ωχυρωμενη] > a_1 5 υιων] > 𝔏 2 εξεπορευετο] > b* εξ αυτης] w_2 d_1. 392 ουδε εισεπορευετο] > k Just 4 αυτης] > e 𝔈f_2 τον εν αυτη] > n_{22} τον] > d_1

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1 και ιερ.] ιερ. δε f_3 ιερ.] prm η Just συνκεκλεισμενη] prm ην d_2. 126: συνκεκαθισμενη i*: + ην Just Mas ωχυρωμενη] + πολις οχυρα $n_{1.4.10.25.31}$ 5 απο] προ Mas υιων] prm των e k M^m Fφ n_8^m n_{16}^m n_5 2 εισεπορευετο ουδε εξεπορευετο εξ αυτης Fφ: εξεπορευετο ουδε εισεπορευετο εξ αυτης ip αυτης] αυτου 527 ουδε] prm και c: και r. 527 619: και ουδεις τ: και ουδε[ις] l εισπεπορευετο 488 3 διδωμι v 7 σοι] σου AMgν_2. 527 dp. 319. 392 18 σοι την ιερ. υποχειριον σου n_{15} 3 ιερ.] + πολιν $n_{2.30}$ 4 τον] τους β F*i. 392: και τους r $F^b\varphi$p. 246. 319 επ αυτη n_{31}: επ αυτης e δυνατους] prm τους τ Mas: δυνατον d_2n_{22} οντα n_{22}

[3]σὺ δὲ περίστησον αὐτῇ πάντας τοὺς μαχίμους κύκλῳ. [5]καὶ ἔσται ὡς ἂν σαλπίσητε τῇ σάλπιγγι ἀνακραγέτω πᾶς ὁ λαὸς

1 — συ—κυκλω: ※ και κυκλωσατε την πολιν παντες ανδρες (+ του $\mathbf{P_2}$) πολεμου κυκλω της πολεως απαξ ουτως ποιησετε εξ ημερας [4]και επτα ιερεις ληψονται επτα κερατινας του ιωβηλ ενωπιον της κιβωτου και τη ημερα τη εβδομη κυκλωσατε την πολιν επτακις και οι ιερεις σαλπιουσιν εν ταις κερατιναις: **P** παντας] > **E** μαχητας **C** 2 ως αν] οταν **S** σαλπισητε] σαλπισωσιν **S** σαλπιγγι] + ※ του ιωβηλ εν τω̃ ακουσαι υμας την φωνην της κερατινης: **P** ανακραγετωσαν **PC**

E 1 παντας] > Bβ κυκλω] + και—κερατιναις e 𝔈. 707 2 σαλπισωσιν 𝔈 σαλπιγγι] + του—κερατινης e 𝔈. 707

S 1 παντας] > k_2 μαχιμους k κυκλω] + και—κερατιναις k_1 (sub οι ◌̣) $k_2 S_b$ 2 οταν k S_b σαλπιγγι] + του—κερατινης k ανακραγετω k_1 w 𝔈

P 2 ανακραγετω γ'

CM 1 παντας] > M 319 μαχιμους **M** ($F^{*at}n_{16}t$)-d_2 p κυκλω] + και—κερατιναις M^m (p. κιβωτου κυ in comm. b) 𝔄 $F\varphi d_1 n_8{}^m n_{16}{}^m$ (sub οι ◌̣ ※) h 2 σαλπιγγι] + του—κερατινης M^m 𝔄 $F\varphi d_1 n_8{}^m n_{16}{}^m$ (sub ※) $n_{17}{}^m$ p ανακραγετω **A** n_{28}. 126. 319

1 συ—κυκλω] > t 3–6 παντες—την πολιν] > F 5 και] > e 6 οι] > $k_2 f_{1.3}$ 2 τη] > $n^{-n_2 \cdot 5 \cdot 8 \cdot 9 \cdot 14-17 \cdot 21 \cdot 28 \cdot 30}$; int lin n_3 7/8 του ιωβηλ] > k_2 8 υμας] > $F^*\varphi$ την—κερατινης] > k_2 την φωνην] > $F\varphi$ p 2 ανακραγετω—αμα] > p

1 παραστησον $a_1 d_2$ αυτη] prm εν w : αυτην c ε. 488. 669 u παντας p. κυκλω F^{*i} p. 392 κυκλω a. παντας d_1 3–6 και—κερατιναις p. σαλπιγγι in comm. 5 et in hunc locum του ιωβηλ.—κερατινης transfert 𝔄 3 πολιν] γην e $F\varphi$ 4 κυκλω] prm και k ουτως—ημερας p. κιβωτου (5) S_b h ποιησατε 𝔈 (uid) $k_2 \gamma n_8{}^m$: + ενωπιον της κιβωτου h εξ] prm επι S_b h επτα ιερεις] τη εβδομη οι ιερεις 𝔈 k M^m $F\varphi$ [[τη εβδομη] > $F^{a\,m}\varphi$]] 5 κερατινας] σαλπιγγας S_b h : + σαλπιγγας e. 707 $n_8{}^m n_{16}{}^m$ του ιωβηλ] ιερας S_b h του] τω 707 $n_8{}^m n_{16}{}^m$ ιωβηδ e. 707 $n_8{}^m n_{16}{}^m$ ενωπιον] prm και σαλπιουσιν S_b h $\gamma' F^{a\,m}\varphi$ [[και] + οι ιερεις γ' σαλπιουσιν] σαλπισουσιν $t\gamma'$: σαλπισωσου t_2]] τη εβδομη ημερα e κυκλωσετε M^m 6 σαλπισουσιν k γ' εν] > e. 707 S_b h c d_1 ταις κερατιναις] ταις σαλπιγξιν (τας σαλπιγγας f_2) S_b h 2 εσται—σαλπιγγι] σαλπισαντες τας σαλπιγγας 126 εσται] εσεσεσθαι 246 σαλπισητε] σαλπιειτε u : σαλπιζητε i 7 σαλπισωσιν] + οι ιερεις w 2 τη σαλπιγγι] ταις σαλπιγξιν 𝔈 S_b 8 ιωβηδ e. 707 $n_8{}^m n_{16}{}^m$ ημας 707 της φωνης $\gamma' d_1$ 2 ανακεκραγετωσαν 392 2 αμα πας ο λαος 𝔄 d_1

3 και κυκλωσατε] α′ ܟܕ ܡܚ̈ܝܬ ܡܚ̈ܐ 𝔖^L 4 απαξ] *una via* 𝔖^M 4/5 ουτως—εβδομη] και ουτος πυησης εξ υμερας και επτα υερης αρουσην τας επτα σαλπηγγας εμπροσθεν της κυβοτος και εν τη εβδομη ημερα f^b 5 κερατινας του ιωβηλ] α′ *tubas remissionis* σ′ *buccinas arietinas* 𝔖^M του ιωβηλ] του αγιου· της αφεσεως d_1 1 (+ 8) και—ιωβηλ] (α′ 𝔖^M) ܘܬܬܩܥܘܢ ܒܩܪܢܐ ܕܝܒܠܐ ܗܘ ܫܘܦܪܐ σ′ ܘܬܬܩܥܘܢ ܒܩܪܢ̈ܐ ܕܝܒܠ̈ܐ ܗܝ ܫܘܦܪ̈ܐ 𝔖 2 τη σαλπιγγι] τη κερατινη . . . ηχη F^b 2 ανακραγετω—αυτων] α′ σ′ ܘܬܬܩܥ ܟܠ ܥܡܐ ܒܩܠ ܥܪܒ ܪܒ 𝔖

ἅμα· καὶ ἀνακραγόντων αὐτῶν πεσεῖται αὐτόματα τὰ τείχη
τῆς πόλεως, καὶ εἰσελεύσεται πᾶς ὁ λαὸς ὁρμήσας ἕκαστος
κατὰ πρόσωπον εἰς τὴν πόλιν.

[6]καὶ εἰσῆλθεν Ἰησοῦς ὁ τοῦ Ναυν πρὸς τοὺς ἱερεῖς [7]καὶ
εἶπεν αὐτοῖς λέγων Παραγγείλατε τῷ λαῷ περιελθεῖν καὶ
κυκλῶσαι τὴν πόλιν, καὶ οἱ μάχιμοι παραπορευέσθωσαν
ἐνωπλισμένοι ἐναντίον κυρίου. [8]καὶ ἑπτὰ ἱερεῖς ἔχοντες

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1 αμα] > PC 1/2 αυτοματα—πολεως] παν το τειχος της πολεως αυτοματον S ÷ αυτοματα: P 2 πολεως] + ※ υποκατω αυτων: P ÷ πας: P ÷ ορμησας: P 3 ÷ εις την πολιν: P 4 ο του E] υιος ναυν coni.] ναυη ιερεις] + ※ και ειπεν προς αυτους λαβετε την κιβωτον της διαθηκης και επτα ιερεις ληψονται επτα κερατινας του ιωβηλ κατα προσωπον της (> P_2) κιβωτου κῡ: P 5 ÷ αυτοις λεγων παραγγειλατε: P 7 ÷ ενωπλισμενοι: P εναντιον E] εναντι (= Cry) κῡ] prm ※ κιβωτου: P και] prm ※ και εγενετο ως ειπεν ις προς τον λαον: P

E 1 αμα] > 𝔈^{H} 2 πολεως] + υποκατω αυτων e𝔈.707 4 ο του Bβ ιερεις] + και— κῡ e𝔈. 707 7 εναντιον Bβ κῡ] prm κιβωτου 𝔈 και] prm και—λαον e𝔈. 707

S 1/2 αυτοματα—πολεως w𝔈f_3] παν το τειχος της πολεως αυτοματον k: αυτοματα παντα τα τειχη της πολεως 2 πολεως] + υποκατω αυτων k_1 (+ οι λ_o) k_2 4 ιερεις] + και—κῡ k 5 ειπεν αυτοις λεγων] > k

P 1 αμα γ τα] prm παντα γ 7 εναντιον γ και γ'] prm και—λαον

CM 1 αμα 𝔄 a iN. 319 2 πολεως] + υποκατω αυτων M^m (sub οι λ_o) 𝔄 F(uid) d_1 $n_8{}^m n_{16}{}^m$ (sub οι λ_o ο′ ※) 4 ο του M^m N($n_{16}{}^t$)u. 619 : ο υιος i ιερεις] + και—κῡ M^m (sub οι λ_o) 𝔄 Fφ d_1 $n_8{}^m n_{16}{}^m$ (sub οι λ_o ου ※) 7 εναντιον M^mg $N^{-n_{18}}$u. 619 κῡ] prm κιβωτου 𝔄 d_1 και] prm και—λαον M^m (sub οι λ_o) 𝔄 Fφ d_1 $n_{16}{}^m$ (sub οι λ_o ※)

1/2 (αμα)—λαος] > 527 1 αυτοματα] > 𝔈^{H} 488. 669 d_1. 126 9 υποκρατω] > d_1 2 εκαστος] > k_2 3 κατα προσωπον] > 𝔈φ. 126. 246 4 ο του (sive ῡς) ναυη] ναυη f: > 𝔈f_2 126 11 και] > $n_8{}^m n_{16}{}^m$ 12 κιβωτου] > 𝔈 5 λεγων] > 707 f_3 d_2. 126 και] > e 669. 𝔄 n_1. 126. 392 7 ενωπλισμενοι] > d_1 14 ῑ̅ς] > 𝔄 7—2 και—κῡ] > f_1

1 αμα] ανω n_{15} ανακραγεντων A$\alpha\nu\alpha$ Mas r Fφ : ανακεκραγοτων $t_1t_2{}^aF$ M a_1n_{19} : ανακεκραγοντων f_3 (in mg?) γ : ανακραγοτων β $t_2{}^*t$ b VWg. 488. 669 p. 126. 319. 381. 619 h* αυτοματως β k_2* 2 εισελευσονται φ in_5 3 προσωπον] + αυτου Mas 4 ηλθεν $c_1{}^*c_2$l τους ιερεις] sup ras 669 : την πολιν 488 : + των υιων ῡηλ $\alpha\nu\alpha$ 11 αυτους] + λεγων $F^b\varphi$ διαθηκης] + κῡ kγ 𝔄-codd Fφ $n_8{}^m n_{16}{}^m$ 12 του] τω 707 ιωβηδ e. 707 κῡ] prm του 707 Mas: θῡ k_2 5 αυτοις] προς αυτους $n_{15\cdot 21}$ λαω] + λεγοντες p. 319 περιελθειν] παρελθειν ν 𝔄 : εισελθειν 𝔈(?) : ελθειν 126 : + κυκλω e 6 κυκλωσαι] prm του e : κυκλωσατε k_1 cl F* πορευεσθωσαν 126. Cyr-cod : παραπορευομενοι εστωσαν n_{14} : παραπορευεσθωσαν n_{31} (ex corr εσ uid) 7 ενωπλισμενοι] sub ο′ $n_{16}{}^m$: ενοπλισαμενοι $n_{8\cdot 9\cdot 16\cdot 17}$: καθωπλισμενοι β : p. κῡ $n_{7\cdot 13}$ 14 κιβωτου] prm της c_2 l a Mas 7 κῡ] prm του ţ Mas εχοντας n_5 n_{31}* (ε suprascr). 126. 246

ἑπτὰ σάλπιγγας ἱερὰς παρελθέτωσαν ὡσαύτως ἐναντίον τοῦ κυρίου καὶ σημανέτωσαν εὐτόνως· καὶ ἡ κιβωτὸς τῆς διαθήκης κυρίου ἐπακολουθείτω. [9]οἱ δὲ μάχιμοι ἔμπροσθεν παραπορευέσθωσαν, καὶ οἱ ἱερεῖς οἱ οὐραγοῦντες ὀπίσω τῆς κιβωτοῦ τῆς διαθήκης κυρίου σαλπίζοντες. [10]τῷ δὲ λαῷ

1 ⸗ παρελθ$^{\varepsilon}_{\alpha}$τωσαν ωσαυτως: **P** παρελθατωσαν P_2C εναντι **S** του]>**S** 2 και 1°] prm ※ παραπορευεσθωσαν: **P** 3 επακολουθειτω] + ⸗※ αυτοις: **P** 3/4 εμπροσθεν παραπορευεσθωσαν **E**] ~ 4 ⸗ και: **P** ιερεις] + ※ σαλπιζοντες ταις κερατιναις και: **P** 5 ⸗ της διαθηκης κῡ: **P** σαλπιζοντες **E**] prm πορευομενοι και **SC** (=Or_g) : πορευομενοι και σαλπιζοντες ※ ταις κερατιναις: **P**

E 1 παρελθετωσαν Be του]>β 2 και 1°] prm παραπορευεσθωσαν e𝔈.707 3 επακολουθειτω] + αυτοις e𝔈.707 4 ιερεις] + σαλπιζοντες—και e𝔈.707 5 σαλπιζοντες B𝔊] prm πορευομενοι και β : πορευομενοι—κερατιναις e𝔈.707

S 3 επακολουθειτω] + αυτοις k 3/4 εμπροσθεν παραπορευεσθωσαν w 5 σαλπιζοντες] prm πορευομενοι και S_g : + ταις κερατιναις 𝔏(?)

P 1 παρελθετωσαν c του]>γ 3/4 εμπροσθεν παραπορευεσθωσαν γ 5 σαλπιζοντες] prm πορευομενοι και γ

CM 1 παρελθετωσαν Wgrvνε. 318. 527. 669 (ε sup ras) Aa $F^{a?}\varphi d_1N.$ 619 εναντι α. 318 a_1a_2 F*$dn_{25\cdot27}$ του]>αg. 319. 669 A $F^b dN^{-n_3\cdot12}$u. 126. 246. 381. 392. 619 2 και 1°] prm παραπορευεσθωσαν να 3 επακολουθειτω]+αυτοις M^m (sub οι λ_o) 𝔄 (uid) $F\varphi n_5 n_{16}{}^m$ (sub οι λ_o ※) $n_{17}{}^m$ 3/4 εμπροσθεν παραπορευεσθωσαν $F\varphi$ipu. 319. 392 4 ιερεις] + σαλπιζοντες—και να. 318 $F\varphi d_1 n_8{}^m$ (indice ad και adposito) $n_{16}{}^m$ (sub οι λ_o) $n_{17}{}^m$ (do.) 5 σαλπιζοντες u. 619] πορευομενοι—κερατιναις M^m (sub οι λ_o) 𝔄 $F\varphi d_1$ $n_8{}^m n_{16}{}^m$ (sub οι λ_o) $n_{17}{}^m$ (do.)

1 επτα]>126 ιερας]>𝔈 παρελθετωσαν ωσαυτως]>γ 1/2 ωσαυτως—σημανετωσαν]>φ 2/3 και 1°—κῡ]>n_{28} 2 και 1°]>619 ευτονως] sup lin 619 της]>e 3 κῡ]>p 3—5 επακολουθειτω—κῡ]>n_{15} 3 οι δε μαχιμοι]>619 μαχιμοι]>n_8 · εμπροσθεν]>𝔈(uid)f 4 παραπορευεσθωσαν]>619 8 ταις>e_2ℓ 9 και]>$F\varphi n_8{}^m n_{16}{}^m n_{17}{}^m$ 4 οι ουραγουντες]>k_2wS_b c (c_1 + ras 11 litt) ℓ 5 της διαθηκης κῡ]>k_2f_3 d_2 της]>w_2 A $F\varphi$, 381. 619 h κῡ]>𝔈 10 και]>e 5 λαω]>n_{22}

1 επτα] prm τας φ σαλπιγγας] πτερυγας n_{26} ιερας] του ιωβηλ F^b παρελθετωσαν] prm και c a_1 : και ελθετωσαν 126 : περιελθετωσαν n_{21} 2 και] του n_2 ευτονως σημαινετωσαν 381 σημανετωσαν t_2 g.488 a_3 h : σημανατωσαν β 669 d_2u. 126. 246. 392 : + ωσαυτως r 3 κῡ] + παραπορευθησαν 707 επακολουθειτω] prm και $n_{11\cdot24}$: επακολουθουσα g : επανακ. n_{26} : παρακ. 392 : ακολουθειτω 126 οι δε] και οι g εμπροσθεν] ετοιμοι $n_{11}{}^t$: + ετοιμοι n_{24} : + εσωθεν 381^t 4 παραπορευεσθωσαν] προ- 𝔈𝔏(uid) S_b : πορευεσθωσαν 126 ιερεις] + εμπροσθεν της κιβωτου της διαθηκης κῡ $F^{bm}\varphi$ 8 σαλπιζοντες] prm οι Mas 4 οι ουραγουντες] ο λοιπος οχλος απας ℓ ουραγουντες] θυραγουντες 318 : ιερουργουντες r. 527 $a_1{}^{cor}N(n_{16}{}^a)\cdot n_{21}{}^t$ $n_{9\cdot15}n_{11}{}^t n_{21}$u : λειτουργουντες d_2 : ακολουθουντες M^m $F^{bm}\varphi$: ουντες 319 : ουτως i^m οπισω] εμπροσθεν w S_b 9/10 πορευομενοι και] πορευεσθωσαν d_2 9 πορευομενοι] προπορευομενοι t_1 10 κερατιναις] + σαλπιγξιν e 5 τω δε] και τω $d_1N(n_{16}{}^t n_{17}{}^t)$

ἐνετείλατο Ἰησοῦς λέγων Μὴ βοᾶτε, μηδὲ ἀκουσάτω μηθεὶς ὑμῶν τὴν φωνήν, ἕως ἂν ἡμέραν αὐτὸς διαγγείλῃ ἀναβοῆσαι, καὶ τότε ἀναβοήσετε. [11]καὶ περιελθοῦσα ἡ κιβωτὸς τῆς διαθήκης τοῦ θεοῦ τὴν πόλιν εὐθέως ἀπῆλθεν εἰς τὴν παρεμβολήν, καὶ ἐκοιμήθη ἐκεῖ.

[12]καὶ τῇ ἡμέρᾳ τῇ δευτέρᾳ ἀνέστη Ἰησοῦς τὸ πρωί, καὶ ἦραν

2 υμων την φωνην **E**] ~ της φωνης **S** εως] prm ※ ουδε διελευσεται εκ στοματος υμων λογος: **P** αν ημεραν] της ημερας εν η **S** αυτος διαγγειλη **E**] αναγγελω υμιν **S**: ~ P_1**C**: διαγγειλη αυτοις P_2 2/3 βοησαι **S** 3 και τοτε ανακραξετε **S**: και αναβοησετε ÷ τοτε: **P** 4 ÷ της διαθηκης: **P** του θῡ] κῡ **S** πολιν] + ※ κυκλω: **P** ευθεως] παλιν **S** 5 εκοιμηθη] κατεπαυσεν **S** 6 τη ημερα τη δευτερα **EC**] τη δευτερα ημερα **S**: ÷ ημερα τη δευτερα: **P**

E 2 υμων την φωνην B*β* της φωνης e εως] prm ουδε - λογος e𝔈.707 αυτος διαγγειλη] αναγγειλη και αυτος e: + *uobis* 𝔈 4 του θῡ] κῡ 𝔈(?) πολιν] + κυκλω e𝔈.707

S 2 εως αν ημεραν διαγγειλη αυτοις w: εως της ημερας εν η αναγγελω υμιν k S_b: *usquedum dies uobis nuntietur* 𝔏 2/3 βοησαι k 3 αναβοησετε] ανακραξατε (-ξετε k_2^a) k 4 του θῡ] κῡ S_a την πολιν] prm κυκλω k: + κυκλω S_b ευθεως] παλιν S_{ag}: + παλιν S_b 5 εκοιμηθη] κατεπαυσεν S_a(𝔏 [uid]) 6 τη δευτερα ημερα k

P 2 αυτος διαγγελει *γ*: διαγγειλη αυτος c: διαγγειλη αυτοις b: διαγγειλη υμιν 𝔖 3 τοτε αναβοησετε *γ* 4 του θῡ] κῡ *γ* 6 τη 1°] > bc_1ℓ

CM 2 υμων την φωνην u. 319 της φωνης ε^{n} *a*ip. 392 εως] prm ουδε–λογος M^{m}(sub οι λ_{δ}) 𝔄 *a* d_1 n_8^{m} (sub οι λ_{δ}) n_{16}^{m} (sub οι λ_{δ} ο′ ※) n_{17}^{m} (sub οι λ_{δ}) αν ημεραν] της ημερας $F^{a\,m}$(del $F^{b\,?}$) αυτος διαγγειλη *a*Nu. 319] αυτος (δι)αγγειλω $n_{4\cdot14\cdot21\cdot22}$ n_{28} (ω sup ras)ᵛ: διαγγειλη αυτοις VW^{a}*αν*g F^{b}*φ* h 3 τοτε p. αναβοησετε a. 381. 619 4 του θῡ] prm κῡ $a_1N^{n-n_{14}}$ h: κῡ v𝔄. 527 F*φ* d_2n_{14}p. 381. 619 την πολιν] prm κυκλω M^{m} n_8^{m} (contra BM!) $n_{15\cdot21}$: + κυκλω *να* *a*$F^{a\,m}$ $d_2N^{rell-n_5\cdot8t\cdot9\cdot16t}$ 17^{t} n_{16}^{m} (secundum BM!) n_{17}^{m}(!) h ευθεως] παλιν a_2

1 ενετειλατο–μηδε] > c ις̄] > 𝔈. 707 λεγων] > 𝔈(uid) n_5 h 2 υμων] > d_1 ημεραν] > 318 8 εν] > k_1 3 και 1°–αναβοησετε] > 𝔈^{H} (per homoioteleuton Aethiopicum) και 1°] > rv 4 της διαθηκης] > 𝔈^{H} του θῡ] > n_{11} την πολιν] > B την] > 619 ευθεως] > 𝔏 n_2 6 το πρωι] > $n_{2\cdot30}$ το] > f_3 και 2°] > 126

1 βοατω 𝔈A a_1 μηδε] και μη A*α* μηθεις] τις i 7 ουδε 707 𝔖 n_{17}^{m}] ου ελευσεται 707 n_{17}^{m} 7/8 στοματος] prm του e *a* n_8^{m} 2 (19) ημεραν p. αυτος c ημεραν] η ημερα i: ημερα e 𝔈(uid) A*αναα* *φ* $n_{2\cdot30}$p. 392 h διαγγειλη] διαγγελη v_2a Mas n_5 (secundum BM!) h: διαγγελαι $n_{1\cdot6\cdot7\cdot10-13\cdot18-20\cdot23-25\cdot27\cdot31(ras)\cdot32}$ 8 αναγγελω] αναγγελη k_2: αναγγειλω S_b 2/3 αναβοησαι] εκβοησαι e 3 αναβοησατε e c A. 318 a*a* $d_2N(n_5^{t})^{-n_{2\cdot7\cdot10\cdot15\cdot16\cdot17\cdot21\cdot31}}$: αναβοησητε d_1: βοησετε 126: + και ανεβοησαν *αν* περιελθουσα] παρ- d_1 4 την] prm εις g απηλθεν] παρηλθεν (sic) n_{22}: απελθετω n_{15}: απελθατω n_8^{m} (secundum BM): απελθατω· απαρθητω n_{16}^{m} (secundum BM) n_{17}^{m} (απελθετω): *feratur* 𝔈 4/5 εν τη παρεμβολη f_2 5 εκοιμηθη] ηυλισθη e. 707 *να* Mas *a*: κοιμηθητω n_8^{m}(secundum BM) n_{16}^{m}(do.) n_{17}^{m} n_{15} 6 τη 1°] prm εν $n_{6\cdot6\cdot22\cdot25-27\cdot29\cdot32}$ δευτερα] ημερα n_5 εστη 319 το πρωι ις̄ k_2 ις̄] prm ο k_1 n_{19}

4/5 ευθεως–εκει] σ′ ⟨illegible⟩

IN THE FOOTSTEPS OF THE RABBIS

S. B. MAXIMON (NEW YORK)

A

Many commentaries have been composed on the short, but valuable collection of Rabbinical utterances, known to us as the *Sayings of the Fathers* (Pirke Aboth). R. Travers Herford has contributed lately a worthy addition to their number.[1]

How is this commentary distinguished from that of other Christian scholars,—such as Taylor, Oesterley and the like? Herford himself answers this question. His predecessors have judged from without, whilst Herford has aimed to show what the "Judaism of the Pharisees meant from the inside"; they have inspected, but he has striven after sympathetic understanding. Hence the commentary of Taylor, for example, is more scientific, but that of Herford is larger hearted. And commentaries of both kinds have equal value. The details of a literary creation need to be investigated by scientific criticism which is exact and cold; its spirit cannot be revealed except through warm and living human sympathy.

Writing with this human sympathy, Herford's whole book is imbued with the spirit of love, modesty and candor. Because of his loving understanding of the Jewish spirit he declares (p. 109) that their whole history in their dispersion confirms the truth that "every assembly which is for the sake of Heaven will in the end be established." Herford's candor and modesty are shown by the fact that he never claims to speak the last word on a difficult question. If a point be doubtful, he declares it to be doubtful; if anything be unknown to him, he admits as much. Occasionally he modifies statements made in his earlier writings and tells us that he can no longer adhere to

[1] פרקי אבות, edited with introduction, translation, and commentary, by R. Travers Herford, B.A. Published under the auspices of the Alexander Kohut Memorial Foundation, New York, The Jewish Institute of Religion Press, 1925.

them with confidence. (See for example his remark on p. 27, with regard to Joshua b. Perahjah and Jesus).

This sympathetic understanding has saved HERFORD from a fundamental error into which other Christian Hebraists have fallen. The latter come to us with a standard of judgement foreign to Judaism. They estimate the value of our sayings and doings as though these were intended to compass a purpose which is not ours. Hence they sometimes attack Judaism because its details do not conform with the principles of Christianity. HERFORD, on the other hand, understands that Judaism has its own standards, purposes and principles, in accordance with which its details must be judged. The question is always whether these details are in accord with the standards of Judaism, promote its purposes and fulfill its principles.

In contrast with the commentaries of the scholars whom we have mentioned, HERFORD's sympathetic work is throughout Jewish in spirit. With regard to its subject matter, it reminds us of the mediaeval commentaries on Aboth—the commentary in the Machsor Vitry, the Sefer Musar of Joseph Ibn Aknin, Meiri's Beth ha-Behirah, Simon Duran's Magen Aboth and others. HERFORD gives us the explanation of words and of sentences, ethical expositions, illustrations from Talmud and Midrash, historical and biographical notes, chronological inquiries. All these occur together, but there is no confusion, for HERFORD arranges his material in perfect order and the reader will find the information he needs without any trouble.

In HERFORD's style also we can recognize here and there the influence of the Talmudic idiom, with which he is so familiar that it affects his own thought. The processes of Talmudic argumentation—inferences *a minori ad majus*, inferences based on verbal analogy (Gezerah Shavah) and the like—are apt to flow naturally from his pen as from that of the Rabbis. Above all, he has an intimate understanding of our creative genius. He appreciates the union of the ideal and practical, which is so characteristic of Jewish ethics (p. 91). He knows that the words of our Sages were not mere sermons, intended to charm the ear, but statements of principles upon which they founded the conduct of their own lives (p. 15). It is clear to him that the Rabbis did not strive, in word or act, for their own honor but for that of God (p. 16). In a word, the thought is not foreign to HERFORD that "the Holy One, Blessed be He, and His Law are One."

At the same time, HERFORD had to consider the needs of readers to whom all these matters are strange. Hence he sometimes indulges in long illustrations, where a word or two of comment would seem enough. So also he deviates from the rule, formulated in his preface, to discuss no questions of religious controversy and to avoid comparisons between Judaism and Christianity. Almost inevitably, he has to think of the Gentile reader, who will open the book without previous knowledge and will look at it through alien eyeglasses. Hence it is not surprising that we meet with remarks such as these: "the term 'Our Father Who is in Heaven'... is of Jewish not Christian origin" (p. 24). "Whatever be said by way of criticism of Jewish ethical teaching in regard to rewards applies with precisely the same force to the teaching of Jesus on the same subject" (p. 40). "Pharisaism never persecuted its heretics, and if it affirmed that they had no part in the life hereafter, at least it did not cut short their life here" (p. 81). "This is a fine lesson, and one which ought to be taken to heart by every church that has persecuted heretics" (p. 139). "The perfection described here" (in the first paragraph of the chapter "On the acquisition of the Torah") "is naturally, in respect of ethical and religious qualities, and a philosopher would pronounce it incomplete. But what is described is a very beautiful and saintly type of character; and the Gentile would do well to reflect that this type of character is produced by pure Pharisaism, and could not be produced by anything else" (p. 150). Such words need no comment. It were well if they were examined and remembered not only by Gentile readers, but also by many of our own people, who unfortunately possess neither the elements of Jewish knowledge nor Jewish standards of judgement.

This book of HERFORD's is, in fact, a sequel to his former works on Pharisaism, well known to all who are interested in the subject. The hard-shelled Jew, as he reads them, will ask himself "what is the character of this writer? Is he to be included in the category of benevolent Gentiles?" (חסידי אומות העולם). And he will answer his own question by declaring HERFORD to be righteous rather than benevolent, just rather than generous. This characterisation is intended as added praise rather than depreciative, for in some respects and in some seasons justice is more than generosity. Generosity is the greater when it follows the steps and completes the work of justice;

but it is the lesser, when it runs before justice and usurps its place. Justice is obligatory; generosity, optional. Justice is the foundation; generosity, the coping stone. Those, who do not act with justice, cannot act with more than justice. Woe to him who makes a roof to his house but builds no foundation thereto!

Herford is generous in his judgements but he pays no empty compliments. He does his duty as a just and independent critic, always ready to praise, where praise is due. Acting towards him in the same spirit of candor, I will now call attention to some particulars in the work before us, which seem to me to require correction.

B

1. (p. 4). The writer quotes the following statement from Baba Kama, 30, a: "Rab Judah said, He who wishes to be pious must fulfill מילי דנזיקין—the words (i.e. laws) concerning injuries. Raba said, He must fulfill מילי דאבות—the words of Aboth, or (as some report him) מילי דברכות—the words of *Berachoth* (the laws relating to Divine Worship)." The last of these three opinions is entirely omitted by Herford and he declares that Rab Judah and Raba expressed the same opinion in different words, the term *Nezikin* being used by the former, because it is the name of the main division of the Mishna, which contains the tractate Aboth.

This view is not acceptable. The Talmud (in the Mishna and Gemara) has just been dealing with the injuries, which one man causes to another by spilling water in a public thoroughfare or by burying fragments of glass or thorns in a wall. It is there related of Rab Shesheth and Raba that they adopted pious customs in regard to the safe destruction of such rubbish; one of them threw it into the fire, the other threw it into the Tigris. Thereupon the Talmud states the opinions of three authorities with regard to the quality of piety. According to Rab Judah, no man deserves to be called pious unless he guard against acts, such as those previously mentioned, in which there is a possibility of injury to others. The opinion of Raba (or Rabina, according to the text of Alfasi and the Munich MS.) enlarges the scope of "piety," because the "laws of Aboth" (general ethical principles) include more than the "laws of Nezikin." The third opinion makes "piety" depend upon Divine Worship, in which there are the acknowledgement of God's Unity and the promise to accept His Sovereignty and to obey His Laws.

In this passage the fulfillment of " the words of Nezikin " does not refer to spoken words but to deeds.

2. In many places in his book (pp. 6, 9–10, 40, 44, 50, 52, 62) HERFORD discusses the history of the first two chapters of Aboth—the method of their redaction and their baffling chronological arrangement. He suggests that Rabbi Zadok, the older contemporary of Rabban Gamliel II, may have compiled the first chapter, his part of the work thus ending with a saying of Rabban Simeon b. Gamliel, identified by HERFORD with Simeon I, who died (or was slain) before the destruction of the Temple. The second chapter would then have been added by Rabbi Judah, the Patriarch, and his school. The author admits, however, that these ideas are only conjectural and that they do not clear up all the problems connected with the case. How are we to explain, for example, the lack of chronological sequence between the first and second chapter? How is it that Hillel's sayings are divided, some in the first chapter and some in the second? Why are the disciples of Rabban Jochanan b. Zaccai singled out from all the other Sages, so that the compiler concerns himself with their qualities and dispositions? Why are sayings of R. Tarphon added at the end of the chapter, after those of R. Jochanan b. Zaccai's disciples, although he is not amongst their number?

It is strange that HERFORD has not cited here the conjecture of HOFFMANN (*Die erste Mischna und die Kontroversen der Tannaim*) which seems more probable than any other, as yet suggested. According to this view, the first two chapters (and part of the fifth chapter) were redacted in the main by R. Akiba. The latter, however, had before him an original Mishnaic text, beginning " Moses received the Law " and ending with Hillel and Shammai, the last of the duumviri (Zugoth). To this series of transmitters of tradition, R. Akiba added in his new arrangement the name of R. Jochanan b. Zaccai, who received from Hillel and Shammai, followed by his five disciples, two of whom were R. Akiba's teachers. To their words he appended the words of R. Tarphon, another of his teachers, and with the latter he ended the chain of tradition from Moses on Sinai to his own days. Finally, the last compilers of the Mishna (Rabbi and his sons) interrupted the chain of tradition by interpolating between the names of Hillel and Jochanan b. Zaccai those of the hereditary patriarchs, descended from Hillel. In this pedigree, they included Gamliel II, Simeon II b. Gamliel II, Judah the prince and his son, Gamliel III, omitting Simeon

(the son of Hillel), Gamliel I, and Simeon I b. Gamliel I. The compiler then returned to the words of Rabban Jochanan b. Zaccai, before whose name the chain of tradition had been interrupted. He divided, however, the sayings of Hillel, leaving some of them in chapter one before making mention of Gamliel II and he inserted the remainder in chapter two, in order that they might immediately precede those of Hillel's disciple, Rabban Jochanan b. Zaccai.

This theory clears up many of the difficulties in the case. Thus, it explains why the compiler goes out of his way to concern himself with the five disciples of Rabban Jochanan b. Zaccai. It was reasonable enough that R. Akiba should pause in order to give a verbal picture of his two principal teachers R. Eliezer and R. Joshua and incidentally of their classmates.

3. (p. 21). "Raise up many disciples." HERFORD comments finely upon this saying. I think it may be added that we can hear in it, as originally uttered, an echo of the opposition between the earlier Scribes (*Soferim*) and the Priests. The Priests considered the Torah to be the possession of their own party and they wished to preserve knowledge for themselves. The Scribes, however, claimed that the Torah was the "inheritance of the Congregation of Jacob" (Deut. XXXIII, 4) and hence they taught their followers to raise up many disciples. This point of view was inherited by the Pharisees and their successors. In the time of the Amoraim, Rab Judah in the name of Rab, using the words of Deuteronomy as a basis, taught that "Whosoever withholds from his disciple the knowledge of a traditional law is as though he robbed him of his patrimony" (Sanhedrin, 91 b).

4. (p. 30). "Hate mastery." HERFORD remarks: "The word translated mastery (*Rabbanuth*), is that which denoted the office of a Rabbi, but it can hardly have had that meaning here." In fact, the word Rabbanuth does *not* denote the office of a Rabbi either here or elsewhere. It means rather "authority," "lordship." "Said R. Hama b. Hanina: Why did Joseph die before his brethren? Because he accustomed himself to exercise lordship." (Berachoth, 55a.) "Woe to lordship, for it brings to the grave those who possess it: there was not a prophet who failed to outlive four kings." (Pesachim, 87b.) In one source (Yoma, 86b) we have instead of Rabbanuth the word *Rashuth*, which certainly cannot mean *Rabbinical* authority.

5. (p. 32). "More reliable is the famous Baraita (Shabbath, 15 a) which says that the lives of Hillel, Simeon, Gamliel and Simeon together filled a hundred years up to the fall of Jerusalem." This is not accurate. The Baraita states that Hillel and Simeon, Gamliel and Simeon *filled the patriarchate* for a hundred years up to the fall of Jerusalem. In estimating the date of Hillel's birth, we must add to this period the years of his life, before he succeded to the patriarchate. According to tradition, he was then eighty years of age and even though we agree that this statement is an exaggeration, he cannot have been less than forty years old, when he took office. Hence 30 B.C.E. is not the approximate date of birth of Hillel and Shammai but rather of the beginning of their patriarchate.

6. (p. 34). "Receive every man with a cheerful expression of face." Whereupon HERFORD remarks: "One would expect this to have been said by Hillel rather than by Shammai." Here the writer hardly understands in what sense such men as Shammai were easily offended. They were impatient when they witnessed anything, which infringed upon the Torah and its precepts, but in ordinary matters they were disposed to behave gently towards their fellow-men. We need only instance the case of Baba b. Buta, one of Shammai's disciples, and the stories told about his patience (Nedarim, 66 b, Baba Bathra, 4 a), in order to understand this type of character. We cannot prove that Shammai's nature was the same, but it seems likely to have been so. So also, R. Eliezer b. Hyrcanus was in a sense hot-tempered, yet he said, "Be not quick to anger." (Aboth, chapter 2.)

7. (p. 34). HERFORD contrasts Shammai's words "Make thy Torah fixed" with those of R. Simeon b. Nathanel, "Make not thy prayer fixed." He gives a beautiful homiletical explanation: "Torah and prayer are both sacred, and both involve duty. Why is one to be fixed and the other not? Torah is the word of God to man, to be received with reverence and accepted without question. It is 'fixed' and not to be modified to suit human convenience. Prayer is the word of man to God, it arises from within the soul; it must not be 'fixed' as a mere formal recital of words, but must be the varied utterance of the emotions of the devout heart." These words teach an excellent lesson, but there are, in fact, two senses in which something can be described as קבע, "fixed." It may be fixed in time or fixed in form. When Sammai said "Make thy Torah fixed" he meant that we should set aside fixed times for the study

of the Law. " Make not thy prayer fixed " implied that we must avoid praying in accordance with a fixed formulary, mechanically repeated.

8. (p. 38). He argues that Rabban Simeon b. Gamliel, mentioned at the end of chapter one, is Simeon I b. Gamliel I, who died before the fall of Jerusalem. This brings us to a well known question of controversy, which cannot as yet be decided. In Debarim Rabbah, chapter five, this saying of Simeon b. Gamliel is quoted in the course of an exposition of the verse " Judges and officers shalt thou appoint for thyself in all thy gates." From this passage in the Midrash, we can adduce a certain amount of evidence in opposition to HERFORD's conjecture. (HERFORD himself alludes to this Midrash but fails to see the difficulty which it creates.) R. Simeon b. Gamliel is there quoted as saying: " Do not give judgement in a spirit of levity, for judgement is one of the three pillars of the world (these pillars being: Truth, Judgement and Peace); consider therefore that to wrest judgement makes the universe to quake." This passage is the second of three expositions of Deuteronomy 16, 18. The first is attributed to R. Simeon b. Yochai and the third to Rabbis unnamed. Hence we may infer, although not with absolute certainty, that Simeon b. Gamliel, who is mentioned after Simeon b. Yochai, is a younger contemporary of the latter, i.e. Simeon II b. Gamliel II.

9. (pp. 41–42). " The merit of their fathers is their support." This is not satisfactorily explained either by HERFORD or by previous commentators. In my opinion, the passage can best be illustrated by a saying of R. Akiba (Mechilta, Massechta d'Pisha, end of Introduction): " Go, said God to Moses, and tell Israel that I speak with thee because of the merit of the whole community. During the whole thirty-eight years of wandering in the desert, when God was angry with Israel, he did not speak to Moses. Hence it is said, 'So it came to pass, when all the men of war were consumed and had died from among the people, that' (then and then only) 'the Lord spoke to me saying' (Deut. 2, 16–17). R. Simeon b. Azzai said, I do not wish to criticize the words of my master (Akiba) but to supplement them. Not only to Moses did God reveal himself because of Israel's merit; but it was also because of their merit that He revealed Himself to all the other prophets." [2] This view, that public distinction is given to men not

[2] See also Sifra, at the beginning of the first chapter and at the end of the book.

for their own sake but for that of the community, occurs often in various forms in Rabbinic literature. Thus R. Eleazar makes this comment on the verse, "And the Lord spoke unto Moses, go, get thee down, for thy people ... have dealt corruptly." (Exodus, 32, 7.) "God said to Moses, get thee down from thy greatness. This greatness was only given to thee for the sake of Israel; now that Israel has sinned, what hast thou to do with greatness?" (Berachoth 32, a.)

Accordingly R. Gamliel son of Rabbi is here cautioning those who labor with the congregation not to take credit to themselves. They have not reached their position through their own merit, but it is through the merit of the congregation that their service is supported by God.

10. (p. 42). R. Gamliel, son of Rabbi Judah the Prince, is here described as the contemporary of R. Jochanan in his years of maturity. This is not so. The leaders of the age, during the lifetime of R. Gamliel and of his son R. Judah Nesia I, were R. Aphes and R. Hanina b. Hama. R. Jochanan was then a youth and he behaved towards R. Gamliel as a disciple who questions his teacher but does not attempt to refute the answers given.[3] The patriarchs who were the contemporaries of R. Jochanan and his associates, were R. Gamliel IV, (the grandson of R. Gamliel the son of Rabbi) and R. Judah Nesia II, who belonged to the fourth generation after Rabbi.

11. (p. 46). ולא כל המרבה בסחורה מחכים. This is rendered by HERFORD, "Nor does one who engages much in business *impart wisdom*," as though the verb מחכים were transitive, as in the phrase המחכים את רבו "that makes his teacher wise" (Aboth VI, 6). This is not correct. The hiphil conjugation of the verb is here used intransitively. There are many similar instances in Rabbinical literature, e.g. "Whoso wishes to become wise should turn to the south in prayer; whoso wishes to become rich should turn to the north." הרוצה שיחכים ידרים ושיעשיר יצפין (Baba Bathra, 25 b).

12. (p. 49). HERFORD writes that R. Jochanan b. Zaccai "must have been born near the beginning of the common era." Elsewhere (in the chronological table, p. 165) he supposes that the death of Hillel took place at the end of the last century B.C.E. This would make the death

[3] See Hullin, 106 a, where R. Jochanan tells how he questioned R. Gamliel the son of Rabbi.

of Hillel, the Master, fall at the same time as the birth of his disciple, of whom Hillel said "Where is the youngest amongst you, who is a father in wisdom and a father of coming generations." (T. J., Nedarim 39 b.) An obvious inadvertence!

13. On p. 57. And in the Chronological table (p. 165), HERFORD gives the approximate date of R. Jehoshua b. Hananiah's birth as 50 C.E. He must, however, have been born at least ten years earlier. Incidental statements, contained in two Baraitas, serve as a proof of this. In one Baraita, R. Joshua, speaking as an eye-witness, declares that "when we shared in the Temple festivities at the drawing of water, we tasted no sleep." (Succah 53 a.) The other Baraita deals with a legal question. "It happened that R. Jehoshua b. Hananiah came forward to assist R. Jochanan b. Gudgada in locking the Temple doors" (one of the Levitical offices). The latter thereupon said to him: "My son, retire for you belong to the guild of musicians, and not to the guild of gatekeepers." (Erachin 11 b, see also Sifre, Numbs. sec. 11 b.) Hence we learn that R. Joshua officiated as a Levite, whilst the Temple still stood. It is known also that a Levite did not exercise his functions until the completion of his thirtieth year. Hence R. Jehoshua was not born later than 40 C.E.

14. (p. 76). Of R. Hanina b. Dosa, HERFORD writes that he learnt Torah from R. Jochanan b. Zaccai, but only so long as the latter lived in Arab, near Sepphoris, R. Hanina's home. It is impossible to disprove this, but it is worthy of note that the Talmud describes R. Hanina b. Dosa as "going to study Torah" under R. Jochanan b. Zaccai. (Berachoth 34 b.) This phrase, in its primary sense, is used of one who leaves his home in order to betake himself to a place of study, but possibly it is here a familiar phrase, the exact meaning of which is to be disregarded.

The conjecture of Estori Parhi quoted by HERFORD that R. Hanina b. Dosa was the son of Dosa b. Harchinas lacks basis. R. Dosa b. Harchinas is represented in the Talmud as a very rich man, who seated his guests on couches of gold (Yebamoth 16 a), whereas R. Hanina sustained life from one Sabbath eve to another on a basket of carob-beans, and this during his father's life time. Can we suppose that the Talmud would have passed over such a circumstance in complete silence?

15. (p. 86). HERFORD supposes that in or about 90 C.E., when the interview of the Rabbis with R. Dosa b. Harchinas took place, Akiba

was famous but not yet a Rabbi. This conjecture seems to be based on the fact that, in the account of this interview, we find that both R. Joshua and R. Dosa address Akiba without giving him the title Rabbi. This proves nothing, for R. Joshua was one of R. Akiba's principal teachers and R. Dosa was a venerable sage. It is not usual for a master to address his pupil as Rabbi, except at the ceremony of ordination.

Here is another proof. The period in question is approximately that of *the* day (בו ביום)—i.e. the day of Rabban Gamliel's demotion. The names of three scholars were considered for the vacant post of Patriarch. Amongst them was R. Akiba, who was only disqualified because he had no distinguished ancestry to rely on. It cannot be supposed that Akiba would have been mentioned for such a position, unless he had been ordained.

16. (p. 89). "All is foreseen." HERFORD writes: "The sayings included in this verse are found in a somewhat shorter form in Aboth d. Rabbi Nathan (text A, chapter 39) and Aboth d. Rabbi Nathan (text B, chapter 44), and in both places are ascribed not to Akiba but to R. Eliezer b. R. Jose ha-Galili." This is not quite accurate. The ascription is only found in text B. In text A, the dictum is introduced by the words "he used to say" and the name of the speaker is not given in this chapter (chapter 39).

17. (p. 92). HERFORD is inclined to follow the accepted opinion that R. Eleazar b. Azariah was less than twenty years old, when he was appointed to the Patriarchate. (According to T. B. Berachoth 28 b, he was eighteen years old, and according to T. J. Taanith 67 b, he was sixteen years old.) HERFORD adds that "at the interview with R. Dosa b. Harchinas, he, Eleazar, was a very young man, so young that R. Dosa did not know of his existence, and asked 'Has then our associate Azariah a son?'" It may be noted, by the way, that this question of R. Dosa is not mentioned in a parallel passage of the Palestinian Talmud (T. J. Yebamoth 3 a).

There is an Agadic story that, on the date of R. Eleazar's appointment to the Patriarchate his head was miraculously crowned with eighteen rows of gray hair corresponding to the eighteen years of his life. It is very difficult to reconcile this story with R. Eleazar's own assertion "I am as one seventy years old," or better "I am about seventy years old." If the story were true we should be forced

to admit that R. Eleazar lived for at least five years after the Fall of Bethar, whereas we hear nothing about him during Bar Cochba's rebellion or afterwards. The words of R. Eleazar "I am about seventy years old" are found in many ancient sources.[4] A Baraita in the Palestinian Talmud adds, "although he entered into greatness he yet lived long." The commentators of T. J. are puzzled by these words and some of them have remarked that the Baraita is in conflict with the Babylonian Talmud, according to which Eleazar only appeared to be old, although he was really young. (R. Eleazar Azkari on T. J. Berachoth at end of chapter one.)

18. (p. 99). HERFORD is surprised that space was found in Aboth for the words of an unknown Rabbi, such as Levitas of Jabneh, whose saying is not his own, but a quotation from Ben Sira.[5]

To this it may be added that Ben Sira is a source of many sayings, attributed in Aboth to various Sages. Possibly these authorities were quoting ancient sayings, which they strongly emphasized as guiding principles of action and thought. Hence the sayings were cited in Aboth as theirs. This theme requires, however, special investigation on its own account.

19. (p. 101). "R. Zadok said: Separate not thyself from the congregation and make not thyself as they who prepare the judges; and make not—(*it* or *them*)—a crown wherewith to magnify thyself nor a 'dish' wherewith to eat."

It is strange that HERFORD emends the word קרדום (ax or spade) into a word meaning *dish.* The verb defining the use of *Kardom* varies in our MS. authorities being either "to eat with," "to dig with," "to cut with." The passage is usually made to read,—"make it not an ax to dig with"; and this version is supported by certain parallels. Thus in Nedarim 62 a, the following saying is attributed

[4] In the Mishna (T. J. Berachoth I, 6; T. B. Berachoth I, 5), Sifre Deut. sec. 130; Tosefta Berachoth I, 12. According to BACHER, *Die Agada der Tannaiten*, vol. I, chapter 10, the same statement was made by Eleazar in the Mechilta (Treatise on Passover, sec. 16) where in the current text the saying is attributed to R. Joshua b. Hananiah. But my friend Dr. J. Z. LAUTERBACH informs me that he has examined two MSS. of the Mechilta (those of Oxford and Munich) both of which confirm our printed text. In the more ancient of these, the text reads as in the Yalkut "I am about eighty years old."

[5] *Ecclesiasticus*, chapter 7, verse 17: "Humble thy pride greatly, for the expectation of man is decay."

to the *son* of R. Zadok: "Do virtuous actions for the good which is achieved through them and speak of them for their own sake. Make them not a crown wherewith to crown thyself, nor a spade wherewith to hoe." This saying is repeated in part in Sifre Deut. sec. 48 and in the Midrash on Psalm 31, 9. It occurs as a whole with some verbal variations in Derech Erez Zuta, chapter two. We there read "make them not as an ax to eat (לאכול) by them, nor as a hoe (כמרא) wherewith to dig." If the reading לאכול be adopted, it means "as an ax, wherewith to obtain means of subsistence." In any case there is no reason to emend *Kardom*.

20. (p. 103). "Everyone who honors Torah is himself honored of men." According to HERFORD most commentators understand the honor of Torah to refer to reverence shown to the written scrolls of the Law. This is not so. Pseudo-Rashi gives two opinions, one of which is that we honor Torah when we refuse to teach it to an unworthy disciple. Maimonides explains that the honor of the Law consists in teaching men to be zealous in fulfilling it. Joseph ibn Aknin writes, "Pursue after the precepts to do them." Meiri explains that a man honors the Law whose own conduct does it honor so that the world says of him, in the words of Yoma 86 a, "Notice so and so, who has studied Torah, how goodly are his actions and how perfect his habits!" R. Obadiah Sforno holds that whosoever honors the Law honors God who gave it and induces others to serve Him with one accord. This last explanation resembles the one given by HERFORD himself.

21. (p. 108). "R. Meir died some time after Rabbi had already succeeded his father, R. Simeon b. Gamliel, as Patriarch." HERFORD seems to base his conjecture upon the strange story, told in T. J. Betsah, 63 a, where we read of the marriage feast made by Rabbi for his son R. Simeon, when the guests clapped together the backs of their hands on the Sabbath. R. Meir passed by and rebuked those present for desecrating the Sabbath. Rabbi was angry and R. Meir fled. The guests ran after him, in order to reassure him. As R. Meir ran away, the wind blew off his turban and Rabbi, who was looking out of the window, saw the back of his head. Then said Rabbi, "I should never have been privileged to become a successful student of Torah had I not looked upon the back of R. Meir." It is obvious, however, that this story is an anachronism, only told

for the sake of the words put into Rabbi's mouth. The correct version is as given in Erubin, 13 b, where Rabbi is reported to have said "The reason that I am readier than my fellow-students is that I saw R. Meir from behind; if I had seen him from before I should have been still readier." (Rashi explains that Rabbi sat on a bench behind R. Meir when he attended the latter's lectures.) There are clear indications that the death of R. Meir occurred before that of R. Simeon b. Gamliel, when Rabbi succeeded to the Patriarchate; R. Jose himself who survived R. Meir,[6] is not mentioned by R. Judah the Patriarch except in the manner in which the deceased are mentioned. Thus we find in Hullin, 137 a, that the opinions of Beth Hillel and Beth Shammai are cited on a certain point and then a third opinion of R. Ishmael b. Jose in the name of his father. Thereupon Rabbi said, "If the opinions of the early authorities had been based on the Pentateuch and that received from R. Jose, on other parts of the Bible, we should have still obeyed the behest of R. Jose; much more so when the reverse is the case." "When one of Rabbi's associates wished to raise an objection against a dictum of R. Jose, Rabbi checked him and said, 'Shall we, poor wretches, argue against the word of R. Jose? There is as much difference between the holiest of holies and the profanest of profanes as between his generation and ours.'" (T. J. Gittin 48 b.) "Had R. Jose been alive, he would have bent in submission before Rabbi." (Sabbath 51 a.) It appears also from many other sources that R. Jose (*a fortiori* R. Meir) died before Rabbi succeeded to the patriarchate.

22. (p. 113). "For thine associates will establish it (the Torah) in thy hand." HERFORD renders, "for thine associates will fulfill it *through thee*," as though we read על ידיך instead of בידך. He then proceeds to explain the passage accordingly. Neither the translation nor the accompanying comment is acceptable. The ordinary rendering gives good sense.

23. (p. 119). HERFORD submits that Samuel ha-Katan reached a venerable age and he points out that this conjecture is independently confirmed by HYMAN in his *Toldoth Tannaim ve-Amoraim*, p. 1148, where Samuel ha-Katan is described as being a disciple of Hillel, in the literal sense.

[6] See Nazir 50 a, Kiddushin 52 b: "Shall it be said that Meir has died, that Judah is angry and that Jose is silent."

The proofs, given by HERFORD, are mainly negative as when he tells us that Samuel is never stated to have died young and may therefore have reached extreme old age. Statements of this description, which are incapable of proof, need not be refuted. Such positive evidence, as HERFORD adduces, is very weak. Thus, he writes: "Even R. Gamliel (i.e. Gamliel II) who publicly disgraced R. Joshua b. Hananjah and was party to the excommunication of R. Eliezer, did not rebuke Samuel when he had disobeyed the orders of the Nasi (T. J. Sanhedrin 8c), but addressed him in words of reverent praise, as one whose character was known to all Israel. This is far more intelligible in the case of a very old man than in that of a young one." But, firstly, in a parallel passage of the Babylonian Talmud (Sanhedrin 11a), we find Rabban Gamliel addressing Samuel as "My son." And secondly, even if we reject this evidence of the Babylonian Talmud, HERFORD's opinion remains unproved, for it is quite possible that the stern Patriarch, who terrorised such, as held stubbornly to their opinions, spoke gently to a meek scholar, who accepted his authority.

The proofs of HYMAN are:

a) Samuel ha-Katan composed an anathema against the *Sadducees* at the request of Rabban Gamliel at Yabneh. Now the Sadducean party disappeared after the destruction of the Temple, so that the Gamliel in question must have been Gamliel I.

b) Samuel ha-Katan is mentioned as a contemporary of Hillel in T. J. Sotah 24c: "R. Jacob bar Idi said, in the name of R. Joshua ben Levi. It happened that the sages had assembled in the upper chamber of Beth-Gadya in Jericho, when a Bath-Kol—a voice from Heaven—was heard proclaiming: Two amongst you are worthy to receive the Holy Spirit; one of these is Hillel, the ancient. Thereupon the Rabbis turned their eyes to Samuel ha-Katan. On a later occasion, the sages had assembled in an upper chamber at Yabneh and a Bath-Kol announced that two amongst them, one being Samuel ha-Katan, was worthy to receive the Holy Spirit. Thereupon they turned their eyes to R. Eliezier b. Hyrcanus. The first proof of Hyman is founded on a mistake. Samuel ha-Katan did not compose an anathema against the Sadducees but against the Minim—the Judeo-Christians—according to the correct reading of the *editio princeps* of the Talmud and of the Munich MS. Hence the anathema in question cannot have been

composed in the time of Gamliel I, as Hyman supposes, for at that period the Judeo-Christians were not as yet dangerous.

Hyman's second proof can be refuted by means of a Baraita, which does not represent Hillel and Samuel ha-Katan as contemporaries. The text of this Baraita is preferable to that of the passage from T. J., cited by Hyman. It occurs in several places (T. J. Sotah, 24 c, T. B. Sotah 48b, Sanhedrin 11a; Tosefta Sotah XIII, 3) and runs as follows: "It happened that the elders had assembled at Beth Gadya [7] in Jericho, when a Bath-Kol was heard proclaiming: One man amongst you would deserve to receive the Holy Spirit, if only the generation were worthy. Thereupon they turned their eyes to Hillel the Ancient. When Hillel died, they exclaimed, Alas for the meek one, the pious one, the disciple of Ezra!" This is followed by a similar story about Samuel ha-Katan, and when the latter died, the Rabbis exclaimed, Alas for the meek one, the pious one, the disciple of Hillel! We may well suppose that the later version of the story, as given in T. J. Sotah in the name of R. Jacob bar Idi, resulted from a misunderstanding of the statement in the Baraita just quoted where Samuel ha-Katan was described, in a funeral sermon, as the disciple of Hillel. Obviously, however, Samuel ha-Katan was not represented as being the actual disciple of Hillel, any more than Hillel was the actual disciple of Ezra. Samuel was the disciple of Hillel by virtue of his good qualities; Hillel was the disciple of Ezra, in that he restored the knowledge of Torah, when it had been forgotten among Israel.

24. (p. 153). "If David King of Israel who learned from Ahitophel only two things called him his master, his teacher, his familiar friend..." Herford accepts the emendation of Dr. J. H. Hertz, who proposes to read שני דברים as one word שנדברים.

Against this Perles has rightly objected that grammatically the phrase should be שהיו נדברים. To this Herford answers that "as shown often in Aboth היה אומר and אומר are used with no appreciable difference of meaning." But a participle and a perfect tense cannot be used in coordinate clauses; we cannot follow שלא למד with נדברים without an auxiliary verb. Secondly, if we accept this emendation, the first part of the sentence is left without an object: If David King of Israel who learned (what?) from Ahitophel but they were merely conversing

[7] We should read Beth Gorya as in Babylonian Talmud, or Beth Goryon as in Tosefta.

together... Thirdly the word בלבד " only " is not used after a verb but after a noun.

Those, who are familiar with Rabbinic style, will perceive on general principles that this emendation of HERTZ is halting, as is also the logic which led him to make this alteration in the text. Obviously the author of the aphorism is contrasting what befits a king with what befits a private individual. He uses an *a fortiori* argument. If David, King of Israel, treated with honour Ahitophel from whom he only learned two things, how much more so should an individual Israelite honour his associate, from whom he has learned the merest trifle.

25. (p. 163). " Five possessions hath the Holy One, blessed be He, acquired in His World." This paragraph was already discussed by the Wilna Gaon, who substitutes for " five possessions," " four possessions " in accordance with Mechilta, Section Shirtha, chapter 9 and T. B. Pesachim 87 b. " Whence is this concerning heaven and earth? As it is written: 'And he blessed him and said, Blessed be Abraham of God, most High, possessor of heaven and earth.' " The juxtaposition of the words Abraham and possessor in this verse led to confusion, so that Abraham was reckoned amongst the possessions.

C

These criticisms do not aim to depreciate HERFORD's book. They only deal with points of detail. Considered as a whole, this work, like the author's other studies in Pharisaism, deserves our grateful recognition.

ERNEST RENAN has said that no one is fit to write an adequate history of any religion, unless he once believed in it and has since lost his faith. For this there is a reason. Those who attempt to study a religion, which was never their own, are able to see only its shell; they cannot understand the inner meaning, they cannot read between the lines. On the other hand, a religionist, who is not emancipated from the yoke of his religion, regards it through the spectacles of tradition. He lacks a standard of judgement and a view-point by the aid of which to view it as a whole and to appraise it independently.

HERFORD has shown us that there are exceptions to RENAN's rule and that it is possible to be a faithful critic of a religion, without belonging to it. We see before us one, whose race and religion are

not ours: yet how intimate is his feeling for the secret things of our Torah! He is quite like one of us; whose soul has derived nourishment from all the resting-places of the Shechinah whether Jerusalem or Yabneh, Wilna or Ladie.

It is of good omen that in this restless and censorious twentieth century of ours, there are still some with whom difference of opinion does not imply lack of sympathy. It shows that there is still a vital meaning in the words of the ancient prophet: "Have we not all one father, hath not one God created us?"

RELIGION AND LEARNING

CLAUDE G. MONTEFIORE (LONDON)

The heading of my few remarks is too grand. Judaism and learning would, perhaps, be better. Anyway, it is very kind of the Editors of this volume to let me have a few words in it bearing upon my dear old friend and colleague, Dr. Israel Abrahams. As I look back upon his life and achievements, I think that they illustrate well the close connection between religion and learning. And though Abrahams was a very exceptional person, his example may be of use to much lesser men: even average students and Rabbis could profit by him—by what he was and what he did. Ideals are helpful just because we cannot realise them. I have spoken elsewhere of his frank, child-like pleasure when he was praised by Dr. Sanday, and praised for his humanism. Who might not be justly pleased at being praised by Sanday, *clarum et venerabile nomen*? And who would not be justly pleased at the choice of the laudatory epithet? For the true humanist has avoided the pitfalls of specialism on the one hand, of sciolism upon the other. Now the Jewish scholar is in frequent danger of both pitfalls. His field, his *Fach*, is necessarily contracted, necessarily specialist; and he must give to it so much time that he is liable to know of other things so very little, and even of the big framework of his specialism so very little. But Abrahams avoided both these dangers. He could see his own subject in its true perspective, though without belittling it, and he knew a great deal about the framework of the big world beyond. And he knew as a scholar should know, as a humanist knows—he knew sanely, wisely, calmly, critically and appreciatively in one.

But there was something more about him than his humanism, unless we use the word in a very wide sense indeed. He was not merely interested in the past; he was also keenly interested in the present. He did not merely care about the Judaism of yesterday. He was more than a Historian, and miles more than an Antiquarian. He cared

greatly, even primarily, for the Judaism of today and tomorrow. And so with all his devotion to knowledge, he realized and maintained that there was some knowledge—however dangerous the thesis may be—which is useless and dead! He was a champion of living Judaism as well as of the Judaism which is past. Above all, he was a convinced adherent of, and a doughty spearsman for, Liberal Judaism. His Liberalism matured, deepened, sharpened, with the years.

Yet, in the last resort, the distinctive feature of ABRAHAMS was his winning character, his kindness of heart, his generosity, and his humility. I always come back to that: I know I keep on saying the same things many times over. All would have been spoiled and ruined, had he been conceited. At all events we can imitate *that*. We need not be conceited, we need not fancy ourselves! Not only are we ridiculous and offensive to others if we are that. We are *lost souls*. The conceited man is a lost soul. He is no good in religion, he is no good in learning; he is no good at anything at all.

Another thing about ABRAHAMS we smaller folk can imitate. I have already hinted at it. There was no eccentricity about him; no whimsicality, no love of paradox. He did not live for many years at a great University for nothing, though he had it all in him before he went to Cambridge. He had the true University spirit—the true spirit of catholicity; the touch of the whole. He sat at the centre. He did not live in a corner. He did not see the facts all distorted, as some do who seem to be looking all day at one of those funny mirrors which some people here in England use for shaving. (I do not know if you have them in America. In one side you see your face oddly large and magnified; in the other side you see it oddly small and diminished.) His was not that sort of impartiality for which one religion is as good and true as another, because all are equally false. He was an ardent Jew. No one e.g. can say that he did not get every ounce of originality and excellence out of the Talmudic Rabbis that he fairly and honestly could. No one can say that he did not make people think better of the Rabbis than they did before they read his books and articles. But he never said absurd things or made absurd claims; he never said foolish paradoxes; he never drew Rabbinism in false perspective. He saw it as it was; as part of a larger whole. Above all, he did not depreciate *Y* because he taught us to admire *Z*. Humanity is the better and the richer for

two excellences, two originalities. If only *Y* be good, if only *Z* be good, it is the poorer. The lily is not the rose, and the rose is not the lily: both are exquisite flowers. He is the worse off, and not the better, who thinks the lily beautiful, and not the rose, or the rose, and not the lily. But you may love the rose more than the lily, or the lily more than the rose. Or, it may be your special task to point out the beauty of the rose or the beauty of the lily. Such a man was ABRAHAMS.

Is there, I repeat, a moral to be drawn for us lesser men? Or, rather, is there a moral to be drawn for the young, for those who are going up the hill, for the students who are leaving our religious seminaries, colleges, institutes? I think there is, but before I attempt to draw it, let me add one more thing about ABRAHAMS. His knowledge was large and varied, and no doubt he could acquire it more quickly than we ordinary people can. Still, let us remember that ABRAHAMS (especially in his younger years) had to give up a lot of time to teaching quite elementary things, a lot of time to writing pot-boilers (though I admit that in his case they were never *mere* pot-boilers), a lot of time to lecturing and tutoring and helping others generally. And, nevertheless, I believe it is the fact that up till the year 1915, he never worked after dinner. (After 1915 increasing burdens compelled him to do so.) These facts are helpful and suggestive.

Religion needs learning. The religions need learning. Each religion needs its scholars and learned men; Judaism not least; Liberal Judaism not least. Each religion needs some men who give up most of their time to learning. No religion can be in a healthy state in which such a class of learned men does not exist, and it is a real requirement that the unlearned laymen should recognize and understand that this is so and why it is so. Each religion needs the fresh nutriment of living scholarship, of living learning. The sap of knowledge must flow up the entire tree. Some seem to think that all that is required is a few Professors who will teach nascent Rabbis the elements of their calling. That is not so. Research is needed for the sake of the religion, and if it is to be for the sake of the religion, it must also be for its own sake.

Between the small learned class and the unlearned layman there must be many gradations. Certainly not all Rabbis can be, or need be, learned, but there are limits and there are degrees. A Rabbi

should know his way about in Jewish learning: he should also know how Jewish learning is related to learning in general; he who knows nothing of other religions knows little of his own. There is a great need of Jewish philosophers, by which I mean, not of historians of mediaeval Jewish philosophy, but of men who, because they are ardent believers in God and in Judaism, will produce philosophies of religion, expositions of Theism, theodicies, soteriologies, &c., learned, impartial, profound, and yet, of necessity, Jewish. If such books and such men cannot arise, we are in a very evil case. Jews who have left their Jewish moorings are of no use to us, however eminent they may be. SPINOZA was of no use; BERGSON, ALEXANDER (a dear friend of mine, and one of the best of men) are, *for us and for our needs,* of no use. I am not sure about H. COHEN; for most of us he is too difficult and remote; and he seems to read into Jewish material what exegetically is not to be found there. I wish ABRAHAMS had had two lives: had he had the time, he might have done some fine work in this field. He knew a great deal about philosophy.

We also need some more good translations, and some good editions of well-selected portions of Jewish classics with exegetical and theological notes. We need scholarly editions of the books of the Hebrew Bible, fully critical, up to date, sane, and with adequate theological and religious discussions from a Liberal-Jewish point of view. And we need much else besides.

What else should the Rabbi know besides theology? It is a most difficult question to answer. In one sense, all is fish that comes to his net. He, clearly, cannot know too much history and poetry; he cannot know too much about the science of the mind and of human nature. Nothing is more absolutely essential than that he should know the elements of Political Economy. Whatever his politics, —and it is to be hoped that we may have Rabbis of many political views,—he must know enough not to say silly things, know enough to understand the complexities of the social and economic problems which surround us, know enough to stand, if possible, above contending parties, and yet not to be above justice, above compassion, above sympathy. Knowledge gives a right caution, knowledge prevents rash and ill-digested affirmations, but knowledge does *not* prevent the recognition and the denunciation of evil. We need learning, but we need the ire of the Prophets as well.

It can all surely be managed better in America than in England because of your numbers. You can afford to have "working" Rabbis, "preaching" Rabbis, and learned Rabbis. But all alike can profit by ABRAHAMS' example, even the parish-priest Rabbi, who also must have at least a bowing acquaintance with learning and scholarship. And then I suppose that the good, fitting and proper salaries which you can pay your Rabbis enable them to buy books. In England few can do that, and the endless little practical duties, the vexations and the fatigues of a harassing profession, are all impediments to study. Still, when there is a will there is a way. And there ought to be a will. It need not necessarily even be a branch of Jewish learning. But some regular study—a couple of hours a day—widens and elevates life. ABRAHAMS used to insist that a couple of hours daily could mostly be wrested from the busiest occupations.

We must look to our Rabbis to preserve the connection between righteousness and wisdom, between goodness and knowledge. If Judaism is to expand and develop, it must partly be by being applied to the problems of life, and partly by constant increases of learning. Each age requires its own first-hand knowledge; each age, its own type and quality of knowledge. And the ideals of knowledge can spread far. In one sense it is indeed true that if the preacher only spoke of that which he thoroughly knew, he would rarely, if ever, open his lips. Nevertheless, there is a certain reverence inspired by learning which does give us some help and advice. Who has not written sentences which have acquired a pleasing ring and cadence by certain particular words, and who has not had the temptation to use those words because they sounded well? There may even be a difference between two words of which one has the accent on the second syllable, the other upon the first. It is the word which has the accent on the second syllable which just *makes* the whole difference in the cadence of the entire sentence. The word which has the accent on the first syllable is a *little* truer, a *little* more exact, but—the other is surely true and exact enough. It is a temptation. But he who has a humble reverence for learning will not yield. He will ask himself at each sentence: Is this sense? Is this paradox? Is this verbiage? Do I know enough to justify such a remark? Is this claptrap? Does this only *sound* well? Has this really *any* meaning at all?

He who humbly worships learning even from afar will keep his intellectual honesty pure and sweet. He will be humble always, though he need not on occasion be lacking in courage. And he will be unprejudiced always, though he need not on occasion be lacking in definiteness and assurance.

He who reads ABRAHAMS' writings and admires them will, I think, strive for honesty, simplicity, truth. He will not necessarily agree with ABRAHAMS' opinions, but he will, if one may use such a phrase, agree with his spirit. For in the spirit of the Master we may, perchance, have to differ from the Master. We must not repeat his statements unchecked. In the difficult and complicated subject of the relations of Judaism to Christianity, to the New Testament, to Jesus and to Paul, where prejudice so greatly abounds, where temptations of many kinds beset us, too many Jews (as I think) loosely and carelessly carry forward the ignorance and prepossessions of one generation to another. The spirit of ABRAHAMS, as revealed in his greatest work (the *Studies in Pharisaism and the Gospels*), bids us seek for vision, for emancipation, for freedom. It bids us rise above the facts fearlessly, calmly, *liberally*. It bids us desire not to cheapen, but to enrich; not to diminish the well-springs of human greatness, but to increase them. Should we not thank God that He has let light fall into the windows of others as well as into our own? Is not the world better for two originalities instead of one? In my young days there was a little book on political economy which sought to show that deliberately to break a tumbler was *not* good for trade! ISRAEL ABRAHAMS did not seek to minimize the greatness of Jesus; he did seek to make manifest the greatness of the Rabbis. He saw life steadily; he saw it whole. Let us seek, on our much lower levels, to do the same.

SIMEON THE RIGHTEOUS

GEORGE FOOT MOORE (CAMBRIDGE, MASS.)

From the time when AZARIAH DEI ROSSI brought the matter into the forum of critical discussion,[1] Simeon the Righteous has been the subject of a swelling volume of special investigations, while every one who has written on the history of the Persian and Macedonian periods of Jewish history, as well as all the commentators on the Wisdom of Jesus son of Sirach and all the authors of Introductions to the so-called Apocrypha of the Old Testament, have delivered at least *obiter dicta* on the points at issue. AZARIAH DEI ROSSI not only acutely detected the apparent contradictions of a chronological order in the rabbinical sources, but introduced a fresh complication by discovering another Simeon the Righteous, son of Onias.[2] His own opinion was that there were in fact two Simeons, both adorned with this honorific title; but he was far from imagining that this solved all the difficulties, and in one case suggests the possibility that Simeon the Asmonean, son of Mattathias, may also have been so called.

In modern discussions the question who Simeon the Righteous was is frequently framed as a dilemma—Simon I or Simon II—and assumes

[1] In his Me'or 'Enayim (1575), Imrè Binah c. 22.

[2] Citing as authority the *Sefer ha-'Ittim le-Jedidiah,* which AZARIAH took for a genuine work of Philo, and translates into Hebrew from the Latin, with notes, in Imrè Binah c. 32. As is observed in the Second Index (of Authors) in the Wilna edition (appended to the *Meṣaref le-Kasef,* 1864), p. 168, it is a forgery by Annius of Viterbo (ibid., p. 162 f.), published under the title, Philonis Breviarium de temporibus, in his Antiquitates Variae, 14 vols. (1499), along with many other spurious compositions fathered on ancient authors. The motive of this particular fabrication, as is disclosed in Annius' "commentary," is to authenticate the genealogy of Jesus in Luke by the independent testimony of Philo of Alexandria! Since even the reprints of Annius' "Philo" are rare, it is pertinent to quote his list of high priests: Ab Alexandro vero ad Asmonaim pontifices usque ad Iudam, Onias priscus annis xxvii, Simon priscus xiii, Eleazarus Antiochi Theos inimicus xx, Manasses Seleuco Gallinico amicus xxvii, Simon iustus honoratus a Magno Antiocho xxviii, Onias huius filius a Seleuco spoliatus templo xxxix. Huic sequitur Iudas Asmonai.

major historical importance through its bearing on the character, composition, and duration of the Great Synagogue, of which he was according to *Pirḳè Abot* one of the last surviving members.

In the present contribution I propose, on the contrary, to examine the testimony about Simeon the Righteous as far as possible by itself, and shall endeavor to show that for the supposed Simon I there is no historical evidence, thus eliminating at least one of the disputed elements in the problem of the Great Synagogue.

I

The rabbinical sources give the name Simeon the Righteous to a high priest who was in office in the early years of the second century before our era, and whose son and designated successor was the founder of the temple in Egypt which was called after him the temple of Onias. During all the years that Simeon filled the office he enjoyed conspicuous signs of the acceptance of his ministry which were not regularly continued after his death.[3] Particularly noteworthy are the concurrence of good omens on the Day of Atonement. So long as he lived, the lot "for the Lord" in the drawing over the two goats[4] always came up in his right hand; after his death it sometimes came up in the high priest's right hand, sometimes in his left. So long as he lived the strip of bright-colored stuff on the head of the scape-goat always turned white;[5] after his death it sometimes turned white, sometimes a deeper red. So long as he lived the scape-goat was dashed in pieces before it had fallen halfway down the precipice over which it was pushed; after his death it escaped into the wilderness and the bedouins ("Saracens") ate it up. Every year when he entered the inner Sanctuary he was accompanied in his ingress and exit by a venerable figure in white robe and head-dress; the last time, this figure went in with him but did not come out,[6] and Simeon knew that he should die within the year, a prediction which was fulfilled a week later.

Other good omens were that the western lamp in the Holy Place (Exod. 27, 20) always burned to the last when the rest went out,

[3] See Jer. Yoma vi. 3, f. 43c; Tos. Sotah 13, 6—8; Menaḥot 109b; Yoma 39a—b.

[4] Lev. 16, 8. M. Yoma 4. 1.

[5] Isa. 1, 18. A sign that the sins of the people confessed over the goat were forgiven.

[6] In Yoma 39b and Menaḥot 109b, this last time the figure was robed in black with black head-dress.

which was a sign of the abiding presence of the Shekinah;[7] after his death it sometimes went out, sometimes burned. So long as he lived the fire on the great altar had such a powerful flame that two sticks put on it in the morning were enough to keep it going all day; after his death it grew weak and the priests had to go on feeding it with fuel all day. The two loaves (Lev. 23, 17) and the twelve loaves of stale shewbread replaced on the sabbath in his time were enough to give a piece the size of an olive to every priest, and this miraculously sufficed to satisfy their appetite, some of them did not even eat all of it; after his death there was only a crumb apiece; the modest priests drew back their hands, the greedy stuck theirs out. At his death his brethren the priests were prevented from pronouncing the benediction (Num. 6, 24–27) with the Name.[8]

A halo of this kind fits the head of one with whose name, Simeon, "the Righteous" coalesced in a kind of proper name. A more significant thing is that he stands out in the memory of the age from which the legends come as the end of an epoch. The high priests after him had no such evidence of the divine acceptance of their ministry.

According to the same sources, Simeon the Righteous, in the hour of his demise, nominated his younger son Neḥunya (Ḥonio) as his successor. Before he was installed, however, a scandalous performance in the temple compelled him to flee for his life to Egypt, where he built an altar and offered sacrifice upon it, citing Isa. 19, 19, "In that day there will be an altar in the midst of the land of Egypt," &c.

[7] Cf. Menaḥot 86b; Shabbat 22b.

[8] Menaḥot 109b; Yoma 39b. Various other things told of Simeon the Righteous are passed over here, because they throw no light on our immediate problem.—The example of the voice from the unseen (Bat Ḳol) which Simeon the Righteous is said to have heard in Aramaic, announcing the frustration of the enterprise which the enemy ordered to send against the temple, "Gasḳolgos is killed and his edicts are annulled" (Soṭah 33a; Tos. Soṭah 13, 5), probably appropriates for him an anecdote originally told of the death of Caligula, to whom not only the name but the content of the oracle corresponds perfectly. It has been conjectured that "Ḳasḳalgos," the last of the kings of the Greeks in the series in Seder ʿOlam 30, is a corruption of Seleucus, but as the name Seleucus (I) is correctly written in the earlier part of the list, and as half the other names in it are unrecognizable, such a guess is hardly worth while. Nor does it help us any with Simeon the Righteous and the mysterious voice, for the high priest in the time of Seleucus' attempt on the temple treasure was his son Onias (2 Macc. 3, 1).

As R. Meir told the story, his older brother Simeon (Simeʿi), jealous of the preferment of the younger, under pretext of teaching him how to put on his robes of office, dressed him up in a woman's undergarments, a sark and a girdle,[9] and exhibited him to the priests in this very unclerical garb, with a tale that Neḥunya had promised his lady-love that the first time he officiated as high priest he would wear these clothes of hers. In the version of R. Judah ben Ilaʿi the rôles were exchanged: It was Neḥunya who played on Simeon the trick which in the other account Simeon is said to have practised on him. The truth came out, but meanwhile the author of the plot had made his escape to Alexandria, where he built an altar, as in the former version.

The animus of these stories, from the middle of the second century of our era, is palpable. Like those told about the establishment of the Samaritan temple on Mt. Gerizim,[10] they fasten upon the Onias temple the odium of a disreputable origin. But the authors or retailers of this story agree that the founder of the temple was a son of Simeon the Righteous, and in the more consistent of the two versions, his designated successor in the high priesthood.

In the context in which they stand in Menaḥot 109 b these Baraitas are attached to two paragraphs of the Misnah [11] which recognize that the temple of Onias was not, as some maintained, an idolatrous sanctuary, but was dedicated to the true God (cf. Megillah 10 a), and that sacrifices might legitimately be offered there in fulfilment of vows or at the expiration of a Nazirite's term, if that temple was expressly specified.[12] Priests who had served there, if they came up to the temple in Jerusalem, were not allowed to minister at the altar, conformably to the precedent in 2 Kings 23, 9; like priests who had bodily defects, they lived off the offerings but could not sacrifice.

In his History of the Jewish War against the Romans Josephus on two occasions narrates the founding of the temple in Egypt by Onias, one of the high priests in Jerusalem. At the beginning of the

[9] In place of the shirt and girdle—or perhaps the breeches—which the high priest were under his vestments (Lev. 8, 7).

[10] Josephus, Antt. xi. 7, 2—8, 7.

[11] M. Menaḥot xiii. 10.

[12] R. Simeon (ben Yoḥai) was of the contrary opinion.

first book we are told that during the contest between Antiochus Epiphanes and Ptolemy VI (Philometor) for the possession of all Syria,[13] Onias having got the upper hand in the intestine strife in Jerusalem, ejected the Tobiads. They fled to Antiochus, and persuaded him to invade Judaea, a project he already had in mind. He took Jerusalem by storm, put to death a great many of those who held to Ptolemy, gave the city over to his soldiers to sack, and himself desecrated the temple. Onias, the high priest, escaped to Ptolemy, and the king having ceded to him a place in the Heliopolitan nome, built a small town patterned after Jerusalem and a temple like that there.[14]

At the end, where the closing of this temple by the Romans (in 72 A.D.) is related, the circumstances of its foundation are again rehearsed.[15] Onias, son of Simon, one of the high priests in Jerusalem, fleeing from Antiochus king of Syria, who was at war with the Jews, came to Alexandria, and meeting a friendly reception from Ptolemy on account of the king's enmity to Antiochus, represented to the king that the Jewish nation would be won to the Egyptian side if he were allowed to build a temple somewhere in Egypt and worship God according to their ancestral customs. In this way the Jews would be made more hostile than ever to Antiochus, who had ruined the temple in Jerusalem, but would be all the better disposed to Ptolemy; and many would flock to him for the sake of the free exercise of their religion.

The description of the site and of the structure with its furnishings that follows may possibly be drawn from Josephus' own observation;[16] and the comment on Onias' motives is no doubt his: Onias was prompted by animosity toward the Jews in Jerusalem against whom he laid up his exile, and thought that by building this temple he would draw the multitude away from them to it.[17]

[13] More exactly, Coele Syria.

[14] Bell. Jud. i. 1, 1 §§ 31—33. Josephus' source here is presumably Nicolaus of Damascus.

[15] Bell. Jud. vii. 10, 2—4 §§ 420—436.

[16] Josephus may have been earlier in Egypt more than once. The one visit of which we are informed was in 69 A.D. when he accompanied Vespasian, who had just been acclaimed Emperor by the legions, to Alexandria. Vita c. 75 § 415.

[17] Bell. Jud. vii. 10, 2—4 §§ 420—436. It had stood three hundred and forty-three years when it was closed by the Romans (§ 436). There is an error in the figures, perhaps transcriptional, of close to 100 years.

Simon, the father of Onias the founder of the temple named after him, in these passages in Josephus, is evidently the same who in the Talmud is called Simeon the Righteous, to whose son Ḥonio (Neḥuniah) the building of the same temple is ascribed.

He is also in all probability the high priest, Simon son of Onias (Hebrew, Simeon son of Johanan), who is glorified by Jesus son of Sirach. The panegyric of the famous men of the sacred history (chapters 44–49) concludes in a kind of palindrome, singling out for especial eminence Enoch and Joseph, and ending with Shem and Seth, and finally Adam, "whose renown surpasses all living beings." [18] This is evidently a formal close of the catalogue of scriptural worthies. The eulogy of Simon which follows (c. 50) is a composition of a different kind, complete in itself.

The impression which this eulogy makes throughout is that the subject of it was a contemporary of the writer, perhaps recently deceased; and this would probably never have been questioned but for the fact that, according to Josephus in the Antiquities, Simeon the Righteous, with whom Sirach's Simeon was rightly identified, lived at the beginning of the preceding century.

As for the age of the Book of Sirach itself, the whole picture of civilization it presents and of the political and social conditions of the time confirms by internal evidence the argument from the date of the Greek translation by the author's grandson,[19] and makes it as certain as such things can be that it was written in the generation before the crisis under Antiochus Epiphanes, the generation in which, according to the Tannaite tradition, Simeon the Righteous ministered as high priest.[20]

With these suppositions the account of Simon's public services with which Sirach's eulogy begins (50, 1–4) admirably agrees. In his time the house was repaired, the temple fortified, the wall of the

[18] So the Hebrew text. Greek "and above every living thing in the creation is Adam."

[19] The translator, on his own testimony, migrated to Egypt in the 38th year of Ptolemy Euergetes (132 B.C.), and translated the book there, we do not know how long after that date.—The paradoxical attempt of HART (1909) to resuscitate the theory of HUG (1834) and others—of whom he makes no mention—that the Ptolemy of the translator's preface was Euergetes I (246–221 B.C.) deserves to be ignored.

[20] The forty years of his incumbency (Yoma 9a; Jer. Yoma 43c) need not be taken chronologically, though a long pontificate is not in itself unlikely.

city built up with battlements like a royal palace, a cistern was excavated, a reservoir like a sea in its multitude of waters. He took pains that his people should be safe from raids, and strengthened his city against siege.[21] More than one occasion for such measures can be found in the history of the city in the century and a half between Alexander and Antiochus Epiphanes. The first Ptolemy is said to have occupied Jerusalem (probably in his second campaign in Syria 312 B.C.) by taking advantage of the Jews' unsuspiciousness and their religious scruples against fighting on the sabbath,[22] and a number of scholars refer to this capture of the city the damages which Simon repaired, identifying Sirach's Simon with Josephus' Simon the Righteous, the predecessor of the Eleazar who was high priest under Ptolemy Philadelphus.[23]

Apart from this identification, which will be discussed further on, it is intrinsically more probable that the restoration of the temple and the fortifications of Jerusalem described by Sirach were made necessary by what happened to it in his own time in the war between Syria and Egypt.[24] In 201 Antiochus III invaded Coele-Syria, in which Palestine is included, and reduced it, apparently with little resistance, as far as Gaza, which city alone withstood him in a protracted siege. After this success Antiochus evidently withdrew the bulk of his forces. Thereupon an Egyptian army commanded by Scopas pushed into Palestine in the winter season, subdued the Jews (who had made their submission to Antiochus), and put an Egyptian garrison in the citadel. At Panion, by the sources of the Jordan, Antiochus inflicted on him a crushing defeat.[25] Scopas succeeded in bringing off the remnant of his army to Sidon, and held out for a considerable time, but as no relief came was at last constrained to surrender. All southern Syria was permanently lost to the empire of the Ptolemies. After his victory Antiochus made himself master of the northern parts of

[21] This free version gives the substance of the verses as they are in the Hebrew and the Greek.

[22] Josephus, Antt. xii. 1, 1. Agatharcides of Cnidus is cited as authority.— Josephus' source is the same which goes on to tell of the translation of the Pentateuch into Greek after Aristeas. Cf. the Letter of Aristeas § 12.

[23] Josephus, ibid., 2, 4.

[24] See on the following E. MEYER, *Ursprung und Anfänge des Christentums*, II, 121—128.

[25] In 200 B.C.

Palestine, and of Samaria, "and before long the Jews in and about Jerusalem came over to him."[26]

Josephus introduces at this point a letter of instructions from Antiochus to an official, presumably the governor set over the region, in which the friendly reception and assistance the Jews gave him are recited, with particular mention of their co-operation in ejecting the Egyptian garrison; and various exemptions, privileges, and subventions, are bestowed on them, among which is a grant of the materials required for the completion of work on the temple and its porticos and any other necessary building. The letter speaks also of the depopulation of the city during the struggle between the two powers, the first stage of which lay twenty years in the past,[27] and offers special inducements to its dispersed inhabitants to return.[28]

That the Simeon the Righteous of the rabbinical sources is to be put in this period may be argued independently from the succession of the individual bearers of tradition in the introduction to the *Pirḳè Abot* at the head of which he stands. From him a series of names, which, to assure the continuity of tradition, must be supposed to represent successive generations, brings us down to Shammai and Hillel. The complete list is: (1) Simeon the Righteous—(2) Antigonus of Socho—(3) Jose ben Joʿezer and Jose ben Johanan—(4) Joshua ben Peraḥiah and Mattai of Arbela—(5) Judah ben Ṭabai and Simeon ben Shaṭaḥ—(6) Shemaiah and Abṭalion—(7) Hillel and Shammai. Shemaiah and Abṭalion are associated with the early career of Herod. Simeon ben Shaṭaḥ was a conspicuous figure in the time of Alexander Jannaeus (103–76 B.C.) and in the reign of Queen Alexandra (76–67 B.C.). The legend that Jose ben Joʿezer was put to death by Alcimus, his nephew (in 161), and that Alcimus was so conscience-stricken by his uncle's rebuke that he expiated his crime by inflicting on himself capital punishment in all four modes known to the law,[29] is in contradiction to the circumstances of his death in 1 Macc. 9, 54

[26] Polybius, quoted in Josephus, Antt. xii. 3, 3 § 136.

[27] Polybius, v. 68–71, 79–87 (battle of Raphia, 217 B.C.). A résumé in BEVAN, *House of Seleucus*, I, 311 ff.

[28] Josephus, Antt. xii. 3, 3 §§ 138–144. The genuineness of this document is maintained against prevalent scepticism by E. MEYER, *op. cit.*, II, 127, n. 2.

[29] Bereshit R. 65, 22; Midrash Tehillim on Psalm 11, 7.

(in 160 B.C.), and, though there is no intrinsic improbability in the date, is inadmissible as evidence of it.

This chain of seven links is stretched over a period of nearly two centuries; it obviously could not be made to extend to three, as it must if Simeon the Righteous be put in the times of the first Ptolemy. It would in that case have to be assumed that some links are lacking, and in fact the text at one point seems to indicate such a gap: "Antigonus of Socho received the tradition from Simeon the Righteous... Jose ben Joʿezer of Ṣeredah and Jose ben Johanan of Jerusalem received it from *them*," &c. "From *him*" would be expected, and some manuscripts make this conjectural emendation. Of the reading "from *them*" two explanations are imaginable: it may be interpreted, "from Simeon and Antigonus," or it may be an early error conforming to the correct "from them" which links the following Pairs.

Neither solution is satisfactory; and I agree with the scholars who infer that at least one link is lacking here. I guess, further, that the missing link did not drop out by accident, but was intentionally cut out. Antigonus of Socho is said to have had a pair of disciples, Zadok and Boethus, in whose schools the Sadducean heresy originated through a false inference from the words of Antigonus—he would not have bidden men serve God without hope of reward if he had believed that there was such a thing as a reward for the righteous after death.[30] The story comes to us in a relatively late source, and, so far as the rise of the Sadducees and Boethusians is concerned, may be ignored. It is more likely, however, that the legend attached itself to the names of two men whom tradition made disciples of Antigonus of Socho than that the eponyms of the sects were inserted *ad hoc* at this precise point. And on the other hand, if the names of these two disciples of Antigonus originally occupied this place in the list, such an imputation would naturally lead to the excision of the obnoxious "pair." I see no reason to suspect that more than this one link is missing.

Against the opinion that Simeon the Righteous flourished about 200 A.D. there is in the rabbinical sources but one piece of conflicting testimony. In Yoma 69a, in a discussion of the question whether it

[30] Abot de-R. Nathan, 5, 2. Compare the second recension, SCHECHTER, f. 13b.

is permissible for a high priest to wear his pontifical vestments outside the temple, the example of Simeon the Righteous is adduced, when he, arrayed in all his high priestly magnificence, with his mitre on his head, and attended by the most illustrious men of Israel carrying golden torches, went out by night to meet Alexander of Macedon, with whom at sunrise he came together near Antipatris.

The story, which need not here be followed farther, is a duplicate of that which Josephus tells of the high priest Jaddua,[31] including the motive, the machinations of the inevitable Samaritans.

So far as the succession of high priests is concerned, Jaddua is a better selection for the rôle than Simeon,[32] but historically there is nothing to choose between the two versions. Zeitlin has recently conjectured that in the original story on which Yoma 69a is based the king was not Alexander but Antiochus III.[33] Certain traits of the narrative give color to this surmise. As the Jewish procession approaches, the king asks, Who are these? and the other party (the Samaritans) reply, "The Jews who rebelled against you," which might very well be imagined to have been said to Antiochus, but has no pertinence to Alexander, to whom they had never been subject. The place of meeting, Antipatris,[34] is a suitable one if the king was coming from the north, as Antiochus presumably did in 197; Alexander; on the contrary, is represented as coming up from Gaza after the capture of that city, and Jaddua is said to have met him but a little way without the walls of Jerusalem, at a point called Sapha, which gave a view of the city and the temple. It is appropriate to mention also that in the letter of Antiochus referred to above, he recounts how the Jews, "when we came to their city received us in splendid style, and came to meet us with their senate."[35]

It is conceivable, therefore, that a story of a meeting between Simeon the Righteous and Antiochus III has been contaminated with the

[31] Antt. xi. 8, 4f.

[32] Josephus' Simon the Righteous, son of Onias, is in his succession a grandson of Jaddua. See below.

[33] See below, p. 359, n. 41.

[34] There is an anachronism in the name Antipatris, which was given to the place by Herod in honor of his father (Josephus, Bell. Jud. i. 21, 9; Antt. xvi. 5, 2; cf. also xiii. 15, 1). It lay on the road from Jerusalem to Caesarea, and could be reached from the former in a night's march (Acts 23, 31). Cf. M. Gittin 7, 7.

[35] Antt. xii. 3, 3 § 138.

story of Alexander and the high priest Jaddua in a form resembling what we read in Josephus. The original motive in Simeon's case, it might then be surmised, was the necessity of clearing himself and his people from the suspicion of having of their own accord fallen away to Ptolemy upon the advent of Scopas, after having submitted to Antiochus in the preceding year.

Whether there is anything in this or not, the story as it stands gives no ground for the inference that Jewish "tradition" made Simeon the Righteous a contemporary of Alexander the Great.

More serious difficulty has always been made by the words of Abot 1, 2: Simeon the Righteous was one of the last remaining members of the Great Synagogue.[36] In the preceding context we read, "the Prophets transmitted it (the Law) to the Men of the Great Synagogue."[37] For our present purpose it is superfluous to involve ourselves in the controversial question of the origin of this name or notion. When any of the Men of the Great Synagogue are specified, they are always men, who, as the Jews construed the history, lived in the days when the temple was restored and the Law re-established—Zerubbabel and Joshua, Ezra and Nehemiah, and Mordecai—all of whom they put in one generation.[38] Inasmuch as the Tannaite chronology reckons only thirty-four years from the completion of the temple to the fall of the Persian empire,[39] one of the last survivors of that generation might well have been living when Alexander the Great passed through Palestine, and there would be no difficulty on that score in imagining that Simeon the Righteous met Alexander. In fact the Seder 'Olam implies that the last prophets (Haggai, Zechariah, Malachi) continued till the time of Alexander.[40] Only then did prophecy cease.

Sirach, in his catalogue (cc. 44–49) ends with Zerubbabel, Joshua, and Nehemiah. Upon it follows immediately the eulogy of the high

[36] משירי כנסת הגדולה.—I use the conventional name Great Synagogue, because any substitute implies an opinion on questions not here to be discussed.

[37] Abot de-R. Nathan (1, 3) makes Haggai, Zechariah, and Malachi a connecting link between the prophets and the Great Synagogue. They are doubtless included among the prophets in that body.

[38] Seder 'Olam c. 29 (ed. Ratner, f. 67b–68a). See Me'or 'Enayim, ed. Wilna, p. 245, top.

[39] Seder 'Olam c. 30 (f. 71a–b); 'Abodah Zarah 9a.

[40] Ibid., f. 70a–b.

priest Simon son of Onias. Those who constructed the chain of tradition in Abot 1 were in the same case. They knew no notable name between the outstanding figures of the age of the restoration and Simeon the Righteous. The Men of the Great Synagogue collectively span the interval between the last prophets, Haggai, Zechariah, and Malachi, and the succession of individual transmitters of tradition whose names were preserved, beginning with Simeon the Righteous, precisely as "the Prophets" collectively span the centuries between the Elders (who outlived Joshua, Judges 2,7) and the age of restoration.

The Men of the Great Synagogue were appropriately taken for this office because it was understood that among them were the leaders in the restoration, and because in the age in which this introduction was prefixed to the collection of aphorisms in Abot, various institutions and ordinances of long standing and of prescriptive authority were attributed to them. From the latter function it was a natural inference that the Great Synagogue was an organized council, something like a rabbinical Bet Din, which lasted through the Persian period and beyond. The Abot does not, however, require such an assumption.[41]

II

Several and strong reasons have been set forth above for the opinion that Simeon the Righteous who stands at the head of the succession of transmitters of tradition whose names are known, lived in the beginning of the second century B.C. Against this, however, is the express testimony of Josephus in the Antiquities, who makes Simeon the Righteous a contemporary of the first Ptolemy, a round hundred years earlier. It is not strange that in the mind of many scholars this testimony should outweigh what I may call the circumstantial evidence which we have adduced for the later date. It is incumbent

[41] The difficulties which this conception of the nature and functions of the Great Synagogue presents arise from applying to the data of the Jewish sources *our* chronology based on the Canon of Ptolemy, which reckons from the rebuilding of the temple (516 B.C.) to Alexander's conquest of Palestine (332 B.C.) 184 years instead of 34—four or five generations instead of one—and to the most probable date for Simeon the Righteous a round 130 years more. To avoid these difficulties various other theories of the nature of the Great Synagogue have been proposed which it is not necessary to discuss here.—Two recent contributions to this literature may be named: HENRY ENGLANDER, *The Men of the Great Synagogue*, in the Hebrew Union College Jubilee Volume, 1925, pp. 145—169; SOLOMON ZEITLIN, שמעון הצדיק וכנסת הגדולה, in מ מערבי, 1925, pp. 137—142.

upon us, therefore, to examine the passages in Josephus and estimate their evidential value. To this end a preliminary inquiry is necessary into the character of the sources which Josephus employed in this part of his history.[42]

For the restoration, the work of Ezra and Nehemiah, and for the story of Esther and Mordecai, the ultimate source is the biblical books in a Greek version. For Ezra and Nehemiah this was the earlier translation which is preserved (incomplete) under the name First Esdras in the Apocrypha of the English Bible; for Esther, the Greek version, with the additions to the original made by the translator. Josephus (or his source) puts Ezra and Nehemiah under Xerxes (486–465) and Esther and Mordecai in the reign of Artaxerxes (465–424), and is there at the end of his biblical material.

From this point to the reign of Antiochus Epiphanes (175–164), where 1 Maccabees comes in, a round two hundred and fifty years, the pages of Josephus (Antt. xi. 7–xii. 4) are occupied by lengthy episodes laid—with some salient anachronisms—in the times of one or another of the kings who ruled in that period.

The first, in the reign of an Artaxerxes,[43] tells briefly how the high priest John (son and successor of Eliashib) killed, in the temple, his brother Jesus, who was plotting to supplant him with the aid of the Persian governor Bagoses, and how Bagoses punished the crime by imposing a heavy tax on every lamb offered in the daily sacrifices for seven years. It can hardly be doubted that the governor Bagoses and the high priest John are the same with the Bagohi and Jehoḥanan named in the petition of the Jews in Elephantine in the 17th year of Darius (407 B.C.), and to whom jointly a previous letter had been sent three years before.[44]

Next comes Alexander the Great (332 B.C.), in the time of the high priest Jaddua, son and successor of this John.[45] The visit of Alexander

[42] Josephus is still cited by many writers as if the question where he got his information about things of which he can have had no knowledge of his own were irrevelant, ignoring all that has been done by historical criticism to solve these problems.

[43] The editions have τοῦ ἄλλου Ἀ. (405–359); NIESE brackets ἄλλου, but if the word is a gloss, it is historically correct. See E. MEYER, *Ursprung und Anfänge des Christentums*, II, 9f.

[44] SACHAU, *Aramäische Papyrus . . . aus Elephantine*, Tafeln 1 and 2, and SACHAU's commentary, pp. 4–8.

[45] Antt. xi. 8; cf. 7, 2.

to Jerusalem, the reverence he showed to the high priest, and the sacrifice he offered to God, are narrated; how he recognized himself in the prediction of Daniel when the book was shown him, and what privileges he granted at the high priest's request, not only to the Jews in Judaea but to those in Babylonia and Media. But all this is incident, so to speak, to the main theme, the origin of the Samaritan temple on Gerizim, whose founder, Manasses, was a brother of Jaddua.[46]

This is followed by the conquest of Judaea by Ptolemy I,[47] (285–246 B.C.) which itself serves only to introduce the long story of the translation of the Pentateuch into Greek under Ptolemy II, Philadelphus, derived from Aristeas.[48]

The conquest of Coele-Syria by Antiochus the Great and the marriage of his daughter Cleopatra to Ptolemy V[49] sets the stage for the story of Joseph the tax-farmer and his son Hyrcanus.[50] The author has here fallen into the anachronism of making Joseph collect taxes for Ptolemy at a time when Syria was in the hands of Seleucus, and the evasion of the difficulty (xii. 1, 1) only shows that it did not go unobserved.

The matter of these stories is palpable fiction, even where the actors are real persons as in the case of the Tobiads. The external history, of which the author shows a respectable knowledge, is used solely to locate the stories in time and give them a historical coloring. The succession of high priests noted in them serves no other purpose.

Without going further into the critical argument, I will only say that I agree with the opinion that Josephus has here, in his customary way, appropriated and reproduced, with very small recognizable contribution of his own, a long continuous extract from a work by an Alexandrian Jewish author to whom he is extensively indebted in the foregoing parts of the Antiquities also.[51]

It is time now to return to the genealogies of the high priests, in Josephus, and particularly to that of Simon the Righteous. The

[46] Antt. xi. 7, 2.

[47] Antt. xii. 1.

[48] Antt. xii. 2, 1—14.

[49] Ant. xii. 3, 3—4; 4, 1.

[50] Antt. xii. 4, 2—10.

[51] See HÖLSCHER, *Josephus*, in *Real-Enzyklopädie der klassischen Altertumswissenschaft*, IX. (1916), 1967 ff.

two places where he appears in the succession are in peculiarly suspicious connections. The first is where the author is retelling the story of the translation of the Pentateuch after Aristeas.[52] In Aristeas the high priest with whom the negotiations are carried on is named Eleazar. Of this Eleazar there is no mention elsewhere, and it was necessary to make a place for him. The succession in Nehemiah 12 is Jeshua, Joiakin, Eliashib, Joiada, Johanan,[53] Jaddua. In Josephus we find so far the same names and order. From that point he is our only author. Jaddua is succeeded by his son Onias about the time of Alexander's death (323 B.C.).[54] Eleazar is brought in as follows: "On the death of Onias, his son Simon, surnamed the Righteous by reason of his piety toward God and his benevolence toward his fellow Israelites, became his successor. When he died, leaving a minor son called Onias, Simon's brother Eleazar assumed the high priesthood." It was he to whom Ptolemy wrote, &c.[55]

The second appearance of this genealogy is in the preamble to the story of Joseph the tax-farmer.[56] After Eleazar, his uncle Manasses filled the office; and after him, Onias the son of Simon the Righteous. This was about the time when Antiochus III and Ptolemy V entered into alliance cemented by the marriage of Antiochus' daughter Cleopatra to Ptolemy, with Coele-Syria and Judaea and Phoenicia as her dowry (194–193 B.C.).

This Onias is represented as a witless and miserly dotard, as was necessary to make room for the rôle of Joseph in the following story.[57]

It will be observed that the author has nothing to tell about Simon except that he was called the Righteous because he was pious and benevolent, which is merely an explication of the epithet; he is a link in a genealogy and nothing more. The succession itself is, to say the least, a singular one, particularly "his (Eleazar's) uncle Manasses"—ascending another generation.

[52] Aristeas, Ep. ad Philocratem, ed. Wendland § 33, 35, &c.; Josephus, Antt. xii. 2, 5 §§ 40 ff.—It is an indication of an intermediate source that in Josephus the name of the author of this letter is consistently written Aristaios.

[53] In vs. 11 Jonathan.

[54] Antt. xi. 8, 7 §§ 346 f.

[55] Antt. xii. 2, 5 § 43.

[56] Ibid., xii. 4, 1.

[57] Ibid., xii. 4, 1 § 158 (cf. his senility § 173).

Those who take the succession of high priests in Josephus as authentic sometimes argue that there must have been such a list, or records from which he, himself a priest, would have been able to compile one. Doubtless temple records were kept, but that any earlier archives survived the seizure of the temple by Antiochus Epiphanes, to say nothing of the repeated pillagings and burnings in later generations, is improbable. The genealogies here in question, however, are locked into the romantic narratives which Josephus incorporated bodily, and, in view of his well-known methods of authorship, there is no reason to suppose that he revised them from authentic lists of high priests even if he had any.

How little reliance is to be put on him in such matters is strikingly exemplified in the list of high priests under Antiochus Epiphanes. Onias, the dotard high priest of the Tobiad story, died about the same time with Joseph, the hero of that story, and was succeeded by his son Simon, and he by his son Onias.[58] When this Onias died, leaving a minor son (also named Onias, as we shall see), Antiochus gave the high priesthood to Onias' brother Jesus; having got angry with Jesus, he deprived him of his office and gave it to his youngest brother, Onias by name. Jesus changed his name to Jason, and his brother and successor Onias was called Menelaus.[59] For double assurance, it is added that Simon had three sons, on all of whom the high priesthood devolved; viz., Onias, Jesus-Jason, Onias-Menelaus.[60] The interesting thing here is that Menelaus, who according to 2 Maccabees 4, 23ff. was an intruder, a brother of that Simon "of the tribe of Benjamin," whose quarrel with the high priest Onias was the beginning of the trouble in the days of Seleucus III, is here converted into a high priest of indisputably legitimate pedigree, the youngest son of Simon, and brother of his two predecessors.

When Antiochus carried off Onias-Menelaus to Antioch and put him to death,[61] and appointed Alcimus in his room, Onias, the son whom Onias left a minor at his death, seeing that the king had killed his uncle Menelaus and given the high priesthood to Alcimus, who was not of the high-priestly stock, so that the dignity had

[58] Antt. xii. 4, 10; ibid., 5, 1.
[59] Cf. xii. 9, 7 § 384.
[60] Compare 2 Macc. 3f.
[61] Antt. xii. 9, 7.

passed in to another family, fled to Egypt and obtained permission to build in the Heliopolitan nome a temple similar to that in Jerusalem.[62]

It is not necessary here to go into questions of fact. But it is to be recalled that in the Jewish War it is the high priest Onias himself who escaped to Egypt when Antiochus IV sacked Jerusalem and desecrated the temple, and built a temple there;[63] and in the repetition of this statement at the close of the War, we read that this Onias was the son of Simon.[64]

In a more scrupulous author it might be surmised that in the Antiquities Josephus was tacitly correcting his own statement in his earlier work; in his case the presumption is that he was merely copying out another source without any attention to its conflict with what he had written in the War.

It may be noted also, as a curious circumstance, that between Jaddua and Jesus-Jason the succession from father to son exhibits no other names than Onias—Simon—Onias—Simon, and that a son, Onias, whose minority makes the elevation of his uncle necessary, occurs both times.

This evidence should suffice to prove that the fact that Josephus (or his source) in the Antiquities attaches the epithet Righteous to a Simon, son of an Onias and father of an Onias, high priest in the time of the first Ptolemy, instead of to the contemporary of Antiochus the Great to whom it is given by the rabbinical sources, is a mere confusion of Simons, and that even the existence of this "Simon I" is problematical.

[62] The Story is told again and more fully in Antt. xiii. 3, 1—4.

[63] Bell. Jud. i. 1.

[64] Ibid., vii. 10, 2—4. 2 Macc. disposes of this Onias quite otherwise (4, 1—6, 33—38) and indeed gives a totally different account of the events.

JOSEPH BEN ISAAC KIMCHI AS A RELIGIOUS CONTROVERSIALIST

LOUIS I. NEWMAN (SAN FRANCISCO)

Joseph ben Isaac Kimchi (RIKaM, surnamed Maistre Petit; born in Southern Spain about 1105, died about 1170) is the first member of the Kimchi family to bring distinction to the Kimchi name. He takes high rank among mediaeval Rabbis as grammarian, exegete, poet and translator. Though by no means the first to enter the field of Jewish apologetics and polemics in relationship to Christianity, he may be regarded as the composer of the first substantial tract in the Hebrew language concerning the Christian faith. The work of his predecessors [1] was confined for the most part to detached apologetical fragments, or to isolated exegetical interpretations of so-called Christological passages in the Old Testament. By the side of Jacob ben Reuben, author of a polemical treatise: *Sepher Milchamoth Adonay* which may have preceded Joseph Kimchi's great work: *Sepher ha-Berith* by a few years,[2] we may consider the latter the first author renowned for his literary activity in other spheres of Jewish scholarship who wrote a comprehensive and organized discussion of current Christian beliefs. The study of Kimchi's controversial interests requires a consideration of the three following themes: first, the polemical works attributed by bibliographers to Joseph Kimchi; second, the polemical references concerning Christianity in Kimchi's commentaries and grammatical works; third, the noted treatise: *Sepher ha-Berith, Book of the Convenant.*

1. *Polemical Works Attributed to Joseph Kimchi by Bibliographers.*

Efforts have been made by bibliographers to attribute a large number of apologetical writings to Joseph Kimchi. For example, Hetzel [3] speaks of five such works, taking as his authority Buxtorf [4] who ascribes to Kimchi as apologetical works not only the *Sepher ha-Galuy*, but also the *Sepher Milchamoth ha-Shem*, the *Sepher ha-Berith*, the *Sepher Nitzachon*, the *Sepher Milchemeth Chobhah* and

the *Sepher ha-'Emunah.* Wolf[5] speaks of four apologetical works. Zedler mentions only three books, omitting the *Sepher ha-Galuy* from the list of so-called controversial writings. Wolf and Zedler give to the *Milchamoth ha-Shem* different names, thus: *Milchemeth Mitzwah* and *Sepher Nitzachon.*[6]

These ascriptions, however, are due to bibliographical errors. Geiger is correct[7] when he assigns to Kimchi only the *Sepher ha-Berith.* As for the so-called *Sepher ha-'Emunah*, Geiger affirms and Blueth supports his opinion[8] that it is identical with the *Sepher ha-Berith,* and is merely another title used to describe the contents of the work.[9] The *Sepher Milchamoth Adonay* does not belong to Joseph Kimchi, as several bibliographers allege, but to Jacob ben Reuben the Rabbanite, who composed it about 4930, or 1170.[10] This work was current in Jewish literary circles for a long time, but its author was unknown. On the basis of insufficient evidence attempts were made to discover the author: for example, Saadia Gaon himself was designated as its writer; it was supposed to have been published under another name and with slight changes in the beginning of the work.[11] The *Sepher Milchamoth Adonay* appeared in the later years of Joseph Kimchi's life; inasmuch as the latter had written a work of similar content, the anonymous book was attributed to him. The first scholar who definitely ascribed the Spanish tract to the Provençal Kimchi was Shem Tobh ben Isaac Shaprut in the year 5145, or 1385. In the preface to his own apologetical work: *Ebhen Bochan*, he remarks: "Now behold I saw a well-known book entitled *Sepher Milchamoth Adonay*, and they say that the Sage Rabbi Joseph Kimchi composed it." It is generally agreed that Shem Tobh was prompted to make this assertion by reason of the fact that the little introductory poem which contains the name and comments of the compiler, Jacob ben Reuben, had been lost from the text which Shaprut saw and which doubtless was current in Spain or France. The year 1170, however, remained, thus furnishing a basis for the supposition that a scholar of this period must have been its author. Inasmuch as it was known that Joseph Kimchi had written a polemical treatise, it was a simple procedure to make him responsible for the unidentified work.[12] This does not inform us, however, on a point which would be of interest were we able to secure exact data, namely: was the *Sepher ha-Berith,* the bona fide polemical work of Joseph Kimchi, known by reputation

to authors in France and Spain of the type of Shaprut or was it known in manuscript as well? Even though Shaprut in 1385 may have seen a manuscript of the *Sepher ha-Berith* (which did not come to light in printed form until 1710), he need not have hesitated to attribute the *Sepher Milchamoth Adonay* to Kimchi in addition. This would lend weight to the hypothesis that Kimchi was supposed to have written two polemical works. But if Shaprut knew in general of a controversial treatise, but had not seen its contents, or did not even know its name, he might therefore have sought to identify as the sole polemical work of Kimchi the *Milchamoth Adonay*. Had he been aware that the exact title of Kimchi's controversy was the *Sepher ha-Berith*, he would have hesitated to assign to him as well the *Milchamoth* without a mention of the other work. It is important to observe also that Shaprut's words are: "they say," thus indicating that it was a popular belief, or at least, an opinion among scholars, that Joseph Kimchi was the author of the *Milchamoth*. An answer to these questions would assist in the determination of the fate of the manuscript of Kimchi's important work, the *Sepher ha-Berith*.[13]

2. The *Sepher ha-Galuy*.

The *Sepher ha-Galuy*, in addition to the *Sepher ha-'Emunah* and the *Sepher Milchamoth Adonay*, is designated by bibliographers as an apologetical work. This opinion is based upon the words of Rabbi David Kimchi, the son of Joseph, in his explanation of Isaiah 52:13: "Now I will explain this passage, just as my father explained it in the *Sepher ha-Galuy* and the *Sepher ha-Berith* which [namely the latter] he composed as a rebuttal to the arguments of the Heretics." The relative "which" has been interpreted incorrectly to refer not merely to the *Sepher ha-Berith*, but to the *Sepher ha-Galuy* as well. The first to make this error was the Apostate, Antonius Margarita, who wrote a German supercommentary to the commentary of David Kimchi on Isaiah 52:13: "Dise zway puecher sind wider den christlichen Glauben fundirt," referring of course to the *Sepher ha-Galuy* and the *Sepher ha-Berith*. Margarita was followed in this assertion by Buxtorf,[14] Rabbi Sabbatai Bass,[15] Wolf,[16] Jechiel Heilprin,[17] De Rossi,[18] Ghirondi,[19] Fuerst[20] and others. Dukes expressed himself cautiously, saying: "We do not know whether the *Sepher ha-Galuy* is a commentary to the Bible or a grammar."[21] Geiger voiced the opinion that the work was of exegetical, not of polemical content,[22]

and in his *Proben* for the first time combatted with detailed arguments the belief that the work was polemical in character.[23] This view was accepted by KALISCH,[24] GINSBURG,[25] and by TAUBER.[26] When in 1887 H. J. MATHEWS published in the series of the *Mekitze Nirdamim* Society the actual text of the *Sepher ha-Galuy*, hypotheses concerning its true character gave way to accurate knowledge concerning it.[27] It was made clear that the *Sepher ha-Galuy* was not a definitely controversial book in the sense that the *Sepher ha-Berith* is. It is rather a criticism of the decisions of the famous Rabbi Tam concerning the literary quarrel between the followers of Menachem ben Saruk and Dunash ben Labrat. Nevertheless the book contains several items and passages of a polemical tendency. In his explanation of words and phrases, Kimchi gives interpretations which have a bearing upon similar items in the *Sepher ha-Berith*; these, however, are largely in the nature of cross-references. One of these passages[28] is an interpretation of Daniel 9, the famous chapter concerning the Weeks of the Anointed which appears in the *Sepher ha-Berith* as a major reply to the Heretic's argument. A second passage[29] gives an explanation of I Samuel 17:56. It is in his interpretation of Isaiah 7:14, however, that Joseph Kimchi contains material in the *Sepher ha-Galuy*[30] comparable to the *Sepher ha-Berith* in the fact that it is of a distinctly and unmistakably polemical nature; the passages in both works bear striking resemblances to each other. At the end of the passage in the *Sepher ha-Galuy*, Kimchi refers both in a prose sentence and in a brief poem to his major polemical treatise, the *Sepher ha-Berith.*

An examination of the other available works by Joseph Kimchi has not disclosed any polemical portions, discussing either openly or by implication, the tenets of Christianity. The *Sepher Zikkaron*[31] is a grammatical work without controversial material. Of Kimchi's exegetical works few have been preserved, and it is difficult to determine the nature of their material. Mention is made of the *Sepher ha-Torah*, a commentary on the Five Books of Moses, which may have contained passages from the Pentateuch cited in the *Sepher ha-Berith*; his *Sepher ha-Miknah*, a Commentary on the Prophets, may have included cross-references to the prophetical passages discussed in the *Berith.* The *Chibbur ha-Leket* of unknown contents; the commentary on Canticles, still in manuscript; the commentary on

Proverbs;[32] the fragment of his commentary on the Book of Job;[33] Kimchi's poetical writings; his translations from the Arabic;[34] his Hebrew version of Bachyah ibn Pakudah's *Chobhoth ha-Lebhabhoth*, originally written in Arabic; his Hebrew translation of Ibn Gabirol's *Mibhchar ha-Peninim*, made into metrical form under the title *Shekel ha-Kodesh*,—none of these works reveals controversial subject matter. The English translation of the last-named work, issued in 1920 at London by Herman Gollancz, has furnished an excellent opportunity for detailed perusal of Kimchi's style by English readers.

3. The *Sepher ha-Berith.*

Thus an examination of the available writings by Joseph Kimchi makes it clear that with one exception they furnish virtually no evidence of interest in the field of Christian-Jewish discussion. This exception is the *Sepher ha-Berith*, clearly intended by its author to be his *magnum opus* in the domain of apologetics. It has the distinction of being the first work by Kimchi to be made known to the reading public through the medium of the printing art, and is the only one of Kimchi's works, published relatively early, namely in 1710 at Constantinople. Not until the latter part of the 19th century did the life of Joseph Kimchi become a subject for the study of historical scholars; in 1887 the *Sepher ha-Galuy* was published and in 1888 the *Sepher Zikkaron* was made available with preface and notes; Gollancz's translation in 1920 was the first translation of any one of his writings into any other language than Hebrew.

We will do no more in this brief essay than discuss the passages which mention the *Sepher ha-Berith*, first by name, and second, by citation and quotation. Even if we did not have in our possession a copy, however fragmentary, of the *Berith*, we would know of its existence by virtue of the several occasions on which it is mentioned both in the works of Joseph Kimchi himself, and those of his noted son, David. Joseph refers specifically to his own polemical treatise in the *Sepher ha-Galuy* (p. 135): "Now I have already given an excellent interpretation of all the refutations of the Heretics, and have inscribed them in the *Sepher ha-Berith*, which I have made as an essay and a response wherein the Heretic speaks and the Believer replies. I have also inscribed on the face of the book verses on the name of the book; they are as follows:

Be strong with the Lord, and let your heart be firm,
For unto you is hope; verily also for the latter end;
If your soul asks of thee concerning the end of wonders,
Return and meditate upon the Book of the Covenant."

There follow this poem verses which Joseph Kimchi describes in these words: "I have made other verses rhyming with the word Epikoros."[35]

David Kimchi refers to the *Berith* on several occasions. Thus, he mentions it in the *Wikkuach*, on page 18b of the collection *Milchemeth Chobhah* (Constantinople, 1710) which includes also the *Sepher ha-Berith*. The words are: "And the rest of the answers you will find in the *Sepher ha-Berith*."[36] It is a sentence thrust in abruptly, apparently having no connection with what precedes or with the repetitious paragraph which follows; it is, however, in the spirit of the work itself, highly fragmentary and brief. David Kimchi mentions the *Berith* also in his *Sepher ha-Shorashim*, or Dictionary, under the word "'Elem." He mentions it also in his own Commentary on Isaiah 7:14.[37]

Citations of passages from the *Berith* without an acknowledgment of their source are to be found in David Kimchi's explanation of Genesis 1:26, used also by Nachmanides in his Disputation before the King of Castile;[38] in the *Sepher ha-Shorashim*, under the roots "'Erek," "Keren" and "Sepher,"[39] again without a direct naming of the source from which David Kimchi derived it. Moses Nachmanides, as we have already stated, employs Joseph Kimchi's interpretation of Genesis 1:26 in his Disputation against Fra Paul. We know that a passage from the Nachmanides polemic found its way into the text of the *Sepher ha-Berith*. There is ground for believing, therefore, that the quotation from Kimchi may have become part of the controversy of Nachmanides by reason of editorial errors on the part of the publishers of the *Milchemeth Chobhah*, rather than by reason of an actual knowledge of Kimchi's work by Nachmanides.

These and other questions depend upon a detailed study of the *Sepher ha-Berith*, its correct text, its sources, its contents, and allied points which cannot concern us here. In another essay, however, we have devoted our attention to all these debatable questions, and have in addition sought to establish the correct text and translation of Kimchi's notable controversy. To this study we must refer the reader.

NOTES

[1] *Jewish Influence on Christian Reform Movements*, New York 1925, pp. 344–52 discusses the suppression of Jewish Apologetics by the Christian Church; pp. 315–59 are devoted to a consideration of Jewish literary influence in mediaeval Christianity.

[2] *Jewish Influence*, p. 351.

[3] *Geschichte der hebräischen Sprache und Literatur*, Halle 1776, p. 109.

[4] *Bibliotheca Rabbinica*, Basel 1640, pp. 438, 440, 441, 455, 459.

[5] *Bibliotheca Hebraea*, i, no. 967, p. 562; iv, 859.

[6] See BLUETH, *Joseph Qimchi und seine Grammatik* in BERLINERS *Magazin für die Wissenschaft des Judentums*, Berlin, xviii, (1891), 204 ff. See also FUERST, *Bibliotheca Judaica*, Leipsic, p. 187; also ISAAC BEN JACOB, *Otzar ha-Sepharim*, Wilna 1880, p. 333.

[7] *Otzar Nechmad*, i, 115 ff.; see also GEIGER, *Proben jüdischer Verteidigung ... im Mittelalter*, in *Jahrbuch* of Breslauer, and the *Deutsch-Israelitischer Volkskalender* of RUHEMANN, I, *Jahrb.*, 5611 (1850–1); II, *Jahrb.* (1851–2); III, *Volkskalender*, 1854. For this comment, see GEIGER, i, 63.

[8] *Op. cit.*, xviii, 205.

[9] DE ROSSI, *Bibliotheca Judaica Anti-Christiana*, Parma 1800, p. 52, gives as references "Scabtaeus," or Rabbi Sabbatai Bass, *Siphthei Yeshenim*, 1680, p. 7; "Seder adoroth," or Jechiel Heilprin, *Seder ha-Doroth*, 1768, fol. 54; "Scalceled akkabala," or Gedaliah ibn Yachya, *Sepher Shalsheleth ha-Kabbalah*, fol. 54; BUXTORF, *Bibl. Rabb.*, p. 38; BARTOLOCCI, *Bibliotheca Magna Rabbinica*, iii, 827; BASNAGE, *Hist. des Juifs*, ix, 282; WOLF, i, 562 and ii, 1052. GEIGER, *Proben*, i, 64: "Ebenso-wenig hat Joseph Kimchi ein *S. ha-'Emunah* geschrieben, indem dies bloß ein allgemeiner Titel ist für eine Schrift über den Glauben und damit wohl nichts anderes als sein *S. ha-Berith* gemeint ist."

[10] DE ROSSI, p. 51, where Sabbatai Bass, fol. 43, is mentioned; also *Seder ha-Doroth*, fol. 171; BARTOLOCCI, iii, 827; WOLF, i, 562. The work is also called *Milchemeth Mitzwah*; cf. BUXTORF, p. 123. DE ROSSI says that though WOLF, iii, 423, MS., remarks that he made use of it in the Oppenheimer collection, he himself sought in vain for it in a catalogue of this collection. The work is sometimes called *Milchamoth ha-Shem*; cf. FUERST, p. 187.

[11] *Cod. Michael*, 229, 2.

[12] With reference to the relationship of the *Ebhen Bochan* to the *Sepher Milchamoth Adonay*, see DE ROSSI, p. 51; GEIGER, *Proben*, p. 63, n. 6; WOLF, i, 1127–8, no. 2157; BARTOLOCCI, iii, 927; WOLF, i, 562; ii, 1052; iii, 423–4.

[13] In the *Ebhen Bochan*, Fifteenth Chapter, Shaprut mentions Jacob ben Reuben, the Rabbanite, in his own criticism of a work by Alphonso de Valladolid directed against Jacob. Joseph Kimchi plays a part in the discussion as well. WOLF, i, 1127, no. 2157 has the words concerning Alphonso: "ex Judaeo Christianum, qui scripserit contra Kimchii librum *Milchamoth*." For a discussion of Alphonso's reply to Kimchi, see below.

[14] *Bibl. Rabb.*, p. 441.

[15] *Siphthei Yeshenim*, p. 16.

[16] *Bibliotheca Hebraea*, i, p. 562, no. 967; iii, 423–4: "una cum prior *S. ha-Berith* ab eodem Kimchio allegatur in commentario super Jes. LIII, 1. Conf. Anton Margaritae Declarationem cap. LIII, Isaiae, p. 79b. ubi ait, utrum contra religionem Christianam scriptum esse. Idem MS. apud Oppenheim."

[17] *Seder ha-Doroth*, 1768, 165b.

[18] *Bibliotheca Judaica Anti-Christiana*, p. 53. "75. Ejusd. *S. ha-Galuy*. Sefer aggalui. Liber Revelatus. MS. Producitur a filio Davide tum in Comm. ad Isai. LIII, 1; tum in 'Libro radicum' ad rad. 'NUS.' R. Scabtai, p. 16, n. 23 quique eum presso pede sequitur R. Jechiel in 'Seder adoroth', fol. 165, verso, notant agere 'Me-ha-Emunah,' de religione. Buxtorfius ex Legeri addimento scribit in *Bibl. Rabb.*, p. 57, esse disputationem contra Christianos, ut alterum *Berith* cum quoa reapse a Davide Kimchio conjungitur in priori testimonio, et utrumque contra Christianam religionem esse exaratum monet etiam Antonius Margarita in 'Declar. cap. LIII, Isaiae, p. 79b.' Eum MS. apud Oppenheimerum servari monet Wolfius, iii, 423. Sed editus catalogus silet."

[19] *Toledhoth Gedhole Yisrael*, Triest, 1853, p. 199.

[20] *Bibliotheca Judaica*, Leipsic, i, 187.

[21] *Literaturbl. des Orients*, 1850, p. 332.

[22] *Otzar Nechmad*, p. 108.

[23] *Proben*, p. 64.

[24] *Hebrew Grammar*, ii, 19.

[25] KITTO's *Cyclopedia of Biblical Literature*, ii, 735.

[26] *Standpunkt und Leistung Dav. Kimchis als Grammatiker*, Breslau 1867, p. 11.

[27] Kimchi, Joseph ben Isaac (1105?—1170?) *Sefer ha-Galuy*; nach der einzigen Handschrift in der Vatikanischen Bibliothek zum ersten Male herausgegeben von H. J. MATHEWS, Berlin 1887, 180 pp. MATHEWS has brought together in the Introduction the various views concerning the contents of the *Sepher ha-Galuy*; BLUETH, xviii, 125—6 has repeated the material in German. See *REJ*, xvi, 294—5.

[28] *Sepher ha-Galuy*, pp. 54—5.

[29] *Ibid.*, p. 135.

[30] *Ibid.*, pp. 134—5. See also EPPENSTEIN, *Keneseth ha-Gedholah*, Warsaw 1890, Abt III, p. 16.

[31] *Grammatik der hebräischen Sprache*, von R. Joseph Kimchi ... herausgegeben von Dr. WILHELM BACHER, Berlin 1888; see GEIGER, *Otzar Nechmad*, p. 105; EPPENSTEIN, p. 5 ff.; WINTER und WUENSCHE, ii, 193 ff.

[32] Published by BAER DUBROWO under the title of *Sepher Chukkah*, Breslau 1868; see EPPENSTEIN, in *Z. f. H. B.*, v, 143 ff.

[33] Published by SCHWARZ in *Tikwath Enosh*, Berlin 1868.

[34] Kimchi brought his philosophical knowledge, gleaned from Arabic sources, into relationship to his own apologetics concerning Judaism and Christianity. The *Sepher ha-Berith* has several Arabic references.

[35] וכבר פרשתי פרוש יפה כל תשובות הטוענין וחקקתי בספר הברית שעשיתי מאטר ותשובה אטר הטוען אטר חמאטין, וחקקתי על סני הספר הרוזים שנים על שם הספר ואלה הם:

התחזק עם ה' ולבך יאטץ
כי יש לך תקוה וגם אחרית
אם נפשך תשאלך על קץ פלאות
שוב והתבונן בספר הברית.

[36] ושאר התשובות תמצאם בספר הברית.

[37] WOLF, iii, 423, has: "*S. Berith* citatur a David Kimchio in comment. ad Ies. vii, 14, qui locus in Codice quodam MS. Uffenbachiani aliter atque in editione expressus est. Vide Bibliothecam Uffenbachian. Part I, p. 230." See the *Berith*, p. 28b.

[38] *Milchemeth Chobhah*, p. 23b.

[39] TAUBER, *Standpunkt*, p. 11; *Milchemeth Chobhah*, p. 27a.

THE DEATH OF SISERA[1]

J. OBERMANN (NEW YORK)

I

The scene of the inglorious death of Sisera as depicted in the Song of Deborah[2] offers a problem which caused perplexity among the ancient translators and which, as far as is known, has not found any satisfactory solution yet. As a whole, it is true, the scene is a masterpiece of artistic boldness and is presented by one of the most perfect strophes in the great Song[3] and indeed in all ancient Hebrew poetry. We see the General of a defeated army on his flight from the fatal battle-field stopping at a tent to ask for a drink of water; we see the mistress of this tent hospitably offering him a generous bowl in which he finds the more refreshing drink of milk; we see her then reaching her hand to a peg, the natural weapon of a tent dweller; and now she is striking and hammering the skull of her guest; at last she has smashed his temple and he sinks down at her feet; sinks, falls, lies dead.

Yet, in this scene of savage beauty there is an obscure spot, reminding us of a piece of ancient sculpture some of whose features have been disfigured by the barbarian hand of time or accident. This disfigured spot may be responsible for the psychological, stylistic or linguistic difficulties which modern scholars find in the passage before us. That is to say, we may reasonably assume that these difficulties did not exist in the scene as originally depicted. I think, in fact, that we are in the fortunate position of being able to restore the original form of the strophe, and to test the correctness of our restoration

[1] The following paper was read before the Society of Biblical Literature and Exegesis, December 1925. With its main problem the writer dealt, in a different presentation, in his article *Drei Kontextglossen zum Deboraliede* in the *Livre d'homage à la Mémoire du Dr Samuel Poznański*.

[2] Judges 5, 25—27.

[3] The most recent and, I believe, most plausible reconstruction of the metrical arrangement of the strophe is that on which V. ZAPLETAL's (*Das Buch der Richter*, Münster 1923) German translation is based.

by the fact that it removes the difficulties alleged more or less emphatically by all modern scholars.[4]

What are these difficulties? To begin with the psychological one: Sisera was the military chief of an army. As such he must have been a strong man and a skillful fighter. Is it then likely that he allowed his hostess to hammer his head, while he patiently stood still until his temple was smashed? Why did he not fight after the first blow? Why did he not flee? If he was disabled by the very first stroke, how could he receive the blows whilst still standing on his feet, and *then*, after his skull was broken, fall down and die?

The psychological absurdity of this picture, inconceivable in a poet whose soundness of vision and plasticity of drawing are apparent in every line, seems to have been already felt by what might be called the oldest commentary of our strophe. The author of the narrative of Jud. IV, in which the description of Sisera's death appears to be a prose adaptation of the poem,[5] offers a rather radical solution of the problem. He makes, evidently in view of the difficulty just mentioned, Sisera receive from his hostess not only a bowl of milk to cool his thirst but also a sort of rug or mantle with which to cover himself so that the attack takes place after the general has fallen into a deep sleep. But it is clear that this solution, natural from the standpoint of a popularizing adaptation, begs rather than answers the question. It grossly contradicts the unmistakable intention of the poem which uses no less than four different words to express the hammering, smashing, striking and demolishing of Sisera's head before he is made to fall down. And for the process of the falling, again, three expressions, evidently intended to depict a slow sliding down, are used: he sank, he fell, he lay down.

[4] See in particular MOORE, *Judges* (in *The International Critical Commentary*), p. 163 and pp. 165 f.; BUDDE, *D. B. d. Richter*, p. 48; NOWACK, *Richter-Ruth*, p. 54 f.; KITTEL (in KAUTZSCH, *Die Heilige Schrift*, I), p. 375; GRESSMANN, *Die Anfänge Israels* (in *Die Schriften des Alten Testaments*, I, 2), p. 193 bottom; BURNEY, *The Book of Judges* (London 1920) a. l.

[5] WELLHAUSEN's characterization of chap. 4 as "eine Reproduktion, die die speziellen Züge verwischt" (*Prolegomena*, 4th ed., p. 242) is, at least in respect to vv. 19, 21, undoubtedly correct. It is strange, however, that W., in common with the commentators quoted in the preceding note, merely registers the discrepancy between the presentation of the poet and that of the prose narrator; the psychological difficulties involved in the poetical presentation itself have hardly been noticed at all. ZAPLETAL, *ibid.*, p. 96 bottom, goes even so far as to miss the discrepancy.

A stylistic difficulty, presented by the present shape of our strophe, is no less striking. The Hebrew text makes Jael, after having served the bowl of milk to Sisera, "reach her hand to a peg and her right hand to" something which the Massorah wants us to read *halmûth ʿamelîm* and which the "Septuagint,"[6] followed by the vast majority of modern translations and commentaries, renders with εἰς σφύραν κοπιώντων, that is a "hammer of workers." But, are we then to understand that Jael attacked her guest with *two* weapons, holding a peg in her left, and a "workmen's hammer" in her right hand? Of course not. Already WELLHAUSEN recognized that *yadah* does not necessarily mean χεῖρα αὐτῆς ἀριστερὰν, nor does *yemînah* in this juxtaposition mean δεξιὰν αὐτῆς; that rather the Greek translator simply mistook the parallelism which uses two different words for one and the same hand; hence "peg" and "workmen's hammer," too, are only parallel expressions for one and the same tool.[7] But this explanation, if correct, makes a poet who otherwise reaches the heights of plastic precision guilty of inadequacy. "Peg" and "hammer of workers" is a harsh, ill-balanced parallelism of identity. And what pray has a "workmen's hammer" to do in a Bedouin tent? Why workmen? Which workmen? Is it likely that a poet like ours, in the midst of an exceedingly vivid and graphic scene in which he reaches the climax of his revengeful passion, introduced a whole *stichos* adding nothing to the picture but a vague, trivial, irrelevant parallelism?

The greatest difficulty, however, is the linguistic one. It is this difficulty that has been pointed out by scholars more sharply than those just mentioned. The formation of nouns with afformative *ûth* presupposes a notoriously late period in the development of Biblical Hebrew. Moreover, this nominal form, especially when applied to tri-radical roots, always denotes an abstract idea, e.g. *yaledhûth*, "childhood," *malekhûth*, "kingdom," *ʿabhedhûth*, "servitude," &c.[8] Consequently, the word *halmûth*,[9] if we really were to read *ûth* and

[6] In truth, it is Aquila who in all probability is responsible for the rendering in question, contained both in the fifth and third columns of the Hexaplar; see FIELD a.l.

[7] Comp. *Die Composition des Hexateuchs*, &c., 3rd ed., p. 218. Notwithstanding this ingenious observation, WELLHAUSEN renders (*ibid.*, p. 217) יתד with "Stiel" and הלמות עמלים with "Werkhammer"!

[8] See BARTH, *Nominalbildung*, 2nd ed., p. 413 f. and BROCKELMANN, *Grundriß*, I, p. 415 f.

[9] The analogy of the traditional punctuation of the cited instances would, of course, require the reading: *halemûth*. However, it is most likely that also in those instances the original pronounciation was: *yal-dhûth*, *mal-khûth*, &c.; comp. SIEVERS, *Metrische Studien*, I, p. 22 f.

to render the word with the concrete idea of "hammer," would present in the time of Deborah not only a linguistic anachronism, but also a linguistic barbarism.

Besides, *ʿamelîm* does not mean "workers." It rather means, as G. F. Moore justly pointed out, "men who are worn out, or wear themselves out, with toil and hardship." In fact, one fails to discover a single instance in Biblical Hebrew where *ʿamel* is used unambiguously in the simple sense of "laborer," "workman." [10] So little, indeed, did the Septuagint conception of *halmûth ʿamelîm* as "hammer of workers" appear acceptable in Antiquity that we have almost as many varying renderings of this phrase as ancient Bible translations.[11] Rashi, who, when necessary, does not shrink from any exegetical daring, appears not to have thought it possible that *ʿamelîm* could mean anything but weary, tired. Accordingly he makes the word relate to Sisera "who was tired and exhausted." [12]

II

I believe that this linguistically inevitable conception of *ʿamelîm* proves to be also contextually inevitable, and that it leads, without the need of changing a single letter of the consonantal text, to the restoration of the original picture of the scene. If *ʿamelîm* relates to the "tired and exhausted" Sisera, then it is apparent that we must expect in the preceding word a verbal rather than a nominal expression. In this case the only possible reading would be *lehalmôth*, and the word would contain the Infinitive of a Hiphʿil of a לי״ה verb; the Qal of this verb would, of course, be *lamâ* and it would denote an action belonging to Jael's proceedings against Sisera. Such a verb with exactly fitting meaning we actually meet quite frequently in Assyrian where *lamû* is used now together with *kashadu*, "to overtake," "to capture," "to take possession of," now together with *ṣâdu*, "to hunt," "to chase," in synonymous or complementing juxtaposition. When used alone, *lamû* means "to enclose," "to surround,"

[10] This is also the case in Ps. 16, 26a for which Gesenius-Buhl registers the meaning "Arbeiter." The only instance where *ʿamal* appears to be free from the sense of "fatigue," "hardship," may be Ps. 105, 44.

[11] See below note 20.

[12] Without a word of reservation (such as פרושו, כלומר) which he as a rule applies when a passage occurs to him as problematical, Rashi simply remarks: עבלים, מיכרא שהיה עמל ויגע. Comp. Dt. 25, 18 and see also below III, 1 and 2.

"to hem in"; in German we would have to apply a verb with preformative *um*: "umgeben," "umschlingen," "umfassen."[13] It is perhaps not unimportant to observe that derivatives of *lamû* are familiar also to the language of the Amarna letters, the culture-historical sphere of which may in a sense be regarded as identical with that of our Song.[14] Of more importance, however, is the fact that *lamû* as a rule is used for an aggressive, hostile action of enclosing or surrounding; it frequently has as its object a mere personal pronoun, in which case it evidently can only mean "to attack," "to clutch."[15]

This observation alone—and there are, as will be seen, other reasons—would suffice to make us feel entitled, or rather obliged to consider the reading:

ידה ליתד תשלחנה וימינה לְהַלְמוֹת עמלים

as intended by the poet, and accordingly to render the line:

"Her hand to a peg she reaches,
And her other hand *to clutch the exhausted*."[16]

[13] See DELITZSCH, *Assyr. Handwörterbuch*, art. כשד, I. ציד and לטה; MUSS-ARNOLT, *A Concise Dictionary of the Assyr. Language*, p. 447b and 484b top.

[14] See in WINCKLER's *Die Tontafeln von Tell-el-Amarna* (*Keilinschr. Bibl.*, V), p. 19* to which perhaps *al-mi* of Letter 67, 8 (see KNUDTZON, I, p. 358) is to be added. Comp. BURNEY, *ibid.*, p. 144 bottom.

[15] Cf. in the Sanherib Inscription (RAWLINSON, I, f. 41; ABEL und WINCKLER, *Keilschrifttexte*, f. 19) col. v, l. 13:  , without any other object, such as *maḫâzu*, *dûru* or the like; hence not "ich aber schloß ihn mit einem Kordon ein" (BEZOLD, *Keilschr. Bibl.*, I, p. 105) nor "ich umgab ihn mit einem Belagerungswall" (ABEL und WINCKLER, *ibid.*, f. 79b), but rather "I attacked him on all sides" (DELITZSCH, quoted by MUSS-ARNOLT, *ibid.*, p. 484a).

[16] As in Is. 48, 13, Ps. 26, 10, &c., so here ימינה is merely another expression for ידה; the inference that both expressions refer to the *same* hand would be as unfounded as the rendering "right hand" and "left hand."—That ל, in dependence on תשלחנה, in the first half line is applied to a substantive and in the second to an infinitive is in Old Hebrew poetry not unusual. Of the many instances comp. only Ps. 34, 14: נצר לשונך מרע ‖ ושפתיך מדבר מרמה, "Keep thy tongue *from* evil, and thy lips *from* speaking guile."—The "plural" ending of *the exhausted* offers no difficulty. The great variety of cases in which Semitic languages apply this ending where no actual plurality is expressed (comp. in Hebrew חיים, זנונים, סנורים, זקונים, בעלים, צוארים, &c., see BROCKELMANN, *ibid.*, II, p. 59ff. and KÖNIG, *Syntax*, p. 207ff. and 279ff.) shows clearly that *îm* (*ûn*) originally was used as a suffix of discrimination in the widest sense of the word, and *hence* could also be applied to discriminate plurality (not *vice versa*). As an instance of similar context comp. אדוניהם נפל Jud. 3, 25.—For the indetermination of עמלים comp. in our Song ארץ, "*the* earth," שמים, "*the* heavens" (v. 4), מלכים, "*the* kings" (v. 19), &c.—On the Hiph. of Assyr. *lamû* see below note 21.

The strongest ground for this consideration is that it is demanded both by the text and the context: the scene itself and its literary presentation appear now truly perfect and life-sized. While Sisera, anxious to resume his interrupted flight and to reach the security of his castle, drinks the proffered milk in standing position, and bends his head over the large dish, his hostess seizes a peg and, after having made the arm[17] of her free hand clasp round his neck from behind in order to give her blunt weapon a solid point to work on, *preventing at the same time his attempts to escape*—she strikes blow after blow, and does not free her victim from her grip until she has smashed his skull, so that he *then* "sinks at her very feet," sinks, falls, lies dead. A scene of bloodthirsty imagination, but sculptured by the hand of a great artist.

III

All the difficulties then, stated above, appear to be actually unreal. They prove to be the result of misunderstanding and to vanish in the face of the original shape of our strophe. The only "difficulty" that historical criticism has now to consider is how to account for so gross a misunderstanding. How could so simple and so well preserved a line ever become completely confused? When did the confusion begin? Which of the two words was first misunderstood and are there any traces of their original meaning and correct understanding? It lies in the nature of our subject that these questions will never be answered with absolute certainty. Some light, however, may be thrown upon them by consideration of the following points which at the same time are, together with the facts already discussed, responsible for the suggested reconstruction.

(1) The conception of *ʿamelîm* as "tired," "exhausted," appears to be evidenced by the prose narrative already referred to. Verse 21 of that narrative tells that Jael executed her deed upon Sisera "for (properly: *while*) he was fast asleep and *weary*." The word which the English Version correctly renders by "weary," יעף,[18] like the word most akin to it, עיף, is used in the Old Testament as describing

[17] Instances like וימינו תחבקני, Ct. 2, 6, show that "hand" may be used in Hebrew where non-Semitic languages would require "arm." Comp. also the usage of Arab. *yad* and Assyr. *idu*.

[18] Vocalize with BUDDE, MOORE and others וַיֵּעָף.

one who becomes *weary by thirst*; in its verbal forms, this word is frequently paralleled with יגע,[19] another unambiguous expression for "tired," "exhausted."[20] It seems then that the author of chap. IV merely replaced the *ʿamelîm* of the poem by a more suggestive, perhaps more popular, expression. While he, as can be seen by his theological views, lived so much later than the poet that he could mistake the meaning of להלמות, as though it were equivalent to מקבת, he does not appear to have mistaken the meaning of עמלים.

(2) It has been stated already that the Septuagint's σφῦρα κοπιώντων, so commonly accepted by modern Bible translators, is not supported by the ancient Versions. A comparison of their various renderings[21] reveals the important fact that no less than three different ancient translators demand in greater or lesser degree the conception proposed in this paper. Both the Targum's "to break the wicked" and Alexandrinus' "decapitation of exhausted" (Moore) understood הלמות to denote an action, and עמלים as the object of this action. While it cannot be ascertained that they actually read *lehalmôth,* as is however quite probable, this reading is evidenced at least by the Vulgate, though the Latin translator, naturally enough, mistook the *ôth*-ending for that of a feminine plural. The only old version, which, but for a minor variation, appears to be in accord with the LXX, is the Peshitto; yet this may merely be another instance in favour of the well-founded theory that this Syriac version was not free from the influence of the work of the Septuagint.

(3) Commentaries and dictionaries when registering the meaning "hammer" for *halmûth* usually refer to the word *we-halema*, which

[19] Hence the direct connecting of עמלים and יגע by Rashi; see above note 11.

[20] See Is. 44, 12: לא שתה מים ויעף, on the one hand, and Jer. 31, 25: הרויתי נפש עיפה, on the other hand; see also Ps. 63, 2; 2 Sam. 17, 29 and passim. For parallel juxtapositions of יעף and יגע see Is. 40, 29, Hab. 3, 17, &c.

[21] The following table is arranged according to the measure in which the Versions agree with the suggested rendering or disagree with that of the LXX:

Alex.: εἰς ἀποτομὰς κατακόπων,
Targ. (doublet): לטהבר רשיעין,
Vulg.: ad fabrorum malleos,
Basil.-Vatic.: τοῦ εἰς τέλος ἀχρειῶσαι,
Syrohex.: ܠܡܫܒܪ ܚܣܝܢ ,ܠ
Peshitto: ܠܡܫܒܪ ܥܡܠ.

On Syrohex. see Field's note in his *Origenis Hexapla* a. l.

in the text of the Song immediately follows the discussed passage. This word, in fact, seems to bear the whole responsibility for the *maqqebheth* of the prose narrative and the σφῦρα of the LXX. Yet the reference is not altogether illuminating: for while the two words are in all probability derivatives of one and the same root, no plausible etymology of a root הלם has as yet been established. If, however, the root of הלמות be *lamâ*, in the sense of Assyr. *lamû*, the question suggests itself whether הלם, too, is not of the same origin, in which case the ה would merely be a preformative augmenting the defective *lamâ* with a "3rd radical."[22] Unfortunately, the Biblical passages where הלם occurs are not unambiguous enough to answer this question one way or another. I believe, however, that Rabbinical Hebrew has preserved for us passages where הלם is used in a sense strikingly akin to that of Assyrian *lamû*. Thus, for instance, in Bab. ʿAb. Zarah 44a bottom, we are told of the test (ʿedhûth) applied to the dynasty of David by means of the Davidic crown: שכל הראוי למלכות הולמתו וכל שאינו ראוי למלכות אין הולמתו. To render the meaning of this passage we have to translate הולמתו precisely like Assyr. *lamû*: the crown would only enclose, surround, hem in, clasp, the head of him who was worthy of the kingship.[23] Fleischer, it is true, suggested an etymological connection between Rabb. הלם and Arabic خلم, referring to خَالَمَهُ in the sense "er hat sich als Freund eng an den andern angeschlossen." But it is quite apparent that *eng angeschlossen* translates the *form* of the Arabic word rather than its root.[24]

[22] Comp. תלל and התל, טמם and אטם (ארח and רוח "to journey"?); other instances in Hurwitz, *Root-Determinatives in Semitic Speech*, p. 89 ff. The ה of הלם may represent causative determination: *to cause surrounding* or *clasping*, that is: *to hammer*. The corresponding form of Assyr. *lamû* denotes, indeed, the causative of the Qal.

[23] Here, again, Rashi proves to be guided by ingenious *Sprachgefühl*: הולמתו, יושבת בראשו יפה ומכוונת למדת ראשו; so also Bab. Sanh. 21b: שבקש להולמו חשב בראשו. A Hiph. of *halam* (Jastrow s. v. correctly: "to attach closely") is contained in Yer. Ter. x, Hal. 4.

[24] One might as well refer to the fact that أَخَاهُ, صَادَقَهُ or أَلَفَهُ mean "er hat sich (als Bruder, Freund oder Genosse) eng an den andern angeschlossen." For Fleischer's remark, see his Nachträge to Levy, *Neuhebr. und chald. Wörterbuch*, I, p. 358.

NOTES ON SOME MIDRASHIC TEXTS

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Mekhilta d'Rabbi Shimeon (ed. Hoffmann 103) on Ex. 20, 1. כך אתם ישראל נמשכתם לי נתמשכתם לי נקוי שתעשו לי רצוני. The context shows that in the difficult, נתמשכתם לי (נמשכתם לי is only a variant of it), we must look for a term indicating that Israel was *obliged* to do God's will. Therefore, I suppose that the original reading was נתמשכנתם לי, "you have been *pledged* to me." Now, נקוי also becomes clear: it is misread for נקיי, Aramaic plural of נקי, here used in the sense of Syriac ܢܩܐ "ready, inclined" (P. Sm. 2445, where several similar passages are quoted).

Midr. Haggadol (ed. Hoffmann 6) on Ex. 1, 7. פרו כבהמה ושרצו כגמלים ורבו כדגים ועצמו כגבורים. Instead of כגמלים, which does not fit with שרץ "to swarm," I dare to conjecture כנמלים "like ants."

Ibid. 12 on Ex. 1, 22 לפי שאסטרוגלין רואין ואינן רואין needs not be corrected into אסטרולוגין, but is quite right. For ἀστράγαλος means "ankle," and ankles provided with signs or figures were used for divination.[1] It is only strange that the Midrash designates here by the foreign word not the ankles themselves but the persons making use of them.

Bereshith Rabba 5, 2 (ed. Theodor 33) on Gen. 1, 9 עשר נודות נפוחות ומונחות בטרקלין צריך המלך למקומן. In this context טרקלין cannot be τρικλίνιον, but *torcularium*[2] "wine-press." The same word, in the full form טרקלרין, JASTROW[3] has recognised in two other passages of the Midrash. The oldest occurrence of it is in the Mishna Baba Bathra 1, 6, where ולא את הטרקלין can only mean the wine-press.[4]

[1] Comp. for reference PAULY-WISSOWA, *Real-Encyclopädie* V. 7, 93a.

[2] The Greek form, by the medium of which the Latin word must have wandered to the Jews, has not yet been found.

[3] Dictionary 558, see also KRAUSS, *Lehnwörter* II, 279 with the note of I. Löw.

[4] Comp. FELIX PERLES in the *Festschrift für Adolf Schwarz* (1917) 300, where reference is made also to the difficult passage Pesiḳta Rabbati 143a כל מי שהיתה לו בית טרקלים.

Aboth d'Rabbi Nathan (II) 12 (ed. Schechter 15a) נמצאו לו י״ב אלף זוגות של תלמידים בבתי כנסיות ובבתי מדרשות יושבים ושונים מאנטיפטרים ולפנים. Instead of ולפנים, we must read ולפנים[5] i.e. from Antipatris until *Paneas*, viz. from the south-west to the north-east. The parallel passage of Yebamoth 62b runs as follows: י״ב אלף זוגים תלמידים היו לר״ע[6] מגבת ועד אנטיפרס. The grotto of *Paneas* (Πανεάς)[7] occurs in different forms[8] in Rabbinical literature and is situated just in the neighbourhood of גבת, a later name for the Biblical גבתון.

Ibid. (II) 30 (ed. Schechter 33b) שלא יסתירו, which SCHECHTER cannot explain, surely belongs to סתר "to refute," so that we must read יִסְתְּרֵם or יִסָּתְרוּ.[9] On the same page, אל תסתיר במותיהם is to be corrected into אל תסתר "do not demolish."

Midr. Tillim 1, 1 (ed. Buber 2a) ודוד הוציא את ישראל משעבוד גליות is a comical mistake for גָּלְיָת "from the servitude of Goliath." The variant מלכיות offered by some manuscripts for גליות only tries to soften the unintelligible reading by a more general designation.

Ibid. on 18, 31 (ed. Buber 77b) למה הקב״ה מחכב את אברהם והצילו מכבשן האש ומתישעת המלכים. Here a mistake similar to that in the passage just referred to, has crept into the text. For the original reading was of course ומתישעת המלכים, viz. from the *nine* kings, mentioned in Gen. 14, 1ff., where it is expressly stated in v. 9 ארבעה מלכים את החמישה.

Ibid. on 78, 50 (ed. Buber 178a) דאמר ר׳ יהושע בן לוי כל מכה שהיתה באה עליהם מכת דבר שפה עליהם is an old mistake for שִׁפַּח "He has added to them."[10] This reading is corroborated by the quotation in the שבלי הלקט sec. 218 (ed. Buber 97a) ומפורש באגדת תלים כל מכה שהביא הקב״ה על המצרים במצרים הביא מכת דבר עם כל אחת ואחת. Besides this quotation suggests the reading עליה instead of the second עליהם, which also would go better with the whole text.

[5] It is true that we would rather expect ועד פנים instead of ולפנים.

[6] Almost in the same wording Bereshit Rabba 61, 3 (ed. Theodor 660).

[7] SCHÜRER, *Geschichte* 4 II, 204ff. deals both with the grotto and the town and the district named after it.

[8] פטיאס, פטייס, פניאס, פניים see KRAUSS, *Lehnwörter* II, 463a.

[9] LEVY, *Neuhebr. Wörterbuch* III, 601 erroneously does not keep asunder the two different roots which are combined in Post-Biblical סתר: (1) "to hid" and (2) "to demolish," "to refute" (the latter identical with שׁתר 1 Sam. 5, 9 Arabic شَتَرَ Acc. *šutturu*). BACHER, *Agada d. Tannaiten* 2, I, 72 n. 5 already conjectures יִסָּתְרוּ. Cf. also J. BERGMANN, *Jüd. Apologetik im neutest. Zeitalter* 55 n. 1.

[10] Comp. Is. 14, 1 ונספחו על בית יהודה.

Ibid. on 104, 26 (ed. Buber 223b) שם אניות יהלכון אלו האוניות שעושין לישראל שהם מכתיבין וגוזרין עליהם שמדות. Both Levy (*Neuhebr. Wörterbuch* I, 42a) and Buber consider אוניות to be plural of אוני (ὠνή) "purchase-deed." But this explanation is already contradicted by the verb עושין. Actually it is the plural of הוניה = אוניה "oppression," comp. the frequent phrase אמות העולם מונין את ישראל.

Ibid. on 119, 1 (ed. Buber 245a) והן הולכין ליהודה ומכתיבין בהן שהן גבורים שנאמר וגברתי ביהוה. In this form the verse referred to does not exist. But beyond all doubt the Midrash aims at Zech. 10, 6 וגברתי את בית יהודה. Now, the copyist perhaps has omitted the nota accusativi את, and then the abbreviated writing וגברתי בי יהו" was misread וגברתי ביהוה.

Ibid. on 119, 9 (ed. Buber 246b) שישוקדים ושוחרים וחוקרים באיזה דבר יבואו לחיי העה"ב. Instead of ושוחרים probably we should read ושוהרים "they are *sitting up*," which would fit well with שוקדים, whereas וחוקרים seems to be a later gloss to the already corrupted reading ושוחרים. The same confusion of the roots שהר and שחר also occurs in Shemoth Rabba 47, 5.[11]

[11] See Levy, *Neuhebr. Wörterbuch* IV, 515b.

LEONE DA MODENA AND THE CHRISTIAN HEBRAISTS OF HIS AGE

CECIL ROTH (LONDON)

Leone da Modena may perhaps be considered the first of modern Rabbis. This title could be justified by his attitude with regard to tradition and by the professional standpoint which he adopted in the Rabbinate. But far more characteristic was the fact that he was perhaps the first important Jewish scholar whose interest was in the exposition of Judaism rather than in the interpretation of Jewish law. This is a tendency which may be traced throughout his writings: but it comes out most pronouncedly in his external relations. No other Jewish writer till modern times represented Judaism to the outside world to anything like the same extent. He received the honour of flattering mention by Christian preachers from their pulpits. Prelates of high rank did not disdain to accept the dedication of his works. He was the author of the first compendium of the Jewish religion for the general information. Hardly a Christian visitor of eminence came to Venice—not excepting princes of the blood—without going to hear the marvellously eloquent preacher in the Ghetto: and some remained to sit at his feet.[1]

The fact of this intercourse with the Gentile world has hitherto been known mainly from the details given by Modena himself in his autobiography and Hebrew letters, together with scattered references in his published works.[2] The supplementary account which here follows is based principally upon a source of information which has

[1] See Leone da Modena's autobiography *Hayye Jehudah*, pp. 24, 33, 34, 40, 46, 50, 53, 57.

[2] Cf. Blau, *Leo Modena's Briefe und Schriftstücke* (Budapest 1905–6), pp. 59 seqq.; and letters cv, clxxv, clxxix.

For the question of Christian Hebraists in general, see Steinschneider, *Christliche Hebraisten*, in *Zeitschrift für hebräische Bibliographie*, vols. i–iv; and, for relations in the seventeenth century in particular, Kayserling, *Les Hébraïsants Chrétiens du XVIIe siècle* (Revue des Études Juives, xx. 261 seqq.): *Richelieu, Buxtorf père, et Jacob Roman* (ibid., viii. 74 seqq.): and *Les Correspondants Juifs de Jean Buxtorf* (ibid., xiii. 260 seqq.); and Dukas, *Lettres inédites écrites à Peiresc par Salomon Azubi* (ibid., vols. xi and xii).

thus far escaped attention. One of the two autograph manuscripts preserved in the British Museum upon which the edition of his Hebrew correspondence was based comprises also the rough draft of a number of Italian letters which the editor unaccountably neglected. A few of them are of only trivial importance, and need not detain us here.[3] Another, of peculiar interest, was written on behalf of the famous Musical Academy of the Venetian Ghetto, being the only solid piece of evidence from a Jewish source for the existence of that characteristic institution.[4] The rest comprises a series of seven letters, concerned mainly with questions of Jewish scholarship, written during the years 1639–40 to a number of Christian hebraists. It is upon them that the present study is chiefly based.

Second among the twenty-six professions which he exercised, mostly without success, at one period or another of his career, Leone da Modena ennumerates the instruction of Gentiles.[5] A couple of these, he himself signalled out for special attention. In the original manuscript, among "the sons whom I reared and nurtured, of my pupils," he mentions, by the side of Rabbis of note in their generation like Azariah Piccio and Benedetto Luzzatto, the names of two Christian scholars—Giovanni Vislingio and Vincenzo Noghera.[6] Evidently,

[3] For the sake of completeness, a list of them is here appended: all are in British Museum, MS. Or. 5395:

p. 4. Italian version of the preface of Samuel Cohen's צמח מענח (Venice 1640).

p. 18. Passover 1639. To "M^co Vita," of Ferrara, thanking him for gift.

p. 24–5. 26 August, 1639. Personal letter to the Wardens of the community of Rome, protesting against their slanderous report as to the inhospitability shown at Venice towards strangers.

p. 30. 23 October, 1639. To Tranquillo (Manoah) Corcos, Rabbi of Rome, reciprocating his greetings.

p. 31–2. 1 January, 1640. To "M^co Fornelli," at Rome, about his son (Leon's pupil) and R. Isaac Padovano.

p. 37. 8 January, 1640. To "M^co Beer," appealing for money for the marriage of his grandson Isaac with Esther, daughter of Judah Montescudolo, for which he needed 100 ducats (see *Hayye Jehudah*, p. 59).

p. 38. February, 1640. To Abraham Coppio.

[4] See my article "בזכרנו את ציון: *L'Accademia Musicale del Ghetto di Venezia*," in the *Rassegna Mensile di Israel*, of Florence, vol. ii. 1927 (also published separately).

[5] *Hayye Jehudah*, p. 64.

[6] B. M. MS. Or. 5395: "בנים גדלתי ורוממתי מתלמידי ..... Ill^mo S^r Giovanni Veslingio Anatomico e semplicista in p^o luogo in Padoa.

Il R^mo S^r Vincenzo Noghera teologo dell'em^mo Card. Sacchetti."

These names come after the Hebrew list published by BLAU, *op. cit.*, n. clxxxii.

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these two at least had gone far beyond the elementary stage in their studies. Letters to both are included in the present series.

Vincenzo Noghera was "theologian" of Cardinal Sacchetti, Archbishop of Bologna. It appears that, in about 1639, being on a visit to Venice, he made the acquaintance of Modena, and wrote to him shortly after his return to his own city. The other in his reply expressed his regret that they were not living near enough to one another to be able to study together.[7] From the note cited above, however, it would appear that, on some future visit, Noghera sat at his feet with some assiduity.

The second of the two had no professional interest in Hebrew. Giovanni Vislingio (as he was called in Italy) was a native of Minden in Westphalia, where he was born towards the end of the sixteenth century, and was educated at Vienna. Though deeply interested in the Humanities, he made a speciality of medicine and natural science. When his studies were ended, he went to Palestine, where perhaps he conceived his interest in Jewish subjects: and, on his return, he commenced to give private lectures at Venice. These met with such success that he was summoned to fill the chair of anatomy at Padua in 1632. Six years later, he commenced to lecture on botany: and in this connection he was sent to Crete to collect rare plants. He died in 1649, leaving a great name but no published work of any importance.[8] It does not appear that he made Modena's acquaintance while he was lecturing in Venice, as it was left to the latter's pupil, Benedetto Luzzatto, Rabbi at Padua, to bring the two into contact. Nevertheless, their subsequent relations must have been intimate for Modena to reckon him among his pupils. As a result of this, when a second edition of Leon's early lexicographical work, the *Galuth Jehudah*, was planned, he asked the professor to accept the dedication (the first edition had borne the name of the Patriarch of Aquilaea).[9] It has already been conjectured that these dedications were motivated by what might be expected from their object. If this was so, Leon had no reason to be disappointed in the present instance, as within

[7] Appendix of Documents, letter II.

[8] PADADOPOLI, *Historia Gymnasii Patavini* (Venice 1726) i. 365–6, where he calls him "immortale nomen." He was really responsible for the catalogue of Cretan plants published by Tommasino.

[9] Letter VI. It was originally intended to dedicate this to Cardinal Barberino: see letter III.

a short period he had occasion to pen a graceful letter of acknowledgement for the liberality of this new benefactor, to be indebted to whom he accounted an honour.[10]

Another lay Hebraist with whom Modena came in contact was Giovanni Argoli, son of Andrea Argoli, the noted mathematician. Like Leon himself, he first became famous as an infant prodigy, publishing his idyll *Della Bombacce e Seta* in 1624 at the age of fifteen. Two years later, he produced an epic poem, *Endymion.* Turning from this point to serious study, he received the degree of Doctor of Law at the University of Padua, and was appointed Reader in Fine Letters at the University of Bologna.[11] In 1640, when he entered into communication with Leone da Modena, he was engaged upon his edition of Onofrio Panvinio's *De Ludis Circensibus et Triumphis*, published two years later at Padua. In this work, he shows a certain amount of Jewish knowledge. In connection with the etymology of the word *circus*, he cited the Talmud, Midrash, and Targum: and (of the more modern authorities) the *Arukh*, Elias Levita, and David de Pomis.[12] In a different connection, he refers to Don Isaac Abravanel.[13] It was apparently with reference to this that he entered into communication with the Venetian Rabbi, to whom he had previously been a complete stranger: for he was interested in the new edition of the writings of the last-named scholar which it was proposed to publish in Amsterdam if a sufficient number of subscribers could be guaranteed, and in the diffusion of which Modena himself had been asked to collaborate.[14] It was probably to Argoli, and in this same connection, that a long fragment without superscription following upon this letter was addressed. The Rabbis had refused to admit as valid the testimony of מפרחי יונים—professional pigeon racers, as it is usually interpreted—a point which had obvious interest for the editor of the *De Ludis.* But Modena inclined to the alternative explanation, of pigeon stealers (it was natural for him, with his well-known proclivities, to discount any condemnation of gambling!):

[10] Letter VII.

[11] Mazzuchelli, *Scrittori d'Italia.*

[12] *F. Onuphrii Panvinii De Ludis Circensibus* (Padua 1642), p. 7, &c. Hebrew words are quoted also pp. 4 and 5.

[13] *Ibid.*, p. 1.

[14] Letter IV.

and it is very likely in consequence of this that Argoli makes no reference to this rather obvious passage in his work. At the same time, another enquiry bearing upon the tractate *Sanhedrin* was made. Did certain Rabbinic convictions to a loss of a share in future life imply that the soul, like the body, was generated by the parents, and could in consequence under certain conditions be considered mortal? Modena, with a noteable show of erudition though perhaps excessive confidence, denounced this opinion as heretical and schismatic.[15]

Better known in the annals of Jewish literature than any of these, and the most eminent amongst the Gentile correspondents of Leone da Modena, was Jean Plantavit de la Pause, Bishop of Lodève, whose acquaintance the Rabbi had made in 1610 at Florence, where they had been on intimate terms for a few days. A little later, they met again in Venice; and after his return home, Plantavit wrote asking the other whether he would be willing to fill the chair of Oriental Languages at Paris. In 1639, when the French prelate was engaged upon his great work, the *Planta Vitis*, he asked a friar who was going to Venice to request Leon for some Hebrew verses of commendation which he could append to it. The Rabbi's failing memory was refreshed by finding a sonnet which he had dedicated to the other on the occasion of his visit to Venice: and his poems figured first among those appended to the Thesaurus.[16] As soon as the first sheets of his work were printed, Plantavit sent them to Venice for Leon's

[15] Letter V. As a matter of fact, this opinion was confidently put forward by no less orthodox an authority than Joseph ibn Jahia in his work, דרך חיים, long considered lost, having been burnt at Padua in 1554. It has been the good fortune of the present writer to discover a manuscript copy made by his son Gedaliah ibn Jahia in 1560: see description in *Kirjath Sepher*, iii. 236–40.

In further reference to the MS. while correcting the proofs, the conjecture that it was to Argoli to whom this fragment was addressed was confirmed by noticing that the memorandum published by Blau, § 197 begins with the words זכור מה שכתב לי האגולי (not האגרוף, as printed). It was obviously in reply to the very interesting points there set down that this reply was penned.

It should be noted that the MS. is throughout replete with alterations and erasures which, while throwing a great deal of light on the meticulous care with which Modena worked, make the text unusually difficult to decipher and reconstitute. I must express here my deep gratitude to Prof. Umberto Cassuto, of Florence, for his extreme kindness in correcting the proofs.

[16] Letter I. This has already been published in a German translation by S. D. Luzzatto in *Jost's Annalen*, iii. 414. Cf. also Blau, *ubi supra*, p. 73–4.

inspection: it may be noted, incidentally, that they took four months on the journey—an excessive time even for those leisurely days. Leon's verdict was enthusiastic, but not adulatory. He acknowledged that it was better than any similar work in Hebrew, and complimented the writer on his erudition and industry. But at the same time he had no scruples in pointing out the misprints which pullulated even in so few pages. From this letter, it appears that Johann Christoph Wolf had several predecessors in the enterprise of composing a dictionary of Hebrew writers. Jacques Gaffarel, the French mystic who was responsible for the publication of the first edition of the *Riti Ebraici*, had commenced it: Plantavit himself collected as many as 700 names: and Modena himself had set his hand to the task, though (as he himself admitted) he fell short of that number by a couple of hundred. At the other's request, he sent him an interesting list of his own writings for inclusion in his work.[17]

The number of persons here mentioned is not large. But it must be realised that the letters included in this series comprise the correspondence of only the two years 1639–1640, when Leon was old and his powers were waning. Nor must it be thought that this represents the sum total of the Gentile scholars with whom he was in touch even in this short period. Fra Ignatio Rundi renewed his connection with the Bishop of Lodève, and inspected his library. The sheets of the French scholar's Thesaurus were displayed to a number of Christian scholars, as well as to Jews. In the same volume which contains these letters, there are noted down a number of names, no doubt of further acquaintances and correspondents: "Father Franchone, of Milan"; "Francesco Marchi, in the house of the illustrious Vicar of Riva"; "the illustrious Father Giovambattista Lucha, of Milan, came recently to find me."[18] Elsewhere, he noted down the loan of a copy of a Bible to a priest.[19] It would appear that with all of these he was on terms of some intimacy. We already know of his relations with Jacques Gaffarel, Fra Pietro Belocchio,

[17] Letter III. This information was utilised by Plantavit in the *Bibliotheca Rabbinica* appended to his *Florilegium Rabbinicum*, especially pp. 588–9. It seems highly probable that Modena misunderstood the other's reference to this comparatively modest work, an alphabetical index by title to 780 Hebrew books, imagining the project to be a dictionary of authors such as he and Gaffarel and simultaneously in mind.

[18] British Museum, MS. Or. 5395, pp. 16, 18, 25.

[19] *Ibid.*, p. 18.

Vincenzo Comonimo, Marco Marini, and a number of other scholars.[20] He was in touch even with distant England, presenting Sir William Boswell with the unexpurgated manuscript copy of the *Riti Ebraici* used subsequently by John Selden:[21] frequenting the house of the English ambassador in Venice (probably Sir Henry Wotton): and sending an anonymous Christian correspondent in England in answer to an enquiry a formal Responsum in Hebrew, accompanied by copies of a couple of his books.[22] When one considers the policy of repression which had been in force in Italy for nearly a century, this is a surprising record. Only one Jewish scholar of the age can stand comparison—Menasseh ben Israel, who enjoyed the advantage of a Protestant environment. But there is a marked difference between the two men and their activities. While the one was essentially a mystic, whose aid was sought out by such as were interested in the more delicate problems of theosophy, Leon shows himself in these letters an objective scholar, with a critical mind and an historical insight far in advance of his age. The founder of Christianity is considered impassionedly and vindicated as a Jew. The New Testament, with Josephus, is taken into account as a historical source. Philo is not overlooked, though he is put down as an adherent of the Essaeans. Leon is fully at home in the language of Christian theology, quoting the Vulgate without effort, and referring to Maimonides as Rabbi Moses of Egypt in full scholastic style.[23] The language may be baroque: but the atmosphere is that of the nineteenth century, and of the full tide of *Jüdische Wissenschaft.*

A point of unusual interest is the attitude which Modena apparently adopted towards Jesus. His erstwhile pupil, Giulio Morosini, informs us that he was in the habit of referring to him as "uomo da

[20] Blau, *op. cit.*, p. 69–70.

[21] See Selden, *De Successionibus*, p. 60: *Uxor Hebraica*, pp. 156–7. I have treated of these points at length in a paper on *Leon of Modena and England* read before the Jewish Historical Society of England on June 8th, 1926, which will be published in volume xi of its Transactions.

[22] See Modena's manuscript Responsa, זקני יהודה (B.M. Add. MS. 27, 148) n. xxxii: תשובה לגוי מאינגילטירה שלח לשאול באור ר"ת סיתה חוטש סדיון זרים.

[23] There is indeed a close analogy in these respects between Leon of Modena and Immanuel Aboab, author of the *Nomologia*. But there is the obvious difference that Aboab was born in Portugal and educated as a Christian.

bene ":[24] but, in a matter of this sort, it is impossible not to suspect the testimony of an apostate. Yet this tolerant attitude finds ample confirmation in other sources. Modena had no hesitation in pointing out that, in matters of doctrine, Jesus followed the Pharisees.[25] He accentuates, in his letter to England, the fact that crucifixion was not a Jewish penalty, but exclusively Roman: and hence, by inference, that the Jews had no part in the death of Jesus, for which their temporary rulers were exclusively responsible.[26] Bearing this in mind, it seems difficult not to identify Leone da Modena with the tolerant Rabbi "that spoke good Latin" upon whom Thomas Coryat forced an unmannerly disputation when he visited the Venetian ghetto in 1608, and who replied to the other's onslaught that "Christ forsooth was a great Prophet, and in that respect as highly to be esteemed as any Prophet amongst the Jews that ever lived before him; but derogated entirely from his divinitie, and would not acknowledge him for the Messias..."[27] All of this savours curiously of the twentieth century, if not later.

To the biography of Leone da Modena, the letters here under consideration add a few graphic details. Though he had another eight or nine years before him, the whole of the series is written in the despondent tone of an invalid who did not have long to live. Writing to a Jewish friend at Rome, Fornelli, on 1 January, 1640, he excuses himself for not having answered earlier, as for the past eighteen days he had been racked with rheumatic pains, from which he was not yet altogether recovered. At the same time, he expressed his sorrow that he had never been able to fulfill his desire to visit

[24] *Via della Fede* (Rome 1683), p. 105. Cf. SIMONSEN, *Giulio Morosini's Mitteilungen über Leon da Modena*, in Berliner Festschrift.

[25] Letter V.

[26] ..... אם כי חדשות אגיד לטעלתך כי דעתי היא שהיהודים מעולם לא המיתו שום אדם באותה צליבה כי לא הורשו ולא נהגו להמית אלא בארבע מיתות ב"ד סקילה שרפה הרג וחנק, ואת היתה מיתה שהיו דנים בה הרומאני וגם שהיו אז מושלים בישראל לא בשביל זה היו היהודים דנים בדיניהם .....

[27] *Coryat's Crudities*, ed. 1905, i. 374–6. Similarly, in his *Magen vaHereb*, § 5, in speaking of a projected work upon the interpretation of the Messianic prophecies, Modena notes that Jesus is reported nowhere in the Gospels to claim divine attributes. His grandson, Isaac min haLeviim, in his introduction, tells how the author used to steep himself in Christian, and even Mohammedan, theological writings. In the introduction to his *Sha'agath Arjeh*, Modena quotes about himself in the name of his Levantine interlocutor a similar opinion: "accustomed and expert in the disputations of the Gentiles and of the Christians more than any other of our generation, a shield and buckler of our Law": (see DE ROSSI, *Mss. Codices Hebraici*, i. 48–9, iii. 76).

that place, which he was now, he feared, too old to do.[28] Yet he was still active. To a communication that arrived late one Friday he was unable to reply immediately at full length since he was occupied in studying his sermons (in the plural!) for the next day.[29] One letter was written to Tranquillo Corcos, Rabbi of Rome.[30] It is of no great importance in itself: but it seems a little curious that two of the foremost Jewish scholars of the age should have chosen to correspond in Italian! Another point of interest is Modena's open avowal, in his letter to Vincenzo Noghera, that the *Riti Ebraici* (written for James I of England) was intended as a counterblast to Buxtorf's *Synagoga Hebraica.* It was for that reason that it concentrated on the fundamentals of Judaism rather than on the incidental ceremonies, some of which he frankly characterised as superstitious.[31] It is new, too, that among the enterprises in which he had made some progress was a Dictionary of Hebrew Authors.[32]

To those who are acquainted with Modena's autobiography, the *Hayye Jehudah*, the querulous tone of some of these letters of his old age will not come as a surprise. Nevertheless, one would hardly expect that he would air so openly before his Gentile correspondents his grievances against his correligionists. It is even more surprising that he should have gone so far as to request the charity of the Bishop of Lodève: though there is no evidence as to whether his petition was successful or not.[33] In close proximity to this in the manuscript is a begging letter "for a poor man" in Hebrew included in the published edition of Modena's correspondence (n. cciii). There can be little doubt that the "poor man" in question was Leone of Modena himself. It is regrettable to have brought to light so unfortunate an episode in the private life of one who was, in spite of all defects of character, among the greatest Jewish scholars

[28] B.M. MS. Or. 5395, p. 31 seq. "... Non spero più quel che tanto ho desiderato in mia vita, di venir a veder ql. Ill^re^ e benedetto ו"פ'פ, perchè mi sento al fin dell'esser mio .... Haurei p^a^ che hora fatta risp^a^ come dovevo, ma son stato 18 giorni a letto molestato da dolori, nè ancora ho ricuperato come è proprio de vechij la sanità ....."

[29] Letter IV.

[30] B.M. MS. Or. 5395, p. 30.

[31] Letter IV.

[32] Letter III.

[33] *Ibid.*

of his age. But the historian has no right to suppress what he finds: and this new detail, unfortunate though it is, adds another expressive touch to the completed picture of one of the most fascinating and most complex personalities of Jewish history.

But it is above all the background of these letters which calls for notice. The whole correspondence is pervaded by a spirit of friendliness, and even affection, between the Jew and the Christian.[34] Leon's is not the only case. He had been introduced to one of his most eminent correspondents by his pupil, Benedetto Luzzatto, upon the progress of whose attack of melancholy he was at pains to report.[35] Another pupil, Isaac Padovano, of Rome, shared his interest in the writings of the Bishop of Lodève, with whom he entered into correspondence through the medium of his master. He enjoyed, too, the intimacy of two French clerics, M. de Léon and M. Culliet, as as of other scholars in the Papal capital.[36] This was the traditional spirit of Italy—the classical country of friendships between Jew and Christian, as it has been termed—from the days of Sabbatai Donnolo and St. Nilus downwards. The instances cited above (and it must again be insisted that they cover only a very brief period of time) are enough to show that the Ghetto had as yet been powerless to execute one of the main objects for which it had been instituted. It is this consideration which perhaps renders the present essay not unsuitable as a tribute to one whose life was so largely devoted to bringing about a better spirit of understanding between the two faiths, and to whose memory Jew and Christian are here joined in doing honour.

[34] On only one occasion does Modena seem to have been on other than good terms with a Christian cleric: when, on his way to Florence, his mule collided with the friar with whom he was riding, with the result that they came to blows. See *Hayye Jehudah*, p. 32.

[35] Letters VI and VII.

[36] Letter III. Verses from Isaac Padovano are included in the *Rabbinorum nonnullorum Orientalium, Italorum, et Germanorum . . . testimonia encomiastica* appended to the *Planta Vitis*.

APPENDIX OF DOCUMENTS

(FROM BRITISH MUSEUM MS. OR. 5395)

I

p. 14.

All'Ill^mo Vescovo di Lodova.

Ill^mo e R^mo S^re

Girano gl'anni, e noi giriamo ancora, e in questo mentre molti giri vediamo, il R^do Padre fra Ignatio Rundi de'Riformati è capitato da me, e m'ha richiesto di far qualche versi in lode d'un'opera che è per dar in luce un gran Prelato, cioè raccolta de'sinonimi Hebraici, e conciò sia che m'habia dato in nota il nome e titoli di V. S. Ill^ma e R^ma, non mi servendo peranco la reminiscenza di lei, mi son reso difficile perchè la vecchiaia con il c(ari)co d'infinite tribolationi sempre m'hanno disseccato il verseggiare e reso derelitto dalle muse. Nel tanto m'è sovvenuto non so come di V. S. Ill^ma e R^ma quando fu a Fiorenza l'anno cred'io 1610 incirca, e che alcuni giorni trattai seco della lingua Hebrea e poi si rivedessimo qui in Venezia e dopo a ciò mi scrisse s'io volea esser condotto nello studio di Parigi per lettor delle lingue, e confrontando i contrasegni con il sudetto padre mi son certificato che senz'altro ella sij quel mio tanto riverito S^re, e ricorrendo alle copie de miei versi heb^i ho trovato un sonetto ch'io le feci quando fu qui in Ven^a il quale tosto m'ha prestato vena di farne un'altro che a quello segue in lode di questa sua degna fatica quali ambi collegati nel modo come le mando stimo che potrà honorarmi di stamparlo nell'opera, restando ella così servita. Acetti V. S. Ill^ma e R^dma quello che può dare un servo povero e sfortunato, vecchio ma tanto divoto verso lei quanto di forze deboliss°, e mi mantenghi nella sua gratia, come io prego il comun P^re, che la conservi felice, e gli faccio riv^za. Il farmi capitar un esemplar stampato mi sarebbe sommo favore, ma quanto prima perchè mi trovi con gl'occhi aperti per leggerlo.

Venetia 18 feb° 1639.

D. V. S. Ill^ma e R^ma

Humiliss° e divotiss° serv^re

L. M. R. H.*

* Leone Modena Rabbino Hebreo.

II

p. 22.

All'Ill^mo e rev^mo Mons^r D. Vincenzo Noghera
Theologo del Emin^mo Card^e Sacchetti.
Bologna.

Ill^mo S^r R^mo

A me non è punto meravig^a, che havendo lei conversato meco solo un 4° d'hora m'habbia preso aff^ne e che si sia mossa a scrivermi, perchè anzi essendo stato così breve il tempo non gl'ha lasciato conoscer le mie imperf^ni, e continuandole in mente quella vana inf^ne che gli diede di me la mendace fama, ha così seguito. Ma sia come si voglia, l'un e l'altro è stata mia gran ventura, che m'ha indegn^te fatto degno e della gratia e della lettera di V. S. Ill^ma, acquisto presso di me di tanta stima quanto conosco il valor del padrone del quale son divenuto serv^re. Il giud° fatto da lei intorno quella mia rel^ne de'Riti nostri, è rettiss° in quanto ch'il vero è ch'io ho hauto intent^ne di reprobar totalm^te quell'opera di Buxtorfio e dare vero conto delle cose essentiali lasciando quelle ch'etiando da nostri (ma d'ingegno) sono stimate superstitione. Questo è certo, ch'in tutte le mie fatiche di studio non ho hauto mai altra mira, che giovar al publico, e diffender la mia povera natione tanto depressa, et haurei fatto molto più se la fortuna con le cure mordaci fastid^zi non m'hauesse tanto molestato da che naqui, e lo farei ancora se già non fosse il mio sole tanto vicino all'occaso, deve però esser dal Cielo e da buoni virtuosi accettato il buon volere.

Che V. S. Ill^ma si dolga non essermi vicino per imparare, lasci dolersi a me che così non sia per servirla, da me poco potrebbe apprendere et io da lei molto restar(ei) favorito. E poi che chi trovò l'inv^ne delle lettere messive rimediò in gran parte alla distanza de'corpi, se alcuna volta con sue si degnarà commettermi l'inf^ne de qualche cosa circa le vostre servitù ch'ad altro non vaglio, e qual sia voglia comando mi sarà sing^r mercede, si come infin^te della gratia che mi fa in offerirsi in favorem accettandola gli rendo gratie.

III

p. 33 seqq.

All'Ill^mo e R^mo Vescovo di Lodova.

Ill^mo e R^mo S^r e P^rone

Mi trovo oltre modo favorito della cortesiss^a sua delli 20 Agosto solam^te ricevuta al fine di X^bre pass° insieme con li primi fogli

de'Sinonimi, e la mostra delle sentenze bibliche, e prima devo renderle gratie della memoria che ha tenuto e tiene di me per sola sua bontà e non per meriti miei, benchè non voglio negar certo che se mi fosse stato concesso l'esserle servitor di vicino non gli sarebbe stato di danno qualche racordo non mai come maestro ma come minimo, che alla giornata gl'havessi dato intorno a suoi pensieri nella sacra scrittura vecchia, poi che ella vi ha così curioso e buono talento, con la qual licenza dirò il mio parere intorno queste sue degniss^e^ opere.

E p^ma^ questa de' sinonimi, è vero che ve ne è una a stampa de quei della scritt^a^ e de' Rabini, la qual mostrai al P^re^ fra Ignatio riformato suo messo, e con altra gli saprò dir il nome dell'autore e dove è stampata, ma non vi ha dubbio, che non è da comparare in conto alcuno con questa sua per la compartitione e per l'amplificatione e quello che è più per l'addur 2 luoghi, e per le dichiarationi e annotationi, che quella è semplice, magra, e asciutta. Onde certo non è se non degna d'ammiratione e di lode, e tale la stiman alcuni belli ingegni heb^i^ e Christiani professori della lingua a quali l'ho mostrata, e desiderano tutti con me vederla finita di stampare. Nelle voci Rabini haurei hauto qualche avertim^to^ da dare, ma non è cosa di gran momento, nè è più a tempo.

Quanto al carattere della stampa e carta, non può esser più vago e degno essendo il medesimo che della Bibbia Regia, ma converebbe bene che tanto più fosse netto d'errori perchè le macchie appaiono più ne' panni fini che nei grossi.

Ho voluto faticarmi nella correttione, e mi è spiacciuto di trovarvene così gran quantità in 4 soli fogli come vedrà per la nota che inclusa le mando, affine che se altri non ne son stampati facci usarvi per l'avenire maggior diligenza, perchè sarebbe male che si dicesse la stampa è bella ma non buona.

Li altri doi delle sentenze non è dubbio che saranno, e di diletto ed utile massime con le annotationi dottiss^e^ che ella gli farà come posso giudic(are) da questa che veggo de'Proverbij di Salamone.

La Bibliotheca poi molti si erano dati a farla, ma niuno l'ha fatta, et anch'io ne ho fatto principio ma poi interlassata, però se lei è gionta al numero di 700 con li nomi degl'autori el trattato del Ab^o^, ha fatto quello che non sarebbe bastato l'animo di far a me, ch'io non passavo 500. Vi è però un Monsu Gaffarel francese di

Parigi che so che vi si affatica, e credo se ella non si affretta che lui la preuenirà.

Di me solam^te^ voglio notificarle che oltre il מדבר יהודה de mie Prediche giovanili ho a stampa un sec^o^ לב האריה 4° foglio trattato della mem^a^ locale, un terzo pur in 4° נלות יהודה dittionario di tutte le parole difficili della Bibbia nostra e de פרקי אבות e הגדת פסח e תפלה non per via di Alfabeto ma da verso in verso per ord^e^ della scritt^a^ e del resto con alcune regolette di Gramatica in principio da apprendersi per regolata prattica, qual era dedicato all'Ill^mo^ Patriarca d'Acquileia, hora è ristampato in Padoa con un'aggiunta d'un Vocabulario chiamato פי האריה de voci Rabiniche e di scrittori di scienze, non toccando però niente del Caldeo, ma solo di quelle che son mezze tra queste e quelle e usate da i scrittori con molti voci proprie delle scienze, e credo andarà dedicato All'Em^mo^ Card^l^ Barberino: un quarto צמח צדיק in 8° tratta delle virtù morali con sentenze de filosofi e detti de Rabini, un quinto in foglio בית לחם יהודה et è un'indice de tutti i trattati de Rabini del libro עין ישראל diviso sotto capi come יראה אהבה השגחה ec. che del capo si comprende quasi la dichiaratione molto caro a Pred^ri^ e tutti, un sesto in foglio che stampai già 4 anni chiamato בית יהודה di molti trattati Talmudisti de Rabini lasciati dal detto עין ישראל, posti nel suo stésso ord^e^ et espositori, e sopra la maggior parte alcune mie annotationi di moralità, qual vien abbracciato da tutti nostri con gran piacere. Questi sono a stampa, ma a penna ne ho molte le quali non se ne ha da far mentione, la ringratio da hora sommam^te^ poi dell'honor che mi farà nel connominarmi, che sarà tutto puro effetto della sua urbanità. Ma quello che mi pesa, è, che dice che si starà doi o tre anni pria che escano in luce le dette opere, perchè non è cosa ch'io habbia più e meno che anni, ne ho molto de'passati e pochi d'avenire, e similm^te^ mi increscе, che siamo tanti lontani che veggo per la sua de 20 Agosto riceuta se non alli 20 X^bre^ che si ricercano otto mesi ad haver risp^a^ d'una lett^a^, e me ne stupisco, tutta via fin che le sue mi trovaranno vivo ne haurà risp^a^, che se in questo mentre posso giovarle qualcosa a suoi dotissimi pensieri in torno a questa lingua e scritt^a^ se si degnarà di ricercarmene posponerò sempre ogn'altra cosa perchè resti da me servita.

Tra tanto, Mons^r^ Ill^mo^ e R^mo^ mio S^r^, l'infelice mio stato mi violenta a dirle quel che per altro tacerei, ad ogni modo la carta non s'arrossisse, e la magnanimità sua mi vi inanima. Io son vecchio indis-

posto e povero, abbandonato da figli e parenti e da questa Università de miei Hebrei ben conosciuto ma mal riconosciuto, onde vivo con non poca miseria. Vorrei racc^mi alla sua gentilezza ch'ella si compiacesse usar meco uno de suoi titoli, come il S^r l'inspira, ma che sia a tempo, chi oltre che ben sà che la carità è legge naturale da usarsi indifferentem^te ad ogni creatura, la impiegarà verso un suo aff^mo servo il qual desia di spender questo poco tempo che gl'avanza doppo quel di Dio in servitio suo.

E per fine che con questa e senza prega e pregarà sempre il commun S^r per la sanità sua e per l'esaltatione d'ogni sua maggior felicità con che humilm^te gli fa riverenza.

D. V. S. Ill^ma et R^ma

Divotiss° et Humiliss° servo.

Un mio già discepolo et hora Rabino in Roma de qualificata dottrina mi scrisse che facea quella fatica degl'Apoftegmi de Rabini, e hora havendole io scritto de le opere che V. S. Ill^ma e R^ma fa, e tra quelle questa delle sentenze Bibliche e de Rabini mi dice che colà in Roma da Monsu de Leon e Monsu Culliet et altri li vien nominato la virtù e grandezza di lei, si che desiderarebbe farsegli ancor lui servo come di già gl'è il suo Maestro, credo gli scriverà facendole riverenza e forsi gli mandarà qualche versi in lode delle sue opere, e m'assicuro che per tale lo accettarà. Il nome di questo è Rabi Isac Padoano.

IV

p. 40.

All'Ill^re S^r Gio. Argoli, Lettor in Bologna.

M. Ill^re et Ecc^mo S^re

Son troppo favorito della deg^ma sua, e sol mi pesa ch'ella ricorra per Acqua ad un esaustiss° fonte il qual potrebbe esser irrigato e somministrato della sua feliciss^a vena in ogni conto. Tuttavia, perchè m'addimanda materie proprie della mia proff^ne, non voglio con soverchia renitenza pretenderne ignoranza totale, e mi preparo a dirgliene il poco che ne saperò *** e così si compiacerà acettar da me quel poco che la scarsità del tempo, la debolezza dell'età e la sterilità dell'ingegno può darle in ess^ne del suo comando. In Amsterdam intendo anch'io che sono per ristampar l'opere de R. Isach Abarbanel, ma vorebbono p^ma haver fermezza di venderne qualche somma:

Hanno ricercato me che io le aiuti, ma vi vego poca strada, non so a che siano per risolversi. S'ella incontrassi in un R^mo Vincenzo Nogara Theologo di quel Em^mo, mi sarebbe favore che me le racomandasse servo. E venendo lei qui in Ven. e mi trovi vivo, mi sarà sempre caro il vederla per servirla e riverir la sua molta virtù come faccio al p.nte con l'animo. Di Venetia 30 marzo 1640.

D. V. S. M. Ill^re et Ecc^ma

Divotiss^mo et Aff^mo serv^re

L. M. R. H.

*** *The original reading, from this point, (scored through in the manuscript) ran:—*

Ma perchè hoggi di Venardì e tardi solo mi capitò la sua, e sono ocupato per studiar le Prediche per diman recitarle al solito, mi escusarà se sub^o non la servo come farò per il seg^te ord^io a Dio piacendo al meglio possibile, tra tanto la riverisco e gl'auguro felicità e contento.

V

p. 41—2.

E p^ma circa quel luogo di Sanhedrin al 3° che gl'Usurai giocatori di Dadi e quelli che faceano volare le Colombe, erano invalidi per testimonianza (così è l'interpretation giusta del testo della Misnà) vi sono due espositioni, l'una è quella che V. S. Ill^re et Ecc^ma dice haver trovato in quelle leggi, che avvezzavano le colombe a deviar le altrui, o con maschij e femine, o con cibi o altro modo, la sec^da è, che giocavano quale delle due Colombe dell'uno, o l'altro volasse più presto ad un segno. Ma a me piace più la prima perchè era altra spetie di furto e come professori di fraude non erano validi testimonij che la sec^da sarebbe il medesimo che il giocare a Dadi.

Quanto poi se fosse tenuto mai da setta d'Heb^i alcuna che l'anima nel generare si procreasse come il corpo da quella del padre et in conseguenza materiale, e mortale, dunque da alcune sette d'Heb^i scismatici fu creduto così, come da Saducei e Samaritani, come riferisce Joseffo, ma non da veri Heb^i cioè da scribi et Farisei, la Dottrina de quali ne gl'articoli di fede fu seguita etiam dal v^ro S^re come s'attesta in S. Matteo Cap° 23 quando ci disse *super Cathedram Moysi sederunt scribae et Pharisei omnia ergo quaecunque dixerint vobis servate et facite secundum opera vero eorum nolite facere* etc. e così è seguita da tutti noi heb^i sin a questo giorno in tutto e per tutto, e se ben alcuni hanno opposto al gran Rabi Moise Egitio ch'in

certi luoghi delle sue opere pare che tenga che l'anime de gl'empij s'estinguano, e che tutte le anime siano solamente una virtù disposta all'intendere, e che non tutte debbano resurgere, vien però diffeso gagliardam^te^ e dimostrato, che de gl'empij intende quello che tante volte vien detto nel Pentateuco *Peribit anima illius de medio populi sui*, che sia una più dell'altra disposta ad intendere e prefettarsi e della resurrettione, cioè che dice Daniel cap° xii *e multi de his qui dormiunt in terrae pulvere evigiliabunt alij in vitam eternam et alij in opprobrium ut videant semper* ma non che ne segua che tenessero l'anime mortali e così in questo R. David Chimici (e sono discorsi che estensivam^te^ ci vorrebbono volumi profondi non una come questa letteruccia familiare, seben al persticaciss° suo ingegno so che basta un cenno). E se Philone ha troppo Platonizato in questa et altra grave materia, per ciò non è stato accettato da noi, ne mai sono stati tradotti in heb^co^ i suoi libri nè si trovano presso li heb^i^ ancor che per altro dottissimi et eccellentj, e si crede che fosse più tosto della setta degl'Essei che altro, e s'accostò troppo alle opinioni de Greci. Ma se i Rabbini n^ri^ in Sanhedrin dicono che quelli che perirono nel Dilluvio non hanno parte nell'altro mondo, o non si levaranno nella ressurettione, non è per certo per che morissero in acqua nè la parola היקום può voler dir ressurettione per che non haurebbe senso il dir annichilarò la ress^ne^ che ho fatto, ma vuol dir sostanza, come nel fatto di Deut° xi. vien usata, ma credono alcuni che non siano salvati ne siano per risorgere per il grave lor peccato, nè è però che l'anime che non risorgeranno siano credute estinti e che non rimangano nelle eterne pene. Et in fine tanto è lontano che gl'Heb^i^ seguaci de Farisei sin hoggi come dissi credano che l'anime siano generate da quelle de Padri e pò mortali, quanto che per validissimo argomento se ne valemo anco noi in negar ch'il peccato originale si sia mai diffuso nell'anime de posteri d'Adamo, e come nel profeta Ezekiel 18 *ecce omnes animæ meæ sunt ut anima patris ita et anima filii mea est: anima quae peccaverit ipsa morietur* et restum: *filius non portabit iniquitatem patris.* Bensì i corpi si hanno da lui con quelle maledittione e difficoltà al ben operare che per il peccato furono causate nel suo, come corpi originati dal suo corpo, ma l'anima non mai sia stata dannata nè impedita per il suo peccato essendo da Dio immed^te^ infusa nella creatione. Questi son discorsi e...

VI

Al S^r Anatomista. p. 43.

Ill^mo S^r e P^rone

Con il S^r Benedetto Luzzatto al quale devo molto per havermi introdotto alla servitù di V. S. Ill^ma, ho molto già discorso che la ricercasse lei se si fosse compiaciuto ch'io me honorasse con il suo nome in certa mia opera che là in Pad^a si ristampa, come P^ne universale nelle virtù. Et hora che il tempo mi stringe ad haverne rass^ne, odo che esso S^r Benedetto è oppresso da certo humor melanconico che lo rende inhabile a conversare. Per tanto ho pregato il presentator della presente, persona di qualificata scienza e mio amico, che gl'esporerà il mio desiderio, accompagnando la mia efficace suplicatione, se ne sarò aggratiato lo riputerò a buona mia fortuna et a favore singolariss^o, e quando no, non scemarò però punto di quell'affettuoso ossequio che ho preso à portarle, e di pregar il S^re per l'augmento d'ogni sua maggior felicità. Ven^a 19 Aprile 1640.

D. V. S. Ill^ma

Divotiss^o e minimo serv^re

VII

Ill^mo S^r e P^rone p. 46.

Bastava bene assai l'honore da me riceuto nell'aggradir V. S. Ill^ma con occhio così benigno ch'io mi sia ornato del suo nome in quella mia fatica, senza ch'ella vi accrescesse ancora effetto di cortesia così degno. Io mi le trovo di doppio ponderoso peso hobligato, havendo riceuto da lei honore et utile, non posso, ma s'io potessi anco non voglio, scaricarmene mai nè disobligarmi, perchè troppo mi torna gloria esser debitore di così insigne creditore, piaccia pur a lei di conservarmi tale, e se la mia servitù può durar poco, si mantenga in lei la memoria di me a lungo, ch'io quanto durarò pregarò il commun S^re che la conserva, e mantenga in quel felice stato che più si può desiderare, con che riverente le bacio le degne mani.

Il S^r Luzzatto segue tutta via nella sua Melanconia.

Ven^a 30 Maggio 1640.

D. V. S. Ill^ma

Riverentiss^o serv^re

L. M.

THE INHERITANCE OF ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN ACCORDING TO JEWISH LAW

CHAIM TSCHERNOWITZ (NEW YORK)

In ancient Israel, as in other nations of antiquity, no great distinction was made between blood relationship (cognation) and artifical kinship (agnation), created by any sort of attachment to a family, e.g. through adoption and the like. The ruling principle was that any one, whether kinsman or stranger, who was accepted under the rule of the head of the family, was considered as his son in all respects. Such a one was able to associate himself with the religious cult after the death of the head of the family and automatically he inherited from the latter. In accordance with this rule, the Hebrews did not distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate children with regard to inheritance and sometimes a stranger could become the heir. Thus we find that Abraham's servant, Eliezer, would, of necessity, have entered into the inheritance of Abraham, had not Isaac been born (Gen. 15, 3). In this verse, Abraham calls Eliezer " a *son* of my household," which is evidently a well-known term, pointing to the established custom that the servant, who governs the household and who is accepted as " son of the household " possesses the right of heirship. It is true that the custom of adoption is never distinctly provided for in the Law of Moses as in the Code of Hammurabi (sec. 185–193). There are, however, indications of its existence amongst the family rights of ancient Israel. Thus Jacob accepted Ephraim and Manasseh amongst his children, so that they inherited a share of the Holy Land on the same terms as his other sons (Gen. 48, 5).

The Hebrew family, as represented in the Laws of the Pentateuch, rested on the basis of *patria potestas* and the children belonged to their father's family.[1] At the same time the Scripture narratives yield

[1] " ' By their families, by their *fathers*' houses.' (Numb. 1, 2.) From this verse we learn that family relationships are to be reckoned on the side of the father and not of the mother." (B. Bathra, 109 b.)

numerous traces of a primitive matriarchate in Israel, especially in the case of exogamous marriages.[2] These traces, however, may possibly be referred to a period, far more primitive than that of the Pentateuchal legislation. The latter was based upon the lordship of the father, especially in his capacity as head of the family, although the mother always retained a fitting position in household life and in the bringing up of the children. As the father possessed this preponderance of power, it followed that no distinction was made between legitimate and illegitimate sons with regard to inheritance, in contrast with Greece and Rome, where illegitimate children received no share in their father's estate. The prevalence of Polygamy was, in itself, opposed to such distinction. The sons of concubines had equal rights with those of full wives (האמהות) and they inherited, as an ordinary rule, together with their other brethren (Gen. 21, 1). In the Division of the Holy Land, no difference was made between the children of Leah and Rachel and those of their hand-maids. In the case of Jephthah, however, we find that his brethren drove him out from his father's house and said to him, "Thou shalt have no inheritance in the house of our father, because thou art the son of another woman." (Judges 11, 2.) There is, however, no decisive proof that Jephthah's brothers treated him in accordance with the recognised law and usage. Perhaps they just relied upon brute force and were actuated by some political motive. This supposition would explain Jephthah's speech to the elders of Gilead, "Are not you the men, who hated me and drove me out from my father's house?" Jephthah holds the elders of Gilead as responsible for the (illegal) act of his brothers.[3]

The Biblical view, which considers a son, whether born in wedlock or a natural son, as his father's heir, continued to be a principle of Talmudic jurisprudence, both in its original form and as afterwards developed. The right of inheritance always depended upon the father's identification of his son as such. The evidence of the father was considered conclusive when he testified that a given person was his son or his first-born, as the case might be, although the latter had not been known as such by common repute. Thus the Bible teaches,

[2] Robertson Smith, *Kinship and Marriage in Early Arabia*, London 1903, chapter III.

[3] Sam. Mayer, *Die Rechte der Israeliten, Athener und Römer*, sec. 202. Benzinger, *Hebräische Archäologie*, sec. 19.

"He (the father) shall acknowledge the first born, the son of the hated." (Deut. 21, 17.) A Baraitha adds this comment: "He shall make others acknowledge his first-born as such."[4] Hence R. Judah said, "A man is a competent witness to testify that such a one is his first-born." (Kiddushin 74 a.) Or as Maimonides paraphrases it: "The father's evidence is always accepted, even when he declares some one to be his son or his first-born, who was never known to be his son." (Laws of Inheritance, chapter 2, sec. 14.)

We read in the Mishna: "He that has a brother *from any source* (מכל מקום) causes the latter's wife to incur the obligation of contracting a levirate marriage (if she be left a widow without children); and he counts as a brother in every respect, unless his mother was a slave or a non-Jewess. A son from any source frees the father's wife from the obligation to contract a levirate marriage (because the father is not considered childless); he is subject to the death penalty for beating or cursing his father; and he counts as a son in every respect, unless his mother was a slave or a non-Jewess." (Yebamoth II, 5.)

What is meant by the cryptic term "from any source"? It may be explained as meaning one born out of wedlock, without canonical rites. It is difficult, however, to suppose that it refers to the *mamzer*,—the bastard, accordingly to the sense in which this term is used in Jewish Law. If the Mishna had in mind the *mamzer*, who might have been supposed most seriously disqualified, why did it not state his privileges in express terms instead of referring to them vaguely and incidentally. Besides, the preceding paragraph of the Mishnah provides that intermarriage between Jews and bastards is forbidden, lest purity of descent become impaired. Hence the bastard, whose brother has died childless, must release the widow by the rite of *halitsah*, instead of contracting a levirate marriage with her. According to this paragraph, on the other hand, a "brother from any source" is commanded to marry the childless widow. If, therefore, the term "brother from any source" includes bastards, there is a contradiction between the two paragraphs.[5]

[4] Retaining the force of יכיר as a causative.

[5] The authors of Tosaphoth (Yebamoth 22 a, catch words מי שיש) observed the contradiction between these paragraphs of the Mishna. They do not, however, understand that this contradiction is chiefly concerned with the question of levirate marriage, because they explain the Mishna in accordance with the Gemara.

We may learn from another passage that the question whether a *mamzer* can inherit was undecided in the era of the earliest-Tannaim. We read in the Tosefta: "They asked R. Eliezer, 'Should a *mamzer* perform the rite of *halitsah*?' He asked a counter-question, 'Can a *mamzer* inherit?' '*Can* a mamzer inherit?,' they repeated. 'Should he perform the rite of halitsah?' said he... It was not that R. Eliezer wished to evade their inquiries, but he never said anything, which he had not received from his teacher." (Tosefta Yebamoth III, 3, Yoma 66 b with slight variants.)[6] If the laws regarding the *mamzer* had been so clear in the Mishna, R. Eliezer must certainly have heard of them and the other Rabbis would not have thus questioned him. The passage, cited from the Mishna, is given as the general decision of the Rabbis and its style attests its antiquity; there is no proof, however, that the phrase "a brother (a son) from any source" refers, in its exact sense, to a bastard.

We read, however, in the Babylonian Talmud: "A brother *from any source*,—what do these words include? Rab Judah said, They are to include the *mamzer*. But are not his rights too obvious to need stating? He is his brother..." (Yebamoth 22 a). A few lines further on, the Gemara discusses the words of the Mishna, "A brother from any source counts fully as a brother." It asks, "What practical decision is here involved?" "He inherits from him." We see therefore that the Rabbis of the Babylonian Talmud had no hesitation in declaring a *mamzer* to be entitled to the same rights as his other brothers. (In the Palestinian Talmud, however, the statement that a son "from any source" counts fully as a son, is said to imply that even through him the father has fulfilled the precept to propagate

[6] Jacob Brüll in his *Introduction to the Mishna* (p. 274, note 31) suggests with much probability that the questions exchanged between R. Eliezer and his companions contained hidden references to Jesus of Nazareth. Thus he was asked, "Shall the shepherd save the lamb from the lion? Shall the shepherd be saved from the lion?" These questions contain metaphorical expressions, commonly used by the early Christians to symbolise Jesus and the Church. R. Eliezer was also asked, "Will such a one unnamed פלני have a share in the hereafter?" Here the reference to Jesus seems unmistakeable. R. Eliezer, as we know, was once arrested by the government on the charge of being a Judaeo-Christian (Tosefta Hullin, chapter 2, Abodah Zarah 16 b) and his associates may have tested him with these questions to which he returned evasive answers. See also *Dor* part I, p. 221 and part II, p. 79, where I. H. Weiss refers to R. Eliezer's alleged Christian tendencies.

the species.[7] It is not stated that such a son is his father's heir. Possibly, therefore, it was not clear to the Palestinian Talmud whether the *mamzer* inherits from his father.)

The principle, laid down by the Mishna, that a son from any source, even if his origin be unworthy, has all the privileges of sonship, was not universally accepted in the days of the Tannaim and Amoraim.

In Deut. 21, 15–17, we read that if a man has two wives, " the one beloved and the other hated," and the hated wife bear to him his first-born son, then the latter retains the right of primogeniture. The Talmud explains that the terms " beloved " and " hated " mean beloved and hated by God; it asks, " How can God thus show preference? " The answer is that the one wife is beloved because of her blameless marriage and the other is hated because of her illicit marriage (Kiddushin 68 a). On the strength of this Midrashic interpretation, there is founded the rule that the offspring of marriages forbidden but not penalised (e.g. between a Cohen and a divorced woman) possesses a legal status and is as though born in wedlock, so that he possesses all rights of inheritance and even the special privilege of primogeniture. R. Akiba, however, was of the opinion that the offspring of marriages thus forbidden was regarded as though born out of wedlock. He pronounces the child of any forbidden connection to be a *mamzer* (Mishna, Yebamoth IV, 13). In the words of R. Simay, " R. Akiba bastardised the offspring of every forbidden connection, except that of a high priest and a widow, where the language of scripture shows clearly that this penalty was not intended." (Kiddushin 68 a.) A majority of the Rabbis, however, disagreed with R. Akiba. Their view is that which was expressed by R. Jeshebab " Go to, let us cry out against Akiba ben Joseph who declared the offspring of every forbidden union in Israel to be a bastard." (*loc. cit.*) The recognised decision was in accordance with the opinion of R. Joshua that none was a *mamzer* except a child, born of an

[7] In the printed editions of the Palestinian Talmud, we read: " He is his son even with regard to the propagation of the species and with regard to a forbidden connection of the second degree (ולשניה)." Commentators on the passage, following Solomon ben Adret, explain it to mean that the laws relating to incest of the second degree apply to such unions. But why should these forbidden connections be singled out from all others? It is better to adopt the reading ולא שניה suggested by other commentators and to emend the printed text.

incestuous union, to which the Torah attaches a death penalty.[8] The Mishna supports this interpretation of *mamzer* by citing a family register, found by Ben Azzai where "that man" (i.e. Jesus) was recorded as being a *mamzer*, i.e. the adulterous offspring of a married woman. (Yebamoth IV, 13.)

Thus the Halachah only applied the stigma of bastardy to the offspring of an adulterous wife or of one, who had committed incest within the degrees of kinship, forbidden in Leviticus. In no other system of ecclesiastical or civil law has there ever been such a humane provision. The Talmudic legislation recognises only natural descent with regard to inheritance: it does not permit defects of birth to diminish rights of inheritance or even special privileges, such as that of primogeniture.[9]

With regard to the status of children, born as the result of intermarriage between a Jewish and a Gentile woman, the Mishna lays down the following rule: "Wherever a betrothal is valid and no sin is connected with it, the issue follows the legal status of the male parent, but wherever the woman cannot contract a valid marriage either with that special person or with any other Israelite, the issue follows the status of the mother. This last rule applies to the union of an Israelite and a slave-girl or a non-Jewess." (Kiddushin III, 12.) Whereupon the Gemara (of the Babylonian Talmud) proceeds to ask, "From what verse in Scripture is this doctrine derived?" R. Yochanan in the name of R. Simeon ben Yohai said that it is derived from the following verse, "He will turn away thy son from following me." (Deut. 7, 4.) Thy grandson, whose father is a Gentile, is here called thy son: this implies that the son of a Gentile mother is not called thy son but hers.[10]

In the Palestinian Talmud, however, some of the Rabbis hesitated to accept this doctrine. We there read: Jacob of K'far Nibburaya

[8] This rule is not made quite clear in the Mishna, where some passages contradict others. See Yebamoth X, 3; Kiddushim III, 12. See also Tosephoth Yom Tob on latter passage, catch words כל מקום.

[9] Maimonides states, in express terms, that the bastard, who is a first born, takes a double portion of his father's estate in accordance with Deut. 21, 17 (Laws of Inheritance II, 12).

[10] This rendering, in which בנך is translated "thy grandson," is in accordance with RASHI's interpretation of the Gemara. See note 12.

went to Tyre. He was asked whether the son of a Gentile woman and a Jewish father should be circumcised on the Sabbath.[11] He proposed to permit this to be done on the strength of the verse " They declared their pedigrees after their families by their *fathers'* houses." (Numb. I, 18.) R. Haggai heard of it and ordered Jacob to be brought before him for punishment. " What is your authority for punishing me? " asked Jacob. R. Haggai then cited Ezra 10, 3 " Let us make a covenant with our God to put away all the wives " —the foreign women of the peoples of the land. To this Jacob objected that he could not be punished on the authority of a verse in the Hagiographa, but R. Haggai reminded him that the end of this verse reads, " let it be done according to the Torah." Ezra was carrying out the dictates of the Mosaic Law which provides that the child of a Jewish mother and a gentile father is " thy son " i.e. Jewish, whilst the child of a gentile mother and a Jewish father is not thy son but hers (Yebamoth II, 6, also Kiddushin III, 12 with some verbal variants).

Jacob of K'far Nibburaya certainly gave a correct interpretation of Number I, 18, and undoubtedly the ancient rule was to trace descent through the father and not through the mother. In ancient Israel, the offspring of mixed marriages was considered to belong to the father's family, for many of the kings of Israel married foreign wives and begat sons who succeeded to the throne. The Kingdom of David was inherited by Solomon, whose mother was the wife of Uriah the Hittite.

At the same time, R. Haggai's inference from the verse in Ezra furnished him with a sound answer to Jacob. It is almost certain that a new law, with regard to the children of gentile mothers, was enacted by Ezra when he caused them to put away all the foreign wives " and such as were born of them " (Ezra 10, 3). It appears that they then agreed that the children, born to these heathen wives, should be considered to trace descent through their mothers only. The attempt made by R. Simeon ben Yohai to deduce this doctrine from Deut. 7, 3 and 4 was a mere mnemonic device (אסמכתא בעלמא). In this latter passage, the plain meaning is, " Contract not a marriage

[11] A Jewish child is circumcised on the eighth day after birth, even if it fall on the Sabbath. A gentile child may only be circumcised on a working day.

alliance with them lest he (the bride's father or his heathen countrymen) turn away thy son from following me.[12]

In the middle ages, some scholars, who were under the influence of Aristotelian philosophy, contended that questions, relating to marriage and the inheritance of children, should be decided in accordance with the principles of natural justice, without taking account of religious prescriptions. Amongst these men was R. Israel,[13] who wrote as follows to Rabbenu Asher ben Jehiel, one of the greatest Talmudists of the 13th–14th centuries: "Certain propositions are established by reason, but disregarded or modified by the religionist. Thus reason dictates that, if any man whether Jew or gentile, take a woman and single her out to bear him children, she is to be called his wife: on rational principles, any other man who becomes her paramour destroys the foundations of society... Then comes the religionist and removes the tie, so far as it relates to an idolater, declaring that an idolater's marriage is no marriage and that the only valid marriage in existence is that solemnised by a Jew with the proper religious rites. Hence the wife of a Jew is his wife in accordance with the principles both of reason and of religion; the wife of a non-Jew is his wife in accordance with the principles of reason only but not of religion... With regard to the present case '(which concerned the disposition of the property of a deceased wife)' it seems to me that reason dictates that persons should be permitted to leave the products of their labour and their toil to whom they will and that anyone whatever, designated by them, should be

[12] Deut. 7, 3 and 4 is explained as above in modern commentaries, e.g. in KEIL-DELITZSCH, *Biblischer Commentar*. Rabbenu Tam (Tosaphoth to Kiddushin 68b, catch word בנך) also understands it in this sense: he proceeds to deduce from the verse R. Simeon ben Yohai's doctrine that the son of a gentile mother is a gentile, but he has to resort to a very strained interpretation. RASHI, on the other hand, explains "he will turn away *thy son* from following me" as meaning "he will turn away thy grand-son," the son of an Israelite mother, who alone is described by Scripture as *thy* son. RASHI well understands the meaning of R. Simeon ben Yohai, however little his interpretation is in accord with the literal meaning of Scripture.

[13] He was the brother of Isaac Israeli, the younger, the celebrated astronomer. The question at issue was whether a local ordinance of the congregation of Toledo was to be interpreted in accordance with the principles of secular logic or of the Torah and Talmud. The ordinance was written in Arabic. Rabbenu Asher accepted R. Israel as an competent translator from the Arabic but not as a legal expert. See *Dor* V, p. 61, note 3.

entitled to inherit... According to our present practice, there are three kinds of inheritance: inheritance *de facto* (e.g. by the right of the stronger), inheritance as recognised by reason, inheritance as recognised by religion."

Rabbenu Asher, however, strongly opposed the views of this scholar and declared that the science of secular logic must not be used in order to interpret the rules of the Torah. "Thanks be to God," said he, "that I am able, so long as I live, to expound the Torah in Israel and to prove my statements by means of the Mishna, the Talmud Babli and the Talmud Jeruschalmi. So shall the congregations not need to borrow illustrations from logic in order to decide questions of Jewish law, seeing that the science of philosophy and the science of Torah cannot be harmonised, one with the other." (Rosh, Responsa LV, 9.)

This passage gives us a good idea of the various currents of thought which existed in mediaeval Jewry and of the conflict of views, which divided the Rabbis from free-thinking philosophers.

In the period of the Geonim there arose a new question which is not mentioned in the Mishna or the Talmud. Can an apostate inherit the property of his father, the Israelite? Many responsa of the Geonim are concerned with this question. Why this question was first discussed during this epoch is not explained in Geonic literature, but it probably became urgent owing to the forced conversions, which followed the rise of Islam. There are indications from contemporary literature that the gentile neighbours of the Jews interfered with their family life: one of the decrees made by the Geonim with regard to wives, who rebel against their husbands, refers to the case of "daughters of Israel who apply to gentile courts in order to receive from them a bill of divorce without their husbands' consent." (Shaari Tsedek IV, 4, 15, Hemdah Genuzah, sec. 140.)[14]

It may be said in general that this was a period of neglect and decline, for which reason the Jewish authorities strove to strengthen family ties and to exclude apostates from the right of inheritance. Most of the Geonim argued that the apostate should be thus disqualified, because he had abandoned "the holiness of Israel and the

[14] See *Dor* IV, p. 9, note 14.

holiness of his father" (Hemdah Genuzah sections 52, 53; Shaare Tsedek IV, 3, 25). This is a principle quite unknown to the Talmud, where we do not find that any kind of inheritance depends at all upon holiness except succession to the priesthood, which is indeed an inheritance of holiness. We cannot suppose the apostate to be inferior to the *mamzer*, who certainly does not possess the holiness of Israel, seeing that he is forbidden to enter the congregation (Deut. 23, 3). Some of the Geonim sought support for their words from Yebamoth 100b which refers to the privileges of those who rightly belong to their father's family, in supposed contrast with the apostate, who does not so belong. But this proof is also weak, for the Gemara only intends to exclude from the line of descent the offspring of heathen women and of slave-girls, on the ground that the children of unlawful marriages were considered to belong to their mother's family. The Gemara never suggests that the apostate belongs to any other than his father's family; this idea was initiated by the Geonim. Similarly the Geonim decided that a husband does not inherit his wife's estate, if she has apostasised from Judaism, "for because of her apostacy she has ceased to be akin to him and he does not inherit from her." (Responsum of Rab Natronai Gaon. The same opinion was held by Rab Zadok Gaon and by Rabbenu Gershom as cited in Or Zarua, Baba Bathra, chapter 8.)

Some of the Geonim, on the other hand, opposed the disinheritance of apostates, as being contrary to the teachings of the Gemara. It was also the opinion of R. Eliezer ben Joel Ha-Levi that the apostate is his father's heir in accordance with the principle that "although he has sinned, yet is he an Israelite." Other scholars recognised that the disinheritance of apostates cannot be supported by the settled decisions of the Talmud, but they justified it because a Jewish court has the power to deprive the apostate of his property, on the strength of the legal maxim that "a confiscation by a properly constituted court is valid."[15] But this opinion also is in conflict with the statement in the Gemara that the command in Deut. 22, 3 to restore every lost thing of thy brother includes the restoration of property, lost by the *mumar*, i.e. one who abandons Judaism (Abodah Zarah 26b). Here the Gemara seems to treat an apostate as "thy brother" and

[15] *Or Zarua, loc. cit.*

his property as the property of an Israelite. The Geonim, however, explained this difficulty by asserting that the Gemara distinguishes between an apostate, who ignores the Torah in order to satisfy his appetite and between one, who does so in a spirit of defiance. But the Gemara itself rejects this distinction and declares that the defiant apostate is called not *mumar* but *min*, infidel[16] (*loc. cit.*). Thus the *min* is one who follows the ideas of other religions, whilst the *mumar* is one who transgresses the Torah in practice although he does not deny the creed of Israel. On this assumption, it is possible to contend that the Geonim treated this question rightly from their own standpoint, because the apostates of their time defiantly denied the faith of Israel and left the community with open rebellion.

The *Posekim* (codifiers of Jewish Law), after the Geonic age, mostly oppose the exclusion of apostates from the right of inheritance, because it is against the teaching of the Talmud. Rabbenu Asher states expressly that there is no real basis for the attempts of the Geonim to find Scriptural warrant for the doctrine that an apostate is not considered rightly to belong to his father's family. He mentions a responsum in which the words "to be a God unto thee and to thy seed after thee" (Gen. 17, 7) are given as a proof that thy son, who does not recognize the God of Israel, is not reckoned as "thy seed." This so-called proof is considered by Rabbenu Asher to be a mere mnemonic device. In his opinion, the *mumar* (or *muhlaf*, converted one, according to the printed editions) is still an Israelite, notwithstanding his sin. He is to be considered his father's son in all respects and frees his mother from the obligation of contracting a levirate marriage, should she be left a widow. The sages, however, (so continues Rabbenu Asher) have penalized him and have tried to support their penalty by reference to Scripture. He concludes thus: "There is no harm in employing any possible argument in order to make the property pass to the presumptive heir rather than that it be divided according to the wish of a person, who has assumed a gentile status." (Rabbenu Asher 17, 10.)[17] Thus Rabbenu Asher

[16] The term *min* is applied often but not exclusively to the Judaeo-Christians.

[17] This was the question at issue. An apostate to Mahometanism made a gift of the property which he was to inherit from his father to his mother. The apostate died and the property was claimed by the mother and also by the apostate's daughter, who was the heir presumptive in accordance with Jewish Law.

does not accept the words of the Geonim as a rule of law, but in practice he follows their opinion.

Maimonides settles the question by the following compromise: "An apostate Israelite inherits from his relatives in the ordinary way. If, however, the Beth-Din see fit to confiscate his property and to deprive him of his right to inherit, lest they strengthen the hands of the wicked, they are within their rights. If the apostate has sons in Israel, let the inheritance of their father, the apostate, be given to them. Such has always been the custom in Morocco." (Laws of Inheritance, VI, 12.) This custom doubtless prevailed in obedience to the instructions of the Geonim and in accordance with the principle, already cited, that a Beth Din possesses the inherent right to confiscate property (see commentators on Maimonides *ad loc.*).

In Rashi, we find mention of the reverse case. He is asked whether a Jewish father can inherit the property of his apostate son. Rashi replies that we do not find that the wicked are excluded from the law of inheritance, for it is written that "I have given Mount Seir unto Esau for a possession." (Deut. 2, 5.) "Much more," he writes in conclusion, "should worthy men inherit from the unworthy. (The wicked) 'may purchase it, but the just shall put it on.'" (Job 27, 17.) Although this question is the reverse of that which we have hitherto considered, it appears from the tenour of Rashi's reply that he did not consider it right to withold an inheritance from apostates.[18] In the "book of initiation" (ספר החנוך) it is stated simply that "Even a *mamzer*, who has changed his religion, inherits from his father" (sec. 400).

The rule actually followed by Jewish tribunals is formulated in the Tur and Schulhan Aruch (Hoshen Mishpat, sec. 283), where the words of Maimonides, as cited above, are repeated. Thus it is left to the Beth Din to permit the apostate to inherit or not, as may seem fit to them, in accordance with the compromise of Maimonides.

Let us now consider the attitude of the Karaites with regard to this question. According to the settled decisions of the Karaites, apostates are excluded from inheritance, because they are considered as dead, as it is written "When he became guilty through Baal, he died." (Hosea 13, 1.) "The sons of the apostate, if they remain Jews

[18] *Pardes*, § 306; *Beth Yoseph* on *Hoshen Mishpat*, § 283.

in faith, inherit, for the son's son is considered as a son. In accordance with these principles the unbeliever does not inherit from the believer, but the sages teach that the believer inherits from the unbeliever." (Addereth Eliajahu, *Inheritance* V.) So also R. Aaron ben Elijah writes in Gan Eden, section 2 that " it would not be proper for the unbeliever to inherit from the believer, because it is written, 'The son of this bondwoman shall not be heir with my son, even with Isaac' (Gen. 21, 10). And it is said, 'If a man has no kinsman ...' (Lev. 25, 26): the sages say that this verse refers to proselytes to Judaism and hence we may deduce that the unbeliever cannot inherit from the believer."

These last two " proofs " from Scripture are extremely weak. Sarah did not argue that the son of the bondwoman should not inherit because Ishmael was an unbeliever, but because his mother was a slave. Still less can we base an argument upon the verse that refers to a man, who is without kin. According to the literal meaning of the verse, there is no necessity to find a reference to proselytes, of whom there is no mention in the context. It is true that the same phrase occurs in Numbers 5, 8: " If the man " (a victim of theft, deceased) " have no kinsman to whom restitution may be made for the guilt, the restitution ... shall be made to the priest ": and that the Rabbis then ask, " Is there a man in Israel without a next of kin?" The verse, however, (they continue) deals with the case of property, stolen from a proselyte, who has no kinsmen. This explanation is given, in this connection, by R. Akiba (Baba Kama 109a). But, in another part of the Talmud, where the Rabbis are discussing Lev. 25, 25–26, they explain this phrase differently. The question there is what is to be done, if a man be compelled by poverty to sell his homestead. The Torah authorises his kinsmen to redeem the alienated property: and " if a man has no kinsman to redeem it," he may himself, if he find sufficient means. In any case it reverts to him in the year of jubilee. The Rabbis then proceed to explain that the man with " no kinsman to redeem it " is he that indeed has a kinsman, but one that is unwilling to act as such (Kiddushin 21a). And even if we considered a proselyte to be a man without kinsmen, no inference could be drawn with regard to the legal position of the apostate. There is no analogy between the children of a proselyte (born before his conversion to Judaism) and the apostates. The former, who were

not conceived and born in holiness, are absolutely heathens; but as to the apostates—although they have sinned, yet are they Israelites. It is well-known, however, that the Karaite teachers made use, when it suited them, of the Midrashic explanations of the Rabbis, even in cases where such explanations were finally discarded by the Rabbis themselves. Finally, " When Ephraim became guilty through Baal he died " is a mere poetic figure, from which the Karaites had no right to deduce the legal maxim that " an apostate is to be accounted as dead."

EINIGE PROBLEME DER JÜDISCHEN GESCHICHTE DER ZEIT DES ZWEITEN TEMPELS[1]

HERMANN VOGELSTEIN (BRESLAU)

Nicht ohne Bedenken bin ich der ehrenvollen Aufforderung des Herrn Dr. Wise gefolgt, im Jewish Institute of Religion eine Vorlesung zu halten. Ich habe auf diese Reise, die ausschließlich als Besuchsreise gedacht war, kein Material mitgenommen, um wissenschaftliche Vorträge zu halten, und bin darum nicht in der Lage, Einzelfragen aus meinem Arbeitsgebiet zu behandeln. Dazu kommt, daß in einer einzigen Vorlesung ohnehin sehr schwer Einzelfragen von größerer Bedeutung erschöpfend gegeben werden können. Aber vielleicht ist es auch vor einem Auditorium von Studierenden auf dem Gebiete der jüdischen Wissenschaft wichtiger, nicht fertige Resultate der Forschung zu geben, sondern die Probleme herauszustellen und anzudeuten, in welcher Richtung die Lösung der Probleme zu suchen ist. So möchte ich Ihnen heute von einigen Problemen der Geschichtsforschung der Zeit des zweiten Tempels sprechen. Auch bei dieser Fassung des Themas lasse ich eine ganze Reihe von Einzelproblemen außer Betracht, um Ihre Aufmerksamkeit lediglich auf ein paar grundlegende Probleme der Geschichtsforschung zu lenken.

Dazu aber gestatten Sie mir ein paar Worte vorweg. Die gesamte jüdische Wissenschaft ist jetzt etwa 100 Jahre alt. In einer sehr wertvollen Abhandlung hat Elbogen in der Festschrift zur Fünfzigjahrfeier der Hochschule für die Wissenschaft des Judentums in Berlin einen Überblick und eine Kritik gegeben. Ich will nur auf einen Punkt hinweisen. Es ist ganz natürlich, daß diese Wissenschaft historisch und philologisch orientiert ist. Über die Tatsache, daß mit und ohne Schuld der Verfasser oft manches an historischer und philologischer Methode vermißt wird, gehe ich hinweg. Auf einen andern Punkt möchte ich hinweisen: Es ist fast überall die Einzelarbeit, deren unbedingte Notwendigkeit uneingeschränkt anerkannt

[1] Vorlesung, gehalten im Jewish Institute of Religion am 19. November 1925.

werden muß, ohne die die weiteren Schritte gar nicht getan werden können. Aber noch fehlt uns die aus dieser Einzelarbeit herausgewachsene und über sie hinausgehende Gesamtdarstellung und Gesamtauffassung, das Hineinstellen der jüdischen Dinge in die allgemeine Geistesgeschichte und Kultur, die Erkenntnis der großen Fragen und Probleme und die Unterordnung der Einzelvorgänge unter diese Probleme. Nur auf der Grundlage exakter Einzelforschung können wir die Zusammenhänge und weiterhin die hinter den Tatsachen stehenden Ursachen und bewegenden Kräfte erkennen. Darum ist die sorgfältigste Einzelforschung das erste und dringendste Gebot. Aber wenn die Arbeit sich in der Einzelforschung erschöpft, so wird sie Gelehrtenkram und nicht lebendige Wissenschaft. Die Aufgabe der jüdischen Wissenschaft muß jetzt sein, über die Einzelfragen hinaus die großen Probleme zu erkennen und zu behandeln. Es ist durchaus verständlich, daß dies selbst bei einem Werke, das bei allen Fehlern im einzelnen doch durch die Größe und Freiheit der Konzeption ein Standardwork ist, der Jüdischen Geschichte von Graetz, vermißt wird. Das jetzt erscheinende Geschichtswerk von Dubnow erfüllt zwar seinem Wollen nach, dem der Verfasser in der Einleitung Ausdruck gegeben hat, das Desideratum. Aber in der Ausführung versagt auch er. Nur so aber kann die jüdische Geschichte und überhaupt die Wissenschaft vom Judentum aus den Winkeln der Wissenschaft heraus mitten in das Leben der Wissenschaft gestellt werden.

Von den Problemen der Geschichtsforschung der Zeit des zweiten Tempels nenne ich als erstes das Verhältnis von Religion und Staat. Ich erwähne es nur kurz, weil ich darauf verweisen kann, daß der Vortrag, den ich über diese Frage in der Gesellschaft zur Förderung der Wissenschaft des Judentums gehalten habe, in der Monatsschrift für die Geschichte und Wissenschaft des Judentums abgedruckt ist.[2] Ich habe dort zu zeigen gesucht, daß im alten Israel ebenso wie überall sonst ganz selbstverständlich Religion und Staat eine Einheit gewesen sind. Für das Empfinden der Menschen war eben Gott der Nationalgott Israels, an den Staat und Volk ebenso gebunden war wie er selbst an Staat und Volk. Die große religiöse Revolution der Propheten hat das Problem Religion und Staat erst geschaffen, sie

[2] Monatsschrift 69 (1925), S. 129 ff.

haben die Religion vom Staate gelöst, die Universalität Gottes verkündet und ausgesprochen, daß in der Vernichtung dieses Staates und Volkes, das seinen eigentlichen Beruf verkannt hat, sich das innerste Sein Gottes erst offenbart. Diese für die Begriffe der damaligen Welt unfaßbare, ja geradezu absurd erscheinende Lehre fand ihre Bestätigung durch den Zusammenbruch und das babylonische Exil. Ich habe ferner in großen Zügen zu zeigen gesucht, wie die Entwicklung verlief und mehrfach zum Ausgangspunkt zurückzukehren schien, während tatsächlich jedesmal beide Faktoren, Religion und Staat, andere geworden waren. Das zeigt sich besonders in dem hasmonäischen Staatswesen, das ein Priesterstaat ganz anderer Art gewesen ist als der Priesterstaat der letzten persischen und ersten hellenistischen Zeit. Ich habe ferner den Kampf zwischen Pharisäern und Sadduzäern gekennzeichnet als den Kampf um die Frage des Primats der Religion oder der Politik und wiederum auf die Antinomie der jüdischen Geschichte hingewiesen, daß diese selben Pharisäer, ja sogar die Essäer, im letzten Stadium des jüdischen Gemeinwesens die glühendsten und fanatischsten Vertreter des nationalen Gedankens gewesen sind, bis der Zusammenbruch im römischen Kriege die endgültige Lösung des Problems brachte, die Jochanan ben Sakkai mit seiner Gründung des Lehrhauses in Jabne mit genialem Weitblick und genialem Erfassen der prophetischen Idee vorbereitet hatte.

Eng verknüpft mit diesem Problem ist ein zweites, das durch die Worte gekennzeichnet wird: Persönlichkeitsreligion und Gemeinschaftsreligion, und mit diesem Problem hängt weiterhin zusammen die Frage der Gotteserkenntnis. Überall ist Religion zunächst gemeinsame religiöse Übung der Familie, sodann des Stammes und des Volkes. Wer zu der Gemeinschaft gehört, bekundet dies durch die Verehrung der Volksgottheiten in der hierfür vorgeschriebenen Form; wer diese Verehrung weigert, schließt sich selbst von der Volksgemeinschaft aus und hat alle Folgen der Ausschließung zu tragen. Wie der einzelne Mensch religiös denkt und empfindet, darum kümmert sich die im Staat organisierte Gemeinschaft im allgemeinen nicht, solange er nur der Gottheit die vorgeschriebene Verehrung leistet. Das ist die Anschauungsweise des ganzen Altertums. Nun ist es eine interessante Erscheinung, daß dieses Problem, dieser Zwiespalt zwischen persönlicher und Gemeinschaftsreligion bei den Griechen immer deutlicher zutage trat, daß dort die öffentliche Religion immer

mehr bloß formal und leer und öde wurde, bis in der Zeit des Hellenismus in immer stärkerem Maße die Mysterienkulte dem persönlichen religiösen Bedürfen Befriedigung verschafften. Der Orient kannte diesen Konflikt nicht wirklich. Das mag zum Teil durch eine verschiedene geistige Veranlagung, durch die klimatischen und die Anbauverhältnisse bedingt sein, ist aber andererseits in hohem Maße beeinflußt durch die verschiedene politische Entwicklung, die ihrerseits die geistige Einstellung beeinflußt hat. Griechenland hat die πόλις, die Republik, den Stadtstaat, der Orient hat die Monarchie, das länderumspannende Reich. Im Orient ist die Gemeinschaft der Religion auf Gotteserkenntnis aufgebaut, d. h. eine enge Verbindung des Menschen mit Gott. Die staatliche Religion ist repräsentiert durch die Person des Monarchen, für den diese enge Verbindung mit der Gottheit ein selbstverständliches Gebot ist. Fordert der Orient Erkenntnis Gottes, so ist es bezeichnend, daß in Griechenland vom First des delphischen Apollotempels dem Besucher das Wort entgegenleuchtete: γνῶθι σεαυτόν! So ist im Orient alle Wissenschaft aus der Religion herausgewachsen, während in Griechenland die Wissenschaft immer feindlicher der Religion gegenüberstand.

Im Judentum ist, wie bereits oben angedeutet, durch die Lösung vom Staate der Begriff der Religion ein anderer geworden. Die universalistische Tendenz der Zoroasterreligion kommt im persischen Weltreich zum Ausdruck: im Judentum hat prophetische Verkündigung und geschichtliches Erleben den Universalismus der israelitischen Religion in dem staatslosen Sein der Gemeinschaft zum Ausdruck gebracht. Es ist die große Frucht des prophetischen Wirkens, der geschichtlichen Erziehung durch das Exil und der Tätigkeit Esras und der Soferim, daß im Judentum der Einklang zwischen persönlicher und Gemeinschaftsreligion nicht nur gesucht, sondern auch gefunden wurde. Als nach dem Niederbruch ihres Reiches in dem Kriege mit Rom die Seleukiden ihr Reich regenerieren wollten, sahen sie hierfür keine andere Möglichkeit als die Vereinheitlichung des Staatswesens durch vollständige Hellenisierung. Das aber zeigt die Enge der antiken Anschauung, daß diese Reichseinheit nicht gedacht werden konnte ohne Reichsreligion. Mit dieser Forderung konnten alle Völkerschaften des Seleukidenreiches sich abfinden, weil sie selbst polytheistisch waren. Der Konflikt trat demzufolge lediglich in der Beziehung des

Judentums zum Reiche in die Erscheinung. Das Entscheidende war nun, daß im Judentum Gemeinschaftsreligion und persönliche Religion in vollem Einklang waren. Wäre dies nicht der Fall gewesen, so wäre das Judentum den syrischen Unterdrückungsversuchen unbedingt unterlegen. Daß dieser Einklang vorhanden war, gab dem Judentum die Kraft, an der die syrische Macht zerschellen mußte.

Nebenbei bemerkt, ist dies das stete und ewige Problem des Judentums. Hier ist die Antwort zu suchen auf die Frage, wie es möglich war, daß das Judentum sich im Mittelalter und in der neuen Zeit erhalten konnte. Und wenn ich einen Augenblick von der geschichtlichen Betrachtung absehen und auf Gegenwart und Zukunft blicken darf, so ist diese Frage des Einklangs von persönlicher und Gemeinschaftsreligion die große Frage von Gegenwart und Zukunft. Und die große Aufgabe gerade für uns Theologen ist, diesen Einklang unter den stetig wechselnden äußeren Verhältnissen und geistigen Bedingungen immer wieder herzustellen.

Die Gotteserkenntnis der orientalischen Religionen hat ihren Sinn in dem Schicksal des Menschen, in der Erkenntnis und damit Beherrschung der dieses Schicksal bestimmenden göttlichen Kräfte. Aus diesem Grunde erwuchs aus der Religion im alten Orient die Wissenschaft, gewissermaßen die verstandesmäßige Erkenntnis der Gesetze der Gottheit. Daß auch die israelitisch-jüdische Religion auf der Gotteserkenntnis beruht, bedarf keiner näheren Ausführung. Die Bibelstellen, die als Beleg hierfür dienen, sind überaus zahlreich und beweiskräftig. Aber die Propheten haben als Sinn dieser Gotteserkenntnis den ethischen Monotheismus herausgearbeitet. Das religiöse Problem war nicht der Mensch und sein Schicksal, sondern der Mensch und sein Sollen. Dadurch nimmt das Judentum eine ganz einzigartige Stellung unter den orientalischen Religionen und ebenso in der späteren Theokrasie des ausgehenden Altertums ein. Ich kann dieses Moment hier nur ganz leicht andeuten und nur ganz flüchtig darauf verweisen, wie später die Wogen der hellenistischen Theokrasie auch an das Judentum brandeten und wie an der Peripherie Kompromisse geschlossen wurden und allerlei Veränderungen vor sich gingen. Wir sehen das Eindringen hellenistisch-orientalischer Anschauungen, die immer wieder überwunden wurden, und wir sehen die Beeinflussung hellenistischer Religionsanschauungen durch das Judentum in deren starker Ethisierung.

Alle diese Veränderungen und diese Vertiefung des religiösen Lebens sind großenteils ein Produkt der Wirksamkeit Esras und der Soferim. Nehemia hat das Werk Esras erst durchgeführt in der כנסת הגדולה vom 24. Tischri 445, in der das Volk die Thora als Grundgesetz annahm. Die bibelkritische Frage, ob es sich hier um die ganze Thora oder nur um einen Teil handelte, ist ein Problem für sich und ist für die Frage und das geschichtliche Problem, das ich andeuten will, von untergeordneter Bedeutung. Mit der Annahme der Thora war das Problem der religiösen Volksbildung geschaffen. Der erste Anfang seiner Lösung war mit der Vorlesung der Thora gemacht worden. Daraus ergab sich die Notwendigkeit der Heranbildung von Volkslehrern, und das bedeutete die Umwandlung der esoterischen Priesterbelehrung in eine Art Hochschule. Schon in dem Bericht über die Versammlung am 1. Tischri treten die Priester den Leviten gegenüber stark in den Hintergrund. Etwa 100 Jahre später, zur Zeit der Chronik, hatte diese Entwicklung weitere Fortschritte gemacht, auch bei den Laien finden wir religiöse Gelehrsamkeit. Das zeigt der Bericht über die Aussendung von Lehrern durch König Josaphat II. Chron. 17, 7—9.[3] Man hatte also damals bereits Lehrer und Buchexemplare, die diese Apostel mit sich führten, zur Verfügung. Die weitere Entwicklung deute ich nur an. Allmählich änderte sich der Aufgabenkreis der Apostel, die größeren Städte hatten Lehrer und Bücher und allmählich auch höhere Schulen, während der Elementarunterricht dem Vater überlassen blieb. Eine Notiz, die sich gegen den Privatunterricht wendet und für den Schulunterricht eintritt, finden wir in dem Ausspruche des Josua ben Perachja in der Mischna אבות 1_6. Mit Simon ben Schetach setzen die Bestrebungen zur Organisierung des Elementarunterrichts ein, und etwa 140 Jahre später finden wir unter Josua ben Gamala, der 61—63 n. Chr. Hoherpriester war, das Werk abgeschlossen. Seine Durchführung der allgemeinen Schulpflicht ist nicht eine Neuerung, sondern lediglich die Kodifizierung eines bereits bestehenden Zustandes. Das ist eine der größten Leistungen des nachexilischen Judentums, eine Leistung von ebenso großer geschichtlicher Tragweite wie die Begründung der Hochschule in Jabne durch

[3] Siehe meine Studie über Ursprung und Entwicklung des Apostolats im Judentum in Monatsschrift für die Geschichte und Wissenschaft des Judentums 49 (1905), S. 427 ff.

Jochanan ben Sakkai.[4] Die Bedeutung wird erst voll erkannt, wenn man den demokratischen Charakter des Judentums mit dem aristokratischen des römischen oder griechischen Vollbürgertums vergleicht. Dieser demokratische Charakter tritt — das ist durch die Entwicklung zwingend gegeben — auch im Bildungswesen und im religiösen Leben in die Erscheinung. Das ist eine der größten Leistungen des Pharisäismus. Die gleiche Tendenz der allgemeinen Volksbildung ist auch in der jüdischen Diaspora zu erkennen.

Diese Diaspora bietet eine Fülle von Problemen dar. Ihre Entstehung und Entwicklung, ihre Ausdehnung und die Geschichte der einzelnen Diasporaländer und -gemeinden ist ein fast unerschöpfliches, bisher jedenfalls noch nicht erschöpftes Gebiet der Forschung. Aber von der Fülle der Fragen, die sich hieraus ergeben, muß ich heute absehen, vielmehr lediglich auf das Problem der Diaspora selbst hinweisen. Jede Religion verändert sich in der Diaspora. Das Altertum kannte keine nennenswerte Diaspora mit alleiniger Ausnahme der jüdischen. Denn wenn Griechen und Phönikier Kolonien gründeten, so nahmen sie ihre Götter mit; auch in religiösen Dingen hatten sie in der Fremde die Heimat. Die Tatsache der jüdischen Diaspora gestaltete das gesamte religiöse Problem in anderer Weise. Sie schuf die Religion ohne Tempel. Der jüdischen Diaspora verdankt die Synagoge ihre Entstehung; aber weit darüber hinaus mußte die Tatsache der Diaspora und der tempellosen Religion — denn der Diasporajude konnte vielleicht einmal in seinem Leben den Tempel aufsuchen — einmal zur Vertiefung des universalen jüdischen Monotheismus, sodann aber zu einer Umwandlung des gesamten Religionsbegriffes führen. Der Charakter der Gemeinschaft war ein anderer, sie war zur Gemeinde geworden. Und bei der steigenden Zahl, Ausdehnung und Bedeutung der Diaspora mußte dies einen wesentlichen Schutz gegen die Veräußerlichung der Religion in bloßem Kultus bilden. Man hat neuerdings, namentlich auf seiten der christlichen theologischen Wissenschaft, den Äußerungen des Diasporajudentums, wie wir sie in Apokryphen und Pseudepigraphen finden, große Beachtung geschenkt und die Bedeutung dieser Äußerungen für die Beurteilung des Judentums nicht selten zu hoch eingeschätzt. Von seiten der jüdischen Forscher sind diese

[4] Recht schief ist die Auffassung Dubnows von Jochanans Leistung in der Einleitung zum ersten Bande seiner *Weltgeschichte des jüdischen Volkes* (S. XVIII) und in Band III, S. 12f., 26, 29.

Äußerungen bisher über Gebühr vernachlässigt worden. Aber vor allem ist noch gar nicht wirklich untersucht worden Gleichheit und Verschiedenheit der religiösen und kulturellen Einstellung in Palästina und in der Diaspora und ihre gegenseitige Einwirkung. ZACHARIAS FRANKEL hat über palästinische und alexandrinische Exegese geschrieben. Aber ganz abgesehen davon, daß diese vor mehr als zwei Menschenaltern verfaßte Abhandlung, so verdienstvoll sie an sich war, heute veraltet ist, umfaßt sie doch nur ein ganz kleines Gebiet dieses Fragenkomplexes. Die Fragen selbst aber sind von der höchsten Bedeutung für das Verständnis des damaligen Judentums, von dem wir immer nur Ausschnitte kennen, wenn wir lediglich das Mutterland oder die Diaspora betrachten. Das Verständnis für die Entstehung des Christentums, deren Erforschung trotz aller anerkennenswerten geleisteten Arbeit immer noch in den Anfängen ist, ist in gleicher Weise an ihre Beantwortung gebunden.

Denn mit diesen Fragen hängt auf das engste die Frage der gegenseitigen Beeinflussung von Judentum und Hellenismus zusammen. Die Entstehung des Christentums hat man früher entweder aus dem jüdischen Monotheismus oder aus dem polytheistischen Griechentum zu erklären gesucht. Mit beiden Versuchen mußte man scheitern. Die Wurzeln der neuen Religion müssen in dem hellenisierten Diasporajudentum gesucht werden, bzw. in dem durch das Diasporajudentum jüdisch beeinflußten Hellenismus. Die Erforschung der Mysterienkulte im Hellenismus, die Erkenntnis der starken orientalischen Einflüsse in diesen hellenistischen Mysterienkulten zeigt uns den Weg, auf dem später der hellenistische Diasporajude Saul aus Tarsus die Gleichsetzung jüdisch-religiöser mit orientalisch-hellenistischen Begriffen vollzogen hat. Hier ist die jüdische Forderung der Gotteserkenntnis umgebogen, so daß sie der orientalischen und hellenistischen angeähnelt oder gleichgesetzt wurde. Hier ist die jüdische Messiasidee mit der damals die Welt erfüllenden, aus dem Orient stammenden, aber nun hellenistisch gewordenen Weltheilandsidee verbunden und die Vergöttlichung des Weltheilands scheinbar auch mit dem Judentum in Einklang gebracht worden. Hier sind die jüdischen Anschauungen von der Prophetie mit den hellenistischen Mysterienoffenbarungen vereinigt worden. Es mag genügen, diese wenigen Punkte hier herauszuheben, um die ganze Wucht und Größe dieser Probleme anzudeuten, die mit diesen wenigen Strichen noch kaum umrissen sind. Denn von

hier aus ist wiederum die Frage zu betrachten, wie es zum Konflikt zwischen Judentum und Hellenismus in der Makkabäerzeit gekommen ist, ob dieser Konflikt ein notwendiger und unvermeidlicher gewesen, und ob er überhaupt ein Konflikt zwischen Judentum und Hellenismus war oder welche Gegensätze damals zum Austrag kamen. Ich habe diesen Konflikt bereits oben erwähnt, aber nur eine, allerdings wesentliche, Seite angedeutet. Die knapp zugemessene Zeit verbietet ein genaueres Eingehen auf dieses Problem, dessen Erörterung eine Gesamtbetrachtung der nachexilischen Geschichte erheischen würde.

Ebenso sei auf ein weiteres grundlegendes Problem nur kurz hingewiesen, das Problem Pharisäer und Sadduzäer. In seinem neuesten Werke, *The Pharisees*, betont Travers Herford mit Recht, daß Geigers Untersuchungen Grundlage und Ausgangspunkt für die Erforschung des Wesens des Pharisäismus und seines Verhältnisses zum Sadduzäismus sind. Er führt weiter richtig aus, daß die Pharisäer zwar nicht de facto, wohl aber de jure — oder wie wir besser formulieren werden — nicht in der Methode, wohl aber im Prinzip die Nachfolger und Erben der Propheten gewesen sind. Er findet den Unterschied auf Grund einer Studie von Lauterbach in der Kohlerfestschrift in der Stellung zur mündlichen Überlieferung und ihrer Beziehung zur Thora. Auch dies wird man ohne weiteres zugestehen und dennoch hier nicht den Schlüssel zur Lösung des Problems finden. Denn auch die Stellung zur mündlichen Überlieferung dürfte kaum das Primäre sein, sondern ergibt sich aus der gesamten Einstellung dieser religiös-politischen Partei. Um sie zu verstehen, darf man auch nicht einen Augenblick den doppelten Charakter dieser Partei — als religiöse und als politische — außer acht lassen. Der bereits oben erwähnte demokratische Zug des Pharisäismus ebenso wie die aristokratische Tendenz des Sadduzäismus wirkt sich keineswegs nur auf politischem und sozialem Gebiete, sondern ganz ebenso auch auf dem religiösen aus. Und dabei ist wieder eine gewisse aristokratische Tendenz des Pharisäismus unverkennbar, die sich in der Heraushebung der חברים von dem עם הארץ zeigt. Diese aristokratische Tendenz erklärt sich allerdings relativ einfach durch die Divergenz von Ideal und Wirklichkeit. Die חברים waren diejenigen, die die idealen Forderungen des religiösen Lebens möglichst vollständig erfüllten, während der עם הארץ den Teil des Volkes darstellte, der es an der Erfüllung fehlen ließ. Der weit wesentlichere Punkt ist das demokratische Prinzip der

Forderung des allgemeinen Priestertums ganz Israels, und zwar in der Weise, daß nicht eine Degradierung des Priestertums, sondern eine Erhebung des Volkes dadurch bedingt war. Aber den eigentlichen Streitpunkt zwischen den beiden Parteien bildete, wie schon oben erwähnt, die Frage des Primats der Religion oder der Politik. Die Pharisäer vertraten den Primat der Religion, die Sadduzäer den Primat der Politik. Die Kämpfe wurden freilich wie immer um Einzelfragen geführt, und die Parteien selbst sind sich oft des grundlegenden Unterschiedes nicht bewußt gewesen. Aber wenn wir von hier aus die Geschichte und Entwicklung der beiden Parteien und der Parteikämpfe betrachten, so dürfte sich uns die Frage leichter lösen und klären. Dabei ist allerdings nicht zu vergessen, daß durch die politischen und sozialen Verhältnisse der Römerzeit gerade der Pharisäismus schließlich der Träger der nationalen Erhebung geworden ist.

Ich habe versucht, Ihnen einige der Probleme in kurzer Skizzierung anzudeuten. Wenn wir die Geschichte des Judentums zur Zeit des zweiten Tempels wirklich durchforschen wollen, so wird es notwendig sein, alle einzelnen Fragen dieser Geschichte so zu betrachten, daß wir die Einstellung der Menschen und die Folge der Ereignisse zu diesen Problemen in Beziehung setzen. So erst ergibt diese Geschichte nicht ein Konglomerat von Einzelereignissen und Einzelfragen, sondern wird sie etwas des Nachdenkens und Erforschens Wertes, etwas, was uns nicht nur über das damalige Judentum belehrt. Darum hoffe ich, daß auch meine skizzenhafte Darstellung nicht ganz nutzlos sein wird, weil ich nirgends Antworten gegeben, sondern durchweg Fragen aufgeworfen und die Probleme herauszustellen gesucht habe. In jeder Wissenschaft aber — und das muß in der Wissenschaft der jüdischen Geschichte stärker hervortreten als es bisher der Fall gewesen ist — ist das Wichtigste die Erkenntnis und die Stellung der Probleme.

SOLOMON PAPPENHEIM ON TIME AND SPACE AND HIS RELATION TO LOCKE AND KANT

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Towards the end of the eighteenth century, among the first Jews who gained their way into general literature there was a predominance of those who worked in the field of philosophy. Some of them, like Solomon Maimon and Moses Mendelssohn, achieved fame and distinction either through the profundity of their thought or through the elegance of their table talk. Others, less famous, like Marcus Herz and Lazarus Bendavid, succeeded only in enshrining themselves in an occasional foot-note in the history of German philosophy or in being included among those who also lived and philosophized, but still they will always be remembered as the pages, if not the armor-bearers, of Kant. That philosophy should have been the vehicle through which the first linguistically emancipated Jews should break into the world's literature was only natural, for outside the Bible philosophy was the only field of knowledge which the Jews shared in common with the rest of Europe. It is characteristic of all these early Jewish pioneers in European letters that even in their new state they continued to draw upon their early knowledge and training and to show the unmistakable influence of their early traditions and interests. Mendelssohn wrote a commentary in Hebrew on Maimonides' logic and composed books on psychology and theology which abound in old-time allusions. Solomon Maimon not only borrowed his surname from Maimonides but published a commentary in Hebrew on the latter's *Moreh Nebukim* and also discussed Maimonides' philosophy in his German autobiography. Among the kind of Jews to whom these men belonged they marked the transition from mediaeval to modern philosophy just as in an earlier generation Spinoza performed a similar

function among Jews of another kind and Descartes among Christians. By the vicissitudes of life and education they formed a link, as it were, between the Jewish philosophic tradition and the European. To this goodly list of names I now wish to add that of SOLOMON PAPPENHEIM.

SOLOMON PAPPENHEIM (1740–1814) is not altogether a stranger to philosophy. Two of his works on the proofs of the existence of God, one entitled *Beiträge zur Berichtigung der Beweise vom Dasein Gottes aus der Reinen Vernunft* and the other *Abermaliger Versuch über den ontologischen Beweis vom Dasein Gottes*, were published in Breslau in 1794 and 1800 respectively. Both of these books, as may be judged from their titles, follow in the trail of KANT's *Critique of Pure Reason*. But it will be of interest to know that in an earlier Hebrew work of his, which is nothing more than a study of Hebrew synonyms, there is a discussion of the conceptions of time and space which, it is our purpose to show, is a characteristic blending of Jewish and European philosophy, especially LOCKE and KANT.

The book entitled *Yeri'ot Shelomoh* (Part i) was published at Dyhernfurth in 1784, about three years after the appearance of the *Critique of Pure Reason* (1781), long enough for the author to have become acquainted with KANT's discussion of time and space. The passages under consideration are introduced by the author as a sort of philosophic excursus at the beginning of his discussion of the Hebrew word for "time."[1] There is no mention of any names of authors or sources in those passages except for a vague reference to "some of the philosophers."[2] The argument of PAPPENHEIM is rather difficult to follow, as his style is purely literary and entirely unlike the accepted style of Hebrew philosophic writings with its precise and technical terminology. Still from behind the veil of his eloquence we can detect the main drift of his thought and identify the sources he followed as well as the views he meant to criticize.

In order fully to appreciate the fine points of PAPPENHEIM's discussion we must first attempt to reconstruct the background of his knowledge, or his mass of apperception, as it were, with regard to the general problems of time and space. This can be easily done,

[1] *Yeri'ot Shelomoh* f. 6, r. a: טרם התחלנו לדבר על שטות המורות על הזמן עצמו ועל כל המתיחס אליו ראינו מן הצורך להעיר תחלה על הזמן עצמו מה הוא.

[2] מקצת המחקרים (*loc. cit.*) קצת מן החוקרים (f. 8, v. b).

assuming, as we have reason to do, that he was well versed in the standard philosophic texts of his time, Jewish as well as non-Jewish. From Maimonides' *Moreh Nebukim*[3] and its commentaries as well as from other standard Hebrew works on philosophy he must have become acquainted with Aristotle's definition of time with all its implications.[4] According to this definition time is an accident of motion, inseparable from motion and hence from space and body, and since it could not exist without motion and body there could be no time prior to the creation of the world, if the world is assumed to be created. He must have also been acquainted with the question whether time is ideal or real, or, as the mediaevals put it, whether time is in the mind or outside the mind, and also with Aristotle's position on this question that time, being the number of motion, is partly real and partly ideal.[4]

From Joseph Albo's *Ikkarim* II, 18, he could have learned of another kind of time, which is pure duration, succession and continuity, independent of motion and space and magnitude. For says Albo: There are two kinds of time. One, "unmeasured duration conceived only in thought, having existence prior to the creation of the world as well as after its passing away." This is "absolute time" in which there is no distinction of equality and non-equality. The other kind of time is that which is "counted and numbered by the motion of the sphere, and to this applies the distinction of prior and posterior, of equal and unequal."[5] The first kind of Albo's time can be traced to an old un-Aristotelian definition, which I have already discussed elsewhere;[6] the second is time in the Aristotelian sense. The first kind of time, or rather duration, furthermore, is purely ideal, that is, it arises in the mind and exists only in the mind, and requires no body and motion or space. It has not even that partial objectivity or reality that Aristotle ascribes to time as he defines it.

These Jewish sources must have been supplemented by his reading of Locke and Leibnitz, for there is evidence, as we shall see anon,

[3] *Moreh Nebukim* II, Introduction, Proposition XV.

[4] *Physics* IV, 14, 223 a, 21 ff.

[5] וזה אף אם יהיה הזמן המשך הבלתי משוער המדומה בהשבה, שהוא נמצא תמיד קודם בריאת העולם ואחר העדרו .... שההמשך הוא הזמן בשלוח .... ויהיה הזמן לפי זה שני מינים, מתנו נספר ומשוער בתנועת הגלגל, ויסוד בו הקודם והמתאחר והשוה והבלתי שוה, ומתנו בלתי נספר ומשוער, והוא המשך שיהיה קודם מציאות הגלגל, שלא יסוד בו השוה והבלתי שוה.

[6] "Note on Crescas's Definition of Time," *Jewish Quarterly Review*, n. s. X, 1—17.

that he was acquainted with the writings of both these authors. In Locke's discussion of time he must have found an expression of views the like of which he had already met in Jewish sources, especially Albo. Time, according to Locke, is not the measure or number of motion (*Essay Concerning Human Understanding* II, xiv, § 6). Its essence is duration and succession, which is a product of the mind. What is generally called time is duration set out by measure (*ibid.*, § 17). And because it is independent of motion and magnitude it could exist prior to the creation of the world (*ibid.*, § 24–25). If Pappenheim had read Spinoza he must have found in him also a similar distinction between duration and time (Epistola XII *olim* XXIX).

Similarly with regard to space he must have gathered from Jewish sources, especially Crescas and Albo, of the existence of two views. On the one hand, there was the view of Aristotle that space is the external, enclosing boundary of a body with its corollary that there could be no space without a body. On the other hand, there was another view, mentioned by Aristotle but explicitely rejected by him,[7] according to which space is identified with the distance or interval or vacuum, which has only the capacity of being filled by a body but which in itself is independent of body. This definition of space is favored by Crescas (*Or Adonai* I, ii, 1, Vienna edition, p. 15 b) and by Albo (*Ikkarim* II, 17). A definition similar to this he must have also found in Locke, for according to him space is distance (*Essay* II, xviii, § 3). In a certain sense, these two contrasting definitions of space may be said to correspond to the two definitions of time, both revolving upon the question whether time and space are dependent upon body or not.

To a mind nurtured upon these traditional speculations about the nature of time and space the views of Kant would naturally appeal only as another one of those theories that came out to deny their reality. Its original marks of distinction would be overlooked by him. What would stand out in his eye as of the greatest significance in Kant's discussion of the problem is its insistence upon the denial of the reality of time and space as something independent of the mind and more especially the repeated statements that they were not accidents or qualities subsisting in a subject. The latter point would

[7] *Physics* IV, 4, 211 b, 6 ff.

at once suggest to his mind the old un-Aristotelian definition of time which likewise denied that it is an accident. He would thus throw it in together with those definitions of the middle ages or with that of Locke which defined time as duration or which found duration as something different from time, maintaining that it exists only in the mind of him who comprehends it.

This is how all the historical threads are brought to a focus in Pappenheim. Following his philosophical precedents he tries to answer the question whether time is real or not, and if the former, what is its nature. From this he tries to draw the logical conclusion as to whether time could have existed prior to the creation of the world. Pappenheim's discussion throughout is devoid of any direct reference to opposite views; no names of authorities or opponents are mentioned; there is only a vague allusion to the prevalent ignorance of the true nature of time among "some of the philosophers," and to "the view held by some philosophers on this subject."[8] He is especially painstaking in calling attention to the importance and originality of his own view on the subject. But whatever we shall finally find his own view to amount to, we shall first try to follow him step by step in the deployment of his argument and to show his complete dependence upon Locke's chapters on space and time in his *Essay Concerning Human Understanding*. He follows Locke closely in the main outline, diverting from him occasionally only to digress into some of the by-ways of the problem or to elaborate his point by additional explanations and illustrations. But these digressions, too, are often suggested by other parts of the *Essay*, and as for the elaborations one is sometimes led to suspect that they are taken from some contemporary German philosophic writings. Leibnitz' *New Essays Concerning Human Understanding* shows its influence as does also, in one important point, as I hope to show, Kant's *Critique*.

Pappenheim sets out by defining time as *duration* and space as *distance*. For *duration* he uses the term המשך, which is also used by Albo, translating it himself by the German *Die Dauer*. For *distance* he uses the term מרחק, to be found also in Albo (רחק) and elsewhere, translating it again by the German *Die Weite*. It is, however, neither Albo nor any other Jewish source but rather Locke whom Pappenheim

[8] *Yeri'ot Shelomoh* f. 6, r, a: שהעלתה גדולה היא אצל מקצת המחקרים; f. 8, v. b: להנחת מקצת מן החוקרים בענין הזה.

is following here, for he proceeds to draw a further distinction between the two senses in which the term *space* (מקום עצמו, מקום, *Der Raum*) may be used, one in the sense of *distance* (רחוק, *Die Weite*), which applies only to the length between two bodies, and the other in the sense of *void* (החלל הרקני) or *capacity* (הכנה לקבל הגשמים), which applies to the entire *interval* (רווח מקום). This distinction is given by Locke in his *Essay* II, xiii, § 3. It would furthermore seem that his immediate literary source must have been the corresponding passage in Leibnitz' *New Essays*, for Pappenheim's description of *distance* bears a closer resemblance verbally to the latter than to the former, and then also the term *interval* as another word for *capacity* occurs only in Leibnitz.[9]

After thus defining the terms time and space Pappenheim proceeds to explain their nature. They are conceptual quantities (כמויות עיוניות) and hence apply to both material and spiritual beings. They are furthermore numerical quantities (כמות מספרי). Accordingly they are capable of infinite increase as well as of infinite divisibility. This characterization is also based upon Locke, who similarly speaks of time and space, or rather duration and expansion, as "abstract conceptions," which do not intimate the idea of body, and also as being capable of greater or less quantities to infinity (*Essay* II, xv, § 1 f. Cf. xiii, § 4; xv, § 9). It is Locke, too, who speaks of number as furnishing us with the idea of infinity in connection with space and duration (*ibid.* II, xvii, § 9 ff.).

But while at first Pappenheim makes rather a sweeping statement that both time and space apply alike to spiritual and material beings, he then veers about and hastens to make a qualification, stating that spiritual beings are to be excluded from any spatial relation.

[9]

Locke

This space, considered barely in length between any two beings, without considering anything else between them, is called distance; if considered in length, breadth, and thickness, I think it may be called capacity.

(*Essay* II, xiii, § 3.)

Pappenheim

והמקום מתעצם על צד הרחוק... שאם נשיער שיהיה כאן גשם משהו מונח בין טורח למערב בדרך משל מיד נדע בבירור שיש כאן הפסק בין רוח מזרח לרוח מערב ושאינן נוגעות זו בזו, כי אותו משהו גשם מפסיק ביניהם ועל כן הם מרוחקות ונפרדות זו מזו. ואותו הריחוק הכמות המפסיק נקרא מקום (דיא וויישטע). ובשתוף השם יקרא גם כן החלל הרקני מקום, והוא מצד שיש בו הכנה לקבל הגשמים אבל באמת לא יקרא זה כי אם רווח מקום לא מקום עצמו (דער רוים).

(*Yeri'ot Shelomoh* f. 6, r.)

Leibnitz

PH. L'espace considéré par rapport à la longueur, qui sépare deux corps, s'appelle distance; par rapport à la longueur, à la largeur, et à la profondeur on peut l'appeller capacité.

TH.... On peut dire que la capacité ou plutôt l'intervalle...

(*Nouveaux Essais* II, xiii, § 3.)

He begins his qualification with the following expression: "But there is a difference between the spiritual and the material beings." He then explains the difference by saying that material beings have two kinds of extension, by way of duration and by way of distance, whereas spiritual beings have only one kind of extension, that by way of duration. He closes his remarks on this point by saying: "But this is outside the scope of our discussion."[10] We have good reason to ask ourselves here. Why this sudden change of view? Why drag in this problem which according to the author's own statement is "outside the scope of our discussion"? All this, to our mind, can be explained only by again referring to LOCKE.

Toward the end of a long comparison between duration and space (or expansion), LOCKE says: "But there is this manifest difference between them, that the ideas of length which we have of expansion are turned every way ... but duration is but as it were the length of one straight line" (*Essay* II, xvi, § 11). The similarity in the turn of speech between this passage and PAPPENHEIM's digression is quite apparent. But more than this. LOCKE then proceeds to raise the question whether spiritual beings are in time and space. He declares that as for time it applies to all beings, whether spiritual or material. But "whether angels and spirits have any analogy to this, in respect to expansion, is beyond my comprehension" (*ibid.*). What PAPPENHEIM does in his digression is simply to reproduce LOCKE's question, which is left open, and answer it negatively.

The question raised by LOCKE as to the spatial and temporal relation of spiritual beings is a mediaeval inheritance. In Jewish philosophy time and, for that matter, space are said to be inapplicable to spiritual beings, under the Aristotelian definitions of these terms.[11] But if, in opposition to Aristotle, time is defined as duration and space as distance there is a certain sense in which they may be said to apply even to God. CRESCAS maintains that under the un-Aristotelian definition of time attributes expressing temporal relations may be applied to God (*Or Adonai* I, iii, 3, p. 23 b). In his identification of space with the unfilled vacuum or distance, he also finds justification

[10] *Yeri'ot Shelomoh* f. 6, r. b: אלא שיש הפרש בין הנבראים הרוחנים לגשמים, כי הגשמים יש להם ב' מיני התפשטות על צד ההמשך ועל צד הרחוק.... אבל הרוחני אינו נופל זולת תחת מין אחד מן ההתפשטות, והוא ההתפשטות ההמשכותי.... ואין זה מכלל דברינו. ונשוב אל הענין ונאמר.

[11] *Moreh Nebukim* II, Introduction, Proposition XV; *Or Adonai* I, 1, 15.

for the old rabbinic dictum that God is the place of the world (*ibid.* I, ii, 1, p. 15 b).[12] ALBO, on the other hand, denies the applicability to God of either of these two terms even under their un-Aristotelian definitions (*Ikkarim* II, 17–18). It is interesting to note that LEIBNITZ in his criticism of LOCKE with regard to the inapplicability of space to spiritual beings refers to the same dictum as CRESCAS by saying that "some have believed that God is the place of things" (*New Essays* II, xiii, § 17). Of course, this dictum, in so far as it occurs in non-Jewish sources, may be traced back to Philo[13] and one need not ascribe it to a rabbinic origin. LEIBNITZ himself mentions Lessius and Guericke as having been of this opinion. Still leaving out God, who is called the place of the world, it may be definitely stated that in mediaeval Jewish philosophy, under the un-Aristotelian definitions of time and space, spiritual beings are said to be in time but not in space.[14] Thus while the question was introduced by PAPPENHEIM under the influence of LOCKE, his solution of it is based upon Jewish sources.

In the course of his discussion as to the nature of space LOCKE says that its definition does not really explain its nature. "If any one asks me what this space I speak of is, I will tell him when he tells me what his extension is" (*Essay* II, xiii, § 15). But one knows as little of the nature of extension as of the nature of space. According to its definition, as ordinarily given, "extension is to have parts that are extended." But to say this is tantamount to saying that "extension consists of extended parts," which hardly explains its nature. LOCKE compares it to the question as to what a fibre was, which could hardly be answered by the statement that "it was a thing made up of several fibres." The same question is also raised by PAPPENHEIM with reference to both time and space, introducing it, like LOCKE, by the phrase: "Any one may now ask us." Like LOCKE he finds that his definitions of time and space, the former as duration and the latter as distance, do not really explain their nature. They are only tantamount to saying that time and space consist respectively of small parts of duration and of small parts of distance. Again

[12] *Genesis Rabbah* 68, 9.

[13] *De eo quod a Deo mittantur somnia* I, 11.

[14] That incorporeal beings have no spatial relations, see *Or Adonai* I, 1, 3: דברים אשר להם סדר בטצב ..... דברים אשר להם סדר בשבע.

like Locke he compares it to the question as to what wood was. "If a man asked us what the nature of wood was," we would fail to answer the question satisfactorily by saying "that the wood concerning which he asks is a thing made up of smaller pieces of wood."[15] Unlike Locke, however, Pappenheim is not satisfied by merely stating the problem and leaving it unsolved. He proceeds to solve it by laying down first two preliminary propositions. These propositions, too, as we shall see, can be traced back to Locke, but their discussion by Pappenheim shows the unmistakable influence of some other literary sources. In one instance, I hope to show, it was that of Kant's *Critique*.

First, Pappenheim distinguishes between two processes of generation or coming-to-be (הויה). One he calls "saltatory generation" (הויה דולגת), the other "aggregative generation" (הויה מתלקטת). The terms may perhaps sound less awful if we attempt to translate them into Latin: *Generatio per saltum, generatio per aggregationem.* Whether these terms are of his own coinage or have been copied by him from somebody else is hard to determine. The distinction between these two terms, however, judged by his explanation, is like that between "timeless or instantaneous change" (שנוי בזולת זמן) and "temporal or gradual change" (שנוי בזמן) found in Jewish philosophy.[16] It may also correspond to Locke's distinction between simple and complex substances (*Essay* II, xxiii, § 1) or between single and collective substances (*ibid.* II, xii, § 6. Cf. II, xxiv). His own illustration of "saltatory generation" is that of a geometrical line each part of which is a line, and of "aggregative generation" is that of the circumference of a geometrical circle (העגול ההנדסי), the parts of which are not circles but arcs (קשתות).[17] Like coming-to-be, passing-away or corruption (העדר הנמצאים) is also either "saltatory" or "aggregative," i.e., instantaneous or gradual. Furthermore, corresponding to these two kinds of generation and corruption there are two processes of the formation of ideas (הוית הציורים), "saltatory

[15] *Yeri'ot Shelomoh* f. 6, r. b—v. a: ואם כן איפו אי אפשר שיהיה ההמשך הזמני שהוא אמנם סך מקובץ מהמשכות קמנות הבאות זו אחר זו שיהיה הוא הומן עצמו, והמרחק המקומי אי אפשר שיהיה הוא המקום עצמו, כאשר הוא אמנם סך משופע מרחקים קמנים. ואלו שאלנו אדם על עצם העץ מה הוא . . . ואף גם אלו היינו משיבים לו יותר מדוקדק שהעץ שהוא שואל עליו הוא דבר מורכב מעצים קמנים, גם בזה לא היינו מספיקים תשובת שאלתו.

[16] *Or Adonai* I, 1, 4. Altabrizi's commentary on Maimonides' twenty-five propositions (prop. IV) uses the expression השנוי פתאום או לא פתאום. Cf. Mendelssohn's *Sefer ha-Nefesh* I, § 16—17: העדר פתאומי, הויה פתאומית (כלי זמן) שיעדר בזמן, שיתהוה בזמן.

[17] *Yeri'ot Shelomoh* f. 6, v. cf. also f. 8, r. a.

ideas" and "aggregative ideas." From his further description of these two kinds of ideas it is evident that he means thereby the old distinction, formally stated by LOCKE, between intuitive and demonstrative knowledge (*Essay* IV, ii, § 1–2). "Saltatory ideas"[18] are ideas which leap in to one's mind and are perceived immediately; "aggregative ideas" are ideas which are gathered up gradually by means of reasoning and through intermediary stages.

Then, in his second proposition, PAPPENHEIM draws a distinction between three senses in which the term "existence" or "being" (מציאות) may be used: "Substantial being" (מציאות עצמיי), "accidental being" (מציאות מקריי), and מציאות על צד ההתגלות, which we shall translate here by "phenomenal being." The last term התגלות, however, is used by the author in several other senses. Taking the word in its literal meaning of "appearance" he combines it with other words to mean appearing, to the eye, in the imagination, *to* the mind and *in* the mind, and he seems to use these expressions in the technical senses of "phenomenon," "image," "idea" and "intuition" respectively.[19] Or, we may put it in another way. On etymological grounds, in its literal meaning of "appearance," he uses it in the sense of (1) *phenomenon*[20] and (2) *phantasm*, the latter in the sense of an image or picture of both the imagination and the mind. On historical and lexicographical grounds, in its derivative meaning of *divine revelation* and *prophetic inspiration*, he uses it also in the sense of *intuition*. Thus מציאות על צד ההתגלות, which we have translated by phenomenal being, may also be translated by fictitious, conceptual and intuitive being.

Of these three kinds of being only the first two are considered by him as having real existence; the third is not to be classed at all among real beings.[21] The first two he defines very clearly and leaves no doubt as to what he means by them. "Substantial being" is that which subsists by itself and is dependent only upon the

[18] Compare the expression *saltus in demonstrando*.

[19] The following passages illustrate the use made by the author of the term:

על צד המציאות בציור ובמחשבה (f. 7, r. b)
שהם מתגלים כך לעינינו (*ibid.*)
ואלה המצואים הצוריים (*ibid.*)
המתגלה . . . בטוחש . . . . והמתגלה גם כן כך במושכל. (f. 7, v. b)

[20] MENDELSSOHN translates "Phenomenon" by הויין (*Sefer ha-Nefesh* II).

[21] *Ibid.*, f. 7, r. b: ועוד מין אחר נמצא יש לנו, אבל הוא בלתי ראוי להכנס בסוג המציאות כלל, והוא המציאות על צד ההתגלות, והוא דבר הבלתי נמצא בישות בפני עצמו, גם לא בישות על צד הרכיבה, כי אם על צד המציאות בציור ובמחשבה.

creative power of God, in conformity with the traditional definition of substance. "Accidental being" is that which does not subsist by itself but is dependent upon some other created being for its support—the traditional definition of accident. As illustrations of accidental being he mentions quantity (כמות, *Die Menge*), sound, color, odor, and refers to other terms of the same kind. His definition and illustration of the third class of being are not so clear. The term "phenomenal" by which it is designated and the example of "priority in place"[22] by which he illustrates it would seem to indicate that he means thereby any external relation. But, then, the term which we have translated by "phenomenal" is also used by him, as we have already mentioned, in the sense of "intuitive," "fictitious" or "ideal." While there is a common underlying meaning to all these terms, namely, the negation of reality, in consequence of which we may be justified in designating this third class of being as "unreal being," the question still remains how did Pappenheim get to this involved terminology.

The answer to this question, it seems to me, may be found in the complexity of the sources which we have reason to believe were used by Pappenheim in his discussion of the threefold classification of being. His basic source was undoubtedly Locke's threefold classification of complex ideas into substances, modes and relations (*Essay* II, xii, § 3). Mode is only another word which Locke, like Spinoza, substituted for the old traditional term accident, the latter term, according to Locke's contention, being "of little use in philosophy" (*Essay* II, xiii, § 19–20). Leibnitz, however, in his criticism, tried to reinstate the term accident (*New Essays* II, xiii, § 19). By relation Locke means a great variety of relations, among which he also mentions the "relation of place" (*Essay* II, xxvi, § 5). Here, again, Leibnitz adds that the ideas of relations are "the poorest in reality" and have "something of the essence of reason" (*New Essays* II, xxv, § 1).

Locke's classification, therefore, with Leibnitz' modifications and explanations, accounts for Pappenheim's threefold classification of being, for his designating the first two by terms "substantial" and "accidental," for his illustrating the third one by the example of "priority in place," for his characterizing it as unreal, and for his

[22] *Ibid.*, ומעין זה המין הוא מה שנקרא קדימה במקום.

describing it by a term which, as we have seen, is used by him, in the sense of any subjective form of reason or imagination. But why did he not use, like LOCKE, the term relation for his third class of being, and what made him lend the additional meanings of "phenomenal" and "intuitive" to the term by which he describes it? This, I believe, can be accounted for by the influence of KANT's *Critique*.

KANT introduces the problem of time and space by asking, as does here PAPPENHEIM, which of the three possible kinds of being they are, and his enumeration of his three possible kinds of being, again as in PAPPENHEIM, is reminiscent of LOCKE's classification of complex ideas. KANT asks himself: "Are they real beings [i.e., substances]? Or, if not that, are they determinations or relations of things, but such as would belong to them even if they were not perceived [i.e., modes or accidents]? Or, lastly, are they determinations and relations which are inherent in the form of intuition only, and therefore in the subjective nature of our mind [i.e., relations]?"[23] Under the guise of the Kantian vocabulary we can discover here the terms substance, mode or accident, and relation, the last one in the sense of being "in the subjective nature of our mind," as LOCKE's relations are described by LEIBNITZ. He also calls this last kind of being "the form of intuition," by means of which we combine all our internal and external sensations into phenomena. Phenomena only, therefore, or things so far as they are perceived by us and appear to us, are in time and space, which to him are the forms of intuition. Thus the term *intuition* with its inseparable companion term *phenomenon* is introduced by KANT in the description of the third class of being known as *relations*, and from KANT, we may safely conclude, it was taken over by PAPPENHEIM.

Like KANT, and undoubtedly following him, PAPPENHEIM tries to answer the question as to the nature of time by first determining what kind of being it is. Exactly like KANT he asks himself: Are they substances? Are they accidents? Or, are they relations existing only in the mind? KANT answers that they are neither the first nor the second but the third, existing only in us as something wholly subjective, or, as he describes them, they are "pure forms of sensuous intuition." PAPPENHEIM, however, in opposition to KANT, but following

[23] MÜLLER's translation (1881), p. 20.

the Aristotelian and mediaeval tradition as well as Locke, answers that they are of the second class of being, namely, accidents or modes.[24] Time and space are to him accidents belonging to the category of quantity, but each representing a different kind of quantity, the one being *duration* and the other *distance*.[25] As accidents they have no independent existence but require some external subject for their support. The subject of space must be a body; the subject of time need not be a body, it may also be a spiritual being, but it must be created.[26] In both cases the subject of time and of space must have external reality. There is no space unless a body occupies it; there is no time unless something, not necessarily a body, endures in it.

Time and space are further continuous quantities and belong to what Pappenheim chose to call "saltatory generation." And here Pappenheim enters upon a lengthy explanation of the nature of continuous quantities and their infinite divisibility.[27] There is nothing new in that explanation which sounds to us merely as an echo of what has been said on the subject ever since Aristotle, though its immediate literary source must have been, again, Locke's discussion of the same subject, which culminates in the statement that "every part of duration is duration too, and every part of extension is extension, both of them capable of addition or division in infinitum" (*Essay* II, xv, § 9). Pappenheim, however, elaborates the discussion by introducing many new illustrations the origin of which may undoubtedly be traced to contemporary German philosophic literature. He also refers to additional arguments on the question of infinite divisibility both which he himself has devised and which may be found in the works of others.[28]

[24] *Yeri'ot Shelomoh* f. 7, v. b: אחרי אשר הראנו שאין הזמן והמקום לפי הנחתנו אך סגולות מקריות נשואות על נושא חוץ להם.

[25] *Ibid.*, וכאשר ק׳מנו לנו שהזמן והמקום אמנם הם סגולת הדברים כפי התגלתם ולא נחייב להם שום עצם בפיעל כי אם עצם הכמות שהוא סגולת המספר המרובה לא נשאר לנו כי אם לידע ולהודיע אותן הסגולות מה הם בעצם, והתרנו לנו שהם עצמים מתעצמים אם על צד ההמשך ואם על צד הרחוק.

[26] *Ibid.*, f. 7, v. a b: הנה בזה ק׳מנו לנו שהזמן והמקום הם מהן הנמצאים המקריים שאין להם מציאות מופשטות, כי אם מציאות מה שהם נשואים אל נושא חוץ מהם....ובעצמות המקום מעיד לנו החוש על זה....ואותו לא נמצא עומד נפרד בפני עצמו מושם אופן, כי אם על אופן שימצא שם כבר גשם הנושא אותו.... ומעצמות המקום....נוכל להקיש על עצמות הזמן....ולא ימצא גם כן במציאות פרדי בשום אופן כי אם כשימצא שם גברא שיש לו מציאות בפועל. Cf. above his discussion as to the relation of time to spiritual beings.

[27] *Ibid.*, f. 8.

[28] *Ibid.*, f. 8, v. a: ובגוף הדבר עצמו שיהיה כל כמות מוכן להלוקה בב"ח מבלי שנגיע אל חלק מהנו הבלתי מקבל עוד ההלוקה יש לנו ראיות מספיקות מה שיארך כאן זכרם מלבד אותן הנמצאות כבר בדברי זולתינו.

Compared with the two definitions which mark the age-old controversy as to the nature of time and space, the controversy which has its exponents in Aristotle, on the one hand, and in Crescas, Albo and Locke, to name but a few, on the other, Pappenheim's position amounts to a compromise. From Aristotle he has accepted the view that time and space exist only when body exists and thus have an existence which is only accidental. But unlike Aristotle he denies that time is the number or measure of motion and that space is the external boundary of body. On this point he agrees with Aristotle's opponents, Crescas, Albo and Locke, for instance, and defines time as duration and space as distance. But unlike Crescas, Albo and Locke he would not say that space and time could exist without a subject. He insists that time is a duration in which there must be something to endure and that space is a distance in which there must be a body to occupy it.

By adopting this definition of time and space Pappenheim is enabled to come out in opposition to Kant and Locke on two important issues. Defining time and space as accidents he establishes thereby their reality—a reality which is only partial and conditional, to be sure, the reality of accidents which depend on something else for their existence. He is thus opposed to Kant who again and again denies that time and space are accidents or qualities, maintaining that they are subjective forms of our intuition. By further insisting upon the inseparability of time and space from some created object, Pappenheim also comes out in opposition to Locke, whose definition he otherwise follows, on the question of the existence of time prior to the creation of the world and of the separability of space from body. According to both Crescas and Locke the necessary corollary of their identification of time with duration and space with distance is that time existed prior to the creation of the world and that the idea of space was independent of the idea of body (*Essay* II, xiii, § 24; xiv, § 24 ff.; xv, § 2–3, § 7. Cf. Crescas, *Or Adonai* I, ii, 1, p. 15 b, and I, ii, 11, p. 19 b). To Pappenheim, however, there was no time prior to creation and there can be no space without body. It is with reference to this issue that Pappenheim begins the last paragraph of his discussion—a paragraph which seems to be aimed directly at Locke[29]—by addressing his reader: "From all that has

[29] See Locke's arguments for the existence of duration prior to the creation of the world in *Essay* II, XIV, 28–30.

been said you can know and understand clearly the wide difference between our conception of time and space and the view held by some philosophers on the same subject."[30] This is what he himself has evidently considered as his own original contribution to the subject.

The concluding statement of PAPPENHEIM is likewise addressed to his readers. "Try to understand this solution of the problem and keep it well in your mind, for it will prove of the utmost importance. Its value will dawn upon you when you come to pry into the subtleties of the higher speculations, for thereby you will rid yourself of the many doubts which confuse man's views in matters metaphysical."[31] There is in this passage an insinuation of the lively discussions on time and space that were aroused in philosophic circles, and in Jewish no less than in others, on the appearance of KANT's *Critique*. We know from SOLOMON MAIMON's autobiography how he happened to come across a chance copy of WOLFF's *Metaphysics* in a butter-shop, how stirred he was on reading it, how he compared it with the views of Maimonides, dashed off a criticism of it in Hebrew and rushed it off to MENDELSSOHN. PAPPENHEIM may have gotten his copy of KANT's *Critique* in a less casual way, but so impressed must he have been by its opening pages that he immediately dashed off his own views, such as they were, in the language in which Jews still philosophized, and rushed them off to his printer to be inserted as an introductory essay to his discussion of the Hebrew word for "time" in his *Yeri'ot Shelomoh*.

[30] *Yeri'ot Shelomoh* f. 8, v. b: ותדע ותשכיל מטוצא הדברים ההפרש הרב שבין הנחתנו בעצם הזמן ומקום לחנחת קצת מן החוקרים בענין הזה.

[31] *Ibid.*, f. 9, r. a: והבן זה הענין ודעהו מאד כי רב הוא. ותועלתו יפצא לך בקרבתך אל העיון בענינים הדקים כי יסלק מעליך פפיקות רבות המשבשות את הדעות בענינים האלהיים.

FORGOTTEN MEANINGS OF HEBREW ROOTS IN THE BIBLE[1]

DAVID YELLIN (JERUSALEM)

Notwithstanding the close investigation of the significance of Biblical Hebrew roots, certain passages remain unintelligible, not because they require emendation, but because the meaning of some of the words still needs to be elucidated. This happens in particular in the case of roots with a known meaning, in which they frequently occur in the Bible; in addition to this usual meaning, however, they have another meaning seldom met with. So long as Hebrew was a living language, the various meanings of the roots were of course known regardless of the frequency or infrequency of their occurrence in the Bible. But when it ceased to be a living and a spoken language, but became confined to books only, a large portion of its vocabulary and the meaning of roots not contained in these books began to be forgotten. And the same fate befell the secondary meanings of the roots we have in mind. Because they occurred in the majority of instances in one particular meaning, this meaning was kept in the reader's mind; and in course of time applied also in those instances where only the second meaning was, in fact, appropriate. Consequent upon this forced exegesis there sprang up diverse and bizarre renderings, where context was ignored, and the whole passage rendered meaningless owing to ignorance of this other meaning, inherent in the root.

In the following article I will endeavour to throw light on various roots of this sort, and to establish their other forgotten meanings, generally by the help of other Semitic languages. Thereby, many passages in the Bible which now, owing to the commoner significance being wrongly thrust on the roots in question seem unintelligible or intelligible with difficulty, will become clearer.

[1] Years ago, in 1921, I published in the *Journal of the Palestine Oriental Society* (Vol. I, pp. 10—14) a small part of the present article containing only the introduction and sections 1, 3, 7. For the sake of completeness I reproduce here that small portion of the essay.

§ 1—אבד

Besides the meaning "to be lost," this root had among the Hebrews the same meaning which it has in Arabic (ابد), that of unending time, whose further limit "is lost" to us, withheld from our attainment —eternity. We find a case exactly like this in the root עלם, from which we get the word עוֹלָם—a time whose end is "concealed" from us (cf. נעלם nif. "be hidden").

We find the root in this sense in the oracles of Balaam, and in verses from the Book of Job, which has been largely influenced by the Arabic language; and by applying this new interpretation we can better understand certain passages in the Bible.

(1) In Num. 24, 20, in the Balaam oracles, we read:

וירא את עמלק וישא משלו ויאמר:
ראשית גוים עמלק ואחריתו עדי אבד:

And he looked on Amalek, and took up his parable and said: Amalek (is) the first of the nations, and his latter end עדי אֹבֵד (R.V. "shall come to destruction"). We see from the beginning of the verse that Balaam was expatiating in *praise* of Amalek, "first of the nations," and with this description agrees the parallel clause "and his latter end *is unto eternity*," i.e. as he is the first of the nations in time, so shall he be the last among them to exist, and his end shall reach "to the limit of eternity."

In the same way Balaam praises the Kenite (vv. 21, 24):

איתן מושבך וישם בסלע קנך
וצים מיד כתים וענו אשור ועבר
וגם הוא עדי אבד:

Strong is thy dwelling-place, and thy nest is set in the crag ... and they shall afflict Asshur and afflict Eber, וגם הוא עדי אֹבֵד i.e. the Kenites also (i.e. like Amalek) shall endure for ever.

Through this interpretation, עדי which has reference to time, becomes clearer, and affords a parallel to the common expression עדי עד (Ps. 53, 18; 92, 8; 132, 12. 14; Is. 26, 4; 65, 18) and to the expression עד עולם (Gen. 13, 15; Ex. 12, 24; &c.).

Was the word אבד, twice written without waw, originally a segholate, אֹבֶד, which is more in accord with its abstract meaning (like נֵצַח with the same meaning)? The same question is raised even if we explain it in the customary way as "destruction" (H. Olshausen, *Lehrbuch der hebräischen Sprache*, p. 337).

(2) Besides the form אֹבֵד we have also from the same root and with the same meaning the form אבדון. This corresponds with such abstract noun formations as רעבון. Here we find the suffix ון—, apparently indicative of time just like the *tanwin* in Arabic أَبَدٌ, and we also find it added to proper names like Hebron, Shomeron, Eglon and the like, indicating locality. We find this form in Job 31, 12:

כי אש היא עד אבדון תאכל

For it, (fornication), is a fire devouring עד אבדון, i.e. for ever, without cessation. We find the same idea in connexion with the word עולם in Is. 33, 14:

מי יגור לנו אש אוכלה מי יגור לנו מוקדי עולם

Who among us shall dwell with the devouring fire? Who among us shall dwell with everlasting burnings? מוקדי עולם.

(3) We find the root used as a verb in the *qal*, with the same significance: Job 30, 2:

גם כח ידיהם למה לי עליהם אבד כלח

Yea, the strength of their hands, whereto should it profit me, men upon whom אבד כֶּלַח, i.e. old age has already come from of old. Job's mockery is natural against those who are younger than he (v. 1), for these young men were weak and powerless in comparison with him, and they were as though old age had long ago come upon them.

The author of the Book of Job uses the same expression elsewhere (Job 6, 16), employing the verb derived from עולם "eternity," "*Wherein the snow* יתעלם, i.e. exists eternally." Here we have the *hithpa'el* form, corresponding to تَأَبَّدَ in Arabic.

§ 2—אוה

From the Arabic interjections وَا آهْ is derived the root اوه in the form تَفَعَّلَ with the meaning, to call out وَا آهْ. A similar thing happened in Hebrew, and from the interjection אוי, וַי (the second word being post-Biblical, used in the Targums and in the Aramaic of the Talmud) there was derived a root אוה (or אוי) with the same form as the Arabic تَأَوَّهَ: התאוה.

The root is found in this meaning in Jeremiah 17, 16 ויום אֱנוֹשׁ לא התאויתי that is to say: on the day when (my) troubles were great, I did not complain or cry אוי. This is immediately followed

by: אתה ידעת מוצא שפתי נכח פניך היה *Thou knowest the utterance of my lips, it was before Thy face*, (and Thou knowest that such a complaint has not passed the door of my lips).

According to the ordinary explanation (i.e. I did not desire), the words are not consequent. Moreover it would be a strange phrase, for nobody would *desire* a day of despair.

From the form התאוה in the *hithpa'el* is derived the abstract noun תאוה with a prefixed *tav*, in the meaning of *crying* אוי, in Psalms 10, 17; 38, 10 (as BARTH already remarked in *Wurzeluntersuchung*, p. 4).

§ 3—אמן

To the various meanings which this root has in Hebrew, we must add one belonging to the Arabic أَمِنَ namely "be calm," "unworried." In this sense we find the root in the following places in the Bible:

(1) In the *nif'al*:

(a) Is. 7, 9:

אם לא תאמינו כי לא תֵאָמֵנוּ

If ye will not believe in me (adopting the reading כי instead of כי according to the variant in KITTEL's text) לא תֵאָמֵנוּ, i.e. ye shall not remain in peace and calmness.

(b) Chr. 20, 20, האמינו ביי אלהיכם וְתֵאָמֵנוּ *Believe in the Lord your God* ותֵאָמֵנוּ *and be calm*, immediately followed by the parallel phrase: *Believe in his prophets* והצליחו *and prosper.*

In these two passages, one of which is certainly influenced by the other, we have a play of words on the two meanings of the root אמן.[2]

(2) In the *hif'il*:

(a) Job 39, 24, in his description of the restlessness of the horse in time of battle, the writer says: ברעם ורעש ינמא ארץ *With storm and rage he maketh holes in the ground* (i.e. the horse makes holes in the ground with his hoofs by stamping, when he wishes to run but is restrained by his rider) ולא יאמין כי קול שופר and he cannot remain quiet and stand at rest, for his stormy spirit drives him on as he hears the sound of the trumpet.

[2] Similar instances of play of words are to be found also in other biblical passages, e g. Job 7, 20, 21:

ואהיה עלי למשא׃ ומה לא תשא פשעי

where למשא means burden and תשא has the meaning of forgiveness.

(b) Prov. 14, 15: פתי יאמין לכל דבר. Here the meaning is not the usual one of the verb, that the simple-minded believes in everything that is told him; the continuation opposes this, and the parallelism here requires the meaning of "being confident, unfearing"—*The simple-minded is confident in every matter, but the prudent looketh well to his going: a wise man feareth and turneth away from evil, but the foolish man passeth by without fear.*[3]

The same idea occurs twice again in Proverbs (22, 3; 27, 12).

The occurrence of the *nif'al* and the *hif'il* of this root with a meaning dealing with a subjective state of mind is paralleled by the use of the root רגע with the same meaning in both *nif'al* and *hif'il* (נרגע and הרגיע) of restfulness, security (see Deut. 28, 65; Is. 34, 14; Jer. 47, 6).

(3) As an adjective of the form *katul*: 2 Sam. 20, 19. *We are of them that are* שְׁלוּמֵי אֱמוּנֵי ישראל *the men of Israel who dwell in peace and safety.* This description of the men of the city corresponds with the usual ideal description: cf. Jud. 18, 7 "*The people ... that dwelt* לבטח *in security*, שוקט ובוטח, *quiet and secure ... and had no dealings with any man*"; עם בוטח "*a people secure*" (v. 10).

The *katul* form of these adjectives אָמוּן and שָׁלוּם corresponds with that of the adjectives סָמוּךְ and בָּטוּחַ (Is. 28, 3), which have almost the same meaning.

(4) In the abstract noun form, אמונה:

(a) Is. 33, 6, where it occurs in the old feminine form with final ת: והיה אמונת עתיך *Thy times shall be* אמונת, i.e. Thy time shall be secure, and thou shalt fear no manner of thing.

(b) In Ex. 13, 12, which tells that when Moses lifted up his hand Israel prevailed, and when his hand grew tired and drooped Amalek prevailed, and that Aaron and Hor supported his hands, so that—ויהי ידיו אמונה עד בוא השמש *Until the setting of the sun, his hands were* אמונה in a secure condition, with no danger of his dropping them again from weariness.

It should be pointed out that this root אמן has the same two meanings as the corresponding root בטח, which also indicates (a) to rely upon someone, and (b) to feel confident, in safety.

[3] The word מתעבר in this sense of "pass by" is also found in Prov. 20, 2. "The anger of a King is as the roaring of a lion; he that passes by מתעבר (passes by him at the time of his anger) sins against his life."

§ 4—בלג

The root בלג had also the meaning of the Arabic جَلَبَ (with metathesis): *to bring*.[4] According to this the verse[5] המבליג שד על עז ושד על מבצר יבוא (Amos 5, 9) becomes fully comprehensible. The last word should be read יביא (as LXX, Symmachus, Peshita, Targum, and Hieronymus). This gives an exact parallelism between the two hemistiches.

§ 5—נהה

The word *hapax legomenon* נהה occurs in one of two verses in Proverbs which are really but two versions of the same proverb, viz.

לב שמח ייטיב פנים ובעצבת לב רוח נכאה
(Proverbs 15, 13)

לב שמח ייטיב גהה ורוח נכאה תיבש גרם
(Proverbs 17, 22)

The word נהה is parallel to פנים. It is remarkable, that in none of the commentaries and dictionaries do we find it identified with the Arabic جِهَة, which is a second form of وَجْه meaning *face*. The word נֶהָה has the same form as שֶׁנָה, לֶדָה, דֶעָה.

The meaning of جهة in Arabic is rather different from that of وَجْه. For جِهَة indicates *direction*, the side to which we turn. But, وَجْه has also this meaning. In Hebrew פנים is taken from the root פנה as the two nouns جِهَة and وَجْه are taken from the root وجه in the forms وَاجَهَ or تَوَجَّهَ الى: turn to.

See also Perles J. Q. R. 1911, p. 102.

§ 6—די

The word בְּדֵי which occurs six times in the Bible (including four times in a duplicated verse, Jeremiah 51, 58 and Habakuk 2, 13) has not yet had its meaning properly explained.

In one of its occurrences, at least, I think that the word certainly has a special sense, different from that in other verses, viz. in

[4] Ben Yehuda in his Thesaurus (Vol. I, p. 544, n. 2 to the root בלג) says: "It is also possible to explain המבליג like the Arabic أَبْلَغَ *led him, brought him*, which is exactly parallel to the second part of the verse." But he did not notice the root جلب in Arabic which saves us from changing ג to ע.

[5] The LXX reads שבר which is parallel to the word שד in the second hemistich. Thus the word שד is not repeated twice tastelessly. שד and שבר are found together in several places (Isaiah 51, 19; 59, 6; 60, 18).

Job 39, 25. There it speaks of the horse longing for battle, and after saying that as soon as he hears the voice of the trumpet he can no longer stand still (ולא יאמין כי קול שופר), it adds בדי שופר יאמר האח.

The word בדי is here compounded of the preposition ב (temporal) and the noun די (in Stat. Constr. דִי) with the meaning of the Arabic noun دَوِيّ which indicates the *light sound* of the wind or of a bird or a bee flying. Here it is transferred to the light vibration of the trumpet before the real blare. This connects well with the previous sentence, as if to say, not only is he no longer quiet when he hears the sound of the trumpet but even when he hears the first low vibration he at once says, Ha!

To this explanation is suited also the second half of the verse *and from afar he smells the battle.* As his sense of hearing is alive to every slight sound, so too his sense of smell is highly developed.[6]

§ 7—דרך

The powerful and beautiful phrase תדרכי נפשי עז (R.V.: O my soul, march on in strength; R.V. mg.: O my soul, thou hast trodden down strength) in the Song of Deborah (Jud. 5, 21) gives little definite meaning owing to the customary sense of the root דרך being assumed.[7]

In the opinion of the present writer, there is here preserved in this root דרך the meaning which it has in Syriac and Arabic in the form corresponding to the Hebrew *hif'il* ادرك ואדריך "to reach"; after the singer has described the overthrow of the enemy, he adds: "Thou, my soul, hast attained power and greatness."[8]

The same sense is preserved in another verse in Judges (20, 43), which, in my opinion, is a remnant of an old song on the destruction of Benjamin:

[6] Gesenius in his *Lexicon* (ed. Gesenius-Kautzsch) explains בדי as "so oft"; but he is compelled to add the word "hallt" ("so oft das Schlachthorn hallt"), *wherever the trumpet sounds.* But this word is not in the text. Gunkel translated well "Beim Klang der Hörner ruft es: hui!" *When the trumpet sounds,* without indicating the origin of the translation.

[7] Nowack leaves this part of the verse untranslated, and says: "The last section is obviously also corrupt; for even if we regard תדרכי as jussive, the phrase 'tread on, my soul, with might' or 'tread under the strong' (Hollmann Bochmann) still gives it no sense in this connexion. How to amend it, with certainty, we do not see."

[8] עז having the meaning of the Arabic عِزّ as elsewhere in the Old Testament (cf. Jer. 48, 17; Is. 52, 1; Ps. 78, 61; Prov. 31, 25).

כתרו את בנימין הרדיפָהו מנוחה
הדריכָהו עד נכח הגבעה ממזרח שמש

" They inclosed the Benjamites round about, and pursued after him as far as Manahath.[9] And they caught up with him, at a place near[10] Gib'ah, towards the sunrising."

Here the word הדריכהו occurs in the *hif'il*, as in Syriac and Arabic,[11] and it is used after the word הרדיפהו exactly like the expression in the " Song of Moses " Ex. 15, 9: אמר אויב ארדף אשיג. The enemy said: I will pursue, I will overtake.

It is very likely that הדריכוהו in Job 28, 8 has also this meaning, as the customary meaning would require the *qal* and not the *hif'il*,[12] followed by the preposition בו or עליו.

Dr. Torczyner draws my attention to Sirach 15, 1. 7

ותופש תורה ידריכנה
לא ידריכוה מתי שוא ואנשי זדון לא יראוה

where the meaning *must* be " to reach," as in the next verse it is mentioned רחוקה היא מ... " it is far from..."; he does not agree however that this is also the meaning of Job 28, 8.

§ 8—חי

The word חי in Hebrew apparently had formerly the meaning also of " the coming year " (when everything comes to life again?). Hence the phrase כעת חיה (Gen. 18, 14. 2; Kings 24, 16. 17) in which the ה at the end of the word is locative and equivalent to a prefixed ל, i.e. *this time next year*. The word חיה must have originally been accented on the penultimate syllable.

[9] Moore reads Manoha instead of *m'nuha*—resting-place—explaining it as a place-name, related to the name Noha, one of the sons of Benjamin, mentioned in 1 Chr. 8, 2; and in my opinion, this is the name of the city " Manahath " mentioned in 1 Chr. 8, 6, where it speaks of Benjamin saying, " These are the heads of fathers' houses of the inhabitants of Geba, and they carried them captive to Manahath."

[10] The word עד has also the meaning of the Arabic " By, at," as explained in § 11 of this article.

[11] Nowack says, מנחה הדריכהו defies explanation, for the treading down of the enemy can only be denoted by the *qal*.

[12] The *hif'il* of the common meaning of this root has a *causative* significance, as בנעלים והדריד Isaiah 11, 15.

A phrase similar to כעת חיה and with the same meaning remained in another form, i.e. in the greeting כה לחי ואתה שלום (1 Sam. 25, 6) which means: *Thus shall it be next year that thou shalt be in peace.* Here we have the prefixed ל.

If we consider the form of festival greeting which is still usual among the Arabic populace viz. كل سنة (or عام) وانت سالم *every year and thou shalt be at peace,* we find it exactly corresponding to the phrase in question, כה לחי ואתה שלום even to the *waw* before the word אַתה. This raises the question if we have not the same formula in the first two words כה לחי being equivalent to כל חי = every coming year, so that the original Hebrew formula of blessing was quite the same as that in Arabic. Or perhaps the old Hebrew greeting כה לחי was transferred to Arabic with corruption of the words to כל חי and in Arabic to كل سنة.

§ 9—יחד

The Hebrew root יחד is one of those with two opposite meanings (in Arabic الاضداد). Whereas the verb and the adverbs יחד יחדיו express unity and combination, the adjective יחיד signifies separation and aloofness (יחיד ועני אני Psalms 25, 16 meaning *alone and separated from others*); or that the thing is without a fellow, as in the phrase את בנך את יחידך (Gen. 22, 2).

The adverbs יחד יחדיו sometimes also have the second meaning of this root, viz. the meaning directly opposite to the usual meaning, like the Arabic وَحْد: alone, solitary, without any other.

This explains the meaning of the words of one of the two women who told Solomon (1 Kings 3, 18):

ואנחנו יחדיו אין זר אתנו בבית זולתי שתים אנחנו בבית

Here the words and emphasis show that the meaning is *we are alone in our house* and there is no place for the ordinary meaning of the word יחדיו.

Similarly is to be understood the answer of Zerubbabel and his comrades to the Samaritans. The Samaritans said to them (Ezra 4, 2) נבנה עמכם, and they answered לא לכם ולנו (in partnership) לבנות בית נבנה לה׳ אלהי ישראל (alone, not with you) כי (אם) אנחנו יחד לאלהינו.

§ 10—ישח–פלט

The word וישחך (Micah 6, 14) is one of the words whose meaning has never yet been explained properly, but has given occasion to various suppositions and emendations.[13]

According to my opinion there is no need of any emendation. The word is the noun ישח with the personal pronoun ך and the noun ישח is the Arabic وَسَخ which in the literary language means dirt or filthiness of garment, and in the vernacular, which is often nearer to the Hebrew than the literary language, is also a euphenism for excrement.[14] This meaning suits the context very well.

אתה תאכל ולא תשבע וישחך בקרבך
ותסג ולא תפליט ואשר תפלט לחרב אתן

That is to say: *Thou shalt eat and not be satisfied, because thy excrement remains in thy body (and not nutritious food).*

The gist of the curse is repeated in the second phrase ותסג ולא תפלט, i.e. *Thou shalt receive*[15] *and not deliver*,[16] i.e. the women will receive the seed and conceive but not bear, for the embryos will die in the womb of their mother, *and if thou shalt deliver I will give them up to the sword.*

[13] Gesenius in his lexicon remarks on this word "unsicheres Wort." LXX translates δυδχοτἀδει, as if reading וחשך. Vulgate translates "humiliatio" as if שחח. Nowack says: "וישחך ist fraglich. Die vorgeschlagenen Konjektionen befriedigen nicht. Cheyne will lesen כחשך deine Hagerkeit." See also Pinsker, *Einleitung in das babylonisch-hebräische Punktationssystem*, p. 37 and his remarks on various conjectures about this word. He quotes the words of the Targum ("der Chaldäer") which I mention in the next note but does not properly explain למרע therein.

[14] The Aramaic Targum also translates ויהי לך למרע למשך using the same word with which the Jerusalem Targum (Lev. 16, 27) translates the word פרשם. מרעיהון is equivalent to the Talmudic רעי (excrement). It is remarkable that all the commentators mention LXX, Peshitta, &c. but do not mention the Targum which gives the right translation.

[15] The source and significance of ותסג have not yet been explained. From the context in this passage, however, it is clear that it corresponds to ותשג "to receive" (comp. German "empfangen," which has both these meanings), and vice versa we find that a ש is used instead of a ס, i.e. גבולות ישינו in Job 24, 2.

[16] The Commentators and lexica do not refer to "פלט" as having this significance in Hebrew. Bart in *E.S.*, p. 7 when discussing Syriac ܦܠܛ and Arabic أفلت quotes Targum of Lev. 18, 25, &c. where פלט represents the Hebrew קיא and also mentions the Talmudic expression כבולעו כך פולטו (Pesahim 74), he does not realise however that this verb has the same meaning also in O.T. as I believe I have proved.

This last curse corresponds exactly to the words of Hosea (ch. 9, 11, 12)

אפרים כעוף יתעופף כבודם מלדה ומבטן ומהריון
כי אם יגדלו את בניהם ושכלתים מאדם

The same idea is repeated in another form in the same book (8, 7)

צמח בלי יעשה קמח אולי יעשה זרים יבלעוהו

On the other hand, Job describing the prosperity of the wicked says:

שורו עבר ולא יגעיל תפלט פרתו ולא תשכל (21, 10)

It is clear that to express one and the same meaning Job uses the root in the *pi'el* (as in the 4th part of the quotation from Micah) while Isaiah (5, 29) uses the root in the *hif'il* (as in the 3rd part of the same quotation). Isaiah describes Assyria as a lion bearing his prey and playing with it before he tears it, as a cat catches a mouse and then lets it go again and catches it again time after time:

שאגה לו כלביא ישאג ככפירים וינהם
ויאחז טרף, ויפליט — ואין מציל:

§ 11—עד

Besides the word עַד which is a short form of עֲדֵי from the root עדה (3rd radical י) and probably corresponds to Arabic حَتَّى (see GESENIUS under עד II A 3 a), there is a second word עַד, with ד originally with *dagesh forte* and corresponding to the Arabic عِنْد (comp. בַּת and بِنْت). Their meanings differ as follows: The former indicates the limit of movement; the second proximity to a given place (apud) or, when it assumes a temporal signification, it means *at the time when*, *during the time when*, just as the Syriac ܥܕ and the Arabic عِنْدَمَا.[17]

This affords satisfactory explanations of many verses which according to the ordinary interpretation are not clear.

The following are some examples:

[17] No doubt while the language was living a distinction was made between these two words in pronunciation, by doubling the D of the second word, just as a distinction was doubtless made between the objective אֵת (declined אֶתְכֶם אֶתְכֶן) and the proposition אֵת meaning "with" and declined (אִתְּכֶם אִתְּכֶן).

(Gen. 13, 12) ולוט ישב בערי הככר ויאהל עד סדום

he pitched his tents in a place near Sodom,

(ibid. 38, 1) וירד יהודה מאת אחיו ויט עד איש עדלמי
(Num. 21, 30) ונשים עד נפח אשר עד מידבא

In the ordinary sense the second עד has no meaning here. Its true import is: Nofaḫ which is by (near) Medeba. Accordingly we must seek for Nofaḫ in the neighborhood of Medeba. (Deut. 2, 23) והעוים היושבים בחצרים עד עזה, i.e. near Gaza. (Ps. 118, 27) אסרו חג בעבותים עד קרנות המזבח. Here there can be no doubt that the word עד means adjoining.

For עד having the temporal meaning of "whilst" compare

(Jud. 3, 26) ואהוד נמלט עד התמהמהם
(I. Sam. 14, 19) ויהי עד דבר שאול אל הכהן, וההמון... וילך הלוך ורב
(Jonah 4, 2) הלא זה דברי עד היותי על אדמתי
(Job 1, 18) עד זה מדבר וזה בא
(Cant. 1, 12) עד המלך במסבו — נרדי נתן ריחו
(Neh. 7, 19) ועד הם עומדים יגיפו הדלתות

§ 12—בלם—עדי

The meaning of the word עֲדְיֹו in the verse אל תהיו כסוס כפרד

(Ps. 32, 9) אין הבין במתג ורסן עדיו לבלום

is very obscure. It is entirely deleted by some critics, some transpose it or divide, but nevertheless do not make the text read well.[18]

Even without reference to kindred languages we could by mere attention to the context guess its meaning. The Psalmist speaks of a horse and the act of restraining and preventing his ... by a bridle and halter. What can the missing word be other than his *course*?

But in point of fact the root עדה عَدَا means in Arabic to "run" and this is certainly the meaning of the word in the passage under discussion. The Psalmist carefully says: *be not as the horse or mule that understands not but can only be restrained in his course by bridle and halter.*

[18] For example CHEYNE proposes to read (!) במתג ורסן עד יובל אליך.

The root בלם ܒܠܡ in Syriac means preventing and restraining. It occurs also in Talmudic Hebrew with this meaning שבולם את עצמו בישעת מריבה *He who* בולם *himself* in a quarrel (Hullin 88). Here the meaning clearly is: he who restrains himself, who prevents himself entering into a quarrel.

§ 13—ענג

This root is found in the Bible five times in the *hithpa'el* form followed by the preposition על—Is. 57, 4; Ps. 37, 4; Job 22, 26; 27, 10. In four of them occurs the phrase על ה׳ or על שדי. In none of these can we admit the ordinary meaning of התענג (delight in) which is followed either by מ (Is. 66, 11) or ב (Is. 55, 2).

In my opinion, in the five verses referred to above the true meaning is the same as that of the Arabic غنج in the התפעל form (Arabic تَغَنَّجَ)[19] viz. to coax...[19]

For the construction of התענג with על compare the Talmudic Hebrew התחטא and Arabic تَدَلَّلَ, both of which correspond in meaning and are also followed by the preposition على על e.g. כבן שהוא מתחטא על אביו ועושה (האב) לו רצונו.

It seems that also the Talmudists explained the word התענג in this sense; for in the Pesikta of עשר תעשר it is written: *R. Joshua of Sikhnin said in the name of R. Levi: Israel coaxes God through the merit of two things ... of the Sabbath, as it is written: If thou turnest away thy foot on the Sabbath. And what is written afterwards?* אז תתענג על ה׳, where obviously the Rabbis explained התענג as being equal to התחטא.

From this meaning is derived the noun תענוג. This gives an excellent sense to לא נאוה לכסיל תענוג (Prov. 19, 10), Coquetry befits not the stupid. This would then remind one of the fable of the ass who wished to imitate the dog in coaxing his master.

§ 14—עשה–שעה

Besides the ordinary meaning of the root עשׂה there are passages in the Bible where its meaning is: to cover, like that of the Arabic root غَشَوَ.

[19] GESENIUS-BUHL recognised the connexion between ענג and the Arabic غنج in the case of והעִנָּגה and המעֻנָּגה, but not in the sense of to coax.

(1) Among the duplicate verses in Proverbs there is chap. 12, 23 differing only slightly from 13, 16:

(12, 23) אדם ערום כוסה דעת	ולב כסילים יקרא אולת
(3, 16) כל ערום יעשה בדעת	וכסיל יפרש אולת

The word יעשה in the second verse corresponds to כוסה in the first verse. In addition the phrase יפרש אולת in the second part of the second verse indicates that the fool publishes and reveals his folly before all. It follows that the first part of this verse must express the idea that the cunning man does the opposite, e.g. covers and hides what he knows.[20]

(2) Proverbs 26, 28 ופה חלק יעשה מדחה.

The ordinary meaning of the root עשה does not suit here for it is not the mouth which slips but the foot. The passage must therefore mean that by using flattery a schemer is able to hide his real intention of crushing his victim.

For a similar expression compare Proverbs 10, 4 (ופי רשעים יכסה חמס).

(3) Job describing how he cannot find God in the four quarters of the earth says (23, 8)

הן קדם אהלך ואיננו	ואחור — ולא אבין לו
שמאל בעשותו ולא אחז	יעטף ימין ולא אראה

The word בעשותו is parallel to יעטף, and the meaning is that God covers and hides the North so that Job cannot behold Him and wraps up the South so that he cannot see Him.

(4) In this sense we must understand the explanation of the name "Esau," as given in the Bible (Gen. 25, 25) ויצא הראשון אדמוני כלו כאדרת שער ויקרא שמו עשו, i.e. *covered* (with hair).[21] According to the ordinary explanation the reason given for his being so called has no meaning. The noun in this form, with a final consonant *waw* shows that we have here a root עשׁו with final consonantal ו like the Arabic غشا = غشو[22] and the derived noun غشاوة = veil,

[20] The ב before דעת is difficult. But in 1 MSS. Ken. דעת, i.e. without the ב. Perhaps it was added when the proper meaning of the root was forgotten.

[21] The form פָּעַל with passive meaning is found also in שָׁגַל married.

[22] This root which indicates *covering* has another meaning also, viz. *fainting*, i.e. remaining in a condition in which sense and perception are lost. In Arabic غُشِيَ عَلَيْهِ: he is covered, means: he is *fainting*, as if a man in this condition is covered up so as not to be able to see, hear or perceive.

This leads to another interesting fact concerning the concatenation of meanings, namely the connexion of Hebrew with other Semitic languages in regard to two meanings shared by

while the ordinary root עשׂה = to do is essentially עשׁי with the third consonant י (cf. עשוי with pronounced י).

(5) Perhaps this is the meaning of the root also in Ps. 9, 16

טבעו גוים בשחת עשו ברשת זו טמנו נלכדה רגלם

i.e. they are sunk in the pit which they *covered* in order that others might not see it and fall therein. In this case this word corresponds well to the word טמנו in the second half of the verse.

Besides this there is another root in Hebrew which corresponds in certain passages in the Bible to the Arabic غشو *cover*, i.e. the root שׁעה differing from it in the position of two letters but without change of ش to שׁ because found next to the guttural.[23] In this meaning the root occurs in Isaiah 32, 3:

כי טח מראות עיניהם מהשכיל לבותם
ולא תשעינה עיני רואים

i.e. they shall not be daubed or covered. But the pointing (whatever meaning is given) must be passive: תִּשְׁעֶינָה.

The metaphor of the first verse has influenced the Koranic metaphor. (The Surah of the Cow, verse 6.)

ختم الله على قلوبهم وعلى اسماعهم وعلى ابصارهم غشاوة

§ 15—פצר

The root פצר in its usual meaning corresponds according to the view held by philologists with the Arabic root فرض. From this we must except the word הַפְצֵר = הַפְצֵר (1 Sam. 15, 23) which according to the context clearly cannot bear the usual meaning. KLOSTERMANN even proposes to emend it to חפין רע (!).

one and the same root. The two meanings of the Arabic root غشو referred to above are also found in the case of three synonymous roots in Hebrew, viz. עלף, עטף, and עטה.

The root עלף (Arab. غلف) means covering and wrapping up e.g. מעלפת ספירים (Cant. 5, 14); ותכס בצעיף ותתעלף (Gen. 38, 14); but it also means *fainting*, e.g. בניך עלפו שכבו בראש כל חוצות (Is. 51, 20); ותך השמש על ראש יונה ויתעלף (Jonah 4, 8).

From the root עטף we find on the one hand וחמעטפות (Is. 3, 22); and ועמקים יעטפו בר (Ps. 65, 14), and on the other העטופים ברעב בראש כל חוצות (Lam. 2, 19), which corresponds exactly to part of the verse בניך עלפו שכבו בראש כל חוצות (quoted above); בעטף עולל ויונק ברחובות קריה (Lam. 2, 11); בהתעטפם כחלל ברחובות קריה (Lam. 2, 12).

From the root עטה (Arab. غطّ = cover), which generally means covering and wrapping up we get איכה תרביץ בצהרים, שלמה אהיה כעוטיה על עדרי חבריך (Can. 1, 7) which doubtless means *fainting from the noon day heat.*

[23] See BARTH, *E.S.*, p. 23.

But the word really corresponds to the Arabic root رفض (with metathesis), meaning "disobey," "refuse to accept." This fits with the context

הנה שמוע מזבח טוב — להקשיב – מחלב אלים
כי חטאת קסם מרי — ואון ותרפים הפצר

§ 16—רום

Besides the ordinary meaning of the root רום it had another meaning in Hebrew corresponding to the Arabic root, viz. wish, desire. Of this meaning of the root two traces are still left in the Bible:

(a) ולכן יחכה הי לחננכם ולכן ירום לרחמכם (Is. 30, 18), i.e. *wish, desire.* We cannot amend ירום to ידם (see GESENIUS, *Lexicon*) for it would interfere with the evident alliteration יחכה לחננכם ירום לרחמכם as DUHM rightly remarks: Bemerke die Alliteration!

(b) אל תתן יי מאויי רשע, זממו אל תפק, ירומו סלה (Ps. 140, 9). The meaning of ירומו here probably is: what they wish and desire. It is nearly certain that this is the meaning of the word here, because of its parallelism to the words מאויי and זממו. (See also PERLES, *Analekten*, Neue Folge [Leipzig 1922], pp. 66, 76. His opinion supports strongly my suggestion.)

§ 17—רמם

With the root רום there have become mixed up in the dictionaries and Biblical Commentaries two words which are clearly from the root רמם in the meaning of *repairing a ruined building or way*, according to the meaning of the Arabic root رَمَّمَ, رَمَّ in the first and third forms:

(1) ויט עלינו חסד לפני מלכי פרס לתת לנו מחיה לרומם את בית אלהינו ולהעמיד את חרבותיו (Ezra 9, 9).

(2) ושמתי כל הרי לדרך ומסלותי ירמון (Is. 49, 11) *they* (i.e. those mentioned in the preceding and succeeding verses) *shall repair my highways.* Accordingly the word ירמון occurs in the masculine, for the subject is not מסלותי but האנשים and there is no need for DUHM's emendation "Für ירמון ist wohl תרומינה zu lesen."

The מ of ירמון should have had a *dagesh forte*, but it was omitted because the word was supposed to come from the root רום.

§ 18—שׂיד

The root שׂיד is found as a verb in one passage of the Bible only, where it occurs twice. This is Deut. 27, 2. 4 which describes the altar on whose stones all the words of the Law are to be written.

והיה ביום אשר תעברו את הירדן ... והקמת לך אבנים גדולות וישדת אותם בשיד: וכתבת עליהן את כל דברי התורה הזאת ...
והיה בעברכם את הירדן תקימו את האבנים האלה ... בהר עבל וישדת אותם בשיד: ובנית את מזבח ... אבנים שלמות תבנה את מזבח ה' אלהיך ... וכתבת על האבנים את כל דברי התורה הזאת באר היטב.

Why should a commandment be given to whitewash the great stones erected as an altar for offering burnt offerings and peace offerings and for writing thereon the words of the Law? Are we to suppose that this was done so that the stones should be white so that the words of the Law could be *written* on them?

But as far as is known no inscriptions which were intended to remain for subsequent generations were ever written on stones with ink; these were, as a rule, *engraved* on the stone. Indeed the original meaning of the root כתב itself is *to engrave* or *hew in stone*, cf. Ex. 32, 15. 16.

ושני לחת העדות בידו, לחת כתובים משני עבריהם מזה ומזה הם כתבים: והלחת מעשה אלהים המה והמכתב מכתב אלהים הוא חרות על הלחות.[24]

I think, therefore, that the root used in this passage is not in the meaning of whitewashing but in one of the other meaning of the Arabic root شيد, i.e. to *build* a building in a strong and lasting manner. The meaning then of the passage is that the stones are not to be put simply one on top of the other without any mortar between, but to be built with a mortar of lime and earth as is usual in building in Palestine. This interpretation is further supported by the use of the word בנה which occurs twice in the same verse: *and thou shalt build them firmly with mortar and build thereon an altar ... of whole stones shall thou build it ... and write* (i.e. engrave)[25] *upon the stones* (i.e. the stones *of* which the altar is built) *all the words of this Law very clearly*. It is interesting that when this command was fulfilled in the days of Joshua we find the words "*Then Joshua*

[24] This is no doubt the real meaning of the command וכתבתם על מזוזות ביתך ובשעריך (Deut. 6, 9) viz. to hew and engrave the words on the stones of the posts of the doors as the Samaritans do to-day.

[25] And similarly in Greek the ideas of engraving and writing are expressed by one root γραφειν. In Latin the root *scribere* from which are derived the verbs *schreiben*, *écrire*, &c. with the meaning of writing on parchment, &c. originally meant to engrave on stone. Similarly the noun מכתבא in Syriac means awl, needle.

built an altar ... as Moses had commanded ... as is written in the book of the Law of Moses, of whole stones, ... and wrote there upon the stones a copy of the law of Moses." Of whitewashing there is here no mention. As said above, this is covered by the word "built."

§ 19—שכן

The original meaning of the root שכן is the same as in Syriac and Arabic (سكن) viz. rest, i.e. immobility, especially of things which generally move; and apparently this meaning remains in Hebrew in the case of the adjective שָׁכֵן, which, besides its ordinary meaning of neighbor, sometimes indicates one who by reason of bodily illness cannot move, a paralysed person.

This explains the words of Isaiah (33, 23. 24): פסחים בזזו בז: וכל יאמר שכן חליתי. It describes how after the fall of Senacherib the people went forth from Jerusalem to take the great booty and that all of them, even the *lame*, went forth to plunder, and even a paralysed man did not say I am sick, but went forth also with them.

List of Roots with Forgotten Meanings here explained

(1) אבד—§ 1
(2) אוה—§ 2
(3) אמן—§ 3
(4) בלג—§ 4
(5) בלם—§ 13
(6) גהה—§ 5
(7) די—§ 6
(8) דרך—§ 7
(9) חי—§ 8
(10) יחד—§ 9
(11) ישח—§ 10
(12) ער—§ 11
(13) ערי—§ 12
(14) ענג—§ 13
(15) עשה—§ 14
(16) פלט—§ 10
(17) פצר—§ 15
(18) רום—§ 16
(19) רמם—§ 17
(20) שׁיד—§ 18
(21) שכן—§ 19
(22) ישעה—§ 14

ADDITIONAL NOTES

G. A. Kohut, *Royal Hebraists*

1. Concerning Frederick II of Hohenstaufen and his patronage of Jewish and Oriental learning see also *The Legacy of Israel* (Oxford, 1927), pp. 216–220. His son and successor in Sicily, *Manfred* (1232–1236) was likewise interested in Jewish learning and is said to have superintended and partly composed a Latin version from the Hebrew of the pseudo-Aristotelean philosophical dialogue, entitled *The Book of the Apple* (*Sefer ha-Tapuaḥ*), composed by Abraham ben Ḥasdai (cp. *ibid.*, p. 221).
2. Charles of Anjou (1220–1285) employed Jewish translators to render Arabic works into Latin, notably Faraj ben Salim, or Farrachius, otherwise *Farragut* (incidentally the name of a popular American naval commander). He is the first professional translator into Latin on record. Especially noteworthy is his extensive medical work *Liber continens*, from the original of Rhazes (Alrazi) of Khorasan (died 932). The first edition was printed at *Brescia*, 1486 and weighs twenty-two pounds (*Legacy*, p. 221). Steinschneider (*MGWJ* 1904, vol. xlviii, p. 717; cp. *Hebräische Übersetzungen*, p. 974) states that, from 1486 until the middle of the sixteenth century, it has been reprinted *five times* and that the sumptuous original Ms., preserved in Paris, is supplied with beautiful miniatures, as well as the alleged portrait of the Jewish translator—*the oldest known likeness of any Jew.*
3. Addenda to Note 6:—

   On the relations of Robert of Anjou to Kalonymos, see especially Steinschneider's article, "Robert von Anjou und sein Verhältnis zu einigen gelehrten Juden," *MGWJ*, op. cit., pp. 713–717. Regarding Robert's contacts with Shemaryah Ikriti, *vide ibid.*, p. 716; see also Steinschneider, *Giuda Romano*, p. 7, note 6; *idem* in Wirchow's *Archiv*, vol. xl, p. 115; *idem*, *Letteratura Italiana* . . . p. 36; and more especially the same author's essay "Robert von Anjou und die jüdische Literatur" in Ludwig Geiger's *Vierteljahrsschrift für Kultur und Litteratur der Renaissance*, vol. I, pp. 136–140; II, pp. 110–114.

   L. Geiger's *Notes* to the *third* edition of Jacob Burckhardt's *Die Kultur der Renaissance in Italien* (Leipzig 1877; 2 vols.) and in the *twelfth edition* (Leipzig 1904, or 1919? also in English translation) *Excursus* xlii, p. 360 deal with the then prevalent knowledge of Hebrew and related subjects, representing contributions by Steinschneider. Compare also *The Legacy of Israel*, p. 282.

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